Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
2016

Bound Together: Slavery and Democracy in Antebellum
Northwestern Virginia, 1815--1865
Adam Zucconi

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Zucconi, Adam, "Bound Together: Slavery and Democracy in Antebellum Northwestern Virginia,
1815--1865" (2016). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 7058.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/7058

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses,
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU.
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

Bound Together: Slavery and Democracy in Antebellum Northwestern Virginia,
1815-1865

Adam Zucconi
Dissertation submitted
to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences
at West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in
History

Jason Phillips, Ph.D., chair
Brian Luskey, Ph.D.
Kenneth Fones-Wolf, Ph.D.
Kimberly Welch, Ph.D.
Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Ph.D.
Department of History
Morgantown, West Virginia
2016
Keywords: Virginia; West Virginia; U.S. Civil War; Slavery; Democracy; Antebellum Era;
Politics; Political Parties
Copyright 2016 Adam Zucconi

ABSTRACT
Bound Together: Slavery and Democracy in Antebellum Northwestern Virginia, 1815-1865
Adam Zucconi
Since West Virginia’s founding in 1863, historians have attempted to understand the
forces that shaped the state’s creation. Most historians have argued that the Mountain State’s
admission into the Union represented a grassroots rebellion among democratically-minded
mountaineers who had long resisted the rule of eastern slaveholding aristocrats. The tumultuous
events triggered by secession and civil war provided the opportunity for westerners to inaugurate
their long desired wishes to free themselves from their allegedly tyrannical brethren and abolish
the institution that many residents blamed for their woes: chattel slavery.
West Virginia’s founding proved more contingent and complex than previously argued.
During the early antebellum era, western Virginians displayed their loyalty to the state and to
slavery through public processions, meetings, and editorials. Residents insisted, however, that
their eastern brethren assist in reforming and democratizing the state’s constitution. The
Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830 failed to include all of western Virginians’ desires but
the changes included in the new constitution broadened the franchise and reflected powerful
market forces fundamentally politics in the Old Dominion.
The 1830 Constitution helped foster, however, a new understanding of the symbiotic
relationship between slavery and democracy. Importantly, western Virginians embraced this
interpretation. During the 1840s and 1850s, as national events concerning slavery became more
frequent, western Virginians continued to profess their support for the peculiar institution and to
the state. Such assertions contributed to the ratification of a new constitution in 1851, as western
Virginians’ desire for a democratized constitution finally came to fruition. The new constitution
deepened residents’ attachment to chattel slavery and the state, a critical development as
abolitionists appeared more menacing and Republicans cultivated a presence in the Northwest.
Few northwesterners supported either party because the destruction of slavery threatened the
foundation of their political rights, another important development wrought by the new
constitution. Rather than drifting farther apart from their eastern brethren in sentiment and
principle, northwesterners drew closer and became fierce proslavery advocates.
The national crisis that began to unfold in 1860 threatened to disrupt the harmony
between western and eastern Virginians. Western Virginians maintained that remaining within
the Union and under the protection of the constitution would ensure democratic rights while
protecting slavery, too. Though eastern Virginians voted to take the Commonwealth out of the
Union, westerners differed on the path ahead. Rather than forging ahead in demolishing slavery
and the state, residents debated the merits of creating a new state and how to resolve the issue of
slavery. After multiple and intense debates and recognizing that the war would not end quickly,
northwesterners voted to create a new slave state. West Virginia entered the Union in 1863 but
its founding reflected the state’s history of slavery, not the democratic revolution posited by
historians. Proponents of West Virginia’s founding insisted that the state’s establishment would
perpetuate, not undermine, racial hierarchy. While West Virginia’s founders ratified a proposal
to gradually emancipate slaves, emancipation would unfold over decades and shifting political
and racial norms threatened to sabotage that process in the future. West Virginia’s future
remained firmly wedded to Virginia’s slaveholding past.
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Introduction: New Contours for an Old Debate: Slavery and Sectionalism in Antebellum
Northwest Virginia
In 1866, West Virginia Senator Waitman T. Willey responded to proposals considered by
the Virginia Legislature that sought reunification between the two states. Willey dismissed
Virginia politicians who considered the Mountain State’s creation merely “‘a war measure,’”
arguing instead that long-standing sectional grievances finally dismembered the Old Dominion.
The “perpetual strife” between eastern and western Virginians, Willey claimed, had threatened to
divide the state on numerous occasions. The Civil War provided the “opportunity” western
Virginians needed to “carry into effect a long cherished desire.” The “strife” cited by Willey
reflected geographical, commercial, constitutional, and political grievances that had festered over
the preceding decades. West Virginia and Virginia constituted two “geographically distinct”
states, “physically separated” by mountains that prohibited social and commercial interaction.
“[L]ittle or no traffic or commerce” existed between eastern and western antebellum Virginians
while the “different…manners, customs, education, habits, and feelings” exhibited by these
residents illustrated that two peoples had occupied one state.1
West Virginians’ reluctance to embrace their erstwhile brethren manifested their belief
that their new state constitution contained the democratic measures and principles for which they
had long pursued. For decades, antebellum western Virginians had sought equal representation
in the state legislature, universal male suffrage, uniform taxation, state-supported internal
improvements, and a public education system, among other issues. Few of these reforms,
however, had been inaugurated by 1861. The Mountain State’s creation, though, provided West
Virginians the opportunity to democratize their state government. The “system of free schools

1

Waitman T. Willey, A Letter from Hon. W.T. Willey, on the Redintegration of Virginia (Washington, D.C.: n.p.,
1866), 3, 5.
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and public education” along with the “improved organizations of county police,
townships…[and] our constitutional protection against the creation of burdensome public debts”
represented a few of the fundamental changes West Virginians had instituted in 1863. A
“reunion of the States would doubtless result in the surrender of those fundamental reforms
inaugurated under our new constitution,” Willey explained. Reunification “would ruin us.”2
West Virginia’s creation, however, did not reflect western Virginians’ antipathy toward
slavery. Though the “long, loud, and persistent clamors” from eastern Virginians suggested that
westerners opposed African American bondage and sought the institution’s demise, Willey
insisted that transmontane Virginians had supported slavery and slaveholders’ rights. Willey
could not uncover “a single fact which…warrant[ed] any just apprehension on the part of eastern
alarmists” on the subject of slavery. West Virginians had never exhibited “bad faith” in
defending the “lawful rights of the eastern slaveholder.” Willey characterized accusations that
questioned his neighbors’ fealty toward slavery as “unfounded” and slanderous. West Virginians
had defended and championed slavery for decades, even when their eastern neighbors doubted
such fidelity.3
Historians have generally agreed with Willey’s argument concerning the inevitability of
the Old Dominion’s dismemberment during the Civil War but dismissed his interpretation of
northwesterners’ proslavery credentials. The sectional strife that Willey emphasized, historians
insist, represented tangible concerns that divided Virginians along geographic lines.
Contemporary historians, including Theodore F. Lang and Granville Davisson Hall, maintained
that political, constitutional, and economic inequalities augmented eastern Virginians’ power
while restricting that of western Virginians. Though other southerners had democratized state
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Willey, Redintegration of Virginia, 6, 8.
Willey, Redintegration of Virginia, 5.
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constitutions and inaugurated majoritarian rule, Virginia slaveholders resisted such measures for
decades, worried that democracy and slavery could not coexist. Efforts to maintain unequal
representation in the state legislature, tax breaks for slaveholders, and enfranchisement for only
propertyholders represented slaveholders’ futile attempts to stem the irresistible march of
democratic reform in Virginia. Western, nonslaveholding yeomen demanded democratic reform
regardless of the consequences on slavery.4
These political and constitutional differences convinced these earlier historians that two
distinct civilizations occupied one polity. Hall insisted that the “unnatural” connection between
them eventually devolved into a “union of force” that “only awaited its opportunity to be
broken.”5 Eastern Virginians’ “aristocratic communities” reflected their stubborn belief that
“slave labor” provided necessary “political and social wisdom.” Western Virginians disagreed
with their Tidewater brethren. The “commoner people” who inhabited the western mountains
rejected slavery and embraced free labor, an ideology Hall considered “the genius of the great
free Republic.” Unlike eastern Virginians’ static and hierarchical society, westerners’ fostered
an egalitarian, vibrant, and dynamic free labor society.6 Looking back, Hall pondered how
Virginians failed to recognize the “irrepressible conflict” between their two sections.7
Modern historians have supported this interpretation that two separate societies shared
one government, a prospect that forecasted conflict. Henry T. Shanks and Charles Ambler
averred that inequality in internal improvements, political representation, and constitutional
powers between the two sections heightened intrastate sectional antagonism and deepened

4

Theodore F. Lang, Loyal West Virginia from 1861 to 1865: With an Introductory Chapter on the status of Virginia
for Thirty Years prior to the War (Baltimore: Deutsch & Co., 1895) and Granville Davisson Hall, The Rending of
Virginia: A History (Chicago: Mayer and Miller, 1902).
5
Hall, Rending of Virginia, 30.
6
Ibid., 34.
7
Ibid., 37.
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resentment between the two sections. Western Virginians shipped their manufactured goods and
natural resources to western markets, including Pittsburgh, Louisville, and Cincinnati, an
economic characteristic that illustrated Virginia’s geographical diversity and the lack of internal
improvements created by the state legislature needed to overcome such obstacles. The statehood
movement, Shanks concluded, represented “part of a long sectional rivalry” rooted in
“sectionalism and economic differentiation.”8
Charles Ambler, a protégé of Frederick Jackson Turner, argued that western Virginians
embodied the democratic and individualistic ideals of frontier experience. Eastern Virginians
languished, meanwhile, in an older and aristocratic society; only their control and manipulation
of constitutional functions and structures allowed them to fend off westerners’ democratic
advances. Northwesterners’ support for the Republican Party during the late 1850s and 1860s
signaled their attempt to break easterners’ political hegemony and inaugurate majoritarian power.
Their tactic worked. Though Ambler concluded his seminal study before 1863, his interpretation
provided a clear explanation for dismemberment and West Virginia statehood. Western
Virginians, tired of living under aristocratic rule, formed a democratic state cleansed from the
previous political and constitutional ills that had infected the Old Dominion.9
More recent historians, however, have emphasized the political diversity of western
Virginia. Richard Orr Curry, John Alexander Williams, and Ken Noe have dismissed the
monolithic antislavery and unionist interpretation of the transmontane region offered by previous
historians. Curry, utilizing a broader primary source base than his predecessors, stressed the
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Henry T. Shanks, The Secession Movement in Virginia, 1847-1861 (Richmond: Garnett and Massie, 1934), 3, 211212. For a similar interpretation concerning sectionalism, see George Ellis Moore, “Slavery as a Factor in the
Formation of West Virginia,” West Virginia History, 18, no. 1 (October 1956): 5-89.
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Charles H. Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), 310, 116-118, 318, 337.
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Northwest’s heterogeneous population and diverse political environment. These differences
became manifest during the secession crisis and statehood movement, as secessionist meetings
and anti-statehood gatherings occurred in most northwestern counties.10 The presence of
southern sympathizers, John Alexander Williams argues, illustrated that a “buckskin elite”
controlled local politics akin to their more refined eastern neighbors. Using the county court
system to consolidate power and land holdings, this “buckskin elite” exercised their brand of
political hegemony during campaigns and elections. The democratic west offered by Ambler
represented a façade, according to Williams.11 Ken Noe’s research on the Virginia and
Tennessee Railroad in southwest Virginia confirms Williams’ argument concerning a more
politically diverse west. The railroad, constructed and maintained by slave labor, facilitated the
rise and expansion of key industries that utilized slave labor, including tobacco, lead mining, iron
production, salt and plaster, and coal mining. All of these products found buyers in eastern
markets including—and arguably most importantly—Richmond. By the late 1850s, southwest
Virginians readily identified their interests with those of Piedmont and Tidewater Virginians, not
their northwestern neighbors.12
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Richard Orr Curry, A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead Movement in West
Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964).
11
John Alexander Williams, “The New Dominion and the Old: Ante-bellum and Statehood Politics as the
Background of West Virginia’s ‘Bourbon Democracy,’” West Virginia History, 33, no. 4 (July 1972): 317-407.
Williams draws a sharp contrast with these “buckskin elite” from the more prominent statehood leaders who hailed
from the Northwest. Individuals like Waitman T. Willey, John Carlile, and Francis H. Pierpont operated in a
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1872. During this constitutional convention, “buckskin elites” controlled the proceedings and reintroduced the
country court system along with the viva voce method of voting, too. Each of these reforms reestablished local
political control and facilitated the rebirth of the old ruling elite. After the dust settled in 1872, West Virginia
operated remarkably like it had before the Civil War. While traditionalists lauded the emerging egalitarian ethos
within western Virginia before the war, Williams remained skeptical about a democratic west and the power local
rulers wielded.
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Kenneth W. Noe, Southwest Virginia’s Railroad: Modernization and the Sectional Crisis (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1994), 60-61, 63-82.
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Recognizing western Virginia’s involvement in championing slavery and slaveholding
interests continues to be overlooked by historians, however. Indeed, more recent historians, in
interpreting Virginia’s antebellum sectionalism and dismemberment during the Civil War, have
stressed the fatal struggle between democratic government and chattel slavery that unfolded in
the Old Dominion during this era. William Shade, William Freehling, William Link, Sean
Wilentz, and Stephanie McCurry maintain that efforts to reconcile or promote equilibrium
between these two institutions were myopic and doomed. While economic expansion promoted
democratic reform in Virginia, William Shade suggests that demographic trends signaled an
approaching crisis concerning slavery. Western Virginia’s growing nonslaveholding population,
increasingly involved in professions outside of plantation agriculture, would invariably demand
majoritarian power, a prospect eastern slaveholders and elites viewed grimly.13 This
demographic trend, William Freehling notes, created “white-belts” in Virginia, notably in the
Northwest, where residents possessed little personal, financial, or political investment in
slavery.14 White southerners, rather than displaying unity on the issue of slavery and democratic
reform, exhibited divisions that would widen with time.15
This alleged inevitable struggle between democratic government and chattel slavery in
Virginia and in the nation has received broad scholarly support. William Link argues that
economic expansion and industrialization alienated northwestern Virginians from the state’s
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William G. Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and the Second Party System, 1824-1861
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996).
14
William W. Freehling, The South vs. the South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the
Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
15
William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990) and The Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007). Alison Goodyear Freehling similarly argues that white Virginians remained a divided slaveholding
community throughout the 1820s and 1830s, as the failure to inaugurate democratic reform in the 1830 Constitution
or pass some form of comprehensive emancipation following the Nat Turner rebellion placed the state (and the
nation) on a “drift toward dissolution.” Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution: the Virginia Slavery
Debate of 1831-1832 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982).
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slaveholding culture. Northwesterners’ alienation encouraged residents to support the
Republican Party in an effort to limit slavery’s expansion in Virginia and the nation and protect
the “moral and economic health of herrenvolk democracy.”16 Virginia’s rending reflected the
endgame in a half-century conflict that pitted slaveholding interests against majoritarian rule and
democratic principles, a conflict Link considers inexorable. Sean Wilentz and Stephanie
McCurry offer similar interpretations stressing the fatal struggle between the institutions of
democracy and slavery. Debates concerning democratic reform in Virginia “widened” the
“breach” between the “western…country democrats and the eastern slaveholder gentry.” West
Virginia’s creation offered the only resolution to this issue.17 Stephanie McCurry supports
Wilentz’s argument, insisting that “modern” political thought and chattel slavery represented two
antagonistic systems incapable of coexistence. Only white southerners blinded by their “hubris”
and an “impoverished political vision” could not forecast conflict concerning black bondage and
white liberty, McCurry argues. Slavery’s destruction in 1865, therefore, represented an
appropriate coda to white southerners’ attempts to balance the two institutions.18
West Virginia’s creation appears to support many of the arguments offered by historians.
Virginia’s intense sectionalism prior to the Civil War strengthens interpretations suggesting that
two distinct peoples developed on either side of the Allegheny Mountains, with each section
possessing different political, economic, social, and cultural interests. Foremost among such
differences was that concerning slavery. With few slaves and fewer slaveholders, western
Virginia appeared as a declining “society with slaves” that showed glimpses of the “free labor”

William A. Link, “‘This Bastard New Virginia’: Slavery, West Virginia Exceptionalism, and the Secession
Crisis,” West Virginia History: A Journal of Regional Studies, 3, no. 1 (2009): 40.
17
Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2005), 341-347.
18
Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2012), 83.
16
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future that awaited northern states. Western Virginia’s proximity to Ohio and Pennsylvania and
commercial relations with western and northern markets strengthened the bonds between
residents and their northern neighbors while attenuating such ties with eastern Virginians. The
region’s small and declining slave population encouraged residents to embrace political and
constitutional principles established on natural rights, not property rights, a mindset that
contrasted sharply with Tidewater and Piedmont slaveholders. Western Virginians, unable to
inaugurate meaningful constitutional and political reform and thoroughly democratize the state
constitution because of easterners’ paranoia and fear, embraced the Republican Party to manifest
their democratic desires. This “free labor” and “free soil” party would guide transmontane
Virginians through secession and civil war, ultimately helping to construct a democratic state
freed from slavery’s corrupting influences.
This gospel of sectionalism and antislaveryism concerning West(ern) Virginia, however,
overlooks important developments that shaped residents’ reactions to dismemberment, statehood,
democracy, and slavery. The sectionalism that Willey noted and other historians have echoed
since 1863 existed but not necessarily to the degree posited. Eastern Virginians’ refusal to
support internal improvements or endorse constitutional reform frustrated westerners who often
expressed their outrage at the ballot box, notably in the widespread rejection of the 1830
Constitution. And while a few outspoken individuals advocated a division of the state in 1830
and again in 1850 to permanently sever the two regions and end sectional strife, most
northwesterners dismissed this ludicrous suggestion. Two-party politics bound northwesterners
with other Virginians across the state, as the Democratic and Whig parties transcended
geographical boundaries and fostered the growth of “imagined” political communities.19

19

Benedict Anderson, Imagine Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York:
Verso Press, 1991).
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Further, northwesterners held in deep regard their Virginia heritage and expressed reluctance to
discard their birthright. Northwesterners and their eastern neighbors shared similar foes, too,
notably northern abolitionists and Republicans, men who appeared to threaten established and
traditional hierarchies. Issues such as free public schools, greater political representation for
non-propertyholders, and more state-funded internal improvements west of the Alleghenies often
divided Virginians along sectional lines but such grievances never reached a level of severity that
threatened state harmony. Northwestern Virginians affirmed and reaffirmed their fealty toward
the state on countless occasions throughout the antebellum era, even during the secession crisis
and beginning stages of the Civil War. During the statehood movement, leaders and residents
bickered over the propriety and significance of leaving Virginia, eventually stumbling their way
to West Virginia’s creation. While a few northwestern Virginians maintained the steady
drumbeat of sectionalism in the antebellum era, most residents preferred the rhythm of a unified
Virginia.
While Willey and other historians have exaggerated the intense sectionalism that
characterized antebellum Virginia, Willey’s argument concerning northwesterners’ deep
investment in protecting slavery and slaveholders’ interests highlighted a fundamental (and
accurate) component of Northwest politics. During the antebellum era, northwesterners stressed
their fealty toward to the peculiar institution, attempting to calm eastern Virginians’ fears that
they posed an acute threat to their human property. At each constitutional convention and in
1861, northwesterners pledged their support for slavery and slaveholders’ rights, promising not
to disturb the master-slave relationship while vowing to disarm any perceived threat.
Northwesterners’ defense of slavery reflected residents’ belief that black bondage ensured and
generated white liberty. Indeed, rather than perceiving the two institutions as antagonistic,

9

northwesterners viewed them as symbiotic. Existing in a state of equilibrium, chattel slavery and
democratic government provided the greatest political freedom available to white southerners.
Regardless of the volatile economic climate or what party ruled the governor’s mansion or White
House, white northwesterners’ political freedom remained sacrosanct and protected. But
democracy and slavery, two fragile institutions, required white northwesterners’ continued
vigilance lest some force, group, or ism threaten them. A handful of white northwesterners
opposed this political dynamic, frustrated about slavery’s centrality to politics while other
interests appeared to languish. But the majority of residents embraced this dynamic, cognizant
that their political representation depended upon African Americans’ exclusion.
The statehood movement exemplified northwesterners’ stance on slavery and
dismemberment. Following Virginia’s adoption and ratification of the Ordinance of Secession in
early 1861, few northwesterners predicted or advocated a division of the state or slavery’s
destruction. An abrupt end to the political and military conflict unfolding around the nation
threatened to embarrass northwesterners who endorsed radical action, including dividing the
state or removing slavery from the region. Indeed, at each key political moment, northwestern
politicians and residents introduced strong arguments for not dividing the state and not
destroying slavery. Only when their democratic rights appeared vulnerable did residents support
separation but the issue of African American bondage loomed large. Slavery proponents worried
about political and racial miscegenation, fearful that the hierarchies that shaped northwesterners’
lives would be dismantled with slavery’s abolition. Accordingly, many such proponents rejected
statehood lest racial equality be foisted upon them by northwestern Republicans and their alleged
abolitionist allies. Statehood supporters, however, assured residents that African Americans
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would remain politically marginalized and socially subordinate in the new state. In short,
statehood promised to protect western Virginians’ racial democracy.
The decades preceding West Virginia’s creation demonstrates that previous scholarship
tracing the state’s genesis to alleged bitter sectionalism and burgeoning antislaveryism
misinterprets northwestern residents’ attachment and devotion to Virginia and chattel slavery.
White northwesterners’ demands for greater political representation represented their belief that
enfranchising non-propertyholders and basing representation solely on the white population
would protect slaveholders’ investment in human property. With all white men exercising
identical political and constitutional rights, possibly divisive differences that could threaten
slaveholders’ prerogatives and the master-slave relationship would be removed from the body
politic. Democracy and slavery, locked in a symbiotic relationship, would guarantee harmony
and stability within Virginia regardless of sectional differences.20 Though democratization
arrived later in Virginia than in other southern slaveholding states, the measures inaugurated in
1851 strengthened northwesterners’ attachment to the state and its institutions and deepened their

“Democracy” is a potent, contested, and slippery word to define. In the strictest political sense, “democracy”
means “rule of the people,” where citizens have a direct voice in, among other privileges, ratifying or rejecting
legislation and directly electing candidates. Majoritarian rule represents a fundamental characteristic of this form of
government. While nineteenth-century Americans accepted this definition, limiting “democracy” to solely
describing a form of government narrows analysis and overlooks “democracy’s” cultural power, too. “Democracy”
not only meant broad, if not universal, enfranchisement for white men, direct election of public officials, justice
meted out irrespective of status, representation based not on property but people, and constitutional equality but a
society that reflected this broad political equality. This equality meant, according to Sean Wilentz, “changing
human relations between governors and the governed,” a seminal transformation that shaped American political,
social, intellectual, cultural, and economic systems. Indeed, political “democracy” often precipitated or closely
followed changes in “human relations” in other arenas, creating an environment conducive to challenging
established norms in every aspect of American society. As Wilentz notes and this dissertation emphasizes, however,
“democracy” represents a fragile system that can be manipulated, limited, or dismantled, requiring vigilance from
citizens regardless of wealth, political affiliation, or any other cleavage. Accordingly, this dissertation employs
“democracy” in its broadest sense, one that encompasses not only the political characteristics embedded in the word
but its transformative characteristics outside of the political sphere. Wilentz, Rise of American Democracy, XVIIIXIX.
20
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engagement in the “politics of slavery.” Northwesterners became fiercely loyal to Virginia and
to chattel slavery.
This loyalty to the state and its central institution shaped northwesterners’ reactions to the
political crises of the 1850s. Residents elected proslavery politicians, censured those who
wavered, and endorsed slavery’s centrality in politics. Northwesterners drew closer in Virginia’s
political orbit, not further away, even with the Republican Party’s arrival. By 1861, the
disagreement between northwesterners and their eastern brethren centered not on slavery’s
propriety or its presence in the Old Dominion but rather how best to protect the institution.
Though a majority of residents insisted that remaining under the power of the federal
government and U.S. Constitution would achieve that end, others endorsed the Confederate
States of America to protect slavery from encroaching Republicans and their abolitionist allies.
This debate shaped residents’ interpretation of statehood, too. Statehood proponents
maintained that separating from Virginia would protect white residents’ political rights while
preserving their racial superiority even with the adoption of gradual emancipation. Statehood
opponents disagreed, arguing that without chattel slavery, racial distinctions would collapse and
political and social anarchy would reign. Though statehood divided these two groups, preserving
racial hierarchy united them. West Virginia’s creation, therefore, represented neither a clean
break from residents’ Virginian or southern ethos nor a democratic, antislavery revolution. The
Mountain State’s founding represented a triumph of racial democracy, a state created to preserve
and perpetuate political privileges for white residents. The liberi expressed in West Virginia’s
motto applied only to white residents, not African Americans.
This study employs a chronological narrative to track northwesterners’ deepening support
for democratic government and chattel slavery. Chapter One provides background to the intense
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debate in early antebellum Virginia concerning democratization. Tidewater and Piedmont
politicians and slaveholders expressed reticence on this issue, worrying that unmooring political
and constitutional rights from property threatened stability. Property meant both landed and
human, two forms that few western Virginians owned. Transmontane Virginians maintained that
natural rights, not property rights, should be the basis for government. Residents also took great
pains to display their fealty toward slavery and slaveholders’ rights, a chief concern for many
eastern Virginians. This debate reached a crescendo in 1829, as delegates across the state
convened in Richmond to modify the state constitution.
Chapter Two explores the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention, a moment many
historians suggest hastened Virginia’s “dissolution.” The convention, however, provided the
foundation necessary for later democratization. Though northwestern delegates failed to
inaugurate all the democratic principles they wished, their victory in enlarging the franchise
validated the changing economic and political context rapidly unfolding around them. Still,
residents expressed outrage that eastern elites had prevented democracy’s inevitable march on
Virginia soil, an outrage expressed at the ballot box and in talk of dismemberment. Such talk,
however, quickly faded as residents enjoyed the broader franchise and events in southeastern
Virginia directed residents’ attention to chattel slavery.
Nat Turner’s Rebellion, coming on the heels of the constitutional convention, posed an
important challenge to slaveholders across the state and politicians who championed the
proslavery cause. Chapter Three analyzes how Virginia proslavery and prodemocracy
ideologues reconceptualized African American bondage to broaden its appeal and stress its
centrality to republican government. The three principal figures in this movement, Benjamin
Watkins Leigh, Charles Dew, and Abel P. Upshur, helped establish the contours of a new
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proslavery ideology that appealed to nonslaveholders in Virginia and across the south. Their
tactic worked. By 1850, northwesterners deepened their engagement in the “politics of slavery”
and strengthened their commitment to slavery and slaveholders’ interests. The final piece in
solidifying residents’ support for the institution and the state rested on democratizing the state
constitution.
Chapter Four examines the Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851 and its dramatic
effects on Virginia’s political culture. During the convention, northwestern delegates stressed
their constituents’ fealty toward chattel slavery, the overriding issue at the convention. Eastern
planters and politicians doubted such faithfulness. With northerners becoming more vocal in
their opposition to slavery and abolitionists possibly operating within the state, slaveholders
needed property qualifications to protect their investment, easterners insisted. But, with
assistance from Henry A. Wise, northwesterners adopted a democratic constitution that
inaugurated universal male suffrage and equalized representation while strengthening the state
government’s commitment to slavery. The impact of the new constitution became manifest
immediately, as gubernatorial campaigns centered on the issue of slavery. While the “politics of
slavery” had characterized northwestern politics prior to 1851, the adoption of the new
constitution deepened residents’ engagement and heightened the dangers of not protecting
Virginia’s new racial democracy.
Not all northwestern Virginians, however, embraced slavery’s increased centrality to
politics. Chapter 5 focuses on the emergence of the Republican Party, a political organization
that attracted some northwesterners with its message of “free soil” and “free labor.” Those that
supported the party believed that the Republican Party could alter the political calculus of the
state by offering residents an alternative to the two-party system that strengthened slaveholders’
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power over the state. Despite previous scholarship arguing otherwise, Republicans remained
alien to most residents. Republicans’ policies closely mirrored those of northern abolitionists to
most northwesterners, drawing condemnation and violence from voters. Rather, up through the
1860 presidential election, most northwesterners remained committed to the two-party system
and supportive of traditional Democratic and Whiggish nominees. As the secession crisis began
to unfold following the election, most residents remained steadfast that the Union, not the
nascent Confederacy, provided the best means for protecting white residents’ democratic rights
and chattel slavery.
Chapter Six examines northwesterners’ arguments concerning secession in early 1861
and the beginning stages of the statehood movement. During the Richmond convention
convened in February 1861, most northwestern delegates expressed their constituents’ firm
attachment to the Union, citing their desire to protect their democratic rights and the institution
of slavery. A handful of northwestern delegates opposed the Union, insisting that secession
would protect those two critical institutions. President Lincoln’s call for troops following Fort
Sumter’s bombardment convinced a majority of delegates statewide, including a few from the
Northwest, that the Republican administration sought slavery’s destruction; accordingly, most
delegates statewide ratified the secession ordinance. Northwesterners opposed to secession
convened meetings and conventions across the region to discuss dividing the state, a proposition
that appeared fraught with obstacles and far from certain. But as the idea of statehood gained
currency in the Northwest, few politicians or residents appeared willing to disturb the masterslave relationship. While some national Republicans considered slavery’s destruction in the
region a prerequisite for statehood, many residents expressed reluctance to abandon the
institution.
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Chapter Seven analyzes how northwestern residents achieved statehood while still
maintaining the region’s system of racial hierarchy. Statehood proponents encouraged residents
to support West Virginia’s creation, insisting that the Mountain State’s founding would
accelerate a demographic “whitening” of the region already in progress. Freed and enslaved
African Americans would be removed from the state while West Virginia’s climate would deter
other blacks from entering the new state. The few African Americans who remained would
reside under draconian antebellum laws concerning freed blacks, as fines and corporal
punishment remained on the books. These few blacks would labor in menial service positions,
leaving more prosperous and prestigious positions for white residents. While statehood
opponents maintained that West Virginia’s creation would “blacken” the mountains, most
residents argued that the state’s founding would protect white equality and racial hierarchy.
Admitted to the Union in 1863, West Virginia represented a triumph of racial democracy.
What unfolded in antebellum West(ern) Virginia and during the Civil War reflected
broader developments convulsing the nation. Issues of race, citizenship, and democratic
development shaped political debates in Virginia, New York, Tennessee, North Carolina, and
California prior to the Civil War while a marked increase in European immigration post-1848
further raised the relationship between political fitness and skin color. The Civil War failed to
settle these debates, as immediate post-war and Reconstruction developments reflected a
continuation of these volatile issues.
The interplay between slaveholders and nonslaveholders in Virginia likewise reflected
developments across the South that sought to tether the interests of the latter with those of the
former. In states across the Deep South, state constitutions democratized political representation
and power between the two classes and helped establish a precedent for other southern states.
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This slaveholders’ democracy promised equal power and voice to all white men regardless of
status or political affiliation. Slaveholders often couched their defense of slavery in terms of
patriarchal defense and familial obligation, hoping these arguments would resonate with
nonslaveholders. Numerous slaveholders also generated strong economic ties with their
nonslaveholding neighbors that directly tied the financial well-being of one family with that of
the other. When the war came, these bonds forged over the previous decades between the two
groups often proved durable and strong as the mobilization of nonslaveholders into the
Confederate army demonstrated. In Virginia, a similar dynamic unfolded except in western
Virginia, where the defense of slavery acquired different meanings and produced different
results. While this dissertation focuses on Virginia, in many instances what occurred in the Old
Dominion reflected broader regional and national developments shaping the country as a whole
in powerful ways.
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Chapter 1: Defining Freedom: Freeholds, Republican Citizenship, and the Grassroots Movement
for Democratic Reform
In June 1824, “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County” wrote an open letter in the
Clarksburg Intelligencer chiding his representative in Congress, Joseph Johnson. Two actions
by Johnson drew the constituent’s ire. First, Johnson refused to support William H. Crawford’s
candidacy in the upcoming presidential election, turning his back on a candidate who the author
believed to have “deserve[d] the station.” Johnson’s other offense was his pro-tariff stance.
While “all the other representatives from Virginia” had rightly denounced the measure and
accordingly voted against it, Johnson embraced the tariff. “A HOUSE KEEPER” warned that such
actions—especially when the people of western Virginia had unanimously rejected such deeds—
were dangerous for Johnson’s political career. For now, western Virginians would watch their
representative in earnest to observe any signs of repentance.1
A constituent writing a public letter scathing the conduct of a representative should not be
surprising, especially to modern observers of the political process. Such actions were and are
common, and are generally indicative of an engaged citizenry and a transparent democratic
process, both hallmarks of western liberal democracies that have emerged and been refined since
the Enlightenment. What should be surprising, given the context of the letter, is the author’s
self-proclaimed identity. The author lived under the 1776 Virginia Constitution, a republican
document that ultimately regarded a “house keeper” as a dependent, disenfranchised resident
who existed on the political margins. White men who owned the requisite amount of land
decreed by the constitution, meanwhile, enjoyed the privileges, prerogatives, and burdens of the
political sphere. But the self-identified “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County” considered such
distinctions artificial and arbitrary. In publicly chastising his representative, “A HOUSE KEEPER”
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understood that he stepped beyond his proscribed sphere and admitted that Johnson likely found
his “stile…a little too dictatorial” considering his “signature.” And the author also confessed
that he “cannot vote at the elections and thereby express my utmost displeasure at your sins of
omission and commission.” Yet he pressed on, looking toward that silver lining in the distance.
His “prospect[s] of…possessing that right at the next election, or the succeeding one at farthest,
is increasing daily,” he declared, and soon he would enjoy the sundry benefits and
responsibilities inherent in republican citizenship. In the interim, he would continue to “arraign
[politicians] at the bar of the public,” broadcasting his approbation or disapproval through
popular media.2
The letter from “A HOUSE KEEPER” elucidates the central tension in antebellum
Virginia’s political system. While the traditional narrative of American democracy chronicles a
constant, if not inexorable, increase in the political rights granted to free white men following the
American Revolution, the vesting of such rights proved uneven.3 Indeed, while the national and
geopolitical consequences of the American Revolution often proved widespread and dramatic,
the domestic and political effects of the Revolution in Virginia proved limited. Elite Virginians
worked diligently to harness the Pandora’s Box that the American Revolution opened, ultimately
ratifying a new constitution and passing laws designed to perpetuate their hegemony and curtail
any liberal sentiments. Rather than inaugurating dramatic political and constitutional changes,
Virginia elites embraced the status quo, with all the prevailing orthodoxies and ideologies
inherent in this political system.
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But the letter from “A HOUSE KEEPER” reveals more than elite Virginians’ refusal to
embrace democratic reforms. While previous southern and Virginia historians have focused on
tracing political and constitutional developments at the state and local levels, Virginia’s political
transformation cannot be grasped solely, or even mainly, from such a top-down perspective.4
The resulting interpretations have proven limited, overlooking the often subtle and latent cultural
practices and values that antebellum Virginians associated with the political process. Notably,
this top-down perspective marginalizes an increasing variety of actors engaging in public
political activities and demanding full and equal political rights, including “A HOUSE KEEPER.”
A grassroots perspective allows a clearer picture of the increasingly broad realm of politics and
political culture that came to form a central component of Virginians’ lives, specifically those in
the Northwest. And as men (and women) convened in barbeques, meeting houses, courts, and
other public areas to discuss politics, what unfolded were often intense and rich debates about the
meaning of politics and how to reconcile politics and power with changing social, economic,
cultural, and demographic realities. In the Northwest, such debates and negotiations took on
added urgency and importance, as many people demanded entry to a political process they
deemed a natural right. To effect change in the political system, these residents engaged in
popular politics to demonstrate the necessary virtues needed in a republic. In so doing, they also
sought to direct other Virginians and southerners toward a reformed model of republican
citizenship, one built not upon land ownership but upon the productive capacity of labor, the
memory of the American Revolution, and the natural right to self-government.5
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When elite eastern Virginians looked west toward the Blue Ridge and Allegheny
Mountains, they viewed this vast western region with a mixture of fear, sublimity, and optimism.
During the colonial era, elite eastern Virginians looked with trepidation toward the periphery of
their world, mindful of the region’s natural beauty and resources but wary of Native Americans
and competing imperial powers. In an effort to bolster the defense of the colony and, later, the
state, Virginians promoted settlements to act as a buffer between the more populous Tidewater
and its western front.6 But the chaotic and disorganized manner in which settlers populated (or
simply squatted) on the land produced political, cultural, and legal misunderstandings between
these settlers and eastern elites. Settlers generally ignored title and ownership rights, flouting the
traditional means of land ownership. The diverse ethnic composition of the settlers complicated
matters further. Rather than the pure English stock that Tidewater Virginians claimed, Germans,
Ulster-Scots, Swiss immigrants, and former indentured servants settled along the western front.
The belief that Tidewater culture could be replanted and replicated west of the mountains
appeared chimerical and fleeting. Up through the mid-nineteenth century, elite eastern
Virginians continued to look skeptically toward their western brethren, seeming to recognize that
such people, including “A HOUSE KEEPER,” could never fit the narrow definition of what
constituted “true Virginia.”7
Elites’ deployment of “true Virginia” as a rhetorical instrument provides an important
window into their governing ideology. From Virginia’s colonial beginnings, these elite men
embraced a hierarchical and patriarchal society based on republican ideology and derived from
the planter-centered political economy of Tidewater Virginia. Contemporaries prized the virtues
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and individual liberty that emanated from land ownership, notably economic self-sufficiency
(achieved through slave labor) and physical independence. Both of those qualities, according to
the tenets of republican ideology, attached these independent men to their community’s interests
and needs and represented the criteria essential to republican government.8 Accordingly, these
men governed the colony’s public affairs. Further, these leading men, labeled the “grandees of
government” by one historian, expected deference and obedience from all those under their
authority, including other white men, women, children, slaves, indentured servants, Native
Americans, and other dependents. The hierarchical and patriarchal world created by the
“grandees of government” and reinforced by republican ideology embodied the vision of “true
Virginia,” a vision that greatly shaped the state’s political institutions and operations and
political culture.9
The “grandees of government” enjoyed a fixed and respected place in the body politic.
These men “imposed, preserved, and profited” from the political world they created, augmenting
their power and that of their ilk.10 The House of Burgesses, county courts, and colonial governor
all remained under the direction of these men, with all three branches of government functioning
to further their power. Land ownership emerged as a prerequisite for suffrage in 1670, thereby
excluding the less prosperous and landless. Supporters for the measure argued that
landownership provided the strongest evidence of a man’s investment in the colony’s welfare
and health. Accordingly, these men’s voices should and did carry more weight. With their
control of government nearly absolute, the grandees regulated everything from indentured
servants’ and enslaved laborers’ behavior to religious beliefs to tobacco prices under the guise of
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patriarchal control and protection and republican virtue. The solidarity and harmony expressed
by the grandees further shielded them from external assaults, solidifying their political power and
their control over colonial governance.11
While the grandees’ faces and names changed over the course of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, their worldview and ideology remained relatively static. The grandees’
descendants continued to disproportionately control county and local offices, even as Virginia’s
population grew outside of the Tidewater. The handful of judges comprising the General Court
crafted legislation, directed the course of the governor’s administration, and used their influence
over the governor to appoint family members to lucrative governmental posts. This small group
of judges also navigated land grants through complex bureaucracy, gaining valuable information
on land. And as the number of qualified voters, candidates, defeated incumbents, and contested
election results declined, the grandees continued to exert greater hegemony over the political
system they created.12
But the American Revolution altered the power dynamic, threatening that carefully
crafted hegemony. In the years leading up to and surrounding the Revolution, a powerful
“evangelical counterculture” jeopardized elites’ loci of power, including courthouses, by
challenging the cultural authority wielded by leading men.13 Residents increasingly petitioned
the state legislature on elective matters, notably on the issue of voter qualifications. Women,
free blacks, and, less often, slaves, authored other petitions touching on private and communal
matters.14 In November 1775, the high turnover of elected officials in county elections reflected
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an increasingly restive constituency and tenant farmers protested the high rents that landholders
charged.15 Such actions revealed the democratizing potential of the war and perhaps presaged a
slow move toward more popular politics. While many of the actors who argued for redress and
change lacked political representation, their actions suggested that the fervor and rhetoric
surrounding the American Revolution permitted such measures. These actions suggested an
alarming trend for Virginia’s elites who could not help but fret about their loosening grip over
the colony’s dependents and public affairs.16
The means for re-securing elites’ political power rested on two legislative achievements.
In June 1779, the General Assembly passed two statutes both aimed at strengthening the rights
and power of freeholders, men who owned a tenure of land for life. One statute abolished all
forms of feudal tenure while the other statute proclaimed that all lands in Virginia would now be
under the sole jurisdiction of the landholder. Both laws strengthened the hands of freeholders by
allowing them to develop, transfer, or sell their land at will, a move directed toward reconciling
the increasing commodification of land with the republican political virtues inherent in land
ownership. Equally important, the laws represented the state legislators’ reaffirmation that the
freehold would constitute the new state’s constitutional foundation. Propertied men would
continue to preside over and protect the republic, prizing their interests and voices and those of
their ilk over those of dependents across the Commonwealth.17
Along with tackling the politics of landownership, the legislature also ratified a new
constitution. Rejecting the revolutionary ideals of egalitarianism and inclusivity, the framers
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crafted the state constitution to perpetuate and strengthen many of the operations, practices, and
structures imposed by their forebears. The framers also included no formal mechanism for
amending the constitution, implying that this body of laws and statutes would operate ad
infinitum. The 1776 Constitution handicapped the power of the executive by permitting the
General Assembly oversight of the executive office. The General Assembly elected the
governor, who served three one-year terms, limiting his power and providing the governor little
opportunity to check the power of the legislative branch. The legislature’s election of the
governor also meant the governor often acted as a puppet for the grandees, making him little
more than a figure head. In one final gesture showcasing the ultimate power of the General
Assembly over the governor, the legislature could pass legislation without obtaining the
governor’s signature via a simple majority. The subsequent legislation was not subject to
executive veto, either.18
Though the governor remained under the watchful eye of the General Assembly, the
position did include an important judicial privilege. The constitution empowered the governor to
appoint justices of the peace to county courts, an important role considering that these local
courts projected the state’s power. These appointments came with an important caveat: the
governor could only appoint those nominated by members already on the bench. As the majority
of those sitting members came from prominent families, the appointment process worked to the
advantage of these families, allowing them to perpetuate and consolidate power in the
community. Furthermore, this process of appointing new judges allowed these prominent
families to insulate themselves from public challenges to their power.19 One such family, the
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Jacksons from Clarksburg, built an impressive network of patronage, jobs, land holdings, and
local and state elected offices in the Northwest through this practice well into the mid-nineteenth
century.20
Still, of the three branches of government, the legislative remained the strongest, a
reflection of the distrust of monarchical figures and the continued perpetuation of grandees’
power. The formula used to determine representation, the method of voting, and the
requirements for voting all worked to solidify legislative power (and the elites they represented)
while limiting the power of the disenfranchised. Indeed, all three measures worked to achieve
the same end: to make sure that government and politics remained the purview of “civilized men,
not for a horde of savages just emerging from an imaginary state of nature,” as one noted
conservative later commented.21 To limit the power this “horde of savages” could wield,
representation in the state legislature favored the Tidewater region, the area where most elites
resided. The state constitution allotted each county two representatives in the House of
Delegates regardless of the county’s white population or aggregate population of white and black
residents. While on the surface this apportionment appeared equal, important demographic shifts
following the American Revolution highlighted this apportionment’s inherent inequality.
Numerous Tidewater counties’ population stagnated or declined as free white people and white
families, along with their slaves, moved west and settled in the western part of the state or in
fertile land opening beyond the Appalachian Mountains.22 This constant and steady migration
increased the populations of western Virginia counties, including those in the Northwest. And as
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this demographic shift continued, residents became increasingly aware of the political paradox of
a minority ruling a majority. As one Monongalia County resident later grumbled, “a defect in
the Constitution” authorized “one third of the free people…[to] rule the other two thirds of the
people.”23 A governing minority flouted equality and democracy for white men while betraying
the legacy of the American Revolution.
The declining population of eastern counties and the increasingly populous western
counties captured Virginians’ attention, including Thomas Jefferson, who ruminated on this
disparity in his Notes on the State of Virginia. Using militia returns, Jefferson compared the
population figures of Warwick County in southeast Virginia against Loudon County in northcentral Virginia. The dramatic population swings in both counties and subsequent political
ramifications confirmed what Virginians believed: a minority residing in eastern Virginia
controlled and benefited from the operations and structures of the state government. As
Jefferson later averred, the “exclusion of a majority of our freemen from the right of
representation is merely arbitrary, and an usurpation of the minority over the majority.”24
Although Warwick County had experienced a declining population in the preceding years, its
representatives still wielded the same amount of political power as the increasingly populous
Loudon County. When Warwick’s delegates joined with other Tidewater delegates, their
numerical advantage proved practically insurmountable, often at the expense of projects
designed to develop the minds and natural resources of the state. A public education system,
numerous internal improvements including canals, roads, and railroads, and greater development
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of the state’s coal fields all faced immense opposition from this minority, with few projects
garnering the state legislature’s approval.25
Perhaps of all the statutes contained in the Virginia bylaws none garnered more scrutiny
than the freehold requirement. A freehold represented the ownership of some quantifiable
amount of land; its political significance, though, greatly outweighed its measureable quality.
Virginia’s colonial government first adopted the freehold requirement in 1670 as a way to
strengthen the relationship between the colony’s planters and landowners and the fledgling
government. In return for financially and personally supporting the government, colonial
legislators decreed that only propertied individuals could vote and hold public office, and that the
freehold would be used to calculate representation. Small farmers, indentured servants, laborers,
and other dependents not meeting the freehold requirement lost their voice in government.
Proponents of this policy pointed to landowners’ support of the government and, as land
represented the source of wealth, legislation, taxation, suffrage, and political office, those with
the most at stake deserved a stronger voice in politics.
Finally, advocates defended the freehold with an ideological justification. Propertied
men represented the proper stewards of liberty and were best suited to perform the necessary
civic duties required for the maintenance of the republic, supporters insisted. Such physical and
economic independence allowed these men to insulate themselves from outside interests and
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voices. As a Clarksburg resident later proclaimed, the freehold requirement allowed freeholders
to “remain beyond the reach of bribery and corruption.” Alternatively, nonfreeholders “may be
swept away by every favourite breeze.”26 Ultimately, the health of the government and the
future of the republic, defenders argued, depended on the freehold requirement.27
Within these grand pronouncements of protecting the republic, a latent current of distrust
existed in the minds of freeholders about the intentions of their non-freeholder neighbors. For
numerous freeholders, especially those in positions of power, non-freeholders appeared as an
uncertain ally or a possible enemy. Freeholders worried that men like “A HOUSE KEEPER of
Harrison County” would revolt against the ruling order or join forces with sympathetic
freeholders and institute draconian legislation that could upset Virginia’s hierarchical
foundations. Land, slaves, material wealth, and raw power could all vanish from the hands of
freeholders if such an apocalyptic scenario reached fruition. Nonfreeholders’ numerical majority
heightened such concerns for freeholders. When rumors of war swirled about Virginia in the
mid-1670s, freeholders’ concerns nearly became manifest, as nonfreeholders lashed out in
protest.28 Although the freehold fluctuated in acreage requirement over the proceeding decades,
the original purpose of limiting participation and centralizing power in the minority continued
throughout the early nineteenth century.
Nonfreeholders often found freeholders’ arguments and fears absurd. The increasing
commodification of land and absentee ownership undermined freeholders’ noble arguments
about the inviolability and sanctity of land.29 Rampant debt, penury, and political corruption
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among freeholders undermined freeholders’ arguments of political independence and piety.30
Freeholders displayed similar reckless behavior during campaigns. As one newspaper
sarcastically remarked, nonfreeholders should step aside in order to “give place to that drunk
freeholder just behind you.”31 Though imbibing on alcoholic beverages remained widespread
throughout the nineteenth century, inebriated freeholders weakened assertions about their alleged
moral and political superiority.32 Despite such actions, the freehold remained, disenfranchising
approximately forty-percent of eligible white men west of the Alleghenies.33 Housekeepers,
renters, laborers, and other dependents, including “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County,”
constituted nonfreeholders. This political marginalization frustrated nonfreeholders, who
pondered when the American Revolution’s legacy would finally be realized.
Reformers advocating for a revised constitution cited two more egregious flaws. One,
voters cast their ballot viva voce. This method of oral balloting exposed voters to scrutiny,
intimidation, and outright threats from neighbors. Further, viva voce balloting allowed
politicians and local elites to persuade voters to support certain candidates through bribery and
patronage, allowing powerful families to preserve their hegemony. Reformers grumbled that
“dependent men went to the polls under duress” while “[o]nly those in independent
circumstances could vote with entire freedom.”34 Reformers supported private ballots, insisting
that this practice would shield voters from outside influences.
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Reformers not only opposed how ballots were cast but also how frequently freeholders
could vote in state elections. Freeholders were eligible to vote in each county in which he owned
a freehold.35 With county elections often occurring on different days and occasionally lasting
multiple days, it was not uncommon for some freeholders to cast multiple ballots. Older
Tidewater counties’ close proximity and smaller size complemented this policy, increasing
easterners’ political power. Western counties larger geographical size and rugged topography
generally prevented trans-Alleghany freeholders from casting multiple ballots. While politicians
stressed “one man, one vote” while campaigning, this phrase rang hollow for northwestern
residents who witnessed what they considered a denial of their natural rights.36
The high rate of disenfranchisement in the trans-Alleghany, the preponderance of
political power in the Tidewater, and West Virginia’s founding in 1863 has caused subsequent
historians to interpret Virginia politics through an east-west prism.37 In reality, no such clear
demarcation existed. Prominent landed families and individuals in northwestern and western
Virginia benefited from the current political system as much as Tidewater elites and often
worked across the sectional divide to accomplish shared goals. For example, the General
Assembly altered the method of electing the president from a district system to a general-ticket
system. This seemingly arcane modification, championed by Thomas Jefferson, allowed elites to
mute dissent and create the façade of a unified electorate.38 Elites on both sides of the mountains
also used vast webs of patronage and their control of and access to the county courts to acquire
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valuable information on available land. In western Virginia, this “buckskin elite” exercised
hegemony over residents by establishing alliances with their eastern brethren and shielding
themselves from public censure via the county court system.39 For example, the Jackson Family
dominated northwestern politics through the middle of the nineteenth-century using the judicial
system to accumulate wealth, land, patronage, political offices, and power across the
Northwest.40 Such individuals and families felt little need to reform the political system to
appease their disenfranchised and dissatisfied neighbors.
Political changes occurring outside Virginia, notably in other slaveholding states,
amplified voices demanding reform. New slave states entering the Union in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries democratized their political systems, flattening distinctions
between white men and embracing the burgeoning democratic ethos. A Morgantown resident
remarked that if he lived in another slaveholding state, such as Kentucky, he would possess “that
most important privilege of freemen, the right of suffrage.”41 Attempts to align Virginia with
more democratic slaveholding states by adopting a new constitution, including one penned by
Thomas Jefferson, encountered heavy criticism and defeat at the hands of the state legislature.42
Though the General Assembly passed laws abolishing primogeniture and entail, such moves
failed to quiet the clamor for deeper and broader constitutional reform.43 In the Northwest,
advocates for reform demanded a democratized state constitution that reflected changing
demographic patterns and embraced what they believed were the natural consequences of the
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American Revolution. Further, they hoped that the new constitution would recognize that men
could stake their claim for political representation on their productive capacity of labor and their
natural right to self-government. Incorporating these new dynamics into Virginia’s constitution
meant shifting the locus of political power from land to the individual, an uncertain prospect
considering the innuendo and suspicion surrounding moves toward popular government.44
Popular manifestations advocating for constitutional and political reform emerged across
the Northwest through various forms. In November 1795, a group of Monongalia County
residents gathered to sign a petition addressed to the General Assembly to protest what the
petitioners considered an aristocratic, inefficient, and broken government. The flaws with the
current political system were numerous. Petitioners chided their rulers for not providing
sufficient checks and balances between the branches of state government; questioned why the
state legislature needed to meet so frequently and thus drain the state coffers; and argued that the
method for electing senators should be changed, perhaps even instituting popular elections for
the position.
While the operations of the state needed repairs, the ideological basis upon which these
operations rested required a drastic reorientation. The petitioners reminded the legislature that
“the people are the source of all legitimate power” and that the “equality of man” represented a
ubiquitous sentiment among residents. Further, those currently excluded were “neither less
virtuous, less wise, less experienced, nor less republican” than their forebears who fought in the
Revolution. Many Virginians—notably those among the governing class—rejected such beliefs.
“[T]hey are afraid to trust the people,” the petitioners declared, a clear marker of the “language
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of aristocracy.” Indeed, these aristocrats sought to “degrade the mass of the people, and sacrifice
public rights to private interest.” To achieve political equality, the petitioners asked the
legislative body to listen to the “will of the PEOPLE” and support a call for a constitutional
convention to create a new constitution that redressed these grievances and embraced the legacy
of the Revolution.45
The petition’s first section stressing the state’s dysfunctional political system reflected a
central grievance for northwestern residents. Such grievances should not be surprising, as
previous historians have used such evidence to portray a state riven by sectionalism. The
petitioners’ rhetorical strategy, though, reveals an important way northwesterners’ attacked the
ruling classes’ ideological flaws. This exercise centered on degrading elites’ republican virtue
while demonstrating the public good nonfreeholders provided. While rulers supposedly sought
to protect the common good, “private interest” constituted their primary concern. Further, an
aristocracy by definition implied a class of men who possessed certain titles of nobility or
positions of status and power; aristocrats were not avatars of the common man.
While the “mass of the people” exercised the same republican virtue as their ancestors,
these men continued to find themselves under the dominion of aristocrats. It should not be
surprising, the petitioners proclaimed, that “the legitimacy of the government itself [was] being
doubted” because it rested on an unstable foundation. In order to be legitimate, a republican
government needed the “constitutional authority” that could only be granted by the “majority”
for the “majority” represented the true rulers of Virginia. Consequently, this proclamation meant
that Virginians, notably the governing class, needed to embrace the widest possible definition of
“the people” and a republic. A broader definition of “the people” meant recognizing all white

45

Legislative Petition of Monongalia County, VA, November 12, 1795, Reel 127, Box 164, Folder 55, Library of
Virginia, Richmond, Virginia. [hereafter cited as LV]

34

men as equals regardless of wealth, holdings, or status; accordingly, a broader definition of “the
people” should be reflected in a new form of government, one that constituted a hybrid of
republicanism and democracy.46 Accomplishing both projects meant constructing new
assumptions about power and legitimacy, a breakthrough in political thinking that would
inevitably lead to conflict.
The immense task of altering the state’s political operations failed to deter
northwesterners, who continued to petition their government. Following the War of 1812,
petitioners reminded the legislature of the military duty many signees performed during the
conflict and their continued service in the local militia. But, Ohio County residents lamented,
“not more than one half” of those who served in the war and currently served in the militia “were
entitled to vote for their Rulers.” Further, these disenfranchised militia men patrolled the
community at night on the lookout for runaway or rebellious slaves while working during the
day to keep the “roads and streets in good order & condition.” Meanwhile the enfranchised “are
in a great measure exempt from any participation in those duties.”47 The exemptions enjoyed by
the latter group physically burdened the community while elevating those men above their
neighbors. It created, in the eyes of the petitioners, an artificial aristocracy that rang hollow with
the memory of the Revolution, the recent military conflict, and the duties required in a republic.
A nearly identical petition in neighboring Brooke County demonstrated that such thoughts
received widespread currency in the Northwest.48
The petitioners touched on something deeper and more profound than the creation of an
artificial aristocracy. In both counties, residents reminded their representatives of the powerful
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gendered and symbiotic relationship between politics and military service. White men staked
their claim to political representation and patriarchal power in the household on their ability to
protect dependents in both spheres, as the public power of military service and politics translated
to private power within the household. This ideological conflation between public and private
power expressed in gendered terms promoted harmony between slaveholders and
nonslaveholders across the South by cutting across class, socioeconomic, and political lines.49
Further, the “public performance” of politics allowed men to distance themselves from
dependents who lacked the right to vote, including women. Once again, the “gendered virtues of
manliness, honor, and character” were on full display for the community to witness.50 But in
Virginia the deprivation of this public power threatened to undermine private power. And by
depriving all white men, but especially those who performed military duties, of their full political
representation, the governing class questioned those men’s masculinity, their control over
dependents, and ultimately their worth in a republic.
The Northwest’s changing economic landscape further reminded residents of their
political exclusion. While the majority of northwestern residents in 1820 claimed agriculture as
their primary occupation, the number of those engaged in manufacturing and commerce
surpassed other regions across Virginia, though substantially less than areas around Richmond.51
Still, the demand for political reform simultaneously increased as residents engaged in industrial
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labor, notably in Wheeling. Residents extolled Wheeling’s development as an emerging
commercial and industrial hub, praising the city’s “inexhaustible mines of her hills, her
manufactories, [and] the industry and enterprise of her citizens.”52 The city’s proximity to coal,
limestone, and iron ore deposits fueled its industrialization during the nineteenth century while
its location on the Ohio River facilitated the shipment of manufactured goods to western and
southern markets. Wheeling’s location also allowed it to emerge as the locus of the slave trade
in the region. The completion of the National Road to Wheeling in 1818 connected the city to
eastern markets while further cementing the city as an important commercial nexus. Iron
foundries, nail works, cotton mills, flour mills, and coal mining in and around Wheeling
provided employment and opportunity for residents, immigrants, and job seekers. While some
jobs relied on plantation goods, most produced commodities unaffiliated with the plantercentered political economy.53
Wheeling’s economic growth created an important variable in residents’ pursuit of
political reform. As Wheeling developed into an industrial-commercial center throughout the
early nineteenth-century, the rise of new industrial and (later) professional classes such as
mechanics and merchants reflected a significant shift away from the planter-centered political
economy of previous generations. Further, the capricious and volatile labor market and economy
decreased workers’ economic stability and independence. Without fixed income, residents
desired to fix their place within the body politic, a sentiment that increased as the Market
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Revolution unfolded. By obtaining political representation and equality, this new class of
workers hoped to shield themselves from the Market Revolution’s dislocating effects.54
In Ohio County, residents lamented that emerging classes of workers performed valuable
work yet lacked political representation. Many felt “aggrieved” that the “right of suffrage is not
sufficiently extended,” most notably to the working-class and yeomen. “Laborers and
agriculturalists, the industrious mechanicks, and the useful Merchants” all contributed to the
wealth and stability of the state; yet they remained under the political rule of the “landholder (be
his moral character what it may).” The planter-centered political-economy and the political
structures based on that dynamic failed to adapt to Virginia’s changing economic landscape.
Those engaged in emerging new professions probably owned little or no landed property but still
contributed to the general welfare of the republic through the productive capacity of their labor.
Further, these “industrious” and “useful” workers were not exploitative, selfish individuals who
would threaten the republic; landholders’ capricious moral and political compasses constituted a
republic’s true enemies, reformers maintained. As the Northwest’s industrial and commercial
sector continued to grow throughout the antebellum period, the voices demanding reform would
increase in size and gain various accents.55
Reformers’ expressed their demands through various channels. Mass meetings,
especially on the Fourth of July, presented some of the strongest language demanding reform
while providing an important window into residents’ worldview. Common among the scripted
and volunteer toasts were those that stressed the global struggle for democracy, aligning
Virginia’s struggle for democratic reform with those occurring internationally. In Clarksburg in
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July 1824, residents gathered in the town square and enjoyed the usual celebratory festivities,
including a military parade, sermon, and banquet. After these festivities, the toasts began in
earnest, officiated by, among others, Thomas P. Moore, a slaveholder.56 The scripted toasts
extolled the memory of George Washington, the U.S. armed forces, internal improvements, and
noted that “the Cause of the Greeks” and “Our Brethren of South America” remained locked in
the same struggle for democracy that the United States endured. In Wheeling, gatherers also
toasted the efforts of Ireland and Greece, along with the “Liberator of the South,” Simon
Bolivar.57 Virginians could take solace in knowing that their fight for democracy mirrored those
around the world. Such pronouncements also steeled residents to continue the fight, aware that
the tide of democracy would soon wash away tyranny.
Volunteer toasts touched on similar themes but also focused on pertinent state issues,
notably constitutional reform. Paraphrasing Patrick Henry, one celebrant in Clarksburg
proclaimed, “If to change [the constitution] be treason, may we all turn traitors.”58 In Wheeling,
one toaster prayed that a “constitution [based] on liberal principles” would “restore [Virginia] to
her former glory.” While the toaster failed to identify those “liberal principles,” one can infer
that political equality and popular sovereignty topped that list.59 Another Fourth of July
celebration in Wheeling two years later echoed many of the same themes. One resident
expressed his hope that an amended constitution and reformed political system would remove the
“weight of a selfish oligarchy” and allow “her citizens [to] enjoy their equal and unalienable
rights.”60 The memory of the American Revolution informed residents’ interpretation of
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Virginia’s contemporary political paralysis but the means for reviving the state remained
obvious. Virginians needed to recognize the natural consequences of the American Revolution
and embrace a reformed political system that valued the political weight of all white men, the
true “people” of the Commonwealth.
Fourth of July celebrations offered more than an opportunity to exalt the exceptional
history of the United States. Indeed, one of the latent cultural aspirations of such gatherings
centered on communal expression and solidarity. Residents from various socioeconomic,
political, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds convened and debated politics, often doing so with an
accessible vernacular. While a farmer or laborer attending the celebration may not have fully
grasped the political minutia of constitutional reform, he probably understood politics when
filtered through the prism of the American Revolution and when debated with neighbors.
Reformers hoped to wield this common vernacular against the governing class to effect political
change from the grassroots. Therefore, when residents spoke of “oligarchy” and “inalienable
rights” during these democratic celebrations and meetings, these words carried tremendous
political significance accessible to residents.61
The harmony expressed during meetings and Fourth of July celebrations overshadowed
disagreements that commonly arose. Henry Clay and Andrew Jackson both received their
respective toasts in one Wheeling celebration, for example.62 Another celebrant praised John
Randolph, a vociferous opponent of democratic reform and supporter of the present ruling
order.63 Such political fractures were common during the 1820s, especially as national political
parties emerged and mobilized voters. Yet one issue received nearly universal approbation from
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northwestern residents: slavery. While home to fewer slaves than other regions of Virginia, the
Northwest nevertheless held thousands of slaves and remained part of the largest slaveholding
state in the country.64 Although sometimes not explicitly stated, the political issue of slavery
always hovered around political discussions. Reformers’ demands for a new constitution often
contained assurances that democratizing the state would secure, not threaten, slavery.
To strengthen their arguments, reformers often recruited slaveholders to sway public
opinion in favor of constitutional revision. In 1825, Monongalia County residents delivered a
petition to the state legislature demanding constitutional reform. Among the signatures were
Thomas Ewell and George Jenkins, the former owning three slaves and the latter owning one.65
Alongside their names were farmers such as Nathan Johnson, who lived in adjacent Harrison
County and Monongalian Arby Pool, both of whom relied on family labor, not slaves, to farm
the land.66 The signatures of Ewell and Jenkins manifest their beliefs and reformers’ arguments
that an amended constitution posed no threat to slave property. Though democratization would
alter the state’s operations and structures, slavery’s status in Virginia’s political constellation
would remain secure.67
Some reformers expanded this argument, declaring that a democratized political system
would tether eastern slaveholders’ interests more tightly to western nonslaveholders. One
Monongalia County resident reassured his eastern brethren that should that “internal foe, which
forms the principal part” of the region’s wealth revolt, the “Western mountaineers [will] rush
down from their rocks, and roaring streams, to the help of their eastern brethren.”68 A
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democratized state government would secure slave property and promote greater harmony
among Virginians across sectional and political lines. Reformers likewise deflected arguments
that their natural rights argument invariably extended to Native Americans, women, children,
slaves, and free blacks. “Free negroes & mullatoes,” the author proclaimed, “never did, and
never will [vote] in Virginia.”69 Instead, allowing white men to exercise their natural right to
self-government and building a state government that recognized that reality would secure racial
boundaries. And as racial lines hardened, the institution generating that demarcation would
become more secure as all white men would aid in its protection. The symbiotic relationship
between democratic citizenship and an ardent commitment to slavery would reach full fruition.
Though reformers professed greater security for slavery and enlisted slaveholders to
assist their push for constitutional reform, the special privileges that slaveholders, especially
large slaveholders, commanded, remained open to scrutiny. Slaveholders often avoided serving
in the local militia except when they served as officers, enjoying the lofty and prestigious
position while leaving the drudgery of militia work to the “farmer, mechanic, & the poor man—
the bone and sinew of the country.” Such a privilege led one observer to argue that the
“aristocracy of the country…rest[s] with the man of wealth and the large slave holder.”70 In
Morgantown, the editor of the Monongalia Chronicle wondered why the burden for maintaining
local roads fell disproportionately upon the “poor man who…though his locks are whitening
with age” still sent his “five or six sons” to repair dilapidated roads. An elder patriarch would
certainly miss the labor his sons on the farm or around the house. The “slave-holder that has two
slaves,” though, could send out his slaves to work while keeping his sons at home.71 The
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possibility existed that the poor man’s sons would labor alongside African American slaves, a
scenario fraught with indignity and shame for free white Virginians. The color line that
supposedly demarcated freedom from bondage became blurred in such instances, leading many
residents to openly question the privileges slaveholders enjoyed. Still, slavery remained immune
from criticism; only the special benefits slaveholders received drew the ire of reformers.
While reformers carefully parsed their language concerning African American bondage,
slavery’s vocabulary represented a powerful language that underscored nonfreeholders’ political
inequality. A nonfreeholder in Wheeling wrote a lengthy missive excoriating the “aristocratical
rulers of Virginia” for fastening the “yoke” around the “disenfranchised.” Virginia’s leaders
controlled the “lives,” “liberty,” and “property” of nonfreeholders, governing without the
“consent” of “the people.” The moral was clear. The relationship that existed between
freeholders and nonfreeholders mirrored the master-slave dynamic, and it was painfully obvious
that nonfreeholders performed the role of the slave. Further, as a political slave, the
nonfreeholder possessed no honor or voice and submitted to the direction of the freeholder. The
lack of honor was especially embittering for white southerners whose culture placed a heavy
emphasis on the public maintenance of honor. Without redress, the political “chains” that
nonfreeholders wore would be tightened and passed down to posterity while the absence of
honor would result in public emasculation and shaming.72 The threat of white slavery paralyzed
white men with fear. Indeed, the disconcerting analogy between themselves and enslaved
African Americans was anathema, the worst degradation a white man could suffer. And the
threat of white slavery mocked notions of political equality, popular sovereignty, and racial
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boundaries. But a democratized state constitution could emancipate nonfreeholders from the
political slavery they currently endured.
This increasing restlessness for political reform divided many elites. Thomas Jefferson, a
sympathetic figure to many northwesterners and nonfreeholders, supported a more equitable
form of representation. “The exclusion of a majority of our freeman from the right of
representation,” he lamented, “is merely arbitrary and an usurpation of the minority over the
majority.” The nonfreeholding majority felt the greatest pains of this political marginalization.73
The minority, Jefferson worried, constituted a homogenous body that, without a larger and more
diverse voter and candidate pool, would reign similar to a king.74 James Madison’s stance
proved elusive. Although he had warned of oppressive majorities in the Federalist papers, he
previously criticized the Washington administration for its coddling of financial elites at the
expense of citizens. He worried that a similar cadre of elites would invariably bend the will of
the state government to satisfy their needs.75 Madison also supported a call for a new
constitutional convention to reform what he considered Virginia’s “bad” constitution, and even
cautioned new states from reproducing the Old Dominion’s form of government. For immediate
remedies, he proposed the popular election of the governor and greater independence for the
judiciary system. Still, Madison expressed caution about constitutional reform, vacillating
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between a proponent and one worried about the larger and possible unforeseen consequences of
revision.76
Other elites cast askance at the more progressive ideas promulgated by Jefferson and
Madison. Abel Parker Upshur and John Taylor of Caroline both passionately believed in the
close relationship between slavery and political power. Democratic reform, Upshur insisted,
inherently threatened slavery by placing the peculiar institution within nonslaveholders’ power.
Accordingly, any whiff of political change that threatened that power dynamic drew the scorn of
both.77 John Randolph of Roanoke remained ever defiant against the democratic tendencies that
emerged in post-colonial Virginia. He assailed the “pernicious falsehood” of egalitarianism
found in the Declaration of Independence, declaring equality between white men a mere
chimera.78 Further, he ardently defended slaveholders’ political rights on both the national and
state level. Attempts by the majority—whether represented by northerners or nonfreeholders—
to interfere with slaveholders’ property had to be dispatched.79
Eastern Virginians expressed many of the same concerns shared by Upshur and Parker.
Residents of Essex County insisted that they were “perfectly content with their ancient
institutions and most jealous and fearful of the spirit of innovation.” The spirit of innovation that
residents feared was democratic reform. Residents worried that embracing democratic reform
would “disturb or put [our institutions] in…jeopardy.”80 In Louisa County, the same specter of
democratic reform hung over the heads of its citizens. “Free men perceive no difference,” they
maintained, “in the acts of a single Tyrant and a numerous body of Tyrants.” Majoritarian rule
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frightened eastern Virginians, who feared the arbitrary and violent rule of mobs. The current
model of government, these residents stressed, worked best to protect their interests and those of
all Virginians.81
Though previous historians have interpreted the clamor for political reform as evidence
of sectional discord, conservative voices emerged from western Virginia. Writing from his home
in Staunton, Archibald Stuart recognized the momentum reformers generated in favor of
amending the constitution. “The public feeling on this subject has become too strong to be
resisted,” he observed. “The people appear determined that the Minority in the state shall not
continue to hold the reins of government.” Along with embracing majoritarian rule, a new state
constitution would invariably broaden suffrage, too. These changes “would sow the seeds of
[our] destruction,” Stuart predicted. “The rights then of those who own the country will be
invaded by those who hold no part of it,” he prophesized, “& it will become in the progress to
that state of things an objection to a Candidate to be either a Man of Talents or property.” Stuart
foresaw the bitter fruits of democracy. Social and political hierarchy would be extirpated, as
those without power and property would seize both from the wealthy. Campaigning and
electioneering would meet a similar fate. Those men best suited for political office—men such
as Stuart and his ilk—would be shunned because they were not avatars of “the people.” Instead,
demagogues, political charlatans, and deceitful orators would seize power by duping uneducated
and easily malleable voters. The fate of the republic hung in the balance, Stuart reasoned,
compelling him to oppose reform.82
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Even in the supposedly solid Northwest, conservatives voiced their opposition to
democratic reform. One anti-reformer shared the same grave concern as Stuart, fearing that “the
people” lacked the necessary political acumen required in a republic. The “people are too
ignorant and corrupt to equalize their government,” he explained. Permitting “the people” to
govern the state would invariably debase the sacrosanct government handed down by the
Revolutionary generation, inaugurating a new political and social order. Conservatives would
“be hereafter oppressed, when put upon equality” with their poor, nonfreeholding, uneducated
neighbors. And while propertied and wealthy men would continue to furnish the lion’s share of
tax revenue, their money would benefit those who paid few taxes. Conversely, the current
government accurately prioritized interests and appropriately meted out political and financial
wealth. Political and social institutions and relations worked harmoniously and for the greater
good of all. Why, then, all this rancorous talk of reform, one anti-reformer wondered?83
While northwestern anti-reformers faced social and political intimidation and pressure
when broadcasting their arguments, such opinions were not isolated incidents. Some opponents
of reform echoed similar arguments as the one above, stressing that “the people” were powerhungry, myopic, and easily corruptible. The blather about a defective constitution emerged from
“men without authority,” demagogues who wished to drag Virginians through the same “oceans
of blood” spilled during the French Revolution, one opponent insisted. These “men without
authority” sought reform for one sole reason: to “freely…hold the bottle.”84 Further, opponents
deployed the racial argument, claiming that a democratized constitution would inevitably include
African Americans. White men would be placed “on an equal footing, at elections & in courts of
justice, with free Negroes and Mulattoes,” a haunting specter for white men. While reformers
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might receive their wish of political equality, it would arrive simultaneously with racial equality,
too, anti-reformers averred. In one move, the pillars of hierarchy, patriarchy, and republicanism
would be demolished, creating a world full of uncertainty and instability.
Serving as a backdrop to these debates were two unofficial reform conventions—one in
1816 and another in 1825—that both convened in Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley.
Representatives from thirty-five counties across the Commonwealth attended the 1816 meeting,
including many men from the Northwest.85 The diverse nature of delegates prevented cohesion
around specific reforms, but demands for white universal male suffrage and representation based
on white population constituted the crux of their demands.86 Delegates couched such demands in
Revolutionary language. Notably, representatives assailed the right of the minority to govern
and legislate over the majority and that the archaic state constitution made a mockery of the
American Revolution’s legacy.87 The state legislature, hoping to appease reformers, responded
by reapportioning the state senate by doubling the number of representatives from the west;
created a Board of Public Works with the power to plan roads and canals; placed banks in
Wheeling and Winchester to provide greater accessibility of capital; and devoted more money to
internal improvements.88 While reformers accepted these changes, political harmony proved
fleeting.
Delegates from across Virginia met once again in Staunton in July 1825, hoping for
greater success than the previous convention. Approximately one-hundred delegates attended,
and media coverage from prominent newspaper editors Thomas Ritchie and John Hampden
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Pleasants assisted delegates’ push for constitutional revision.89 Delegates once again advocated
for legislative apportionment based only on the white population, excluding African American
slaves and land. Further, delegates demanded universal male suffrage. But divisions within the
ranks of reformers stalled their efforts and anti-reformers exploited such cleavages.90 Still, many
northwesterners remained sanguine that the “aristocracy of the legislature” could only
temporarily delay democracy’s arrival in the Old Dominion. Indeed, the “enlightened people” of
Virginia “have long been sensible of…their power” to instigate political reform, and needed only
to look to their Revolutionary ancestors for confirmation.91
While the putative representatives bickered, their constituents convened mass meetings
across the state during the late 1820s. These meetings welcomed men regardless of class or
political status, illustrating residents’ widespread desire for reform and opposition to the present
state constitution. Meetings in Richmond, Rockingham County, Louisa County, and Loudon
County all witnessed significant gatherings of “non-freeholders, and others friendly to the
extension of the right of suffrage.” Residents declared that they would no “longer…tamely
submit” to the chains of “political bondage” that the minority had forged around the majority.
Should this form of political slavery continue, residents rhetorically asked. “Every man in the
country must answer NO!!”92
In the Northwest, advertisements emphasized the meetings’ inclusivity, pleading for all
men regardless of political affiliation or personal fortune to mobilize and support a constitutional
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convention. In Ohio County, an advertisement requested all citizens to assemble at the
courthouse to “adopt such measures in regard to the Convention as may be thought necessary.”93
A proposed meeting south of Wheeling requested the “non-freeholders of this election district”
to assemble and “adopt such measures as they shall deem just and expedient” concerning a
constitutional convention and the election of representatives to that gathering.94 Rather than
limiting participation in these meetings to only freeholders, the meetings offered a forum for
Virginians to discuss the current political system and mobilize for its alteration.
The demands for a constitutional convention reached critical mass during the 1827-1828
legislative session. Reformers across the state continued to wield the powerful language of
liberty and equality while maintaining the steady flow of petitions and meetings. Newspaper
editors, including Ritchie and Pleasants, published such appeals, helping to generate sympathy
for political reform. Enough political pressure emerged that the General Assembly approved a
call for a public referendum in 1828 on the subject of convening a constitutional convention the
following year. Virginia freeholders approved the measure by a five-thousand majority, with a
nearly unanimous Shenandoah Valley approving the call while approximately three-fourths of
the Trans-Alleghany sanctioned the measure. Conversely, nearly seven-eighths of the Tidewater
and one-half of the Piedmont rejected the call. But the votes of the populous West carried the
day. The General Assembly passed an act summoning a convention for the following year, and
required the revised constitution be submitted to voters for ratification or rejection.95
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In the months preceding the constitutional convention, residents expressed hope that
Virginia’s political salvation was at hand. And, once again, Fourth of July celebrations provided
the forum needed to express such hopes. At the Methodist meeting house in Wheeling in 1829,
“a highly respectable audience of Ladies and Gentleman” articulated, heard, and cheered the
usual patriotic toasts associated with the national holiday. One official toaster prayed that the
members of the convention would form a “Constitution adapted to the character and permanent
interests of Virginia.” Following that toast, one reveler toasted “The West. – Yesterday a
wilderness—to-day a country great in the improvements of art, and teeming with a wealthy and
healthy population.” The sequence of these two toasts represented an effort to emphasize the
close relationship between a new constitution and embracing the democratic and progressive
ethos emerging in the Northwest. A new constitution would unleash the immense potential
found in western people and resources, ushering in a new era for the region and state.96
In nearby Elizabethtown, Fourth of July celebrants echoed similar sentiments. After the
conventional patriotic toasts, revelers once again focused on the upcoming constitutional
convention. They hoped that the “constellation of political talents and experience” to be
gathered in Richmond would be equaled by a “liberality of sentiment.” Immediately following
that toast, those gathered lamented the “degraded” and “enfeebled” character of Virginia, a state
that had long languished under the “weight of a selfish oligarchy.” Still, residents expressed
their profound hope that “the day of her political regeneration is drawing near.” The coupling of
the two toasts illustrated what residents considered the state’s ailments and antidote. Only by
embracing progressive and democratic principles could Virginians resurrect their political
fortunes, reinvigorating residents and returning the state to its erstwhile lofty national status.97
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As northwestern residents awaited the convention in late 1829, they could not help but
believe that Virginia’s aristocratic government was in its death throes. History appeared to be
moving in that direction. Internationally, the overthrow of monarchical rule in South America
and parts of Europe demonstrated that the wave of representative democracy would inevitably
sweep away all the vestiges of tyrants. Events closer to home gave greater hope. The emergence
of Jacksonian Democracy and political parties appeared poised to usher in a new era of politics,
where property, wealth, or birthright would no longer carry political weight. Southern
slaveholding states, including Alabama and Mississippi, had already embraced democratic
principles while not threatening slaveholders’ property. Arguments extolling the compatible if
not symbiotic relationship between slavery and democratic government gained increased
currency across the South. Interpreting such events, countless Virginians and Americans
increasingly believed that a representative democracy was the normative political model.
And for many northwestern Virginians, that political model transcended the current and
archaic model that shackled peoples’ energies and political rights. Principally, the structures and
operations of the state appeared as a colonial relic. A malapportioned general assembly, strict
suffrage requirements, a hegemonic legislative branch, and a flagrant omission of checks and
balances illustrated to reformers that the state languished under an aristocracy. Equally
egregious, this aristocracy seemed unwilling to listen to its constituents. Judge Lewis Summers
of Kanawha County noted that upon receiving petitions demanding constitutional reform, the
legislature did “nothing” with them except to “send them, with…recommendations to
committees.” The prospects for these petitions seemed dim at best.98 Armed with such
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evidence, northwestern residents assailed the state’s conservative structures and operations and
the aristocratic men who perpetuated them. These aristocrats made a mockery of the memory of
the American Revolution, rejecting equality and self-government. Only by embracing
democratic principles could the state be set aright.
The petitions, Fourth of July celebrations, letters, and public meetings reveal not only the
grievances northwesterners possessed but also the workings of a dynamic and flexible political
culture. Nonfreeholders petitioned the state government demanding redress, signing their names
beside men who possessed landed and human property. In Brooke County, three residents—
Andrew Young, Roger Hill, and Thomas Allison—all signed a petition demanding a new
constitutional convention to fix the inadequacies in the present constitution. None of these men
owned property.99 Further, men (and women) aired their hopes and aspirations during meetings
and Fourth of July celebrations, cheering toasts and rubbing shoulders with their neighbors.
Fourth of July celebrations and political meetings welcomed men of all political stripes and
status, allowing all assembled to converse and debate. The burgeoning print medium allowed
men like “A HOUSE KEEPER of Harrison County” to publish a letter excoriating the conduct of an
elected official. While Virginia’s official political sphere only permitted propertied men and
men of wealth, the broader political sphere welcomed all white men (and women) regardless of
property, birthright, or wealth. In essence, Virginia’s system of government appeared rigid yet
flexible, static yet dynamic, tethered to the past while showing glimpses of its possible future.
But reform-minded residents and their representatives wanted a full embrace of democratic
principles, structures, and operations, and the most effective means of achieving such dramatic
change started with constitutional reform.
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Chapter 2: Reformers’ Victory: the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention
By April 1830, the constitutional convention that had assembled in Richmond the
previous October had accomplished its task. Delegates had approved a new constitution and
submitted it to voters who would shortly ratify it by a comfortable ten-thousand vote margin.1
While the new constitution received nearly universal acclaim east of the Blue Ridge Mountains
and warm support in the Shenandoah Valley, its passage met with widespread resistance in the
Northwest. Residents mobilized en masse against this new body of laws, decrying the
“aristocratic” principles that shaped the document. The new constitution, according to these
residents, perpetuated the constitutional inequalities that plagued the state under the previous
constitution. The hope that residents’ expressed prior to the convention had turned to bitter
disappointment.
Northwestern residents lashed out in disbelief and anger. Editorials, meetings,
correspondence, and extralegal political action illustrated residents’ disapproval of the
constitution. In Monongalia and Preston counties, “Many Non freeholders” published a letter in
the local newspaper addressed to other nonfreeholders in the region. Angry about their
continued political exclusion, these nonfreeholders interpreted their status in the body politic as
akin to African American slaves. Nonfreeholders languished as “political slaves...journing in a
land not ours” while performing as “servants of the Noble Lords of this land.” Adding to
residents’ “degraded and servil condition” were rumors that the eastern “landholding party”
supported “the rejection of the new Constitution because their power is not adjusted to please
them,--forgetting us altogether.” The authors, apoplectic about such political manipulation,
constructed a plan to demonstrate that though they remained “Bondsmen” they would publicly
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express their frustration. “[W]e feel proud,” these men confidently stated, “that at least two
hundred and fifty of us will be at liberty to come to the polls in this county and stand up erect,
and speak for ourselves.” Though disenfranchised, these men believed their presence, rhetoric,
and actions around the polls would generate sympathy among voters. While the new constitution
lacked democratic reforms, these men would manifest the democratic sentiment that burned
brightly in their hearts and minds.2
The disappointment expressed by “Many Non Freeholders” reflected their disbelief that
delegates adopted few, if any, democratic reforms. Legislative apportionment in both houses
continued to favor eastern Virginians. This malapportionment continued to underrepresent
northwesterners and ensured that state funding for internal improvements or a public school
system would remain uncertain. While the new constitution extended the right of suffrage, the
extension appeared modest, falling well short of universal male suffrage. The state legislature
would continue to appoint government officials while prospective politicians still had to possess
a freehold, too. The county court house system remained intact, perpetuating prominent
families’ program of consolidating power through patronage and land acquisition. Virginia’s
constitution appeared to have undergone few revisions.
Numerous northwesterners panned the new constitution. Residents’ energy and optimism
contained in editorials, Fourth of July speeches, meetings, and legislative petitions leading up to
the convention seemed wasted. Though voters could vote against the proposed constitution,
reports across the state strongly suggested that its ratification was a fiat acompli.
Northwesterners would continue to languish under a constitution that extended special privileges
and powers to a certain class of individuals, bestowing increased representation, an insulated

2

The Republican Monongalia & Preston Advertiser, April 6, 1830, 3. [emphasis in original]

56

court system, and a limited electorate to men determined to consolidate political power at all
costs. The constitution’s lack of a formal amendment mechanism increased residents’
disappointment and anger.
Previous historians of the 1829-1830 Virginia Constitutional Convention explain the
outcome as a defeat for democratic proponents and a victory for reactionary conservatives.
Frequently, this body of historiography posits the convention as a manifestation of sectionalism
and a harbinger of eventual dismemberment for the Old Dominion and the nation over the issue
of slavery.3 One northwestern historian contended that “the people of West Virginia replied” to
this convention, along with other numerous injustices, in their refusal to support eastern
Virginians’ secession movement in 1861.4 Another contemporary historian agreed, declaring
that the constitution ratified in 1830 “sow[ed] the seeds of injustice and distrust which bore fruit
in later years.”5
Modern historians have generally agreed with these previous interpretations.
Conservative eastern planters, wary of democratic reform and fearful for their slave property,
maintained their control of the state government, refusing to embrace the democratic principles
championed by western nonslaveholders. This debate over slavery foreshadowed the national
debate that would take place thirty years later. And though some historians have disagreed over
the convention’s sectional nature or slavery’s centrality to the debates, the consensus persists that
conservatives’ overwhelming interest in slavery convinced enough delegates to defeat
democratic reformers. For these historians, the convention represented a counterrevolution
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against the democratic forces that threatened to overtake the government and threaten chattel
slavery.6
As Christopher Michael Curtis has recently argued, though, historians’ preoccupation
with the convention’s refusal to embrace democratic reforms obscures the important ideological,
political, and practical changes manifest in the new constitution. Specifically, seemingly minute
and modest changes made to suffrage requirements accelerated the process of converting
Virginia into a slaveholding democracy. While the traditional basis of the freehold rested on its
acreage and its inherent association with republican ideology, the new constitution redefined the
freehold in terms of its commercial value.7 By removing the freehold from its classical
republican moorings, Virginians embraced the new political and economic context rapidly
unfolding around them.
But this important change did not mollify many northwesterners. In the decades leading
up to the convention, the majority of northwesterners passionately supported universal white
male suffrage. Allowing all white men to vote, proponents argued, accurately reflected their
interpretation of the American Revolution, helped secure private and public power for these
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white men, and rightfully validated the “common man” shibboleth of Jacksonian Democracy.
The new suffrage requirements, however, fell woefully short of reformers’ desires. This defeat
in the convention, coupled with failed reforms of legislative apportionment, popular elections of
government officials, and the county court system, embittered residents who believed their
failure rested at the feet of eastern planters and slaveholders determined to slay “the demon of
Reform” and protect their chattel at all costs.8
This perception that eastern slaveholders cared more about their African American slaves
than equality with their white neighbors had profound and lasting consequences on intrastate
sectional relations, the formation of political parties, the cultural debate over immigrants, and
relations between neighbors. In the Northwest, these consequences possessed special import, as
the region would become a flashpoint for these developments over the next four decades,
embroiling residents in pitched political and cultural battles. But the importance of the
convention went deeper than these issues. The convention’s denouement and the new
constitution did more than crystallize the perception that eastern slaveholders valued their slaves
more than white equality. Indeed, the changes manifest in the new constitution presented the
possibility that slaveownership and a racially based democratic polity could determine
republican citizenship and provide the foundation for Virginia’s republican government.
Virginians’ counterrevolution in 1830 protected slavery by paving the way for a modern
slaveholding democracy.
As northwestern residents looked toward the upcoming constitutional convention set to
convene in October 1829, many expressed optimism that deep and profound political change was
imminent. Some argued that the august body of delegates set to assemble in Richmond would
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lead the state out of political darkness and toward the light of democracy. “What good may we
not anticipate,” one Fourth of July toaster in Wheeling boldly proclaimed, “when Madison,
Monroe, and Marshall are at the helm.”9 Along with former presidents James Madison and
James Monroe and sitting Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, the assemblage included
Governor William Branch Giles and the state’s two senators, John Tyler and Littleton W.
Tazwell. The gathering of such intellectuals and Founding Fathers, combined with the national
march of Jacksonian Democracy, convinced residents that their long political suffering would
soon end.
Northwestern residents also placed great hopes in their delegates to the convention.
Those delegates included Alexander Campbell, an evangelical minister and Christian reformer,
and Philip Doddridge, a lawyer and outspoken proponent of democratic reform. Both men hailed
from Brooke County. Eugenius M. Wilson, a merchant and erstwhile Federalist, and Charles S.
Morgan, both Monongalia County residents, joined Campbell and Doddridge in representing the
northwestern counties of Ohio, Tyler, Brooke, Monongalia, and Preston.10 Even before the
convention’s opening, though, western delegates’ numerical disadvantage threatened to derail
their hopes of consummating a democratic constitution. The constitutional convention bill
passed the previous year allotted representation on senatorial districts, where eastern Virginians
held a distinct advantage.11 Still, northwestern residents and representatives remained aplomb.
“The friends of the Convention appear to be contented with the progress which they have made
towards reforming the state government,” a Wheeling newspaper editor reported.12
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Delegates commenced work on October 5, 1829. As the convention began, the cultural
differences between northwestern delegates and their counterparts from beyond the Blue Ridge
Mountains quickly became manifest. Tidewater delegates, some of whom claimed the dignified
status as members of the First Family of Virginia, arrived with powdered wigs, expertly tied
cravats, and knee britches and silk stockings that complemented their attire. Such men looked
the part of eighteenth-century aristocrats and classical republican government. Western and
northwestern delegates, in contrast, resembled the hardscrabble environment from which they
traveled. They arrived with disheveled hair, ties askew, and wearing homespun (and often
mismatched) clothes. While Tidewater gentlemen traveled upon purebred horses (and, in the
case of John Randolph of Roanoke, from imported English horses and carriages), western
delegates descended from ragged and ill-bred horses that displayed the wear and tear of the
journey across the mountains.13 These “uncouth looking” men, often scions of immigrants,
lacked the “bland and polish manner belonging to the South,” a distinction that became manifest
when compared to their Tidewater colleagues.14 But northwestern delegates wore these
distinctions with pride. While their fellow delegates from beyond the Blue Ridge embodied
aristocracy, they embodied democracy.
The differences in delegates’ clothing reflected differences in their speech patterns.
Contemporaries often remarked at the “bold” and “eloquent” voices emanating from Tidewater
and other conservative delegates as they “strove manfully against” reform measures.15 Their
voices reflected their generally pure English heritage, education, and training in classical theories
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of government, politics, political science, and philosophy. The voices emanating from
northwestern delegates, specifically Philip Doddridge, often registered as unintelligible because
of thick Scotch Irish accents.16 Reformers shot back, arguing that the “English way” of electing
politicians inexorably led to the “English way of speaking to them.”17 The diversity of political
and linguistic accents, reformers argued, was one marker of a new political and social context
where men no longer needed a freehold to vote or express deference when talking to politicians.
For reformers, the “English way” of structuring politics and relations between governors
and the governed appeared as vestiges of colonial and aristocratic rule. Simply put, the “English
way” was incongruous to this new political age. Reformers, hoping to fully inaugurate this new
political age, aimed to remove other relics of colonial and aristocratic rule. Eugenius Wilson of
Monongalia County wondered aloud about the effects of including a statute in the proposed
constitution that would “stamp the seal of perpetual disenfranchisement” for those Virginians
who engaged in dueling.18 Dueling, a gentleman’s custom used to defend a man’s honor and
reaffirm social hierarchy, had faded in popularity but still retained a certain following among
culturally orthodox planters and social and political elites.19 Other delegates commented on the
measure and recommended the matter to the General Assembly, but Wilson’s later tacit
endorsement suggests a real cultural divide between northwestern delegates and their Tidewater
counterparts. Delegates at the convention not only had to contend with diverse political
principles; they had to navigate equally diverse cultural understandings that generated and
shaped those political principles.
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As the debates unfolded in Richmond, representatives quickly found themselves clashing
over two divisive issues: whether or not to expand suffrage and addressing malapportionment in
the state legislature. On the former issue, northwestern representatives agreed that suffrage must
expand beyond the archaic freehold requirement.20 Alexander Campbell argued that the freehold
represented “as great an uncertainty as can be well conceived,” finding the whole edifice upon
which Virginia’s system of government rested as “precarious.”21 Eugenius Wilson found the
freehold equally distasteful. Wilson exclaimed that it was “absurd and unjust” to base
citizenship on a “fixed number acres of land, because of the inequality of the value of land.”
Wilson, acutely aware of land commodification and absentee ownership, especially in the TransAlleghany region, believed that the value of land was “too fluctuating, and its tenure too
uncertain” to measure a person’s attachment to the community. Confronted with the realities of
a market society, he averred, Virginians required a different litmus test for republican
citizenship.22
But if the convention expunged the freehold requirement from the constitution, what
would replace it? Or, as Wilson asked, “What test shall we apply?” to determine one’s
attachment to the republic.23 Here delegates differed, a key example of the fluid coalitions that
hampered reformers’ efforts. Alexander Campbell, who later founded the Disciples of Christ,
believed that the Old Testament provided delegates with a blueprint for expanding suffrage. He
argued that the “God of Israel first proposed a social compact” called a Berith in Hebrew; when
translated, the Berith was “precisely equivalent to our English word Constitution.” After the
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Israelite leaders wrote the Berith, they “submitted to every man on the muster roll of Israel.”24
The political implications were clear. All men—not just landowners, religious clergy, or the
governing class—voted to ratify or reject this constitution. Accordingly, Campbell offered an
amendment for extending the right of suffrage to “every free white male of the age of twenty-two
years, born within this Commonwealth.”25 His plan to expand suffrage based on age and
residency represented the most democratic plan offered during the convention; moderate and
conservative delegates deemed it too radical and dismissed it.
Eugenius Wilson of Monongalia County spoke highly of the connection between natural
rights and political participation. He maintained that “Nature, or Nature’s God rather, had
conferred certain original rights upon man.” Foremost among these rights was the “right of
appointing our own agents.” The argument that all white men possessed a natural right to selfgovernment largely reflected his and other reformers’ beliefs that the American Revolution had
wiped away the vestiges of aristocratic rule and ushered in the rule of the “common man.” But
Wilson could not completely shake the belief that Virginians needed to demonstrate their
attachment to the Commonwealth, a reflection of rampant absentee ownership and land
speculation in western Virginia. His proposal increased those eligible to vote but was more
modest than Campbell’s proposal. Under Wilson’s plan, free white males who had resided in the
Commonwealth for a minimum of two years, paid taxes during that election year, satisfied
military or militia obligations, and fulfilled any road service requirements would be eligible to
vote.26 Those who shared the burdens of government, he maintained, should enjoy the franchise.
His plan eschewed property qualifications for suffrage, finding the capricious market value of
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property too unstable a foundation. But the proposal still proved too radical for many moderate
and conservative delegates, meeting the same fate as Campbell’s proposal.
Other northwestern delegates looked to other slaveholding states for guidance on
expanding suffrage. Monongalian Charles Morgan argued that Virginia should align itself with
the other slaveholding states that had democratized their constitutions to include liberal suffrage
requirements and direct election of government officials. Morgan offered a synopsis of each
slaveholding state’s constitution, noting residency, age, property, or other requirements needed
to vote. Morgan’s efforts were more than a simple civics lesson. Rather, he believed that these
constitutions conclusively illustrated “that the principle of General Suffrage is neither new nor
dangerous.”27 These slaveholding states had broadened the franchise (and many had equalized
representation, too) without endangering their chattel, compromising private property, or
inaugurating civil anarchy. Slaveholders and nonslaveholders in such states possessed similar
political interests and worked harmoniously to protect those interests. Only Virginia and North
Carolina refused to follow their fellow slaveholding states.
Morgan’s proximity to Ohio and Pennsylvania—two nonslaveholding states that operated
with more democratized constitutions than Virginia—strengthened his argument. “[My
constituents] see and know the benefits of General Suffrage on society,” Morgan insisted.
Indeed, the nearly daily economic, political, and personal interactions between northwesterners
and residents in Ohio and Pennsylvania confirmed the lack of political rights Virginians enjoyed
compared to other states.28 And as the Northwest followed a similar economic trajectory as that
of Ohio and Pennsylvania, Morgan believed that the voices emanating from northwestern
laborers would only increase in intensity and volume. Those white men who labored in the
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fields, shops, and manufactories “constitute the great mass of actual productive labourers of the
State” and deserved political representation. These men manifested the productive capacity of
labor, Morgan maintained, and offered more to the Commonwealth than indolent aristocrats
adorned with powdered wigs who subsisted off of slave labor.29 Alexander Campbell agreed
with his colleague. The manual labor required of and performed by western Virginians ensured
that their “Republican principles” remained “pure and uncontaminated.” On the other hand,
eastern Virginians, Campbell remarked, owned “negroes” who “fan[ned] them to sleep,” strongly
suggesting that the lack of physical labor made such men not only physically weak and
effeminate but politically enfeebled, too.30 Manual labor not only promoted masculinity in the
public and private spheres for white men but ensured a hearty citizenry capable of protecting the
republic.
Morgan’s support for expanded suffrage and democratic reform reflected a different
understanding of politics and government than what conservative delegates understood.
Opponents of suffrage reform feared that an enlarged electorate comprised of propertyless men,
drunkards, paupers, and other degraded and dependent classes led inexorably to “mobs,
confusion, and turmoil at the polls.”31 Noted conservative Benjamin Watkins Leigh reminded
the convention that every state that had embraced the “extremes of democracy” soon devolved
into “licence and anarchy.”32 Where conservatives perceived chaos, though, Morgan interpreted
a healthy democratic society. Morgan conceded that when “many thousands of persons are
brought together upon election days, there will be disputes, and sometimes turmoils.” But
delegates should embrace such displays. “These disputes only serve to show,” he declared, “that
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the body politic is in a good and healthy condition; that it has energy and power.” While eastern
conservatives and opponents of reform preferred the “cold calm” of present elections “where few
men dare express opinions on the public affairs,” democratic elections meant that “all are free to
discuss the affairs of Government.”33 Indeed, the arguing, bantering, debating, and politicking
that occurred during elections showcased democracy in action. For during these interactions
citizens offered their respective political interpretations, negotiated these understandings, and
arrived at an accord that ultimately reflected the will of the majority. The “cold calm” displayed
during current elections signaled widespread apathy and disinterest and permitted political
manipulation by a vocal minority. The will of “the people” could not be accurately ascertained
from elections. Morgan hoped that the inauguration of democratic reform would revitalize the
state and the people and usher in dynamic and universal participation.
Morgan’s interpretation of democracy reflected the growing leviathan of Jacksonian
Democracy, a nascent movement that encompassed reforming constitutions, flattening
distinctions between white men, and inaugurating a more raucous form of popular politics.
Opponents of expanding suffrage specifically and Jacksonian Democracy generally considered
northwesterners’ arguments rubbish. Conservative Benjamin Watkins Leigh considered
democratic principles, including the “Circuit Court System” and “Universal Suffrage,” as a
northern “plague” that threatened to sicken the body politic.34 Leigh’s epithet of “plague” was
revealing. With the causes of many contagious diseases still unknown in the nineteenth-century,
Americans feared the unpredictability, rapidity, and arbitrariness with which illnesses struck.
Leigh’s figurative equation of a plague and democratic reforms, therefore, sought to refute
reformers’ ideological motivations, for these reforms, like contagious diseases, possessed no
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political agenda nor could they control their own actions.35 These democratic reforms, like
“influenza” or “small-pox,” struck randomly and would ravage Virginia’s body politic. Further,
the “plague” of democratic reforms emerged not from the ideals of the American Revolution or
the context of Jacksonian Democracy; rather, they represented a dangerous and frightening
northern outbreak that sought to replicate the heathen northern milieu on southern soil. Leigh
proposed a simple solution to this malady. Stop the madness of democracy before it infected
Virginia by maintaining the current power structure, thereby quarantining the body politic from
nonfreeholders and other dependents who transmitted such “plague[s].”
Other opponents of reform spoke fondly of the freehold as the only proper and secure
source of civic security and tranquility. Philip Norborne Nicholas, a Richmond banker, found
little wrong with the freehold requirement and limiting suffrage to landholders. Nicholas railed
against the idea that “[s]uffrage is derived from nature,” arguing that the “lasting ownership of
the soil of the country…is the best evidence of permanent attachment” to the commonwealth and
thus afforded the best means for determining suffrage.36 John Randolph of Roanoke spoke
forcefully against any suffrage or representation proposals that he believed would “divorce
property from power.”37 He feared that proposals to expand suffrage beyond its current
requirements would result in “bondage” for him and his ilk, as nonfreeholders would exercise
limitless power over property. Randolph believed that the current constitution correctly
distributed political power and rightly recognized the immense political weight that property,
whether landed or human, exerted. For Randolph, the “pernicious falsehood” of egalitarianism
promulgated by reformers misinterpreted the memory of the American Revolution and seemed
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destined to destroy the Commonwealth.38 Accordingly, he passionately supported the freehold
and castigated proposals that failed to maintain that scheme.
Other delegates opposed to changing the freehold requirement found arguments extolling
man’s natural right to self-government quixotic and baseless. Abel P. Upshur, representing the
Eastern Shore county of Northampton, rhetorically asked if the “savages” in the “forests of
America” or who “inhabit the Asiatic islands” possessed the natural right to self-government that
reformers claimed all men enjoyed. Of course not, he sneered. Such “savages” lived in a crude
and chaotic environment, not the hierarchical and patriarchal world of Virginia. An individual’s
political representation and power derived not from natural rights but rather from the society’s
structure in which he lived, he maintained.39 Accordingly, only those individuals in possession
of certain forms of property should be allowed to vote. Private property, particularly land,
satisfied that requirement.40
Upshur was not alone in his denunciation of “natural rights.” Numerous conservative and
moderate delegates supported Upshur’s rationale, arguing that reformers’ emphasis of “natural
rights” in connection to enfranchisement undermined their own argument. Philip Pendleton
Barbour of Orange County, in a pointed speech directed to reformers, wondered if “individuals
of the discarded classes” should also be allowed to vote considering they supposedly possessed
natural rights. Women, children, laborers, the disabled, and other dependents, were among the
“discarded” who lacked sound political or moral judgment.41 Some delegates sarcastically
wondered if the “natural rights” argument could be extended to African Americans. Littleton
Waller Tazwell, representing Norfolk, and Upshur, both asked reformers how they can “limit
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themselves to white population alone.” For if all men possessed the same natural rights, how
could reformers exclude African Americans, Native Americans, or other “savages,” they
inquired.42 The inclusion of such “discarded classes” threatened to make a mockery of
Virginia’s slaveholding society and nullify the color line that supposedly demarcated freedom
from bondage. Even the most avid reformers refused to countenance black voting. The “natural
rights” argument, once thought to be a powerful weapon for reformers, now emerged as a
formidable stumbling block as they pursued expanded suffrage.
The debates over reapportioning the state legislature were as equally divisive as those on
suffrage, with the two issues often intermingling. As with suffrage, northwestern delegates
believed their proposals reflected the correct interpretation of the American Revolution by
recognizing white equality. Accordingly, northwestern and western delegates supported the
“white basis” plan. Under this proposal, only the free white population would be considered
when calculating representation, excluding African American slaves and taxes. Cognizant of
their rapidly increasing white populations, delegates from Northwest and western Virginia
generally argued that this plan would correctly recognize majoritarian power and reflect the
current demographic shifts altering the state’s human geography. Armed with a majority in the
state legislature, western Virginians could soon realize their hopes of internal improvements to
enhance communication and commercial access and a public education system to educate
residents.
Proponents of the “white basis” contended that this proposal recognized the memory of
the American Revolution. Only white citizens, reformers contended, deserved political
representation because they constituted “the people.” Opponents of the “white basis,” though,
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perceived in this plan the “tyranny of the majority” that some Founding Fathers feared.43 These
opponents of the “white basis” caustically referred to it as “King Numbers.” John Randolph, one
of the plan’s more vocal opponents, stated unequivocally that he “would not live under King
Numbers.” He would neither allow “King Numbers” to act as his “steward” nor “task-master.”44
For Randolph and his ilk, the implications of living under “King Numbers” were dire, as they
would be powerless to control “King Numbers,” unlike their current dependents. The carefully
ordered world that Randolph reigned over would be upset.
The epithet “King Numbers” was an important rhetorical tool wielded by anti-reformers
and opponents. These men wielded this moniker to deny reformers’ ideological motivations,
arguing that this plan sanctioned mob rule and political anarchy. Indeed, “King Numbers”
succinctly and powerfully captured opponents’ fears in widely accessible phraseology while
simultaneously advancing their interpretation of the American Revolution. The word “king”
reminded Virginians about the abusive, tyrannical, and arbitrary nature of despotic rulers.
Virginians needed no clearer evidence of such behavior than their experience with King George
III during the American Revolution. His capriciousness and dismissive attitude toward the
colonies still burned brightly in the minds of Virginians, especially as their home represented a
locus of political independence and military engagement.
Further, by connecting “King Numbers” to King George III, anti-reformers appropriated
the memory of the American Revolution to reflect their interpretation and outcome of that
seminal moment. The colonies revolted to free themselves from a tyrant, conservatives argued,
not to inaugurate the dangerous doctrine of majoritarian rule. Why replace one tyrant with a
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thousand tyrants? What Virginians needed were men trained in classical thought, not trained
behind a plough, to lead them and protect the republic. The narrative of the American
Revolution propagated by northwestern and western delegates represented a dangerous canard,
conservatives and opponents insisted, designed to overthrow benevolent and educated rulers and
replace them with the uneducated and crude masses.
This uneducated and crude mass of men represented the seemingly overwhelming and
limitless power of “Numbers.” Faceless and nameless, this mob of men welcomed violent
confrontation, willfully flouting proper legal and political boundaries to achieve a desired end.
This corrupt and uneducated mass possessed no guiding political principles but rather operated
under the control of slick orators with deep pockets or libations. This majority would “oppress,
harass, and plunder the minority,” leaving private property and wealth vulnerable.45 The effect
of “Numbers” would extend to the ballot box, too. Elections would not be won by the most
deserving candidate but by the one who mobilized the required “numbers” to the polls, sullying
elections and overturning traditional authority. Corrupt political manipulators would replace
benevolent and selfless politicians, using their position to consolidate power rather than using it
to protect the republic. “[N]o inherent virtue” could be found in such circumstances,
conservatives maintained, only an abusive majority that used its “physical power” to achieve its
political goals.46 Put simply, the reign of “King Numbers” would prove fatal to the body politic.
Northwestern delegates understood the damage the epithet “King Numbers” inflicted and
tried to soften its blow. Alexander Campbell contended that this plan of representation would
“operate to the advantage of the whole state” by replacing the state’s current “monarchical and
aristocratical” form of government. Nonfreeholders and nonslaveholders who lived in the
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shadows of their powerful neighbors would enjoy the political representation and equality they
deserved as white men under the “white basis,” as well.47 Charles Morgan maintained that
“King Numbers” accurately reflected the new political and social context unfolding around them.
“King Numbers” represented the “legitimate sovereign of all this country,” he stated, and that
“General Jackson” was the only “lawful representative of King Numbers.” The glorification of
the “common man” at the heart of Jacksonian Democracy appeared unstoppable with President
Andrew Jackson at the helm. And while this movement was nascent, its supporters had already
toppled tyrannical rulers and rewrote aristocratic constitutions elsewhere. Opponents of “King
Numbers” stood against the tide of history, Morgan declared, for a more “wise, benevolent,
patriotic and powerful” ruler could not be found in the United States or the world. By
inaugurating “King Numbers,” Virginians would embrace the dynamic that power rested in the
“supreme tribunal” of the state, “public opinion.”48
Still, few, if any, conservatives, anti-reformers, or even moderates welcomed the prospect
of living under “King Numbers.” Opponents declared that Virginia would witness the same
scenes of popular unrest and violence that beset France during the tumultuous years of the
French Revolution. Benjamin Watkins Leigh cautioned the convention of “experiment[ing] on
the body politic” in the same manner as France. The “large dose of French rights of man,”
nearly identical to the “natural rights” advocated by western reformers, inevitably led to “fever,
frenzy, madness and death,” he warned.49 Once again, Leigh employed a revealing metaphor to
express his fears. Nineteenth-century medical procedures often proved dangerous, if not fatal,
and medicine often enjoyed the same infamous notoriety from skeptical Americans who
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distrusted medical quacks and the “cures” they peddled.50 France’s condition worsened as
democratic reformers administered more and more of their “rights of man” dosage, Leigh
reminded his colleagues, and reformers continued this prescription until France’s body politic
violently convulsed and died. The implications for the Old Dominion were clear. Unless
delegates rebuked reformers and their quack medicine, Virginia awaited the same fate as the
French Republic.
Imagery and rhetoric derived from the French Revolution became so ubiquitous among
anti-reformers that it provoked an outburst from Philip Doddridge. “We should imagine that we
are listening to [Edmund] Burke on the French Revolution,” he remarked. “All the horrors of
that volcano are set before us,” he protested, “as if in our madness, we were ready to plunge into
it.”51 But the frequent references to the French Revolution—and Doddridge’s outburst—
illustrated the power of that moment’s historical memory to inform delegates’ interpretation
about constitutional revision in Virginia. To opponents of reform, the French Revolution
represented the dangers of democracy. That moment encapsulated opponents’ fears of an
enlarged (and largely landless) electorate, the reign of “King Numbers,” and the vulnerability of
private property. The fears appeared tangible enough for opponents and numerous moderates to
oppose “King Numbers” and support another form of representation that took into consideration
the white population and private property. Delegates referred to this plan as the “mixed basis.”52
Apportionment in the state legislature based on the “mixed basis” reflected supporters’
fears of private property in a democratic society. Private property deserved extra security,
supporters argued, both because of its inherent vulnerability and taxable nature. Perhaps no
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species of private property appeared more vulnerable than African American slaves. During the
convention, approximately eighty-two percent of the state’s political elite owned at least one
slave; nearly one-third were planters.53 By 1830, Virginia was home to more slaves than any
other state in the Union, nearly 470,000 slaves.54 Though the majority of slaves lived east of the
Blue Ridge Mountains, every county in the state, including the Northwest, held slaves. Ohio
County had 360 slaves, while residents in Brooke County, the northernmost extension of the
state, owned 228 slaves.55 While delegates considered slavery solely an issue for eastern
Virginians, the ubiquitous presence of enslaved African Americans across the state produced
constitutional debates over slavery and slaves’ political weight that were critical to all
Virginians.
Tidewater and Piedmont delegates, representing districts with larger numbers and a
higher density of enslaved African Americans, contended that their constituents required greater
political and constitutional protection. This need for extra security was urgent, too. The recent
violent overthrow of Santo Domingo’s slaveholding regime, coupled with the memory of Gabriel
Prosser’s failed rebellion in 1800 (and Denmark Vessey’s in South Carolina in 1822), convinced
many Virginians (and numerous white southerners) that egalitarian rhetoric and ideals were too
dangerous in a slave society.56 Philip Pendleton Barbour justified his reticence for embracing
democratic principles by connecting this system of government to “the frightful and appalling
scenes of horror and desolation” that marked the downfall of Santo Domingo’s slaveholders.57
Benjamin Watkins Leigh candidly confessed that slaveholders “cannot admit any interference”
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with their property “without the greatest danger.”58 Conservative delegates believed that any
outside interference with their chattel imperiled the master-slave relationship and their sacrosanct
right to private property. In a democratic society, such fears were heightened by white residents
openly discussing equality and natural rights, words that slaves might hear, internalize, and act
upon. Nonslaveholders, conservative delegates reasoned, especially those living in an area with
few slaves, failed to appreciate such fears. Extra constitutional and political protection for
slaveholders, though, would help calm slaveholders’ fears and ensure that Virginia’s
slaveholding regime prevented any uprising.
Conservatives’ skepticism concerning democratic reforms in a slaveholding state also
reflected their doubt that African American bondage could flourish in the Northwest. Various
reasons existed for such reasoning, Abel Parker Upshur explained. “[A] rooted antipathy to this
species of population” existed beyond the Alleghenies, he stated, intimating that a crude form of
antislaveryism could be found in western Virginia’s hollows and hills. Upshur also wavered on
whether slavery could exist so close to free states. The region’s proximity to Ohio and
Pennsylvania would “forever render this sort of property precarious and insecure,” he warned,
and remarked that the Ohio River or an abstract state boundary was inadequate for stemming
northerners’ increasing hostility against slavery. The region’s climate prohibited widespread
plantation agriculture, notably cotton and tobacco, making the need for slave labor unnecessary.
Rather, northwesterners relied on “personal industry” and “personal exertion,” not slave labor, to
improve their homes and farms. For the foreseeable future, Upshur maintained, slaveholders
would constitute a minority and slavery would never flourish on the windward side of the
Alleghenies.59
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Upshur’s claims about the Northwest reveal his and other conservatives’ ignorance of the
region and static view of slavery. Slavery existed in every county in Virginia, including those in
the Northwest, such as Brooke, Ohio, and Monongalia. The first two counties bordered Ohio
and Pennsylvania while Monongalia shared a border with the Keystone State. Conservatives,
accustomed to living in a slaveholding society where slaves comprised the dominant labor force,
overlooked how slave labor constituted one form of labor available in northwestern counties.60
Though slave labor was not the dominant labor force in the region, northwestern slaveholders
exploited this type of labor like other slaveholders across the state. One local historian stated
that slaves were “employed in domestic service, driving teams and ordinary labor.”61
Slaveholders across the Northwest and Appalachia used their slaves to tend sheep, prepare wool
for market, export livestock down the Ohio River and to New Orleans, and rear cattle and pigs
for slaughter and transport to Baltimore. While not engaged in traditional slave labor agriculture,
northwestern slaves demonstrated the dynamism and adaptability of slavery to a new and
different physical landscape and political-economy.
Other practices concerned with slavery would have reminded easterners of their society.
Northwesterners meted out corporal punishment against rebellious or unrepentant slaves,
including by whipping and burning.62 Northwestern slaveholders, similar to other slaveholders
across the state and South, sought to protect their slaveholding rights by including local whites in
various functions. Some slaveholders hired local poor whites to oversee their slaves on seasonal
cattle drives, allowing these men to exert mastery over African American slaves and enjoy the
fruits of white supremacy. Slaveholders also rented pastures from nonslaveholders for their
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animals to graze.63 These actions helped slaveholders further their investment in slaves while
promoting amicable (and often profitable) relations with their nonslaveholding neighbors. The
bond established between slaveholders and nonslaveholders also sought to promote a shared
interest in the future and security of slavery, a critical relationship if and when slavery seemed
threatened. Renting slaves, though it occurred less frequently in the Northwest than near
southwestern Virginia’s Kanawha salt mines, allowed northwestern slaveholders to extract more
money from their chattel while encouraging nonslaveholders to support slavery and the
slaveholding regime. Renting slaves also promoted harmonious relations between slaveholders
and nonslaveholders, with the latter group able to take advantage of an extra set of hands for
domestic duties or harvest time.64 Though the majority of northwestern residents maintained
their farms through family labor and “personal industry,” slave labor was also readily available.
With their fealty to slavery questioned, northwestern delegates attempted to persuade
skeptical delegates about the benefits of a democratized slaveholding polity and the compatibility
of slavery and democracy. Eugenius Wilson posited that a democratized constitution would
forever bind the interests of the slaveholder and nonslaveholder. Inferring that the Missouri
Compromise and the Nullification Crisis were harbingers of future conflicts over slavery, Wilson
pleaded with delegates to “unite” all “free white” men in preparation of an inevitable “crisis.”
With the slaveholder and nonslaveholder possessing identical political interests, Virginians
would stand united against any threat to slavery.65 Philip Doddridge believed that the latest
census data showing an increase in the slave population in the Northwest demonstrated that
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slavery and democratic supporters could peacefully coexist.66 Skeptical delegates needed to look
no further for evidence of such a claim than Doddridge, a slaveholder and passionate exponent of
democracy.67 Richmond banker Chapman Johnson broke ranks with his eastern colleagues and
supported these assertions by northwestern delegates. Johnson declared that fixing legislative
apportionment on the “white basis” would foster “a feeling of affection and sentiment of justice”
between western nonslaveholders and eastern slaveholders and ultimately protect slavery.68 Near
the convention’s conclusion, Alexander Campbell attempted to introduce an antislavery petition
only to be dissuaded by colleagues. While Campbell’s motives remain murky, his colleagues
feared that this petition would only stoke sectional tensions, incorrectly brand all westerners as
antislavery, and validate opponents’ arguments about westerners’ unsound position on slavery.69
Northwestern delegates remained publicly mum on Campbell’s conduct. Rather, they continued
to proclaim that they sought only to protect slavery while prohibiting eastern slaveholders
exercise of “political dominion” over northwestern residents. Democratic reform promised to
secure both.70
In the Northwest, the convention played out in newspapers, keeping residents abreast of
debates, suffrage and apportionment proposals, the conduct of their elected representatives, and
overall pursuit of democratic reform. As the convention commenced, residents expressed
optimism that their representatives’ arguments and evidence would convince other delegates to
embrace reforms. The obduracy displayed by “tide-water men,” though, incited anger and
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dismay in many residents. Such men, residents decried, “are not inclined to trust the people at
large with any powers.”71 In Wheeling, the local newspaper editor excoriated conservative
delegates who wondered about the efficacy of a constitutional statute that would prohibit new
residents to the state from voting for five years. This political quarantine imposed upon new
residents threatened to undercut western Virginia’s growing white population, especially that
around Wheeling, where industrial jobs attracted prospective employees. Immigrants from
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey accelerated the region’s demographic growth, as the
population rose approximately forty percent between 1820 and 1829.72 Wheeling, above other
towns in Virginia, the editor maintained, depended on this influx of immigrants from other states
for their “capital, industry, and enterprize.” The five year quarantine amounted to an attack on
Wheeling and its growing industrial sector, and further sowed seeds of competition and distrust
between residents of Wheeling and eastern Virginia. The newspaper editor nonetheless
expressed his optimism that this “obnoxious and preposterous proposition” would meet its due
fate.73
Perhaps more galling for northwestern residents than the rumored five year political
quarantine was the rhetoric and logic of Benjamin Watkins Leigh. Leigh, foreshadowing James
Henry Hammond’s “mud-sill” speech, equated the tasks that slaves performed in eastern
Virginia with those performed by poor yeomen and landless peasants in western Virginia. But
while the latter group would receive political representation under reformers’ plans, slaves
remained excluded (and rightfully so, according to Leigh, for they lacked proper morality and
intellect). Still, Leigh questioned whether “those who are obliged to depend on their daily labour
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for daily subsistence” should be engaged in “political affairs.” According to Leigh, the answer
was simply “no.” The “peasantry of the west,” he confirmed, were ill-prepared and uneducated
for the rigors of republican citizenship. These men lacked the political fitness to participate in
politics, and their inclusion would inherently threaten all Virginians and private property. The
security of the state depended on the continued exclusion of these “peasants.”74
Not surprisingly, Leigh’s comparison of enslaved African Americans and western whites
went over poorly with western residents. His words were met with a mixture of apoplexy and
disbelief, as northwestern white residents considered their equation with slaves as anathema.
Such a comparison represented one of the basest and degrading insults a white southerner could
receive as it appeared to flout the color line that supposedly demarcated white from black,
freedom from bondage. Now Leigh, and possibly other members of his ilk, seemed comfortable
in imposing the same shackles on white residents as their slaves. Residents assailed such
possibilities. Those white men who toiled behind the “plough” or worked with “mechanic’s
tools” sharpened their moral and physical skills, they argued, which prepared them for the rigors
of republican citizenship. These white men controlled their labor and deserved the political
representation to protect that labor. “[T]ide-water gentlemen” such as Leigh, though, enjoyed
“amusements and vices” while they lived off the “labour of their slaves.”75 Indolent planterpoliticians like Leigh contributed little to the Commonwealth and failed to recognize that
political representation for the “peasantry of the west” would ensure security for private property
and a healthy body politic. Rather, Leigh and his colleagues preferred to rest on the security of
antiquated political reasoning, favoring paranoia to practicality.
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Leigh’s figurative equation of African American slaves to white westerners coupled with
news of the convention’s rejection of reforms worried northwestern residents. And, by the end
of 1829, their delegates shared that sense of disappointment and frustration. Efforts to directly
elect the governor failed, even though most delegates agreed that the governor should remain
politically weak. The prospect of the people electing the executive still seemed too dangerous
for many delegates to accept.76 Alexander Campbell introduced a measure to promote common
schools; the convention refused to debate its merits.77 Supreme Court Chief Justice John
Marshall countered accusations that the county court system encouraged nepotism and
corruption, maintaining that the current system enabled judges to mete out punishment
judiciously and independently without fear of rebuttal from an oversight body. The system also
ensured an unrivaled form of “internal quiet” that other states, especially those in the North,
envied.78 Northwestern delegates hoped that the two former presidents’ support for reform
would sway moderates and undecided; instead, Monroe only warmly supported some measures
while Madison consistently voted with opponents of reform.79
Opponents of democratic reform measures enjoyed numerous victories, including
representation in the state legislature. A modest change to the formula calculating representation
still allotted the majority of delegates to Piedmont and Tidewater counties, forty-two and thirtysix respectively. Voters in the twenty-six counties west of the Alleghanies, where the majority
of the white population resided, received thirty-one delegates. The convention applied the same
arbitrary scheme of apportionment to the Senate. The forty counties west of the Blue Ridge
Mountains received thirteen senators while the sixty five counties on the eastern side of the Blue
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Ridge received nineteen. This favorable allocation of representation to eastern districts
represented a measure of “double security” for eastern slaveholders who paid taxes on their
slaves and on products purchased from the profits of slave labor.80 Northwestern delegates and
residents hopeful that a future amendment could change the formula used to calculate
representation were dismayed that the new constitution forbid the General Assembly to alter the
number of delegates or senators allotted to each district.81 What one Wheeling newspaper
labeled as “THE BASIS OF ABSURDITIES” further cemented the preponderance of political power
wielded by planters, slaveholders, large landholders, and the political elite.82
Reformers’ hopes for expanding suffrage met the same fate as their aspirations for
altering representation in the state legislature. Northwestern delegates championed plans that
either would have inaugurated universal male suffrage or a form of general suffrage fell victim to
conservatives and moderates who feared the repercussions of democratic reform. Instead,
delegates ratified a proposal that appeared only to modestly increase those eligible to vote.
Among those now permitted to vote included those enfranchised under the previous constitution;
owners of a freehold worth at least twenty-five dollars; leaseholders whose annual rent was at
least twenty dollars and who had held that lease for a minimum of five years; anyone who legally
stood to inherit a freehold; housekeepers in charge of maintaining a residence; tenants and jointtenants; and those who possessed land as part of a corporation, held a title in equity, and who
held a mortgage.83 The addition of these new groups to the electorate signaled a marked
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departure from the values of economic and political independence and civic virtue that defined
republican citizenship, although it still fell short of reformers’ goal of universal suffrage.
The denial of universal male suffrage or a form of general suffrage incensed northwestern
residents, and historians have seized on this frustration to argue that delegates ratified a facsimile
of the previous constitution that included only modest alterations.84 But the changes made to
suffrage revealed important developments occurring in Virginia, and signaled delegates’
acknowledgement of a new economic context. Though officeholders still had to own a freehold,
the increased electorate meant increased power for voters to check politicians’ conduct. While
previous definitions of the freehold focused on its acreage, delegates at the convention, cognizant
of market forces, redefined the freehold in terms of its commercial value. This redefinition
recognized land’s economic qualities and its status as a transferrable commodity. Freeholds
could be divided and transferred without undermining the principal ownership, allowing men to
purchase parcels of a freehold as a stock or bond and vote without outright owning the freehold.
This change reflected a critical shift from classical republican ideology that had informed the
initial interpretation of a freehold. Perhaps more importantly, this redefinition and
reconceptualization of republican ideology presented the scenario of slaveownership constituting
a basis for republican citizenship in the future.85
The enfranchisement of tenants, leaseholders, and housekeepers likewise signaled an
acknowledgement of current economic forces and an important ideological transformation of
republicanism. Charles Fenton Mercer, the measure’s principal author, believed that land
represented only one form of capital and that sundry other forms attached Virginians to their
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state. Those men in possession of other forms of “other property besides land,” he suggested,
showed their fealty and support to Virginia similar to a “land-owner.” Further, Mercer and other
supporters of this proposal recognized that both land and labor generated important capital, and
that the “proprietors” of this capital deserved political representation to protect their interests.86
Mercer’s suffrage proposal “bridged the antagonistic arguments of democratic and conservative
delegates,” although some conservatives, including Benjamin Watkins Leigh, feared that this
redefinition of citizenship would affect universal male suffrage.87 While the proposal did not
inaugurate universal male suffrage, the reconceptualization of property as principally a form of
capital represented a critical ideological shift away from classical republican ideology and to a
more democratized government.
Western and northwestern Virginians applauded many of these reforms and signaled their
desire to ratify the new constitution. In Martinsburg, one newspaper editor considered the
constitution’s ratification the “desired policy of the West.” The new constitution “contains many
beneficial reforms, and, secondly, because it encreases its relative political weight and enables it
at some future day to assert more effectually, the proper basis of representation.” The
constitutional revolution demanded by westerners “must be gradual,” the editor conceded.88
Philip Doddridge “admit[ted] the superiority of the new [constitution] over the old one,” a phrase
some western Virginians interpreted as his tacit approval.89 A Shenandoah Valley newspaper
identified northwestern newspapers that supported ratification, including one in Wheeling,
Clarksburg, and Morgantown. The newspaper also noted that Monongalia delegate Charles
Morgan endorsed the new constitution, “declar[ing] his determination to vote for the new
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Constitution, and urg[ing] such arguments in favor of the expediency of its ratification.”
Morgan, “an ardent friend of reform,” would persuade his constituents to ratify the new
constitution as his words carried “great weight” in the region.90
Western and northwestern Virginia’s denunciations, however, drowned out such
favorable interpretations of the proposed constitution. Numerous transmontane residents lashed
out in frustration and anger because delegates failed to fully democratize the state constitution,
notably in refusing to inaugurate universal male suffrage and equal representation. By early
1830, two northwestern delegates emerged as outspoken critics. Philip Doddridge and
Alexander Campbell assailed James Monroe, James Madison, and Frederick County delegate
John Cooke, the lone western representative to support ratification, for their apostasy to the
democratic cause. Doddridge lamented the divisions that arose between western delegates on
matters of reforms, which hindered their ability to form a united front and parry attacks from
moderates and conservatives. Perhaps most concerning for Doddridge was what he interpreted
as residents’ capitulation toward the new constitution’s ratification. This posture of
“submission,” he declared, represented what eastern slaveholders desired to see in their chattel.
Northwestern whites appeared consigned to live under a “political compact” that promised
“slavery of us and our children,” turning a once bright political future for the region into one
dominated by eastern planter-politicians consumed with their pursuit of absolute power and
absolute protection for their chattel.91
Alexander Campbell’s interpretation of the convention’s denouement and future
prospects for the Northwest seemed equally foreboding. In a series of letters printed in the
Wellsburg Gazette, Campbell denounced the machinations of a manipulative “faction” that
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flouted the will of the majority.92 The minister found conservatives’ and anti-reformers’
characterizations of western reformers abhorrent, along with their fear mongering tactics. Such
delegates, Campbell declared, willfully spread rumors about westerners imposing draconian
taxes upon the ratification of a democratic constitution. The fear generated by this canard
resulted in countless “[p]etitions, remonstrances and expostulations, inflammatory speeches and
addresses” produced by eastern Virginians who immediately became “alarmed for their negroes
and their estates.”93 This canard produced the desired effect, Campbell lamented, as moderate
and conservative delegates expressed their constituents’ fears through the rejection of democratic
reforms.
Campbell found little to support in the new constitution. What good was the extension of
suffrage, he questioned, “when it can be of no use to use except annually to meet, [and] to
murmur at our masters.” While their “masters” denied northwesterners political representation,
they would willfully impose taxes to support a “standing army…to keep down the slaves” or
impress them to quell an “insurrection.” White northwesterners would be compelled to support
the institution that denied them political equality. “[W]e must be demislaves, or an Irish
peasantry, or a species of heliots,” Campbell decried, serving at the whims of the state’s
slaveholding regime. African American slavery, that “curse of curses, which has deluged every
country with crime, and engulphed it in ruin,” now prevented white northwesterners from
enjoying the political privileges that rightly belonged to them. Until Virginians had a frank
discussion about that “black cloud in our horizon,” northwestern residents would continue to find
themselves under the dominion of slaveholders.94
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Northwestern residents, like their representatives, found little in the proposed constitution
to applaud. Earlier drafts of various proposals that delegates transmitted to constituents in late
1829 stirred emotions among proponents desirous of universal male suffrage specifically and
democratic reform in general. Rather than expunging the “antiquated and anti-republican
principles” that shaped the state’s political institutions and culture, the convention has been
busily “fastening the yoke of the slaveholder’s supremacy upon the necks of the white
population.” Reforms championed by residents had all seemingly failed, with the blame resting
at the feet of planter-politicians, large landowners, and the political elite. “Honest labour” and
“[i]ntelligence and industry” disqualified northwestern white men from enjoying political
representation, as such virtues apparently meant little in Virginia. Rather, the status of a
landholder “gives a better title to the enjoyment of civil rights.”95
By early 1830, northwestern residents, in possession of the proposed constitution, argued
that the constitution represented a reaffirmation of divisive and dangerous sectionalism.
“[E]astern Virginia will never conform to the interests or views of Western Va.,” one anonymous
writer grumbled, arguing that the two possessed incompatible and antagonistic interests. To
remedy this, western Virginia should explore annexation to Maryland. The “greater intercourse”
between western Virginia and Maryland would politically revitalize the region and promote
commercial interests.96 Another writer compared Virginia to neighboring Ohio and remarked at
the “Egyptian darkness” that enveloped the “Antient Dominion.” The new constitution ensured
this “Egyptian darkness” while the document’s prohibition on alteration ensured that Virginia’s
planter-politicians would continue to wield power over their “white slaves, as well as black.” A
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division of the state along the Alleghenies presented the only means of achieving political
representation for white northwesterners while freeing themselves from political bondage.97
Many northwestern residents spoke frankly about slavery’s role in denying their pursuit
of democratic reform. One resident was incredulous that a “race of beings, having no political
exestinence, and who are moreover deprived of their every natural right” seemingly enjoyed
political representation while countless northwesterners remained locked out. Planter-politicians
“white-washed” their slaves so it would appear these men still abided by the color line that
separated freedom from bondage. Instead, in their pursuit of power and security, these
slaveholders’ made a mockery of the color line.98 An anonymous writer, “JUSTICE,” recounted
the “memorials,” “writings,” and “conventions” over the past thirty-five years undertaken by
residents who, once hopeful for a democratic constitution, now discovered themselves in
“political bondage.” The author saved his most caustic remarks for the proposed constitution’s
arbitrary means of allocating representation. He warned his audience of the dangers of
“amalgamating…the free white and slave population,” believing that the two races should
remain separate.
The author’s verb selection was revealing. In nineteenth-century lexicon, “amalgamate”
generally referenced the interracial sexual contact between white men and enslaved female
African Americans. Eastern Virginia’s long history of slavery and large number of slaves
increased the likelihood of such contact, but slaveowners refused to acknowledge this tawdry
history. The appearance of mulatto children on the plantation and at auctions, though, seemed to
validate such rumors. A “large percentage of human stock shipped to the Gulf States,” one
contemporary later remarked, “bore the best blood of the F.F.V.” as a result of this “cross-
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breeding.”99 The author’s use of “amalgamate” recognized not only the long history of
interracial sexual contact between whites and blacks but the verb also served as an underhanded
swipe at eastern slaveholders. While such men spoke of the need to protect private property and
minority rights, these pronouncements were timeworn bromides designed to obscure their true
intentions. Eastern slaveholders prized their chattel over their white neighbors and the proposed
constitution manifested that sentiment.100
Prior to the vote on the proposed constitution, residents convened across the region to
discuss the constitution and its implications. Residents gathered at the Wheeling courthouse in
December 1829 to voice their displeasure with conservatives’ and moderates’ refusal to embrace
democratic reform. The gathered men expressed outrage concerning the convention’s rejection
of the “white basis,” and strongly denied that the “free laborers of the West” shared the same
degraded status as “the slaves of the East, or the peasantry of Europe.” Their labor, morality,
and intellect separated them from such degenerates.101 In nearby Randolph County, residents
declared the proposed constitution to be “distructive of the natural rights of man” and perceived
in the document the same principles that the “British Crown” foisted upon their forefathers.
While much of the nation and slaveholding South enjoyed a “free elective democracy,” the new
constitution seemed prepared to throw northwesterners “into the dark and gloomy abyss of
aristocracy.”102
In March 1830, a few weeks prior to the official popular vote on the proposed
constitution, a spontaneous gathering of residents met at the home of Samuel Woods, a
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prominent lawyer and slaveholder.103 Woods, called to chair the meeting by those gathered,
oversaw the passage of four resolutions that emphasized residents’ belief that “the new
constitution, both in letter and spirit, opposed” the “principles” found in the Bill of Rights.
Residents concluded that they would oppose the constitution “by our votes” or, for those
disenfranchised, through “all fair and honorable means.”104 In one final plea before the popular
vote, a Monongalia resident urged all of his neighbors, freeholder and nonfreeholder alike, to
convene during the next court day to “adopt some measure in opposition to the ratification” of
this “most ARISTOCRATICAL charter.” Perhaps a united front comprised of men from all classes
would illustrate the animus against the new constitution and persuade eastern politicians to
discard that document and start anew.105
Prayers for a new convention or constitution went unanswered. Delegates’ approval of
the proposed constitution by a 55 to 41 margin in January presaged the popular vote in April. By
a comfortable ten-thousand vote margin, Virginians overwhelmingly ratified the new
constitution, with the majority of the support for the constitution coming from counties east of
the Alleghenies.106 In the Northwest, final poll numbers revealed residents’ profound opposition
to the constitution. In Ohio County, residents rejected the constitution, 643-3. In Philip
Doddridge’s Brooke County, residents polled unanimously against the constitution.107 Further
south in Harrison County, over one-thousand voters opposed its ratification while less than ten
braved the hostile crowds to support the proposed constitution. Supporters of the new
constitution, though, found solace in returns from Monongalia and Preston counties. Though a
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majority of residents rejected the proposed constitution, over seven-hundred voted for its
ratification. This figure represented one of the highest totals in the region.108
The high levels of support for the new constitution in Monongalia and Preston counties
seemed out of character for the supposedly monolithic Northwest. Delegates and constituents
appeared united in their pursuit of democratic reform in the decades leading up the convention,
but the returns reveal a divided populace and warm support for the constitution. Evidence
suggests little correlation between the percentage of slaves relative to total population and
voters’ support or rejection of the constitution.109 Both Monongalia and Preston had higher-thanaverage slave populations for the region but Harrison was home to more slaves than those two
counties combined and voters there overwhelmingly rejected the new constitution.110 Supporters
of the new constitution in these two counties may have believed that the changes to suffrage laws
would eventually prove beneficial. This interpretation may have emerged from their
representative, Charles S. Morgan of Monongalia, who threw his weight behind the
constitution’s ratification. During the convention, Morgan at times appeared apathetic, even
garnering the censure of his constituents for his “anti-republican course” on certain democratic
reforms.111 Unlike the outspoken proponents of democratic reform in Alexander Campbell and
Philip Doddridge, who mobilized opposition to the constitution, Morgan “harangue[d]” voters as
they arrived at the polls in Morgantown, exhorting them to support the new constitution. His
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“mighty influence” was evident in the final tally.112 This personal style of politicking perhaps
best explains the vote totals in the two counties while showing the uneven advance of democratic
reform across the slaveholding South and nation. Further, the vote revealed that the divisions
present during the convention carried through ratification, underscoring the Northwest’s political
diversity and shifting coalitions.113
Historians have generally neglected interpreting residents’ support for the new
constitution, focusing instead on the widespread resistance manifest in the region. Few
outspoken supporters left an historical record, making it challenging to analyze their arguments.
Dissenting voices likely found it difficult, if not impossible, to speak freely without garnering
threats from opponents. And while some supporters of the new constitution voted to ratify it, a
high probability remains that not all advocates exercised this right. Virginia’s viva voce method
of voting opened voters to discrimination, ostracism, and violence, especially those with
different interests than those of the majority. (Free Soilers and Republicans in the region would
face this same harassment in the 1850s and 1860s). Supporters who journeyed to the polls likely
encountered mobs of discontented men determined to prevent votes being cast in favor of the
new constitution. Faced with this dilemma, men could bow to peer pressure and vote against the
constitution, turn around, or face public censure (or worse) for their opposition vote. The
“interested and overbearing majority” that eastern planter-politicians feared in the guise of “King
Numbers” operated on both ends of the political spectrum, advocating democratic reform while
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squelching opposition.114 This dynamic would become increasingly important and visible as the
politics of slavery occupied state and national politics in subsequent years.
Speaking forty-five years after the conclusion of the 1829-1830 Constitutional
Convention, Waitman T. Willey presented a brief biographical treatment of Philip Doddridge at
the West Virginia Historical Society’s meeting at West Virginia University in Morgantown.
Willey, a veteran politician who had himself challenged eastern Virginians’ hegemony in the
1850-1851 Virginia Constitutional Convention and had helped guide West Virginia’s statehood
movement during the Civil War, reduced the debates of the early convention to one issue,
slavery. All the theories of government espoused by conservatives like Leigh, Upshur, and
Randolph represented a guise for “the protection of slavery,” he proclaimed. These leaders
apprehended that increased democratization of the state and inclusion of nonslaveholders would
inexorably result in oppressive taxation of chattel and perhaps slavery’s “total abolition.”
Doddridge had battle against this powerful ideology, and though he lost, his arguments resonated
with West Virginia’s founding fathers during the Civil War.115
Willey’s interpretation of the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention suggests that the
convention represented a conservative counterrevolution, one designed to entrench slaveholding
interests and reject democratic reforms. Demagogues such as Leigh and his ilk believed that
slavery and democracy represented two antagonistic elements. Doddridge battled this ideology
during the convention, only to be overwhelmed by the state’s slaveholding regime. This regime,
consumed with its pursuit of absolute power and absolute protection for its chattel, would
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eventually lead the state to civil war and place in motion western Virginia’s statehood
movement.
What Willey misinterpreted about the convention, though, was that it constituted a
critical moment on Virginia’s path toward a slaveholding democracy. While delegates at the
convention embodied and expressed conservative values and ideologies, the new constitution
represented a marked departure from classical republican ideology. Virginians, who had extolled
the freehold’s virtues of independence and permanence, now spoke of the freehold in terms of
the cash nexus. This reconceptualization of republican ideology contained important
implications. Sundry forms of private property or capital could be used to determine republican
citizenship, moving Virginians closer to the idea of the person-based democratic government
advocated by reformers. This commodification of the freehold lessened its attractiveness for
determining republican citizenship, requiring Virginians to search for a new litmus test. The
belief that slaveownership and herrenvolk democracy could constitute that basis gained increased
currency and acceptance across the state, as a racially based democracy would protect and
strengthen chattel slavery.116 Slavery was not an obstacle to democratic reform, as argued by
Willey; it became the essential ingredient.
The convention and new constitution hardened many northwestern residents’ perspective
of eastern politicians, planters, and slaveholding elites. Transmontane Virginians perceived little
in the constitution that reflected the burgeoning democratic ethos that championed the cause of
the “common man.” Indeed, the constitution seemed antiquated and obsolete before the ink on
its parchment dried. A Fourth of July reveler in Wheeling in 1830, hoped that the new
constitution would enjoy a “short life” and that the “rights of man” in Virginia would soon
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receive political representation.117 One historian describes the new constitution as “antediluvian,
even in terms of its own times,” inferring that it represented a counterrevolution of conservative
and slaveholding interests and a stinging defeat for democratic proponents.118 But this
mischaracterization overlooks the salient ideological, political, and practical changes manifest in
the new constitution. The constitution was not “antediluvian”; rather, it represented a blending
of nineteenth century conservative and progressive ideals, a reflection of delegates’ awareness of
a new economic and political context unfolding around them and the uneven march of
democratic reform. More importantly, the new constitution accelerated Virginia’s development
as a modern slaveholding democracy, a movement that received increased support over the next
few years.
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Chapter 3: A Peculiar Détente: The Rise of Proslavery and Pro-Democratic Thought, 1830-1850
In 1850, Virginia appeared on the verge of dramatic political and constitutional reform.
Two decades after the conclusion of the previous constitutional convention, Virginians supported
the convening of another body to once again reform the state’s laws and (hopefully) address the
“political degradation” experienced by many northwesterners.1 Randolph County lawyer and
slaveholder David Goff presented one guiding principle to his representative to the convention,
Gideon Draper Camden of Harrison County, a principle Goff believed would prove beneficial for
all Virginians.2 “Let the East have any guarantee they want to protect their slave property,” Goff
insisted. Though he supported the “white basis,” a platform opposed by many eastern
Virginians, Goff supported constitutional safeguards and other political measures to protect
eastern slaveholders’ peculiar property. Indeed, Goff believed that the “white basis” and extra
protection for slaveholders would “operate to the protection to the West as well as the East.”
White northwesterners would obtain the political equality they desired while eastern slaveholders
would acquire greater protection on their chattel. Long desired sectional harmony would be
achieved through a slaveholding democracy.3
What important changes over the previous two decades led to the 1850-1851
Constitutional Convention? Why did Goff declare unflinching support for extra “guarantee[s]”
for eastern slaveholders, men who had long denied white northwesterners political and
constitutional equality? These questions take on greater importance when they are considered
alongside the anger and disappointment expressed by northwesterners following the ratification
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of the 1830 Constitution. Historians exploring this episode in Virginia history have arrived at a
general consensus that the failure to obtain democratic reforms in 1830 represented one of the
mileposts on Virginia’s road to eventual dismemberment.4 This anachronistic narrative, though,
sacrifices contingency for convenience, specifically the convenience of knowing and confirming
the conclusion of this important political and constitutional struggle. Goff’s instructions to
Camden and his belief in the symbiotic nature of slavery and democratic reform reveal the
synthesis of two decades of important political and ideological developments in Virginia. Most
notably, changes in political thought and the perceived increased dangers against slavery,
including the rise of northern antislavery groups, during the 1830s and 1840s ultimately help
lead Virginians to support a new constitutional convention.
The changes and issues that compelled Virginians to once again amend their constitution
reflected national and state developments concerning slavery. National crises concerning
slavery, notably the Wilmot Proviso, the Mexican-American War, and the rise of abolitionism in
the North, convinced some eastern planters and politicians that constitutional reform would align
the interests of nonslaveholders with those of slaveholders and promote unity among Virginians
on the issue of slavery. In 1848, Governor William Smith announced his continued support for
“revising our state constitution,” arguing that the North’s “oppressive policy” toward slavery
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necessitated a united front among all white Virginians against such tyranny.5 The following
year, Governor John B. Floyd echoed the sentiments of his predecessor. “[C]onstitutional reform
will satisfy the demands of the people,” Floyd concluded, and unite “all the interests of the
Commonwealth.” The “sooner” such reform could be “accomplished the better,” he
maintained.6 By closely linking constitutional reform with protecting slavery, Virginians
cemented that symbiotic relationship and thus made any attack on slavery an assault on all
Virginians’ political independence.
Concerns over slavery within the state manifested, too, as threats to the peculiar
institution seemed increasingly tangible and serious.7 Slaveholders across the state worried that
abolitionists operated secretly within the state (and perhaps with aid from sympathetic
nonslaveholders), helping slaves flee and indoctrinating blacks and whites with their dangerous
and troubling beliefs. In September 1845, the Wood County Circuit Superior Court tried three
Ohio residents arrested on providing “countenance, protection, and assistance to six negro
slaves.” Wood County’s location on the Ohio River made it an attractive target for abolitionist
activity and slaves hoping to flee to the North and possibly into Canada. These three Ohioans
“feloniously entice[d], advise[d], and persuade[d]” the six slaves to “abscond and from the
possession and service” of their master. Such subversive actions, Judge David McComas
argued, threatened the “peace” and “stability” of Virginia.8
The threat of abolitionists invading the state amplified concerns that some
nonslaveholding residents looked longingly for the end of slavery. In 1847, Washington College
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President Henry Ruffner published his Address to the People of West Virginia, a tract that
elucidated the political, economic, and social ills spawned by slavery. The immense and myriad
ills produced by slavery required immediate action, he concluded. Ruffner supported gradual
emancipation to prevent western Virginia from being overrun by African American slaves and,
in the process, release westerners from the political power wielded by eastern slaveholders.
Ruffner’s plan garnered mainly negative reviews but nonetheless illustrated that such ideas,
though relatively dormant since 1832, still received circulation within the nation’s largest
slaveholding state. Constitutional reform would hopefully ameliorate nonslaveholders’ overt and
clandestine attempts to undermine slavery and the power of the slaveholding regime while
generating a united front against abolitionists’ assaults.
The rise of Jacksonian Democracy during the 1820s and 1830s and the entrenchment of
the two-party system across the South bolstered support for slavery, but in Virginia this narrative
proved more complex. Proponents of Jacksonian Democracy in Alabama and Mississippi
ratified and amended state constitutions so that by 1832 both states had established universal
white male suffrage and increased the number of popularly elected political offices.9 In
Tennessee and North Carolina, Jacksonians reformed their states constitutions in 1834 and 1835,
respectively, removing vestiges of colonial and early republic limits on political participation.
Most importantly, the new state constitutions excluded African Americans from politics and
rejected any emancipation plan, preventing the few free propertied blacks that resided in those
states from voting or allowing future freed slaves any opportunity of political representation. 10
The democratic actions undertaken by these southern states promoted a formal hardening of
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racial lines, a flattening of social and class distinctions among white men, and an increased
commitment to “herrenvolk republicanism.”11 Politics became the domain of free white men in
the 1830s and 1840s across the slaveholding South, ensuring greater political independence for
white men and a more ardent commitment to slavery.
Virginians experienced the effects of the two-party system. Partisan newspapers, party
platforms, caucuses and nominating committees, and canvassing candidates were common sights
throughout the state, including the Northwest.12 Though reformers lamented the suffrage
restrictions imposed by the 1830 Constitution, the number of those eligible to vote increased and
practically all white men could engage in party functions. But as politics increasingly emerged
as the purview for white men across the slaveholding South, white, disenfranchised Virginians
grumbled about their political exclusion. The disenfranchised felt the “unjust and injurious
bearing” produced by the “foolish and anti-republican restriction upon the right of suffrage,” a
Parkersburg newspaper lamented. The lack of universal male suffrage represented one marker of
Virginia’s “constitutional misfortunes” that generated needless social and political divisions.
These divisions, planters and slaveholders across the state feared, could eventually erode
nonslaveholders’ fealty toward slavery.13
In each reason that compelled Virginians to once again amend their constitution two
decades after the previous revision, the same fundamental truth became manifest. Slavery and
democracy for white man became inseparable and practically indistinguishable, a southern alloy
that promised political and social independence and public and private power for all white men
while generating an army of passionate defenders for chattel slavery. The defense of slavery
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invariably thus became a defense of democracy, with the inverse holding equally true. In the
Northwest, the majority of residents, including men like David Goff, willingly embraced this
political dynamic. Though some residents protested the inordinate power wielded by
slaveholders and the political “double security” placed on chattel property, the outcry against
slavery was minimal and isolated, especially after 1832.14 Northwestern residents understood
and accepted the southern axiom that political liberty for white men depended on enslaved
African Americans.
In the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the 1830 Constitution, the clamor over
annexation, demands for another constitutional convention, and even rumors of violent resistance
quickly faded by the end of the year. Various reasons existed for this decrease in tensions. “A
dismemberment of the old dominion is to be deprecated,” one northwestern resident stated,
believing that the national and state political ills produced by such action would outweigh
possible benefits.15 Other western Virginians provided an optimistic perspective on the new
constitution. Within scathing reviews of the new constitution, critics often applauded the new
requirements for suffrage, noting that the “right of suffrage is extended” before focusing on the
constitution’s drawbacks.16 Though not possessing all the democratic principles advocated by
reformers, the 1830 Constitution represented “one great step towards a perfect reform of the
government.” Western Virginia’s continued demographic growth and economic expansion
would eventually compel eastern Virginians to accept democratic reforms, residents maintained.
The new constitution represented a minor and temporary setback in democracy’s eventual
triumph.17
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Other northwestern residents expressed tangible concerns about annexation to
Pennsylvania, Ohio, or Maryland. Residents in Wheeling worried about the economic
ramifications of annexation to Pennsylvania, as the city competed with nearby Pittsburgh for
national prestige, economic power, and commercial clout.18 “What would Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh agree to do for Wheeling and Clarksburg?”19 Though many residents still believed
that politicians in Richmond attempted to stifle Wheeling’s economic growth and political clout,
securing financial support in the Keystone State would be highly competitive and uncertain.
Wheeling politician Archibald McClean believed that the bluster surrounding annexation and the
dissatisfaction with the constitution emerged from a vocal and disgruntled minority. If the
“whole voice” of the Northwest could speak on this issue, he insisted, “a different result” would
be manifest. The supposed “undivided voice” of the Northwest, while manifest in the years
preceding the convention, fractured as residents began to appreciate how the new constitution
furthered their respective interests. Self-interest, not political principles, swayed many
residents.20 The immediate response to the new constitution varied across the Northwest. Many
residents pined for another convention that would implement democratic reform and liberate the
“politically cursed” majority.21 Still others accepted the constitution’s provisions, enjoying the
extension of suffrage while dismissing possible alternatives. The supposedly monolithic
Northwest once again illustrated its political diversity.
Any further discussion of the 1830 Constitution quickly faded by 1831 as news of the
Southampton uprising in August reached the Northwest.22 Nat Turner’s rebellion in Southside
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Virginia, outside of its human cost, challenged the emerging southern ideology of paternalism.
Paternalism, a lower South remedy to the quandary of slavery and Christianity, progressed in
starts and fits. In the Old Dominion, few openly accepted paternalism, with most adherents
residing in the heavily slave-populated Tidewater and Southside regions. The majority of
Virginia slaveholders, according to Lacy Ford, argued that sagging economic profits
demonstrated the limitations of a slave-based economy, leaving some in the state searching for a
way to remove slaves and free blacks.23 Turner’s rebellion appeared to provide that opportunity.
Virginia Governor John B. Floyd proposed a plan to remove all African-Americans from
the state. In a letter to South Carolina Governor James Hamilton, Jr., Floyd stated he would
support legislation curtailing slaves’ mobility. This included confining slaves to their masters’
plantations, prohibiting all black preaching, and removing all free African-Americans from the
state.24 This short-term solution, Floyd hoped, would preclude imitators and calm white
Virginians’ fears about another revolt. His long-term solution appeared more polarizing. He
proposed using surplus state revenue to remove all blacks from Virginia, a “first step to
emancipation.” Floyd assured Hamilton he would proceed “tenderly and cautiously,” and invited
responses from the South Carolina governor and Georgia’s governor, too.25
Floyd’s plan for emancipation may not have been as audacious as it first appeared.
Virginia, like Maryland and Delaware, initiated steps in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries to decrease its slave population. For example, in 1816 the Virginia Legislature quietly
endorsed colonization and private manumission as part of a larger program to “whiten” the upper
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South through demographic reconfiguration. Northwestern residents generally supported this
demographic reconfiguration. Parkersburg lawyer Peter G. Van Winkle supported colonization,
echoing economic arguments that the “value of slave labor has probably reached its maximum.”
This realization would eventually compel slaveholders to rid themselves of their chattel. Rather
than being inundated with a population of “free blacks” who exhibited a “tendency to crime,”
removing such a troublesome population became the “duty of the country.”26 A large majority of
northwestern residents supported colonization, characterizing colonization societies as “humane
and liberal” as they offered African Americans the opportunity to return to their ancestral home
civilized and Christianized.27 Once in Africa, these colonized men and women would elevate the
“political and moral character” of their continent.28 This process of “whitening” Virginia would
remove “a black population [northwesterners] do not want,” stop the illegal smuggling and
importation of slaves to the Deep South, and invalidate the “unnatural and unpatriotic” northern
doctrine of abolitionism.29
In the Northwest, the public reaction to the fallout from Nat Turner’s rebellion remained
cautiously guarded. In Morgantown, the Monongalian reprinted a memorial from Richmond
slaveholders petitioning the state legislature for inaugurating some means of removing free
blacks and colonizing slaves. The “existing curse of slavery” demanded immediate attention,
lest the increasing free and enslaved populations eventually overrun Virginia’s white
population.30 The editor of the Monongalian also rebuked any discussion of revisiting a division
of the state in the wake of Nat Turner’s rebellion.31 In Wellsburg, the editor of the Wellsburg
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Gazette republished an article from the Niles Weekly Register that advocated emancipation with
removal.32 Few men attacked slavery outright and none demanded its immediate abolition.
Indeed, one of the few public attacks on slavery centered on its “deleterious” economic effects, a
sentiment that previous generations of Virginians had articulated.33 Economic concern may have
proven to be the most important for many northwestern residents but not because of slavery’s
effect on the state’s overall economy. Newly emancipated slaves, if not removed or colonized,
could, along with free blacks, head north in search of employment. African Americans would
flood local job markets, depress wages, and increase unemployment among white men. Growing
industrial cities such as Wheeling and, to a lesser extent, Wellsburg, could represent a possible
destination for these emancipated former slaves. Unless an ironclad agreement could be reached
that ensured the removal of all emancipated African Americans from the state, many
northwestern residents remained pessimistic about emancipation’s efficacy.
Residents around Charleston expressed similar concerns but noted the possible political
ramifications of emancipation. For numerous years, Judge Lewis Summers decried, “eastern
gentlemen” acquired their “political power either as derived from the slave population, or under
the pretext of guarding that species of property.” Yet he worried about the larger, possibly
unforeseen consequences of emancipation. If delegates pushed too hard and actually achieved
emancipation, Summers worried “nothing will be left for rail-roads or canals in any quarter.”34
After appropriating capital for removing free blacks and slaves, the state government would have
little left in the treasury for internal improvements for western Virginia. Even the prospect of
voting for emancipation could prove dangerous. Eastern politicians could “make reprisals”
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against the west “for its course on the slave question,” a dangerous proposition considering the
immense power wielded by such men.35 Instead of advocating for emancipation, Summers
remarked that considering slavery’s position in electoral politics and its future in Virginia “may
be the work of time.”36
The debate over slavery and emancipation unfolded in the state legislature during the
winter of 1832, exhibiting similar sectional divisions as those present during the 1829-1830
Constitutional Convention.37 Across the Tidewater and Piedmont, proslavery advocates sought
to minimalize the threat of insurrection and quash talk of emancipation. Many of these
legislators supported removing free African Americans, a group they viewed with suspicion. In
areas with few slaves, including the Northwest, delegates took a strong stance for emancipation
and removal, reminding their colleagues that slavery retarded economic growth and precluded
democratic reform.38 Accordingly, northwesterners coalesced around Thomas Jefferson
Randolph’s post-nati plan.39
Most western delegates openly professed their disdain for chattel slavery, arguing that
this “cancer on the political body” required immediate removal lest the symptoms worsen.40
Other western delegates reminded their colleagues that their section cared “deeply” about the
outcome of this debate, rebuking arguments that slavery represented an issue solely for eastern
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Virginians to debate.41 Kanawha County delegate George W. Summers emerged as an avid
proponent of emancipation and colonization, believing that the removal of African Americans
would eventually beget political equality for white westerners. Slavery, he declared, poisoned
slaveholders’ republican values, producing the “embryo tyrant of its little domain” while
inculcating “abusive epithets” within masters. When property rights came in conflict with the
common weal, he averred, the former must yield to the latter.42 Brooke County representative
John C. Campbell, a disciple of Philip Doddridge, supported voluntary colonization, reflecting
his constituents’ demand of “whitening” the state and protecting white, laboring northwesterners.
To manifest these demands, Campbell worked during the debates to secure sufficient funding for
transporting African Americans outside of Virginia.43
Eastern representatives, especially those from the Southside, attempted to downplay Nat
Turner’s rebellion. As Lacy Ford argues, these delegates portrayed the rebellion as an isolated
incident that the militia quickly extinguished. Governor Floyd, while a westerner, echoed this
interpretation. The “banditti of slaves” never constituted a significant numerical group, and their
reign of terror lasted only twenty-four hours. Once alerted, local citizens and militia groups
“speedily terminated” these “deluded fanatics.”44 Other slaveholding proponents, including
Wiliam O. Goode of Mecklenburg County and James H. Golson from Southside Virginia,
wielded similar arguments as those espoused during the previous constitutional convention.
Specifically, they deflected assertions that slavery stifled economic growth, blaming instead the
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Tariff of 1828 and meddlesome abolitionists and other outside agitators. True safety, such men
averred, could be achieved by removing the state’s free African American population, not
slaves.45
As during the previous constitutional convention, numerous eastern delegates denied that
western nonslaveholders deserved a voice in this debate. Western Virginians possessed “no
pecuniary interest” in slavery and only sought emancipation as a means of inaugurating the
dreaded “white basis” that eastern delegates defeated two years earlier.46 This debate over
slavery “chiefly and peculiarly” affected eastern Virginians, especially since the “farmers and
graziers” of western Virginian needed only a “few slaves” to perform the “menial, domestic”
tasks. The minimal impact of slavery on western Virginia’s economy and society paled in
comparison to the slave society of eastern Virginia.47 Some men echoed Upshur’s assertion that
a “rooted antipathy” against slavery existed among western Virginia’s hollows and hills, and
residents sought only the opportunity to strike against the institution. If this variant of
antislaveryism could not be quarantined to the western side of the Alleghenies, Goode warned, a
division of the state would emerge as the only possible remedy.48
Most delegates generally agreed that emancipation and removal through colonization
would, in the end, preserve the Old Dominion as a white man’s republic. But they divided over
the means to achieve that end.49 Virginians were acutely aware of the burdensome costs
associated with colonization, and slaveholders across the state posited that taxes needed to
support such a plan would come from their pockets. This form of government overreach worried
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even the most ardent emancipationists, including those in the Northwest.50 Randolph’s plan
constituted an “unconstitutional and unrepublican confiscation of property” that lacked
compensation, endangered the “exclusionary” right of private property, and could ultimately
establish a dangerous precedent on future political and constitutional actions.51 Ultimately, such
drawbacks proved the unraveling of Randolph’s post-nati plan and other emancipation
proposals.52 Northwestern delegates salvaged a political victory, though, voting unanimously for
a resolution that laid the groundwork for colonizing free African Americans. This proposal,
passed by the state legislature, evinced northwesterners hopes for a “whitened” Virginia.53
Few Virginians felt satisfied at the conclusion of these debates. Conservatives
reproached each other for permitting western nonslaveholders to broadcast their disdain for
slavery. Northwestern delegates, while pleased to obtain a tentative plan for the removal of
African Americans, hoped the debates would awaken Virginians from their “fatal lethargy on
this subject.”54 A Wellsburg resident, reflecting on these debates, aptly captured his neighbors’
sentiments regarding slavery. In a series of letters published in the Brooke Republican,
“W.T.W” spoke plainly about slavery’s effects on the state.55 The author stated unequivocally
that slavery deluded Virginians into supporting the dangerous doctrines of nullification and
secession, believing that the latter two spawned from a desire to protect the peculiar institution.
Northwestern Virginians, to avoid being dragged into such a perilous situation, should adopt all
“honest measures to prohibit…the dark tide of slavery” from washing over their region. These
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measures included emancipation and colonization along with a vigorous interstate slave trade.56
Northwesterners “should lend ready assistance” to eastern Virginians in achieving this important
goal, even conceding to eastern Virginians sole discretion on state laws concerning slavery.
Refusal on the part of eastern Virginians to “whiten” the state could compel northwesterners to
pursue a division of the state.57
As with other western representatives during the debates over slavery, “W.T.W” believed
that emancipation and removal would protect the white, laboring northwesterner. While a
proponent of emancipation, “W.T.W.” believed that manumission should occur gradually lest the
Northwest be inundated with a “vast mass of miserable population, deplorably ignorant and
utterly incapable” of self-sufficiency. The “intelligent laboring classes” of the region would
invariably suffer. Western arguments demanding political representation for their labor would
be undermined by African Americans who would depress wages, increase competition, and
devalue manual labor.58 If emancipation could not be properly paired with colonization, then
African Americans should remain in bondage.59
The removal of African Americans from Virginia would also promote sectional harmony.
Slavery brought eastern interests “into direct conflict, with the interests of the west,” this
Wellsburg resident insisted, with internal improvements, political representation, and public
education presented as casualties in this political strife. Only two alternatives existed for
producing “an identity of policy” for Virginians. Either western Virginians would yield and
purchase slaves until their society mirrored that of eastern Virginia or the slaveholders east of the

56

Brooke Republican, June 12, 1833, 3.
Brooke Republican, June 19, 1833, 1.
58
Brooke Republican, June 12, 1833, 3.
59
Brooke Republican, June 12, 1833, 3.
57

112

Blue Ridge would emancipate themselves from slavery, making the Old Dominion a free state.60
Racial purity, employment for white men, republican virtue, and sectional harmony demanded
some form of action, “W.T.W” concluded. Having failed to adequately address these concerns,
northwesterners then could seek a division of the state, the final act in this intrastate drama.
Historians interpreting the 1832 Virginia Legislature Debates have generally agreed that
these debates presaged Virginia’s eventual dismemberment. The threat to divide the state
because of Virginians’ inability to resolve the issue of slavery appear to reaffirm that
interpretation. The “breach” between western nonslaveholders and eastern slaveholders
“widened” as a consequence of the debates, Sean Wilentz asserts, foreshadowing both the state
and national crisis over slavery in 1860.61 Alison Goodyear Freehling traces Virginia’s
“dissolution” into two states during the Civil War to these debates, as western, pro-democracy
reformers battled eastern, aristocratic slaveholders for control of the state legislature, political
power, and the future of the Commonwealth. The inability for these two factions to coexist,
according to Alison Freehling and William Freehling, clearly illustrated a “white community
irrepressibly divided by slavery,” a debilitating internal division that continually resurfaced and
later weakened the Confederate States of America.62 William Shade’s core-periphery analytical
paradigm adds greater nuance to the clear sectional division posited by Alison Freehling, but he
also argues that subsequent discussions over slavery in Virginia followed the same general
contours sketched out by Virginians during this debate.63
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This historiography suffers from an anachronistic perspective. Aware of West Virginia’s
separation from Virginia during the Civil War, historians have searched for antecedents to that
movement, sacrificing contingency and context for a selective reading of the evidence.
Dissatisfaction arising from the 1832 Virginia Legislature Debates and threats of division from
the Northwest, for example, seemingly represent an important milepost on the road to
“dissolution.” When considered alongside the previous constitutional convention, West
Virginia’s separation appears inevitable. But Virginians were not privileged with such
information. Rather, many placed their faith in the marketplace and the legislature’s voluntary
emancipation scheme to begin the deliberate, if slow, process of “whitening” the state. This
demographic reconfiguration would not be achieved overnight, residents understood. Further,
talk of division represented an ultimatum or last resort designed to impress upon eastern
slaveholders the severity of political injustice suffered by northwesterners. Only after exhausting
all political and constitutional options would northwesterners have explored a division of the
state.
The true legacy of the 1832 Virginia Legislature Debates emerged from the writings of
proslavery advocates Benjamin Watkins Leigh, Thomas Roderick Dew, and Abel Parker Upshur,
not in the seemingly inevitable “dissolution” of the Old Dominion. In the span of a few years,
these men witnessed slavery come under increasing attack both from within and without.
Eastern delegates fended off accusations in the 1829-1830 Constitutional Convention that
slaveholders and freeholders wielded inordinate power to the detriment of political
representation for white men. While eastern delegates defeated reform initiatives such as
universal suffrage and equal representation, the freehold underwent a dramatic redefinition that
broadened the electorate but diminished its political viability. Two years later, Virginians
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revisited slavery and its role in the state, with many westerners advocating some means of
emancipation and removal. Once again, easterners closed ranks and defeated serious, detailed
proposals that called for slavery’s eventual removal. Even with these political victories,
slavery’s future in Virginia appeared uncertain.
The internal political debates over slavery emerged as national discussions over slavery
came to the forefront.64 The rise of immediate abolitionism in the North, the “Tariff of
Abominations,” South Carolina’s threat of nullification and secession, and David Walker’s
bellicose Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World impressed upon proslavery advocates that
opposition to slavery appeared increasingly tangible and militant. Few solutions seemed to exist
to convince Virginians of the need to maintain slavery and confront threats to the institution.
The “positive good” argument posited by Deep South politicians, clergy, and residents had failed
to gain traction in Virginia outside of the Tidewater and Southside. Eastern slaveholders’
economic arguments about slavery’s profitability rang hollow, especially considering the state
remained mired in a depression.65 Rather, Leigh, Dew, and Upshur sought to recast slavery as
essential to republican government. These theorists saw slavery as a wellspring and model of
republican virtue, not tyranny. Further, they wanted slaveholding to replace the freehold as the
basis for republican citizenship and government, thereby representing the source of political
freedom and independence for white men. Slavery’s future would be tethered to that of the state,
providing the greatest security possible for the peculiar institution.
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Leigh, Dew, and Upshur’s campaign to reconceptualize slaveholding as the source of
republican citizenship signaled an important political and constitutional shift. The
democratization of southern state governments in the 1830s, notably in Tennessee and North
Carolina, occurred concomitantly with a more aggressive defense of slavery. Democracy for
white men and slavery for African Americans became inseparable, existing in a powerful
symbiotic relationship that flattened class distinctions and promoted unity between
nonslaveholders and slaveholders. This dynamic would unfold in Virginia, too. The
“whitening” sought by northwestern residents would not be achieved solely through
demographic shifts but through the manifestation of “herrenvolk republicanism.”66
Benjamin Watkins Leigh served as the principal figure in refashioning a defense of proslavery republicanism by replacing the freehold with slavery as the basis for republican
government. In his 1832 Letter of Appomatox [sic], Leigh reflected on the Virginia Legislature
Debates over slavery, scolding delegates for mischaracterizing the evils of slavery and for their
reckless discussion of seizing private property. Leigh mocked the supposedly divine revelations
received by Turner, insisting instead that a “hallucination” seized the slave and distorted his
moral compass.67 Any subsequent insurrections would not be traced back to “hallucinations,”
the “incendiary writings” of northern abolitionists, or the “seditious practices of negro
preachers,” he warned. The blame would fall upon the “measures proposed” and the “speeches
delivered, in our own legislature.”68 Indeed, Virginians needed to stop the wild and irresponsible
talk of abolition, emancipation, and removal lest slaves internalize these words and pursue
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freedom through their own means. Leigh proposed an increased militia presence and greater
vigilance among citizens, including nonslaveholders, to prevent another slave rebellion.69
Leigh also refuted delegates’ assertions about slavery’s degrading effects on the white
population. Though New England enjoyed a superior system of “elementary education,” Leigh
dismissed thoughts that slavery’s absence resulted in educated and literate residents. Moreover,
talk of slavery corroding morals or producing the “embryo tyrant of its little domain,” as
suggested by George Summers, represented a “pernicious” exercise that focused on the few evil
deeds publicized by delegates and sympathetic newspaper editors. Greece and Rome, both
slaveholding societies, represented the acme of manners and civilization.70 Delegates, including
those from the Tidewater and Piedmont, had “exaggerated” the evils generated by slavery,
confirming westerners’ assertions that the health of the republic depended on slavery’s abolition.
Indeed, these “unwise, [and] ill-judged” mischaracterizations of slavery undermined easterners’
defense of slavery, providing an opportunity for opponents of slavery to exploit. Leigh implored
slaveholders to broadcast slavery’s benefits, believing that such efforts would appease
nonslaveholders and quiet any discussion of emancipation.71
As Christopher Michael Curtis has noted in his interpretation of the Letter of Appomatox,
Leigh avoids any defense of private property in terms of the freehold. Rather, Leigh situated
private property in slavery and the master-slave relationship at the center of republican
government.72 Delegates’ plans for emancipation represented a “violent abrogation of the rights
of slave property without the consent of its owners.”73 The dangerous and revolutionary
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proposals advanced by emancipationists lacked authorization from slaveholders, violated state
law concerning private property, and appeared to validate the “tyranny of the majority.”
Slaveholders possessed an invested right in their current slaves and their future increase, a
fundamental law that the “legislature cannot constitutionally take away.” Leigh’s conclusions
were clear. Slaveholders’ rights to their chattel were “inviolable,” deserving of constitutional
and political safeguards to keep it safe from the “power of the public.”74 Indeed, the health of
Virginia’s republican government depended on the protection of such rights.
The fruits of Leigh’s Letter of Appomatox would not be manifest for some time. But his
argument that slavery represented a “positive source of republican virtue” and required
constitutional safeguards in order to protect it and, by extension, the republic, occurred at a
critical moment in Virginia and national politics.75 With opposition to slavery and slaveholders
increasing, proslavery Virginians needed an ideological defense of the peculiar institution that
would ensure its longevity and generate passionate supporters. By tethering slavery to the
republic’s health, Leigh proposed a powerful symbiotic relationship that would ensure slavery’s
survival. Few, if any, would attack slavery if it constituted a cornerstone of the state
government. Further, by championing the virtues that emanated from the master-slave
relationship, Leigh sought to discredit abolitionists from without and emancipationists from
within. Finally, his defense of slavery reflected his abandonment of the freehold, providing an
opportunity for future constitutional reform on suffrage and political representation. Slavery, not
the freehold, would serve as the guarantor of republican virtue and the basis for republican
citizenship.
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William & Mary Professor Thomas Roderick Dew furthered this reconceptualization of
republican government championed by Leigh. In his Review of the Debate in the Virginia
Legislature of 1831 and 1832, Dew dismissed emancipation and colonization schemes, extolled
the civilization of African Americans in the United States, and offered a pro-democracy theory
based upon slavery. Dew found common ground with Leigh. Both men rejected Thomas
Jefferson’s assertion that slavery corrupted the moral character of the slaveholder and, by
extension, the republic. Further, both Leigh and Dew perceived in the master-slave relationship
the necessary attributes for republican citizenship. Masters, Dew maintained, acted “humanely”
and were “kind and indulgent” to their slaves.76 Indeed, the master introduced the “exalted
principles of morality and religion” to his slaves, principles the master and slave continually
refined during their interactions.77 The examples of cruel masters, such as those paraded out by
western delegates, illustrated that those slaveholders failed to understand the nuanced masterslave relationship. Dew traced this failure to white northerners who married into slaveholding
families, reaffirming his argument that a dearth of political virtue resulted from slavery’s
absence.78 A healthy republican government depended on the exceptional virtues that emanated
from slavery and the master-slave relationship, notably benevolence and stewardship.79
The benefits of slavery and the master-slave relationship extended to all white men, too,
offering equality and independence to nonslaveholders. Liberty for freemen, Dew contended,
burned brightly in ancient slaveholding societies such as Rome and Greece because freemen
possessed an intimate understanding of bondage. An identical dynamic prevailed in the
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slaveholding South. A “perfect spirit of equality so prevalent among the whites” demonstrated
the great leveling effects of slavery. Because African American slaves occupied the “low and
menial offices,” the “distinctions” that wracked nonslaveholding societies were practically
nonexistent in slaveholding states.80 Race was the only “distinction” that existed. “Color alone,”
Dew proclaimed, represented the sole “badge of distinction…and all who are white are equal in
spite of the variety of occupation.” The political implications were profound. The “spirit of
equality” that characterized slaveholding societies also represented the “generator and
preserver…of liberty.”81 With all other distinctions subsumed by slavery, Virginians could
inaugurate a racially based, democratic polity that offered independence for all white men and
increased protection for slavery. Democracy and slavery would more than coexist; they would
strengthen each other.
Eastern Shore politician and John C. Calhoun ally Abel Parker Upshur complemented
this emerging proslavery discourse seven years later. Upshur posited that racial slavery refined
the characteristics of benevolence and stewardship, two important qualities required for a
republican government. Slaveholding “prepare[s] [the master] for the love of freedom, and to fit
him for the enjoyment of it,” Upshur declared.82 Slaveholders possessed “more elevated
principles, a wider expansion of thought, a deeper and more fervent love, and a juster estimate
of…liberty,” a reflection of the exceptional qualities derived from slavery.83 The master-slave
relationship equipped slaveholders with the ability to judiciously and fairly mete out punishment
and justice, ensuring the health of their republican government, the safety of their neighbors, and
the perpetuation and stability of their patriarchal world. Indeed, the “personal independence and
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self-respect” derived from “the relation between master and slave” provided the strongest
foundation for “political liberty.”84 And with slavery constituting the foundation of a healthy
republican government, white men sought to “preserve unbroken” that relationship that bestowed
political independence.85
White men also sought to “preserve unbroken” the master-slave relationship and slavery
in general because of the social benefits derived from the peculiar institution. Upshur, like Dew,
posited that slavery flattened social distinctions among white men, generating a powerful sense
of equality. “Here the slave is black, and the white man is never a slave,” he remarked. Indeed,
the “color of the slave,” he proclaimed, that “eternal, ineffaceable distinction of nature”
bestowed independence for white men and bondage for African Americans. Regardless of how
“poor, or ignorant or miserable” a white man may be, the presence of African American slaves
ensured a certain level of respectability and status in the community.86 Moreover, white men
could exercise mastery without being a slaveholder. A white nonslaveholder wielded “absolute
authority over the negro, and…receive[d] from him continual proofs of deference and respect.”87
Renting a slave elevated a nonslaveholder into the social ranks of the master class, allowing him
to experience the southern ideal of mastery. This temporary entry into the master class
increasingly aligned the interests of slaveholders and nonslaveholders, ensuring greater security
for the institution that provided social independence and freedom for white men.
Virginians needed to support and maintain slavery, Upshur concluded, because the
institution prevented the farcical and dangerous doctrines of abolitionism from upsetting racial
hierarchy. The presence of African American slaves cultivated an acute sense of “independence,
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freedom, and equality among all classes” of white men. The political spirit that emerged from
this dynamic was not “that rude and levelling democracy, which seeks to establish a perfect
equality.” Northern states, under the corrupting influence of abolitionism, had begun to
inaugurate this “perfect equality” in their society. Rather, white southerners enjoyed a
“republican equality” that permitted white men and only white men to participate.88 The benefits
of slavery touched and supported white southerners in a myriad of ways, thus demanding
vigilance and fealty from white southerners every day.
The proslavery defenses promulgated by Leigh, Dew, and Upshur reflected Virginia’s
changing political, economic, and social contexts. Proslavery Virginians recognized that the
longevity of slavery required situating slavery as the basis for republican government, a
reconceptualization that sought to inextricably bind the health and future of two institutions.
Slavery could also replace the increasingly useless and archaic freehold as a guarantor of
republican virtue and liberty. The frank discussions concerning slavery following Nat Turner’s
rebellion necessitated a stronger defense of the master-slave relationship and the rights of private
property in slaves. At the core of all three defenses rested a recognition that slavery’s future
depended on nonslaveholders, including those in the Northwest. By extending the advantages of
slavery beyond the plantation and into every household, business, and polling station, Leigh,
Dew, and Upshur illustrated the institution’s centrality to all white men. Though
northwesterners owned fewer slaves than other regions in Virginia, they enjoyed identical
privileges and benefits offered to all white Virginians. The often volatile economic context that
characterized industrialization in the Northwest might jeopardize a white man’s employment, but
he could rest assured that he would never fall below the level of an African American. This
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hardening of the color line reflected the increasingly popular and powerful southern axiom that
slavery for African Americans generated and protected liberty and independence for white men.
Over the proceeding decades, northwesterners internalized and championed these
political ideas, becoming vocal pro-democratic and proslavery Virginians. The entrenchment of
the two-party system in Virginia throughout the 1830s and 1840s assisted this development by
inaugurating a raucous style of popular politics that elevated the image of and vested political
power in the common man. In the slaveholding South, the two-party system pitted politicians
and partisans against each another in a political struggle over which party provided the strongest
defense for slavery.89 This brand of politics invited participation among all white Virginians,
including those in the Northwest who remained disenfranchised. The political arena of
northwestern Virginia mirrored other developments across the South, but the region’s proximity
to northern states also shaped residents’ expectations of their state government. The constant
interaction with residents of Ohio and Pennsylvania, two states that offered greater political
representation to white citizens, intensified northwesterners’ demands for political equality.
Within these demands, though, northwesterners offered their pledges of fealty to state and
concessions to slaveholders, a clear reflection that the rhetorical effort begun by Leigh, Dew, and
Upshur was paying dividends. The path toward democratic reform would be colored
distinctively by slavery.
The entrenchment of the two-party system across the state represented one of the critical
developments that lent credence to the ideas put forth by Leigh, Dew, and Upshur. As Michael
Holt has demonstrated, the two-party system operated effectively on national and state levels
because it allowed extensive competition along a broad spectrum of issues. Political parties took
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opposing sides on pertinent political, economic, and social issues, and offered to voters what
each party considered the proper means of achieving and maintaining a healthy republican
government. A stark demarcation between the two organizations emerged through this process.90
The two dominant parties during the 1830s and 1840s, the Whigs and Democrats, possessed all
the trappings of modern political parties, including ideologically oriented platforms, caucuses
and nominating committees, partisan news outlets, and candidates canvassing the region.
The Northwest was no exception to this development. The proliferation of partisan
newspapers, competitive local elections, and the sights and sounds of campaign season clearly
illustrated that northwesterners participated in one the key political movements of the era. A
supporter of Waitman T. Willey instructed him to “mount your horse and scower the County
maik Stump Speaches etc.” if he desired to win election to the House of Delegates. Willey,
though a prominent and respected Whig in Monongalia, still faced intense competition in a
district that heavily favored Democrats.91 Democrats also performed well in counties along the
Ohio River, southwestern Virginia, and in areas generally undisturbed by the Market Revolution.
Whigs garnered the majority of their support in burgeoning manufacturing towns, including
Wheeling and Charleston, and in counties favorable to internal improvements.92 Both parties
worked to mobilize white residents to the polls during elections, hopeful that their message (and
perhaps a few alcoholic beverages) would convince residents to vote for their respective
candidate.93
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The two-party system in Virginia proved crucial for creating a political détente between
western and eastern Virginians, specifically on the issue of slavery. As William Cooper has
shown, both Whigs and Democrats portrayed their organizations and ideologies as “safe” on the
issue of slavery while accusing the opposition of advocating subversive and inimical principles
that imperiled the peculiar institution. The “politics of slavery,” according to Cooper, mitigated
conflict between nonslaveholders and slaveholders and ultimately defined and shaped southern
politics before the Civil War.94 While Cooper focuses on regions and states across the South
with large enslaved populations, this dynamic unfolded along the peripheries of the South, too,
including northwestern Virginia. When vetting candidates, some residents supported those who
hailed from southern soil. Morgantown resident Thomas P. Ray faced a quandary in the months
leading up to the 1836 presidential election as he preferred neither Democrat Martin Van Buren
nor Whig Hugh L. White. But White was a Tennessean. “I will choose the southern one,” he
concluded, confident that White’s southern credentials implied his fealty toward the institution.
Van Buren, a New Yorker, simply could not be trusted to protect slavery.95
The “politics of slavery” were clearly manifest in partisan newspapers, as Whigs and
Democrats accused the other of being “unsafe” on the issue of slavery. “It has been for some
time drummed in our ears,” a Wheeling Whig newspaper lamented, “that the whigs are
abolitionists, and that the only safety of the South is in re-electing Mr. Van Buren.” Supposedly,
the editor complained, only Democrats could be trusted on the sacrosanct issue of slavery.96
Whig partisans often denounced Democrats as radical “Loco Foco Abolitionists” who employed
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unscrupulous tactics and spread false rumors in an effort to debase Whigs’ slavery credentials.
One Whig newspaper returned such a charge, arguing that Democrats’ attempts to brand Whigs
as unsafe on the issue of slavery represented desperate and manipulative attempts to destabilize
the country, a goal Democrats shared with northern abolitionists.97 Even the nomination of a
southern Whig for president failed to silence some Democrats’ accusations. Supporters of
Virginian William Henry Harrison during the 1840 Presidential election denied the general’s
support of abolitionism, arguing that no politician “has gone farther, in his opposition to the
schemes of the fanatics.”98
When not denouncing their supposedly abolitionist foes, Democrats burnished their
candidates’ proslavery credentials. Democrats exalted the “patriotism and political integrity” of
their candidates who advocated sound “Democratic doctrines,” including the protection of
slavery against federal encroachment.99 A group of Morgantown residents echoed such
sentiments during a Fourth of July celebration. Whigs’ disdain for Democratic candidates, one
reveler proclaimed, resulted from Democrats’ “steadfast principles,” which included a marked
vigilance on the issue of slavery.100 Indeed, Democrats often found greater success in wielding
the issue of slavery against their opponents. A Brooke County newspaper editor, reflecting on
the conflicts between Whigs and Democrats, admitted that Democrats possessed a “pronounced
predilection for proslavery ideas.” Democrats’ political dominance in the county “for a
generation or more” reflected a widespread acceptance of the party and its proslavery ideas.101
Even Whigs begrudgingly admitted that Democrats often utilized the issue of slavery more
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effectively. One national Whig politician lamented that despite Zachary Taylor’s election in the
1848 presidential election, Virginians continued to support Democratic candidates, including
Lewis Cass. “Old Virginia is still wedded to her idols,” he bemoaned, a clear indication of
Democrats’ superior ability in this election to use the “idol” of slavery to their advantage.102
The inclusivity and democratic participation generated by the “politics of slavery” and
the two-party system in general represented an important characteristic that mobilized
slaveholders and nonslaveholders, freeholders and nonfreeholders, into the political sphere.
Here, though they possessed different socioeconomic backgrounds or enjoyed different positions
of status in the community, their racial status subsumed these differences. Meetings that often
numbered in the thousands became commonplace across the Northwest, bringing residents from
across the region into Wheeling, Morgantown, Bridgeport, and other towns. Wheeling resident
Peter Garnall, in a letter to his nephew in Florida, remarked at the “excitement” surrounding the
upcoming presidential election later that fall. Approximately “three thousand” Whigs convened
north of Wheeling while a Democratic meeting equal in number gathered in Bridgeport. Garnall,
a Whig, noted that the “overwhelming majority of men women and children” supported the
Whig candidate, William Henry Harrison.103
Partisans during these political meetings sought to discredit their opponent’s platform
while burnishing their own, in the hopes of drawing new adherents. Nearly twenty-thousand
Whigs gathered in Wheeling to hear political speeches and witness the operation of a nail
machine and handle instruments used in glass manufacturing and in the iron foundry. The
enterprising spirit exhibited in these three professions represented a marked contrast from
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Democrats who adhered to traditional agricultural pursuits.104 An advertisement for a Whig
meeting in Morgantown invited “ALL…WHIG FRIENDS, AND EVERY BODY ELSE” who disapproved
of the spoils system used by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren.105 Conversely, a
Democratic meeting in Morgantown hoped that the “Democrats of the Mountains” would come
out in full force to support the Democracy and rescue Virginia from Whig politicians.
Democrats welcomed their own members and disenchanted Whigs, too, including those in
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.106
The style of interparty disagreement between Whigs and Democrats manifest during
these meetings carried over into the state legislature. Delegates, like their constituents, debated
the National Bank, currency, tariffs, internal improvements, the spoils system, and the scope of
presidential power supplied fodder for both political parties. Roll-call votes of Whigs and
Democrats on many economic issues, such as banking and currency revealed a high level of
disagreement between 1835 and 1843. In other economic areas, such as granting corporate
charters, Virginia fell in line with other states.107 The composition of the state legislature
likewise reflected this intense party debates. From 1838 to 1841, for example, Whigs possessed
a slight numerical advantage over Democrats, often registering somewhere between one and five
percent.108 This intense partisan conflict ensured that political parties continued to court voters, a
process that helped mobilize more northwesterners into the political sphere.109
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While the two-party system encouraged broad participation and intense interparty
disagreement, this system also reminded Virginians of those who remained disenfranchised due
to constitutional requirements. Partisan meetings in the Northwest often invited fellow Whigs or
Democrats from Pennsylvania and Ohio, too, two states that offered far greater political
representation for its residents than Virginia.110 Indeed, while the state’s political parties often
fostered sectional harmony on national issues, the lack of political representation for many
western Virginians brought some Whigs and Democrats together on the issue of constitutional
reform.111 As Peter G. Van Winkle suggested, Virginians, regardless of party affiliation, should
demand with one voice “an adequate remedy for the evils we deplore.” Those “evils” often
arose from a constitution Van Winkle and other northwesterners considered broken.112
Virginians hopeful for constitutional reform, though, confronted opposition from eastern
elites. The 1830 Constitution required the state legislature to review census data and reapportion
representation accordingly, but Tidewater and Piedmont planter-politicians in the General
Assembly refused to follow through.113 The returns from the 1840 U.S. Census revealed the
continuation of demographic trends that began decades earlier. The white population west of the
Blue Ridge Mountains registered more than that east of the mountains, further validating western
Virginians’ claims that a minority wielded power over the majority.114 Moreover, though the
state’s total slave population decreased during the previous decade, this decline occurred
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primarily on the western side of the Alleghenies. Numerous counties in the Tidewater,
Piedmont, and Shenandoah Valley witnessed an increase in their slave populations.115 These
demographic trends demonstrated to one Wheeling resident that northwesterners have been
“basely and heartlessly cheated out of our just rights by a minority.”116 This “tyrannical and
oppressive” form of government, a Lewis County resident declared, required immediate reform
to stop the eastern minority from continuing to wield “ruthless” power over the majority.117
The demands and justifications articulated by northwestern residents for a new
constitution in the 1840s generally mirrored those expressed prior to the 1829-1830
Constitutional Convention. Residents’ focused on obtaining universal male suffrage, addressing
malapportionment in the state legislature, reforming the county court system, allowing for the
public election of government officials, and creating a state-supported public education system.
Residents’ justifications for these reforms likewise echoed those leading up to the previous
constitutional convention. Some residents harkened back to the memory of the American
Revolution, where, northwesterners maintained, ordinary men had demonstrated their political
fitness and boldly sacrificed their lives in the quest for a republican government. At a
constitutional reform meeting in Gilmer County, residents assailed the current system used to
calculate representation, the “mixed basis.” This “arbitrary and unequal” system of
apportionment was “wholly irreconcilable with our great revolutionary struggle, which made us
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free and independent.” White men, not African American slaves, deserved political
representation in accordance with the memory of the American Revolution.118
Residents’ use of the memory of the American Revolution to justify a new constitution
dovetailed with the “natural rights” argument. Ordinary men in 1776 clearly illustrated that the
possession of property, whether landed or human, was unnecessary to determine one’s political
fitness. Rather, all white men possessed the natural right to self-government. At a reform
meeting held in Wood County, residents professed their belief in the doctrine that “every citizen”
should be entitled to “absolute and practical equality,” regarding it as “an original or
fundamental right.”119 In a Fourth of July Speech in Wood County, Peter G. Van Winkle
supported the “great principle of equality,” denounced the “false distinctions” created by the
constitution, and “profess[ed] my faith in my fellow man.” “[T]he people,” he maintained, “are
the safest depositories of all governmental power.”120 The right of suffrage represented one of
the “natural rights of man,” Wheeling newspaper editor J.E. Wharton asserted. Other states
correctly recognized that “a man holds suffrage as an inherent right vested in him by his Creator”
while “the demagogue with a few acres of ground” could practically “manufacture” a class of
citizens beholden to him, not to the state’s interests.121 By reforming the constitution, Virginians
would ensure the manifestation of Providence’s design and promote a fair and equitable political
system free from manipulation.
The spirit and progress of Jacksonian Democracy over the past decade validated
northwesterners’ arguments that “the people” could be trusted in their exercise of political
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power. “Old Virginians,” complained a James E. Wharton of Wheeling, “do not feel that men
are now able to govern themselves.” “[B]ut the people feel that they are able,” he stated
confidently, and deserved the opportunity to demonstrate their political fitness.122 The current
“age requires no less” than a thorough constitutional revision, one Parkersburg newspaper
explained, an age where all white men enjoyed the prerogatives of citizenship regardless of
wealth or social status.123 The spirit of Jacksonian Democracy that had empowered “the people”
had also inspired southerners to reshape their state constitutions. This reform occurred without
endangering slaveholders’ rights, encouraging some northwesterners to look to these southern
states for guidance. One northwestern politician advised “following the example of Kentucky
and making even the judges elective by the people.”124 The popular election of judges would
help remove the traces of nepotism and corruption that plagued the county court system. Peter
G. Van Winkle entrusted his fellow northwesterners to “do what is safely done by the people of
other states,” specifically the “preservation or…exercise” of political power.125 Slaveholding
states that had embraced democratic principles failed to devolve into anarchy and slavery
remained secured, refuting many easterners’ assertions about democracy’s inherent threat to
private property.126
The change in social sensibilities manifested in Jacksonian Democracy reflected the
changing economic context, too. In the Northwest, the growth of glass works, nail
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manufacturers, and iron foundries often meant the movement of men and their families from the
countryside into the towns of Wheeling, Wellsburg, and their surrounding environs. But as these
men moved into the cities, their opportunity to obtain a freehold—and illustrate a permanent
attachment to the community in accordance with republican ideology—diminished. Though
these men labored and contributed to the state’s economic health, they lacked political
representation, an absurdity in the minds of many residents. “[P]roperty cannot be made the
evidence of a man’s permanent interest with and attachment to the community,” a Wheeling
newspaper proclaimed.127 Wheeling, the locus of much of this dynamic economic growth,
witnessed an increase in demands for political representation as its industrial labor class matured
during this period. In nearby Wood County, residents declared in a reform meeting that “the
possession of property” bestowed neither increased political power to its owner nor should it be
used to determine political representation.128 One Weston resident believed that the “class…of
nonfreeholders” who paid taxes or served in the militia demonstrated a “permanent common
interest with, and attachment to, the State.”129 As the region’s economy developed along a
different trajectory than other areas in Virginia, its residents would continue to feel the burden of
a state constitution that, though partially reformed, needed to reflect changing economic and
social contexts.
Historians exploring sectional tension in Virginia have accurately recognized other longstanding grievances and demands articulated by western Virginians. Alongside important
political and constitutional reforms, historians observe that western Virginians believed that a
democratized state constitution would facilitate the creation of a public school system and lead to
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greater state investment in internal improvements in western Virginia. Such sentiments were
widespread throughout the Northwest in the 1830s and 1840s. Northwesterners blamed their
failure to achieve political, economic, and social reforms on obdurate eastern slaveholders and
politicians. These men, many northwesterners believed, privileged their chattel over white
equality and sought to consolidate political power in an effort to arrest the development of the
largely nonslaveholding Northwest. Subsequent historians have interpreted this evidence to
explain Virginia’s eventual dismemberment along clear, sectional lines. Indeed, the frustration
exhibited by western Virginians during the 1830s and later during the secession crisis appears to
reaffirm this interpretation.130
However, extant evidence also reveals an important, complementary narrative.
Throughout the 1840s, northwesterners expressed their continued fealty toward Virginia, their
hopes for greater sectional harmony, and a firm belief that slaveholders deserved extra
safeguards to protect their chattel from external threats. This evidence, overlooked or dismissed
by previous historians, offers an interpretation of the state undergoing a “détente” through
slavery. Indeed, alongside northwesterners’ demands for constitutional reforms were offers to
support slaveholders’ pursuit of greater political protection over their chattel. Northwesterners
remained hopeful that these public pronouncements would demonstrate their fealty toward the
state’s foremost institution and that the inclusion of large numbers of nonslaveholders would
strengthen, not endanger, slavery. Further, these public pronouncements revealed
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northwesterners’ support of the ideological reconceptualization of republican thought initiated by
Leigh, Dew, and Upshur a decade earlier. Rather than a stumbling block, slavery would become
the medium through which democratic and constitutional reform would be achieved.
In October 1845, residents of Lewis County and nearby Harrison County gathered at the
local courthouse to discuss and debate constitutional reform. Residents approved the passage of
six resolutions that contained many of the common political and constitutional grievances,
including the need to inaugurate the “white basis” in the state legislature and the rightful power
of majoritarian rule. After the six resolutions had been read aloud, Judge Edwin S. Duncan
offered his interpretation of the sectional discord affecting Virginia. While Duncan castigated
the “unjust discrimination against the West” by eastern Virginians, he reminded those gathered
of their past fealty and continued responsibility to the state and its institutions. “[W]ith what
care they had watched over the slave interest, peculiar to the East,” he proclaimed. The
“obedience and loyalty” northwestern Virginians had exhibited over the past years evinced their
support for slavery and that they would protect, not threaten, the institution. Indeed, the
“security” desired by eastern slaveholders would occur if they extended “justice” to western
Virginians. By the meeting’s end, residents unanimously adopted another resolution, stating that
northwesterners remained “utterly opposed to a dismemberment of the State for any purpose
whatever….[W]e will not separate from the East, and the East will not separate from us.” Rather
than actively pursue a division of the state or attack slaveholders or slavery, these northwestern
residents professed their unwavering support for the state and offered extra protections for
slaveholders. Democratic reform would not harm slavery, residents concluded; it would protect
and strengthen it.131
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Northwestern residents and politicians who supported the belief that political reform and
greater security for slavery could occur simultaneously also demanded that the two elements
needed to remain in equilibrium. Reform must not threaten private property, while the need to
protect slavery could not prevent white equality. In a letter to constituents, four northwestern
politicians maintained their support for the “white basis” and refused to concede to the “mixed
basis” on any new constitution. While slaveholders were “entitled to efficient protection” on
their property, that protection could not supersede white northwesterners’ “social and political
rights.”132 One contributor to the Wellsburg Weekly Herald supported an ad valorem tax that
would operate equally across the state, an important attribute that would not “oppress the tax
payer, or his peculiar property.” Northwestern Virginians “unanimously” supported this plan as
it would “make Virginia ‘one and indivisible.’”133 Support for policies and safeguards favorable
to slavery and slaveholders extended into the Shenandoah Valley, too. “We would not…refuse
adequate protection in the shape of guarantees, to property, if the East desire it,” one
Shepherdstown newspaper argued. This “compromise” would “not injure us” but rather promote
sectional harmony.134 “We are willing to see it [slavery] properly surrounded by guards against
improvident legislation, and excessive taxation,” residents admitted, but not “as an element in the
distribution of political power.”135 Protection for slavery could not supersede political
representation for whites but rather both should help form a healthier and more durable body
politic.
These public pronouncements extolling the need for political representation and
protection for slaveholders accompanied expressions of fealty toward the state. These
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expressions served to reaffirm northwesterners’ identity as Virginians and as loyal supporters to
the state’s institutions. In a reform meeting held at the Wheeling courthouse, residents
acknowledged the political evils produced by the constitution and the obduracy exhibited by
eastern politicians. Still, residents rejected discussion of dividing the state. “We are opposed to
anything like drawing invidious lines of distinction” that could precipitate dismemberment,
residents maintained.136 In Lewis County, the newspaper editor confessed that many residents
“prefer a division of the State to any other mode of redress.” These same residents, though,
prayed that such an occurrence “may never come” and looked longingly for “chords of common
interest” that would bind all Virginians.137 Parkersburg residents professed that despite the lack
of political representation, they nevertheless felt “deeply attached to this Ancient
Commonwealth” and “counted [themselves] among her children.” Achieving political equality,
not a division of the state, represented their primary goal.138 Ritchie County residents expressed
similar sentiments. They “hope[d] that our brothers of Eastern Virginia” would act with greater
fidelity to western Virginians as they constituted “children of the same good old
Commonwealth.”139 Talk of division creeped into some discussions concerning constitutional
reform, but residents often softened that threat by pledging fealty to the state or wielded the
specter of disunion to communicate the magnitude of the political injustice northwesterners
experienced. Northwesterners considered themselves Virginians first and foremost.
Opponents to this thinking existed in the region, though. These residents maintained that
the presence of slavery prohibited true and lasting democratic reform, and that such reform could
only succeed once the state removed its slave population. Such voices, however, remained
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isolated and marginalized from accepted and established political thought. In Preston County,
newspaper editor F.B. Woodward argued that slavery represented “an affliction, a plague, a
cankering, itching cancer” in need of immediate removal. Only the removal of slaves from the
state could assure pure and enduring democratic reform.140 Anson Berkshire in Ohio County
shared such sentiments. His newspaper, The Crisis, maintained that some form of emancipation
would inaugurate political and social freedom for white men. “The deep-bedded social evil of
Slavery” demands “decisive, unflinching, [and] uncompromising” action, Berkshire averred.
How could a state singularly devoted to slavery “constitute a republican government?”141 The
impassioned pleas from both Berkshire and Woodward, though, represented isolated and radical
voices on the issue of slavery. While some northwesterners believed that slavery precluded
constitutional and democratic reform, few argued that removing slavery was feasible or practical.
Rather, the majority of northwesterners who demanded political reform understood that it would
only occur with concomitant pledges to protect slaveholders’ property.
Residents’ pursuit of another constitutional convention acquired momentum throughout
the 1840s. National and international discussions concerning slavery and slaveholders’ rights
impressed upon some Virginians about the need to resolve domestic disputes.142
Northwesterners’ continuing pledges of fealty to the state and support for slavery aided such
thoughts. Even some eastern Virginians appeared supportive of a new constitutional convention.
“The press and people of Eastern Virginia,” a Parkersburg newspaper reported, “appear to have
undergone…a total revolution in sentiment with reference to…a constitutional convention.”
Such advocacy reflected an awareness on the part of easterners of the “odious” features of the
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constitution that hampered the entire state, not solely the West.143 Indeed, many northwestern
legislators heard that a “large number of the Eastern members are in favor of a Convention.”144
Still, numerous eastern Virginian planters and politicians remained unimpressed by
northwesterners’ pronouncements or that constitutional reform would preserve slavery or aid the
Commonwealth. In two consecutive sessions in the early 1840s, the eastern-dominated state
senate defeated proposals to call for a convention, and then promptly ignored a similar request by
the governor a few years later.145 Richmond lawyer Arthur Alexander Morson argued that the
“mixed basis” was “essential to the protection of eastern Virginia” as western Virginians owned
few slaves and had displayed hostile attitudes to slavery in past political and constitutional
conflicts. Constitutional and democratic reform would place eastern Virginia and its peculiar
property in a “prostrate” position “at the foot of western Virginia.” Morson denied the feasibility
and efficacy of democratic reform in a slaveholding state.146 Barbour County attorney John
Carlile lamented that northwesterners will “have to wring from the east” any acknowledgement
of political equality or a call for a constitutional convention.147 Political reform, even if a
constitutional convention could be achieved, was far from certain.
Even some northwesterners expressed misgivings about a convention. Though the “white
basis” received widespread support in the Northwest and supporters declared that “freemen will
never tolerate” any other plan, other westerners supported the “mixed basis.”148 John Carlile
noted that “Valley men and Trans-Allegheny men…are opposed” to the “white basis,” tracing
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this opposition to residents who “are jealous of the rapid growth of the North West.” “We
should not bestow all our censure to the east when we differ among ourselves,” he confessed.149
Other northwesterners appeared willing to concede to the “mixed basis” if it convinced eastern
Virginians to convene a constitutional convention. “Some our members think we ought to be
willing to compromise [on] the matter,” one northwestern politician reported.150 Other western
Virginians worried about the breadth and depth of reform. Morgantown merchant Henry Dering
admitted that “we need reform,” but wondered if reformers would know “where to stop.”
Democratic reform could devolve into a “hazardous experiment” that could graft the “wildest
schemes” imaginable onto the constitution with unknown (and possibly dangerous)
consequences.151 Further south, Lewis Summers prayed for reform “but without running into a
Shay’s or Dorr rebellion.” Once reformers began altering the state’s political foundations, would
they retain proper safeguards to protect private property and restrain radical political
elements?152
The divisions that hampered reformers’ aspirations in 1830 emerged again two decades
later, revealing once again a divided Northwest and the uneven and uncertain progression of
democratic principles across the slaveholding South and the nation. Ultimately reformers
differed over their interpretation of a democratic Virginia. Would property qualifications for
voting be removed or simply lessened? How would the General Assembly be apportioned?
How would slavery shape the state’s political structures? What power should be accorded to
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private property and its owners in a democratic polity? Would an expanded electorate comprised
mostly of nonslaveholders weaken or strengthen the government? Answers to these questions
would dominate any constitutional convention.
In 1849, the eastern-dominated state legislature acquiesced to western demands and
passed a bill that called for a constitutional convention to be convened on the “mixed basis.”153
While eastern Virginians conceded to call a convention, it would be assembled on their terms,
including granting a generous majority of fifteen delegates to their section. The popular
referendum that called for a convention on the mixed basis garnered statewide approval, with
comfortable majorities in the Tidewater and Piedmont and strong opposition in the western
counties.154 And even though northwesterners avowed they “cannot submit” to this plan and
considered it a “dishonor,” they consented, believing that any convention provided an
opportunity to achieve some level of constitutional reform.155 In the fall of 1850, northwestern
delegates trekked across the mountains to Richmond in search of political equality for their
constituents, an endeavor far from guaranteed.
Twenty years after the last constitutional convention, Virginians once again assembled in
Richmond and in taverns, churches, meeting houses, and courthouses across the state to debate
constitutional and political reform. Though northwesterners expressed frustration and
disappointment over the ratification of the 1830 Constitution, these feelings quickly faded as
residents considered the benefits of the new constitution and the drawbacks of hasty, reckless
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actions. The entrenchment and growth of the two-party system in the region welcomed broad
participation among voters and non-voters, allowing all men an opportunity to engage in debates,
meetings, and party functions. The conflicts between Whigs and Democrats often centered on
which party best protected slavery and, with it, white men’s political independence. Through
these battles, residents understood and accepted the southern axiom that slavery for African
Americans produced political equality for white men. This southern axiom, refined and
promulgated by Leigh, Dew, and Upshur, would become the defining characteristic of Virginia
politics through the U.S. Civil War.
Residents’ engagement in the “politics of slavery” during this twenty year period
reflected their growing support for the state and slaveholders’ rights. Rather than actively
seeking a division of the state or attacking slaveholders or slavery, residents expressed fealty to
the state, support for extra safeguards for slaveholders, and a belief that democratic and
constitutional reform could be achieved through the institution of slavery. Indeed, numerous
northwesterners believed that greater protection for slavery could be achieved through
democratic reform, a dynamic that had unfolded with great success in other southern
slaveholding states. Opponents in the region denied any compatibility between democracy and
slavery, but these few voices remained on the periphery of the Northwest’s political culture.
Democracy and slavery could sustain and strengthen each other, residents believed, ensuring a
durable and healthy republican government that would diminish sectional tension. But achieving
democratic and constitutional reform in 1850-1851 meant persuading eastern legislators and
slaveholders that nonslaveholders would support, not threaten, their peculiar property. Many
easterners, aware of the growth and assertiveness of antislavery groups in national politics,
balked at such suggestions. The future of the Commonwealth arguably hinged on the resolution
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Chapter 4: “Whitening” Politics: Slavery, Politics, and the 1851 Constitution
In November 1851, the Cooper’s Clarksburg Register began publication. In its inaugural
issue, editor and proprietor William Pope Cooper explained his motives for establishing a weekly
newspaper in Harrison County. An avowed exponent of the Democratic Party, Cooper believed
that his newspaper would ably serve northwestern Democrats by offering news and political,
economic, and social commentary. His analysis of local, state, and national news would be
interpreted through a partisan lens, defending the efforts of his party while castigating rivals.
Cooper believed that the “great principles of Republicanism avowed by Jefferson” represented
the true source of political liberty and independence for white Virginians. As editor, Cooper
solemnly declared to use all his journalistic abilities to support and advance that important
belief.1
The establishment of a partisan newspaper should not be surprising, especially during the
prime of the two-party system, when newspapers acted as a critical medium that disseminated
and advocated party principles. But the timing of the newspapers’ founding reflected what
Cooper and other northwesterners’ considered to be the beginning of a new political and
constitutional era for Virginia. Virginians “have just adopted a new constitution,” Cooper
exclaimed, expunging the “old relics of monarchy” and replacing them with “enlightened and
liberal” democratic principles. This inauguration of democratic reform occurred with increased
safeguards for slaveholders woven directly in the new constitution. With slavery interlaced
throughout Virginia’s political and constitutional structures, the symbiotic nature of democracy
and slavery reached full maturation in the Old Dominion in 1851. Cooper, a nonslaveholder,
celebrated the constitution’s adoption and ratification.2
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After operating approximately two decades under the previous constitution, Virginians
elected delegates for the task of rewriting their state constitution. The same democratic reforms
that northwesterners demanded in the years preceding the previous constitutional convention
were demanded once more in 1850: universal male suffrage, equalized representation in the state
legislature, direct election of government officials, and, among other demands, reforming the
county court system. Elected representatives assembled in Richmond while northwestern
residents anxiously read the convention’s proceedings, communicated with their delegates,
debated their neighbors on the convention’s progress, and anticipated positive news emerging
from the state capitol. While the previous constitution disappointed and angered many residents,
the new constitution adopted by delegates in 1851 received northwesterners’ hearty approbation.
The 1851 Constitution contained numerous desired democratic reforms, finally freeing
northwestern residents from what many considered aristocratic and antiquated means of
determining and vesting power in “the people.”
William Cooper celebrated the passage of the new constitution and remarked on what he
considered the important changes contained in the new constitution. Universal male suffrage
caught the editor’s attention. Now, a “large and respectable portion of citizens who have
heretofore been deprived of the elective franchise” would enjoy their “birth-right” of
enfranchisement. While the 1830 Constitution had increased the electorate beyond the colonial
era limits, this new constitution enfranchised practically all white men. These newly
enfranchised northwestern residents could exercise this right when they voted for those public
officials who “frame[d] and administer[ed]…laws,” notably that of the governor and lieutenant
governor. (Seizing on this new political structure, Cooper placed the names of Joseph Johnson
and Shelton Leake as Democratic candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively,
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near the newspaper’s masthead.) Along with universal male suffrage and the direct election of
most public offices, a more equalized form of representation in the state legislature and the
popular election of judges meant increased political power for northwesterners in state and local
affairs. This new constitution inaugurated “the dawn of a new era,” exclaimed one northwestern
politician.3
For many historians, this “new era” represented one of the final, pitched sectional battles
before Virginia’s dismemberment during the Civil War. Earlier historians such as Theodore
Lang and Granville Davisson Hall maintained that the 1851 Constitution clearly revealed the
degradation experienced by western Virginians, and that only a division of the state could ensure
political equality. Lang contended that “many leading men” in western Virginia “began to
devise means for separation” following the new constitution’s ratification.4 Democratic reform
could not overcome the differences manifest in two different societies, differences that Lang
emphasized stretched back to the region’s “origin of settlement.”5 Hall perceived in the new
constitution the same “Machiavellian hand” that sought to foment disunion and create a southern
slaveholding republic, a program solely designed to expand slaveholders’ hegemony. According
to this interpretation, western Virginians, confronted with this dilemma plotted to divide the state
to halt eastern Virginians’ slaveholding program.6
More recent historians have generally agreed with these previous interpretations.
William Freehling argues that the 1851 Constitution “only stalled off [a] class and regional
showdown,” a conflict continually over slavery and one that would inevitably end with West
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Virginia’s creation.7 Echoing Theodore Lang, Sean Wilentz contends that antislavery appeals in
western Virginia illustrated that “Virginia consisted of two societies encompassed within a single
border,” and though the 1851 Constitution inaugurated democratic reform, these measures
proved insufficient in promoting sectional harmony.8 While the Northwest obtained greater
political power through the 1851 Constitution, William Link maintains that residents continued
to experience and exhibit a feeling of “political isolation” during the 1850s. He argues that
residents manifested this “isolation” through various means, including pursuing annexation,
gravitating toward the Republican Party, and rejecting secession in 1861.9 William Shade
suggests that demographic trends in the 1850s signaled an approaching crisis over the issue of
slavery. The declining slaveholder population in the state coincided with an increasing
nonslaveholder population, especially in the western half of the state. Nonslaveholders,
enfranchised by the 1851 Constitution, would invariably, Shade implies, pose an acute political
threat to slavery’s future in the Commonwealth.10 These historians arrive at the same general
argument: Virginia’s political system had become too ossified to accommodate an increasingly
diverse constituency. Demographic, political, constitutional, and economic trends all indicated a
looming conflict over the issue of slavery during the proceeding decade. The 1851 Constitution
represented only a stop-gap measure, delaying the inevitable rending of Virginia.
But to many Virginians in 1851, the new constitution did indeed inaugurate the “dawn of
a new era.” For decades, western, disenfranchised nonfreeholders demanded political and
constitutional equality on par with their enfranchised and propertied brethren east of the Blue
Ridge. Though western reformers endured setbacks, notably in 1830, the 1851 Constitution
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represented a resounding triumph. Northwesterners could now claim membership in an inclusive
democratic political system, one that offered broad political rights and guaranteed political
representation for all white men. Residents cheered the constitution’s recognition of majoritarian
power, a principle that resonated with the memory of the American Revolution and validated
arguments about man’s “natural right” to self-government. The new constitution’s safeguards
for slavery and slaveholders angered few, with some maintaining that these measures amounted
to a compromise between eastern and western Virginians that would allay sectional tensions.
Residents displayed their overwhelming support for the constitution by their actions, too,
overwhelmingly voting to ratify the constitution.
The articles concerning slaves and slavery in the 1851 Constitution represented the first
such references in the state’s constitutional history. Along with capping the amount slaves could
be taxed, the new constitution placed restrictions on private manumission and curtailed the
General Assembly’s power to emancipate slaves. These articles strengthened and protected
slavery and slaveholders’ interests, manifesting the ideas envisaged by proslavery advocates
Leigh and Upshur. By fusing slavery and republican government, Virginians ensured the health
and longevity of both institutions, effectively making them inseparable. As questions concerning
slavery’s future continued to surface throughout the 1850s, Virginia proslavery advocates took
solace knowing that white Virginians would interpret any threat to slavery as a threat to their
political independence. The new constitution turned white Virginians in all the state’s regions
into proslavery foot soldiers.
According to nearly all the previous scholars of the topic, white northwesterners turning
into proslavery foot soldiers should have increased sectional tension and hastened the statehood
movement. But residents deepened their commitment to slavery and the state, embracing the
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fundamental southern axiom that black bondage protected white liberty. Residents championed
the rights of slaveholders, denounced the wicked machinations of abolitionists, and defended
themselves against accusations questioning their loyalty to slavery and Virginia.
Northwesterners intensified their engagement in the “politics of slavery” as whiteness emerged
as the sole factor demarcating freedom from bondage, with residents attacking those who
threatened to upset established political and racial hierarchies and relationships. The
inauguration of democratic reform in Virginia in 1851 deepened northwesterners’ fealty toward
slavery and the state.
Delegates to the 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention reflected the changing political,
social, and economic dynamics that had been unfolding in the state over the past two decades.
The Revolutionary generation had generally faded away, while the number of prominent planters
and slaveholders had dwindled, too. Professional men, including lawyers, doctors, and
merchants, comprised the majority of delegates to the new constitutional convention. Only a
handful of planters and even fewer large slaveholders attended.11 Northwestern delegates
embodied the rise of this new professional class in the Old Dominion. Over half of the thirteen
Northwest delegates practiced law, with others claiming occupation as a millwright, saddler,
merchant, and farmer.12 At least five delegates were born outside of Virginia, notably four born
in northern, nonslaveholding states.13 Approximately half of the Northwest delegation was
slaveholders, including Waitman T. Willey, Gideon D. Camden, and Joseph Johnson, though
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none were planters or large slaveholders.14 Northwest delegates embodied the rise of the new
professional class, and manifested their identification as Virginians through their status as
slaveholders.
Delegates gathered in Richmond in October 1850 to amend the state constitution.
Northwestern delegates gained an important victory in the convention’s initial month when they
secured the convention’s adjournment until the following January when data from the 1850 U.S.
Census would become available.15 The census confirmed northwesterners’ claims about
Virginia’s antidemocratic and antiquated political structures and functions. While the majority
of whites resided west of the Blue Ridge, property restrictions limited their political
representation and the overall power wielded by residents and their representatives.16 As Taylor
County residents argued, the “free white population” represented “the only true basis of
republican government.” The denial of majoritarian power constituted a tyrannical government
unfit for free men as it threatened the important principle of “political equality.” Residents
demanded what they considered their constitutional rights as a numerical majority.17
Eastern Virginians, though a minority, wielded majoritarian power and effectively
controlled the state government. And many eastern delegates wanted to perpetuate that power to
protect their interest in slaves. National events concerning African American bondage during the
1840s made the institution appear more vulnerable, including the arrival of abolitionism and free
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soilism on Virginia’s borders.18 Demographic trends within the state augmented those fears,
notably those unfolding in the Northwest. Delegates John Knote of Ohio County and Jefferson
Martin of Marshall County supported publishing the convention’s proceedings in German so
their German constituents could follow the convention’s progress.19 Many eastern politicians
considered these German immigrants, refugees of the failed 1848 Revolution, as a dangerous
populace that understood little of Virginia’s political culture or its institutions. Virginians’
sanguinity expressed prior to the convention faded as they sparred over reforms and the impact
of those reforms on slavery. This focus on slavery during the convention differed sharply from
the previous convention, where reformers and anti-reformers debated the efficacy of the freehold
and property qualifications.
During the convention’s opening weeks, Tidewater and Piedmont delegates, wary of the
possible deleterious effects of democratic reform on slavery, denounced reformers’ schemes and
ideas as dangerous and subversive. Reformers’ advocacy of the “white basis” plan of
representation, universal suffrage, and the popular election of public officials threatened to
elevate uneducated, crude, nonslaveholders into a position of immense power. Halifax County
delegate George W. Purkins contended that “the people” certainly did not include that mass of
western nonslaveholders who clamored for political representation. Rather, “the people” meant a
“political community” of men who shared overwhelming identical interests. In the context of
Virginia politics, that “political community” meant slaveholders, a powerful demographic that
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wielded immense state and local power over their slaves and, according to reformers, exercised
that mastery over white men, too.20
But if reformers resented the mastery wielded by eastern legislators over white men,
these eastern legislators feared that a reformed political system would allow western white men
to lord over slaveholders. Richmond delegate R.C. Standard perceived in a “democracy of
numbers” the characteristics of “naked and unmitigated Dorrism[.]” Standard’s reference to the
Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in the early 1840s reminded delegates of the militant and
aggressive tactics employed by democratic reformers. Such scenes of anarchy would unfold in
the Old Dominion if Virginians opened politics to the masses, he warned.21 Fauquier County
delegate and slaveholder Judge Robert E. Scott, annoyed by reformers’ majoritarian arguments,
wondered how much longer Virginians would be forced to listen to westerners’ “eternal
demands” that “mere numbers” should constitute the basis for republican government. The
“white basis,” he warned, would not provide “protection to property” but would instead “lay it
open to be plundered at the discretion of a mere majority.” Once vested with legislative power,
nonslaveholders would impose draconian taxes on slaveholders to pay for internal
improvements, effectively taxing slavery out of existence. The “mixed basis” provided the “only
adequate protection” for slaveholders, Scott maintained. All other schemes of representation
were hostile to Virginia’s slaveholding interests.22
Opponents of reform claimed that democratic reform, notably the principle of
majoritarian rule, closely resembled the dangerous “isms” gaining acceptance in the North.
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Chief among these was free soilism. Standard warned that the “white basis,” if inaugurated by
the convention, would engender the same sentiments in the General Assembly as those harbored
in the House of Representatives, “that northern…antislavery…almost free soil house.” Could
Virginia’s “slaveholding interest expect favor…[or] justice” from either body? 23 James Barbour
of Culpeper County castigated reformers’ who argued that slaveholders’ antipathy for
majoritarian rule precluded political representation for white men. Barbour interpreted in this
argument the ideological foundation “upon which the free soil party of the north bases itself.”
Westerners’ assertions that “slave labor is an interference with the rights of free men” mirrored
the free soil and free labor arguments articulated by the nascent and northern Free Soil Party. 24
The presence of free soilism in Ohio and Pennsylvania, along with rumors of free soil meetings
in Virginia, made such accusations appear more manifest. Opponents of democratic reform
perceived in reformers’ cries ideas and values that had been transmitted across the Mason-Dixon
Line. “[Y]our democracy is too much of northern origin,” complained one conservative to a
northwest delegate.25 The moral was clear. The style of democracy supported by northwestern
reformers appeared tainted by northern values and ideas, notably a visceral aversion toward
slavery. And if free soilism could be inaugurated in the Old Dominion, what other northern
“isms” could Virginians also embrace?
Reformers’ arguments extolling man’s natural right to self-government likewise reflected
an invasion of northern principles designed to undermine slaveholders’ hegemony. Mecklenburg
County delegate and planter William O. Goode reminded the convention that a “numerical

23

Standard, Basis Question, 17.
James Barbour, Speech of James Barbour, Esq., of Culpeper, in the Committee of the Whole, on the basis
question, delivered in the Virginia Reform Convention, on Thursday, February 27, 1851, (Richmond: R.H.
Gallaher, 1851), 12.
25
Virginia Reform Convention, 117.
24

153

majority is no where recognized in our system” of government. Goode seized on a similar
objection noted by his predecessors in the previous convention. Did “females” and “little
children” possess these same natural rights as reformers’ claimed white men held?26 Standard
furthered Goode’s argument, adding that “convicts and paupers” would be invited to the polls
under universal suffrage and enjoy representation under the “white basis.”27 Westmoreland
County delegate and planter Richard L.T. Beale considered the whole natural rights argument an
“absurdity.” No “secret law of nature” existed that bestowed political virtue to men or qualified
them to vote. The basis for political representation emerged from society, Beale concluded, and
Virginia’s political community demanded that politics reward property owners.28
For Beale and his ilk, property qualifications ensured a constant and stable government
with structures and functions in place that mitigated, if not eliminated, the capriciousness and
volatility of public opinion. Indeed, the current structure of the state government prevented what
Judge Scott of Fauquier considered the “dangerous turbulence of democracy” from convulsing
the body politic.29 If the convention adopted the “white basis,” uneducated and malleable voters
(who could be easily plied with alcohol or patronage) threatened to instigate a revolution that
would overturn established political hierarchies.30 A state government organized under the
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“white basis” could permit a spontaneous “call [for] a new convention” where that majority
would “expunge from the constitution any provision” deemed incongruous to political equality. 31
Slaveholder and Prince George County delegate Timothy Rives wondered if reformers’ pursuit
of democracy would lead them to dismantle the “long tried practice of the past” and “abandon
customs” that had protected the rights of property holders. Rives prayed that reformers would
restrain their “radical hands” before they inflicted irreversible damage.32
To prevent the inauguration of democratic reform in Virginia, anti-reformers wielded
every rhetorical weapon in their arsenal. The memory of the French Revolution once again acted
as a powerful means to manifest democracy’s excess. Events like the French Revolution occur,
an eastern delegate argued, when the government left the “power of the people…entirely
unrestricted.”33 Indeed, the “blood-stained records of revolutionary France” constituted the only
evidence needed to elucidate the danger of democratic reform.34 Other delegates equated the
furor for democratic reform to a volcano. Volcanoes erupted unpredictability and
indiscriminately, destroying everything in its path. The “smoldering volcano” west of the
Alleghenies threatened to destroy the republic, immersing Virginians into a Hobbesian state of
nature where brute force and mere numbers, not intellect or private property, would govern the
state. The dangers of democratic reform necessitated a full defense of the current structure of the
state government.35
An unabashed defense of slavery and the need to protect slaveholders stood at the core of
anti-reformers’ arguments. This focus on the peculiar institution reflected an abandonment of
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the freehold, a process begun in the post-Nat Turner years and initiated by Leigh, Dew, and
Upshur. Delegates’ preoccupation with slavery also reflected their increasing concern over
slavery’s future in a nation with more voices opposing African American bondage.
Northwestern Virginians’ demands for reforms, William Goode lamented, “directed the attention
of the northern abolitionists, and of the English abolitionists” who might conclude that the “slave
holder is weak in Virginia, and…weak throughout the south.” Though he denied that
conclusion, Goode worried that abolitionists reading the debates could infer that proslavery
advocates in the Old Dominion were on the defensive.36
Many Tidewater and Piedmont delegates simply believed that enfranchising the state’s
growing nonslaveholder population would imperil slavery. Examples of other southern states
having undergone a thorough democratization without any danger to slave property failed to
convince eastern delegates. As Scott argued, the “homogenous interests” in Georgia,
Mississippi, and Alabama facilitated democratic reform because a majority of the population
manifested a strong investment in slavery. The meager slave population in the Northwest and
across western Virginia illustrated that westerners possessed different interests than easterners.37
Reformers, cried Standard, asked slaveholders to place “legislative power… in that section in
which slave property scarcely exists at all.”38 Culpeper delegate James Barbour echoed similar
sentiments. “I tremble when I anticipate the day,” he declared, “when the unrestricted control
over the powers of this government shall pass into hands not interested in the preservation of that
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property.”39 Reformers possessed no “natural right to seize my property,” Scott declared, and on
this position many easterners refused to compromise.40
Northwestern reformers confronted an immense challenge refuting what Waitman T.
Willey considered the “inferential impeachment of western integrity,” specifically that western
Virginians could not be trusted on the issue of slavery.41 Refuting this accusation took different
forms. John S. Carlile declared himself to be a “Virginian by birth” and a proud “Southern man”
who posed no danger to the state’s institutions.42 To demonstrate his constituents’ fealty toward
slavery and the state, Willey introduced resolutions passed at two different reform meetings held
in Morgantown. These resolutions expressed residents’ unwavering support for democratic
reforms, notably the “white basis,” universal male suffrage, and the election of government
officials from the governor down to the local courts. Within these demands, Monongalia
residents also supported “a sufficient constitutional guaranty” that would “amply and fully”
protect property rights, specifically that of slaveholders.43 Though “not entitled to
representation,” private property, including that in slaves, required “just and full protection.”44
Gideon Camden introduced resolutions adopted at a similar reform meeting in Harrison County,
reemphasizing his constituents’ belief that democratic reform could occur with greater protection
for slavery.45
Such resolutions extolling northwesterners’ fealty, though, appeared as paper guarantees
in the eyes of some eastern delegates. These guarantees could be easily revoked or forgotten
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once residents achieved reform. James Barbour of Culpeper stated flatly that he did “not believe
in these guaranties, or their efficacy,” believing that the majority would “purge” the constitution
of these safeguards once residents deemed them “onerous” and “objectionable” to political
equality.46 Marion County delegate James Neeson denied such accusations, reminding eastern
delegates that the “only protection” for slavery rested on expanding political rights for western
white men. National crises concerning slavery should serve to remind slaveholders that true
security for the peculiar institution rested on securing allies, not alienating neighbors. Other
slaveholding states had democratized their state constitutions and “no injury has ever been
inflicted on slave property,” Neeson maintained. Slaveholders in these states realized that
nonslaveholders governed “wisely and faithfully, with due regard to all interests.” A
government constructed on “injustice…must fall,” he averred. But if delegates “constitute a
government” on democratic principles they would produce “brave and powerful” allies who
would provide “security” for slaveholders and support their rights during the “hour of…direst
need.” A democratic government would strengthen, not endanger, slavery.47
Preston County delegate William G. Brown echoed Neeson’s arguments, emphasizing
that democratic reform would secure allies who would support slavery against foes from within
and without. Northwesterners are “loyal to Virginia and to all her institutions,” he declared.
Brown considered the “duty of society to guard carefully” property rights, including through
“constitutional guarantees and legal enactments.” For years, northwesterners had manifested
their “affections and our support” for slavery, proving themselves loyal allies to slaveholders.
Brown assured delegates that his constituents’ fealty would continue “in the future” if the eastern
slaveholders would recognize their transmontane neighbors as “equals.” But the continued
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denial of political representation to western whites could prove catastrophic, Brown warned.
“There can be no peace in Virginia,” he cautioned, “…until all odious political discriminations
are forever abolished.”48 Like Neeson, Brown expressed little difficulty in granting political and
constitutional safeguards to eastern slaveholders. In return, both men asked for political
representation for their constituents, a move that would promote unity between slaveholders and
nonslaveholders and ease sectional tensions.
No other northwestern delegate, though, provided a clearer and more powerful
articulation of his constituents’ position on slavery and democratic reform than Monongalia’s
Waitman Thomas Willey. Willey, a noted Whig, slaveholder, and lawyer who had trained under
democratic reformer Philip Doddridge, fervently believed that greater security for slavery could
be achieved through the process of political and constitutional democratization. He reminded
delegates that, outside of South Carolina, the majority of states operated under some form of the
“white basis.” Importantly, slave property remained secure in those states.49 Eastern delegates’
claims that the “possession of lands and tenements, goods and chattles” reflected “superior
political authority” and required protection through the “mixed basis” were “abhorrent” and
calculated to increase tensions between slaveholders and nonslaveholders. Property bestowed
neither “virtue” nor “wisdom to its possessor,” he argued. Rather, the memory of the American
Revolution mandated that all white men possess equal political power regardless of property,
intellect, or birthright. By securing majoritarian rule, Virginians would also secure slavery. 50
Willey believed that Virginia slaveholders needed this extra protection for slavery
because the institution’s future seemed uncertain. The “encroachments and menaces of Northern
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fanaticism” had made slaveholders “justly alarmed” about not only northerners but
nonslaveholders residing in Virginia.51

But Willey considered the latter fears unfounded and

“idle.” The expansion of slavery in the Shenandoah Valley and across southwest Virginia
ensured that no “western majority would or could oppress the eastern slave holder by exorbitant
taxation, or by any enactment affecting slave property.”52 Willey even supported a
“constitutional limitation” on the legislature’s “taxing power” to protect slaveholders’ property. 53
Further, he emphasized his constituents’ fealty toward slavery and their support for extra
protection for slaveholders. Northwesterners supported “just and equal protection” for all forms
of property, including slaves, and delegates needed to only look to the historical record for
evidence of their unwavering support for slaveholders’ rights.54 Northwesterners had “united”
with eastern Virginians on the issue of slavery in the past and looked forward to maintaining that
unity in the future.55
But ultimately slavery’s future hinged on democratic reform. “Give us our natural
rights,” Willey maintained, “…and you secure our fidelity forever.” The bonds of common
interest produced by a thorough democratization of the state constitution would generate a
powerful and resilient form of political unity that would withstand national or state crises
concerning slavery. “You will bind us to your interests and your fortunes, by ties ten-fold
stronger than any…legislative majority can devise,” he proclaimed. Northwesterners would
mobilize “by [the] thousands” against the “leprous hand” of “Northern fanaticism” and against
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the “dark demon of insurrection.” Eastern Virginians would not be surprised at this swift and
passionate response, for northwesterners’ “liberty and honor” would rest on the health of African
American bondage.56
The benefits of a democratic slaveholding republic were immense and profound; the
failure to inaugurate democratic reform, though, could prove detrimental to slavery’s future in
Virginia. If eastern delegates adopted the “mixed basis” over northwestern objections they
would initiate “tumult and [an] alienation of fraternal feelings” and witness the destruction of
“peace and concord.”57 Why would northwesterners “ardently and cordially support negro
slavery, when by so doing they are virtually cherishing the property which is making slaves of
themselves?”58 Willey dismissed the possibility that abolitionism would gain a foothold in the
Northwest, but warned that “a hostility to slavery” could develop among residents who believed
that eastern Virginians cherished their chattel more than white equality. This “hostility” could
eventually “excite a species of political abolition” against slavery and “an attitude of
antagonism” against slaveholders. The failure to inaugurate democratic reform would produce
dire consequences. Increased sectional tensions, widened divisions between slaveholders and
nonslaveholders, and allies turning into enemies could unfold in the Commonwealth. Slavery
would not be protected; it would be placed in greater peril.59
Willey’s remarks during the convention provide important insight into how northwestern
residents understood the dynamic between slavery and democracy. Much like his constituents,
Willey did not oppose slaveholders or their right to govern their chattel.60 As a slaveholder
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himself, Willey considered the “title to this property…sacred.”61 But northwesterners objected
to eastern slaveholders’ use of slaves and the issue of slavery to deny majoritarian rights. Such
actions smacked of a betrayal and a denial of core republican principles achieved during the
American Revolution, an event that demonstrated the political fitness of all white men. Eastern
slaveholders’ insistence on the “mixed basis” appeared to elevate African Americans to a
position in politics reserved solely for white men. If forced to choose between protecting slavery
or acquiring their natural political rights, practically all northwesterners would choose the latter.
But reform could resolve this conflict. Residents believed that democratic reform would satisfy
all Virginians: white, nonslaveholders would achieve the political representation and
independence they had long sought while slaveholders would gain greater security for their
chattel.62
The pleas and pronouncements from northwestern delegates failed to convince enough
eastern delegates to adopt reform measures. The convention deadlocked on multiple occasions
during early 1851, and whispers of adjournment or a division of the state quickly surfaced. In
the Northwest, residents reached out to their delegates to offer advice and present their
perspective about the convention’s most pressing issues. George S. Ray, a farmer from Ohio
County, expressed his fears about the convention’s progress.63 Ray worried that delegates from
the Shenandoah Valley, aware of slavery’s increasing importance to their region, would “play
false in the hour of need” and caucus with eastern slaveholders. This coalition would inevitably
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foil any attempts at reform. If this occurred, “our people will be dissatisfied,” he lamented.
Residents “will naturally begin to enquire into the subject . . . and begin to feel and know that it
is the slave power that is ruling over them.” “[A] hostility to the peculiar institution” would
emerge in the region “which will in the end make Virginia a free state.” Ray believed that if the
convention failed to properly situate slavery within the state’s electoral system, northwesterners
would continue to “feel” that the slave power manipulated politics and that enslaved property
represented the source of political inequality. This feeling among residents would manifest into
an antagonistic spirit toward slavery that could threaten the institution.64
Other residents joined in this vibrant debate on slavery and democratic reform.
Practically all residents assailed the “mixed basis” and eastern legislators’ attempts to use that
formula to calculate representation. If easterners ratified a constitution with the dreaded “mixed
basis,” the Wellsburg Weekly Herald declared, northwesterners would be “Virginia slaves to
slave masters.” Western delegates needed to continue supporting the “white basis,” the
newspaper concluded.65 Fairmont lawyer Alpheus F. Haymond felt his neighbors becoming
jaded and frustrated because of eastern delegates’ continued intransigence on reforms. “The
people of the West,” he asserted, “will no longer submit to the present odious constitution and
neither will they submit to the mixed basis proper.”66 John G. Burdett, a farmer from Taylor
County, commented that “a respectable group of citizens are…discussing the pros. and cons. of
the recent developments” in the convention. The “feeling of our people,” he concluded, “are
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against compromis[ing] what is humbly conceived to be our rights.”67 Parkersburg residents,
though “loyal” to the state, remained “unanimous” in their support for the “white basis.” Eastern
Virginians needed to “repent” from their “reckless indifference” toward the West and cease the
“monstrous” injustice they imposed on northwesterners.68
Frequently residents’ discussions of the convention centered on whether western
Virginians should pursue a division of the state if eastern delegates rejected democratic reforms.
Nearly all residents declared that such action should only be a last resort or ultimatum used to
convince eastern delegates to compromise.69 Burdett “hope[d]” that Virginia would remain
united, finding it “painful” that members of “the same family” bickered over issues that should
unite, not divide, them. He supported a “divorce,” though, should eastern Virginians continue to
place northwesterners in “unequal and degrading conditions.”70 In a constitutional reform
meeting held in Wood County, residents “deplore[d] any movement tending towards a separation
of Virginia,” and that dividing the state should only be advocated if the “anti-republican and
oppressive” mixed basis be adopted.71 Monongalia County attorney Ralph L. Berkshire
cautioned northwestern delegates about actively pursuing dismemberment. “[A] division of the
State will not I am confident, be popular with our people though it may be politic to threaten the
East with it,” he maintained. Withdrawing from the convention to precipitate a division should
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only be a “last resort.” The widespread support for compromise measures in Monongalia and
Preston counties convinced Berkshire that residents would approve any new constitution.72
In nearby Harrison County, Circuit Court Judge George H. Lee, a slaveholder, reminded
Gideon Camden that of the resolutions passed at a constitutional reform meeting, the first
“affirmed the close attachment of the western people to Virginia as she is.”73 Harrison County
farmer and slaveholder Caleb Boggess believed that western Virginians should only separate
after “having exhausted all…peaceful efforts to attain our rights.”74 The interpretation that
northwesterners actively pursued a division of the state overlooks the hesitancy and caution
expressed by residents. Demanding a division of the state communicated to other Virginians the
serious injustice of the “mixed basis.” Northwesterners desired to remain Virginians; they also
demanded what they considered their fundamental political rights. On this latter issue few
residents were willing to compromise.
Accomac County delegate Henry A. Wise emerged as the principal figure in brokering a
compromise between reformers and anti-reformers. Though a slaveholder from Virginia’s
Eastern Shore, Wise often caucused with western reformers and supported their pursuit of
democratic reforms. His alliance with western reformers manifested his dogmatic belief that
democratic reform would strengthen and protect slavery, not endanger the institution.75 Eastern
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Virginians continued resistance and support of a “fundamentally aristocratic and antirepublican”
electoral system threatened to turn western allies into enemies.76 The “democracy” championed
by eastern delegates appeared as a derivative of the “Adams school,” a political system
controlled and manipulated by patricians solely for their benefit. In embracing this corrupted
form of “democracy,” eastern delegates “den[ied] the sovereign power of the people!” And by
rejecting majoritarian rule, Wise declared, Tidewater and Piedmont delegates threatened to
destroy the institution they sought to protect.77
Wise, an unabashed “pro-slavery man,” believed that the continued denial of westerners’
political representation would inexorably array thousands of Virginians against slavery. The
“worst enemy of slavery” were not northern Free Soilers or abolitionists, he asserted, but in the
exclusion of the “free white population in Western Virginia.” Implementing the “mixed basis”
represented a misguided and dangerous action on the part of eastern delegates. For without
adequate political representation, he warned, northwesterners would perceive themselves as
equivalent to chattel. But enfranchising westerners would generate proslavery allies who would
defend the institution. Wise’s support for “free, equal and universal suffrage” and the “white
basis” reflected his belief that democratic reforms offered “the best protection, not only to
persons but to property.” True security for slavery and slaveholders rested not in restricting the
number of those who possessed a stake in the institution; true security for the institution rested
on showering its benefits on all white men.78
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Wise’s political maneuvering and defense of democratic reform helped free the logjam
that had stalled the convention’s progress. In the weeks following Wise’s speech, eastern ranks
crumbled as delegates from Lynchburg, Norfolk, and Richmond recanted their support of the
“mixed basis.”79 A final bill concerning representation received delegates’ approval in late May
1851. In the House of Delegates, the West received eighty-two of the 150 seats, while the East
obtained thirty of the fifty seats in the Senate. The bill also stipulated that the General Assembly
would revisit apportionment in 1865 and, if members could not reach agreement on how
representation should calculated, four options would be voted on by the public.80
With representation settled, delegates quickly agreed on other constitutional issues.
Unlike during the previous constitutional convention, the expansion of suffrage met little
resistance as Whigs and Democrats across the state sought to increase their electorate. Though
some conservatives advocated some form of property ownership for voting privileges, their calls
appeased few and, by July, delegates passed universal male suffrage.81 Delegates also increased
the number of popularly elected offices, including that of the governor, lieutenant governor,
attorney general, and members of the Board of Public Works. In an effort to reform the county
court system, the constitution empowered residents to elect all local and appellate judges and
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justices of the peace.82 These measures, exclaimed the Wellsburg Weekly Herald, illustrated the
“grand advance” of “liberal principles” in the state, and an important triumph of democratic
reform over antiquated aristocratic elements.83
This constitutional triumph of democratic reform also strengthened the institution of
slavery. The 1851 Constitution required that any emancipated African American slave would
“forfeit their freedom” and be reenslaved if they remained in the state beyond one year.84 The
new constitution also empowered the General Assembly to “impose…restrictions and
conditions…on the power of slave-owners to emancipate their slaves,” curtailing a slaveholder’s
prerogative while increasing the power of the General Assembly to legislate such actions.85
Section 21 of the Constitution prohibited the General Assembly from “emancipat[ing] any slave,
or the descendant of any slave.”86 Proslavery advocates found much to celebrate in such clauses.
Virginia’s government and elected officials would be constitutionally obligated to protect
slavery, ensuring that whatever future conflicts arose concerning African American bondage,
Virginians would be compelled to support slavery.
Slaveholders also received extra constitutional protection concerning taxation. The 1851
Constitution included an ad valorem system of tax assessment where all forms of property would
be taxed “in proportion to its value.” Property in slaves, however, was exempt from that
assessment.87 Rather, slaves twelve years and older “shall be assessed with a tax equal to and
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not exceeding…three hundred dollars.” Slaves under twelve “shall not be subject to taxation.”88
These articles, similar to proposals offered by Henry Wise, ensured that slaveholders would be
protected from market changes and hostile nonslaveholders wielding legislative power.89 The
full weight of the new state constitution supported slavery and slaveholders’ rights while
simultaneously inaugurating democratic reform. The democratic revolution of 1851 signaled
Virginians’ overwhelming commitment to slavery.
Northwestern Virginians passionately defended and supported the new constitution.90
One resident exclaimed that the “West ought to be satisfied” with the new constitution “for it is
more than I ever expected could be obtained.” “[W]e will have a very democratic constitution,”
he concluded.91 The Wellsburg Weekly Herald viewed the new “liberal” constitution with
“entire satisfaction” and believed it “will pass without much opposition.” Now the “poor
man…can stand on equal platform at the polls, with his purse proud neighbor,” and obtaining
political office “must be gained by other means than buying or courting favor at Richmond.”92
Any faults in the new constitution were “immaterial.” If “Virginians cannot thrive under” the
new constitution, the Herald concluded, “their case is hopeless.”93 The Kanawha Republican,
meanwhile, considered the tax concessions as “a wrong and an injustice.” But the measures
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were part of a larger “compromise” adopted by Virginians “for the sake of peace and the
preservation of the unity of the State.” The newspaper called upon “all people of all sections [to]
live up to it in good faith.”94 Wirt County farmer Aaron Ruble celebrated the new constitution.
He found the new constitution “much better than…anticipated,” and believed that it
demonstrated the triumph of “Human wrights & Republican Principals.” The “boys of the
Western Mountains” had achieved a tremendous victory, he exclaimed.95
For more than a decade prior to this constitutional convention, northwestern residents
pledged their support for extra safeguards for slaveholders in union with democratic reform. The
new constitution satisfied both arrangements. Northwesterners celebrated the new constitution’s
democratic reforms, notably universal male suffrage, the direct election of government officials,
a more equally apportioned state legislature, a reformation of the county court system, and the
funding of public education. All of these democratic initiatives vested political power in “the
people,” a marked departure from what many residents claimed to be the aristocratic and archaic
1830 Constitution. But now “the people” had to protect slavery through the ballot box,
supporting politicians who pledged to defend slavery and assailing those who threatened the
institution. Further, the actions of elected representatives would be under intense scrutiny, lest
any politician waver on their commitment to African American bondage. This heightened
defense of slavery reflected its importance in the state’s body politic. Virginians situated slavery
at the core of their political and constitutional system because slavery now officially provided
political independence and protected liberty for white men. This “whitening” of the political
process also cast race as the only demarcation between freedom and bondage, further increasing
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the political stakes. Now defending whiteness meant defending slavery, a dynamic that few in
the Northwest opposed.
The euphoria surrounding the new constitution’s adoption carried over into the state’s
first popularly-elected gubernatorial contest in December 1851. Previous governors, chosen by
the state legislature, protected the “slaveholding counties” from majoritarian power, one
conservative confessed.96 John Carlile, though, characterized the governor as a “Creature of the
Legislature” who remained “indebted” to legislators while he supposedly represented and served
all Virginians.97 Now, with the adoption of universal male suffrage, governors appealed directly
to voters, championing their causes and defending their interests. While the “politics of slavery”
existed prior to 1851, this southern brand of politics intensified post-convention, as political
candidates continually reaffirmed their fealty to slavery and support for slaveholders’ rights.
These appeals represented more than protecting slavery; they also reflected candidates’ promises
to protect white men’s political independence.
Before the constitution’s ratification in October 1851, Democrats and Whigs had already
chosen their respective candidates for governor. Meeting in September in the Shenandoah
Valley town of Staunton, Democrats chose politician and farmer Joseph Johnson from Harrison
County. Whigs, convening in Charlottesville, selected Kanawha County lawyer George W.
Summers.98 Both gubernatorial candidates were slaveholders, with Johnson owning six slaves
and Summers five.99 As the campaign unfolded, Summers initially stressed traditional Whig
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economic policies, notably the creation of state-funded internal improvements and protective
tariffs. Slavery, though, quickly trumped these issues and dominated the contest.
In 1832, as a state representative in the House of Delegates, Summers, then a
nonslaveholder, announced his support for some form of emancipation. Further, he echoed
Thomas Jefferson’s assertions that owning slaves corrupted a slaveholders’ moral compass.
While such sentiments may have been permissible in the immediate post-Nat Turner context, in
1851 they appeared subversive, dangerous, and hostile to African American bondage. Eastern
Democrats assailed Summers on his supposed infidelity, accusing him of abolitionism. One
Charleston supporter of Summers noted that eastern Democrats “are trying to injure him…by
republishing his speech in 1832.” He remained optimistic that such efforts “will fail.”100
Another supporter decried eastern Virginians who attempted to brand Summers as an
abolitionist. These attacks sought “to prove that Western men were not then, are not now, and
ought not hereafter to be trusted on the subject of slavery.” All western Virginians should
“resent the insult at once” because, as “sons” of the same Commonwealth, they had remained
“true to Virginia.” Summers manifested that loyalty. The “Western masses” supported
Summers because of his “loyal and unflinching” advocacy of “Western interests and rights” but
also because of his devotion “to every interest of all Virginians,” including slavery. Easterners’
characterization of Summers as an abolitionist was ludicrous. “If he cannot be trusted on the
subject of slavery,” a partisan declared, “neither can the whole West.”101
Confronted with such accusations, Summers defended his position on slavery. Summers
considered the charge of abolitionism “ridiculous” and solely calculated to produce “false
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apprehension” among voters. “I am a slaveholder,” he declared, residing in the largest
slaveholding county west of the Alleghenies and strongly opposed to “all and every scheme” that
could “affect the security of slave property.” Summers also reminded voters that he supported
the constitutional provision denying the state legislature authority to emancipate slaves. The true
threat to slavery, he inferred, was his opponent. Joseph Johnson “lives in a part of the State
having less interest in that property” than other regions, and Summers was unsure if Johnson
owned slaves. Further, Johnson’s former home state of New York welcomed abolitionists and
helped escaped slaves flee to Canada. Summers suggested that Democrats carefully scrutinize
their candidate before casting aspersions on him.102 Despite the “mad-dog cry of abolition” from
eastern “blood hounds,” Summers remained confident in his chances, and encouraged western
Virginians to “stand” against these baseless accusations. For the accusations against Summers’
fidelity were more than partisan attacks; rather, they represented “an attack upon the whole
West,” and all westerners needed to respond.103
For his part, Johnson, who had served as governor under the previous constitution,
welcomed the work of those Democratic “blood hounds.” By December 1851, doubt surfaced
among Whigs about turnout for their candidate. In Parkersburg, Peter G. Van Winkle lamented
that though he expected a majority for Summers in the traditionally Whiggish city, “nobody here
knows and very few…will venture a guess” at that figure. The attacks had taken “a slice…off
here and another there,” leaving little hope that Summers would emerge victorious. Though
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Whigs pledged to “do our best,” the accusations against Summers proved too difficult for his
candidacy to withstand.104
Johnson won Virginia’s first popularly-elected gubernatorial election by a comfortable
margin. Summers received reduced Whig majorities in typical eastern Whig strongholds in the
Piedmont and Tidewater, as the charges of abolitionism resulted in “a prodegeous falling away”
amongst once stalwart Whigs. In the Northwest, party lines generally held sway. Whig counties
in the region, particularly Ohio and Wood, generated large majorities for Summers while
traditionally Democratic counties, including Monongalia, Preston, Marion, and Harrison,
supported Johnson.105 Northwesterners, honed in the practice of the “politics of slavery,”
showed little of the violent electoral swings that could have unfolded with the inauguration of
universal male suffrage. Though defeated Whigs believed that “the new voters were generally
on the democratic side,” northwestern voters reflected the continuation of entrenched partisan
affiliation.106 A few voters probably moved from one party to another, but the majority of voters
remained loyal to their party. Whigs believed their candidate would defend slavery while
Democrats professed the same about their nominee. The two-party system in the Northwest
proved resilient and dynamic, permitting broad participation in the post-convention era while
still manifesting the “politics of slavery.”
But dissatisfaction with the fusion of slavery and electoral politics appeared to take an
aggressive turn following the 1851 gubernatorial election. In early 1853, Brooke County
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residents convened to discuss annexation to Pennsylvania. Historians have often interpreted this
event as a denunciation of the “politics of slavery” and a harbinger of future dismemberment.107
The causes of this meeting, though, were more complex. Residents lamented their “dependence
upon Wheeling,” decrying the favoritism bestowed by Richmond while Wellsburg languished.
Wellsburg city leaders predicted that their “unfortunate geographical position” would “become
worse and worse as Wheeling” grew “more influential and populous,” cementing its status as the
Northwest’s lodestar.108 The state legislature deserved partial blame for refusing to adjudicate
this conflict. The “palpable oppression” exhibited by the General Assembly, notably in its
lethargic pace in granting railroad charters, incensed Brooke County residents. As Ken FonesWolf has noted, many of Wheeling’s economic, social, and political elite cultivated relationships
with Richmond politicians, generating ties that bound the two cities together while other
northwestern cities and towns suffered.109 Wellsburg represented one of those casualties.
Wheeling residents jeered Wellsburg’s secession movement. The editors of the Wheeling
Daily Intelligencer mocked the “proceedings of the Wellsburg night meetings,” where a few
residents clandestinely convened to express their misguided frustration. Such meetings occurred
under the cover of darkness because of Brooke County residents’ strong opposition to
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dismemberment.110 Indeed, the Intelligencer doubted the “‘natural kinship’” between the
Panhandle and Pennsylvania, as suggested by some Wellsburg politicians. Though the
Panhandle shared a similar geographic position with Pennsylvania, Wellsburg residents held
more in common with Virginians than residents of the Keystone State.111 The editors of the
Intelligencer were correct. Despite the animosity expressed by Wellsburg residents, many
looked toward possible dismemberment with sadness and “regret,” not alacrity or hopefulness.112
Yet again, those advocating for a division of the state were few and isolated, often advocating
dismemberment for other reasons that simply escaping from the state’s slaveholding regime.
A division of the state, though, according to one historian, remained in the forefront of
politics as dramatic demographic changes accelerated during the late 1840s and 1850s.113
German immigrants, fleeing the failed 1848 Revolution and attracted by the Northwest’s
growing industrial sector, arrived in large numbers in the late 1840s and early 1850s.114 Most of
these immigrants spoke neither English nor the language of slavery. During the previous
constitutional convention, eastern delegates worried that these German immigrants, once
enfranchised, could elect politicians apathetic or hostile to the state’s slaveholding interest. The
rituals and public political displays signaled German immigrants’ presence and demonstrated
their political fitness.115 But could these immigrants be trusted on the issue of slavery?
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Some Germans attempted to integrate themselves within Virginia’s slaveholding culture
by defending slavery and denying charges that they harbored antislavery or abolitionist
sentiments. In March 1854, Germans in Wheeling gathered to discuss recent legislative action
on licensing and temperance. After a speech by Democratic Congressman Sherrard Clemens,
gatherers passed a series of resolutions. The attempt by “unprincipled demagogues” to “drag the
temperance question” into the political arena reflected the machinations of “Northern fanaticism”
who sought to disturb national and state tranquility. These machinations could be clearly seen in
the efforts of J.E. Wharton, a Wheeling newspaper editor, who published articles appearing to
condemn slavery. Rather than allow such inflammatory messages on slavery to slander the
Northwest, these Germans immigrants sought to “condemn the traitor to our laws, and abhor the
treason.” Wheeling Germans “utterly disclaim the slightest sympathy of feeling” with any article
attacking slavery, considering such positions as “not only disloyal to the city and state, but
DISGRACEFUL

to both.” As proud Virginians, these Wheeling Germans denounced any attempt to

undermine the institution that supported their political freedom in their new homeland.116
The role of Wheeling Germans in supporting slavery extended beyond assailing those
who spoke against the peculiar institution within the state’s borders. “[A]s a border people,”
these immigrants considered themselves sentinels on the state’s “outpost,” offering to defend the
“cherished institutions of the State.” These men pledged their support in “repressing the
invading spirit of Northern fanaticism, in whatever shape presented…by foes without, or less
honorable…[and] more insidious and cowardly, foes within.” Wheeling Germans’ fealty toward
slavery carried over into their support of Virginia. Though rumors of division occasionally
surfaced in the region, “we stand by the ancient, faith, policy, and renown of Virginia.” “[W]e
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will indignantly repel any attempt to distract and divide” Virginians “or to array any one portion
of her people against the other upon questions of domestic policy or institution.” Rather than
actively pursue dismemberment or attack slavery, these Wheeling Germans supported African
American bondage, defended the institution from any and all threats, and pledged their fealty to
Virginia. Though some eastern planters continued to express fear about this growing new
electorate, these immigrants sought to dispel such notions.117
Expressions of fealty toward slavery and Virginia, including those articulated by
Wheeling Germans, reflected a larger phenomenon unfolding across the Northwest. This
commitment to African American bondage and the state reflected the widespread belief of the
inextricable and intimate connection between the two institutions. With slavery interlaced
through the state’s constitutional and political structures and functions, northwestern residents’
defense of slavery illustrated their patriotism; their allegiance to the state likewise reflected their
attachment to slavery. Residents manifested the arguments championed by Leigh, Dew, and
Upshur, who had emphasized the close relationship between the state government and slavery.
The voices in the Northwest that questioned this important relationship, such as J.E. Wharton,
were few and isolated, and often invited censure from the public. Northwesterners’ remained
committed to the state and to slavery.
In early January 1853, the Ohio County Court heard the case of a runaway female slave.
The slave had escaped to Ohio with the aid of a free African American in Wheeling, who
authorities later captured and detained. The court found the slave guilty of absconding from her
owner and sentenced her to two years in jail. The justice delivered by the court, the Wheeling
Daily Intelligencer proudly announced, demonstrated the Northwest’s fealty on slavery and
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slaveholders’ rights. The “people of the Northwest are behind none in their fidelity to the laws
designed to protect the institutions of Virginia,” the Intelligencer declared. Though eastern
legislators and slaveholders questioned northwesterners’ position on slavery, the court’s decision
reflected residents’ perspective on African American bondage. Northwesterners, “though not
slave owners,” remained “true to the interests of those of Virginia’s citizens who were,” and
would fight for the right of fellow Virginians to own slaves. Further, residents
“opposed…Abolitionism and Free Soil agitation, as any citizens of the State.” “[N]o one” in the
region opposed the court’s decision because northwesterners understood the fundamental
importance of the master-slave relationship. The master-slave relationship needed “to be
protected and enforced at all hazzards” because it was “part and parcel of the law of the land.”
Indeed, because slavery and the master-slave relationship represented the cornerstone of the state
government, northwesterners would punish “to the utmost rigor of the law, all who seek to
interfere” with the peculiar institution.118
Those who sought to disrupt the master-slave relationship, notably abolitionists, drew ire
and elicited censure from Northwest residents. Northwesterners ridiculed abolitionists’
promotion of social and racial equality, perceiving in such ill-fated efforts a baseless attempt to
destabilize the country and part of a larger program designed to overturn established hierarchies.
The Wheeling paper mocked an “anti-Slavery Convention” held in Cincinnati that welcomed
“Infidels, Negroes, and women in short coats and breeches,” a motley crew of men and women
seeking to overturn patriarchy and racial hierarchy. The differences between abolitionists and
anti-slavery advocates mattered little; their endgame appeared identical.119 A southwest
Virginian maintained that southerners had “rescued [African Americans] from barbarity,
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idolitory, cannibalism, and brutality,” Christianizing and civilizing African Americans. But
abolitionists’ dogma of “Uncle Tomism” threatened to “shake the world and cause civilization to
retrograde.”120 In Morgantown, the editor of the Monongalia Mirror mocked the nuptials of an
African American man and the daughter of a white abolitionist. The daughter “had been bro’t up
an abolitionist,” taught to “look upon the negro race with…pity and charity,” and witnessed the
reception of African Americans into her household “on terms of perfect equality and affection.”
Though the father objected to the marriage, the two stole away, married, and were now
expecting. The Mirror relished in the irony of the situation. “The fool is caught in his folly,” the
newspaper proclaimed, and soon the abolitionist would be “saluted by the sweet lisp of half a
dozen little niggers.” Abolitionism was a farcical and dangerous doctrine, northwesterners
believed, designed only to overturn established hierarchies and threaten national stability. 121
Though some northern abolitionists characterized the Panhandle as fertile ground for
proselytizing, residents denied such baseless characterizations. “[A]re the people Wheeling
Abolitionists or free soilers,” the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer rhetorically asked. “[O]r are they
Virginians and Southerners in sentiments and interests?”122 “Our sons of the soil are true as steel
to their Alma Mater, the dear old Commonwealth, and to the institutions of their forefathers,” the
editors maintained. Defending the fidelity of Panhandle residents’ seemed unnecessary because
of the widespread acceptance of slavery and support for Virginia. Even “most of our adopted
brethren have the good sense to respect” slaveholders’ rights, slavery, and the institutions of the
state.123 Followers of these dangerous “‘isms’ of the North…burnt the Bible, the Constitution of
the United States and the Declaration of Independence, because they sanctioned the institution of
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slavery.” Northwesterners denounced such actions.124 Summarizing the position of its citizens,
the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer proudly proclaimed that they “have taken a firm stand against
Abolitionism and kindred fanaticism.”125 These denunciations of “isms” and “ists” reflected a
shared commitment among southern and northern conservatives to marginalize and extinguish
ideologies that threatened established hierarchies.126 Further, these denunciations also signaled
northwesterners’ widespread acceptance of established and dominant hierarchies, notably slavery
and patriarchy. Northwesterners’ felt neither isolated from the state nor indifferent to its
institutions; rather, residents closely identified with other Virginians and supported the state’s
institutions.
The threat of “isms” or “ists” infiltrating Virginia’s electoral politics appeared manifest in
the 1855 gubernatorial election. Democrats selected Eastern Shore politician and planter Henry
A. Wise as their candidate for governor, the “most popular eastern man in the west,” according
to a Wellsburg newspaper.127 His supporters argued that his defense of democratic reforms and
increased protection for slavery during the constitutional convention endeared him to yeomen
across the state who would help propel him to victory. A Taylor County resident considered “the
name of Mr. Wise…a cherish[ed] word in every cabin in W. Virginia,” and “hope[d]…to
signalise my gratitude in some more tangible form.”128 Before Wise’s official nomination, the
Cooper’s Clarksburg Register supported his candidacy, reminding readers of his important work
in the previous convention. Northwesterners owed Wise their “grateful remembrance” as he
“contributed…in overthrowing the odious ‘mixed basis’” and helped secure northwesterners’
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political representation.129 At a Democratic meeting in Harrison County, residents passed two
resolutions extolling Wise’s efforts during the convention. Wise was the “able and fearless
defender of equal rights and equal laws” who also manifested a “sincere devotion…to the
interests and institutions of the South.” Harrison County residents pledged their full support.130
Whigs, though, faced an existential crisis. Whigs’ failed attempts to court immigrants in
the early 1850s alienated nativist voters in the North and upper South, including Virginia. By
1854, the party fractured, unable to contain the sectional discord arising from the KansasNebraska Act. Fragments of the party (combined with some alienated Democrats) lived on in the
American, or Know Nothing, Party. The Know Nothing Party, built upon an anti-immigrant
platform, purportedly told its followers to claim that they “know nothing” about the
organization’s functions. Followers also gained the name “Sam,” a derivative of “Uncle Sam”
and a reflection of the party’s nativist ideology.131
By the middle of the 1850s, Know Nothings constituted a prominent political party and a
threat to Democratic hegemony in Virginia and the South. Know Nothings enjoyed electoral
success in Fredericksburg, Norfolk, Lynchburg, and Portsmouth, and an increasing presence in
Wheeling, Charleston, and Lewisburg on the western side of the Alleghenies.132 One Wheeling
resident approved the party’s opposition to “political popery,” a stance that opposed the rituals
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used by the Democratic Party to secure political power.133 The party’s maturation in Virginia
reflected the concomitant increase in the number of foreign-born residents within the state and
the Northwest. Approximately thirty-five thousand foreign-born residents called Virginia home
in 1850, ranking it as one of the highest totals among slaveholding states. Most immigrants
settled in cities such as Richmond, Petersburg, and Wheeling. Northwestern counties, notably
Marshall and Ohio, boasted some of the higher figures of foreign-born residents in the state.134
Democrats welcomed immigrants (and their voting power), believing that their arrival in the
United States reaffirmed the nation’s exceptional status as a bastion of liberty and freedom. But
many residents in the Northwest worried that these immigrants, many of whom were Catholic,
would maintain their allegiance to the pope and not the president. Immigrants looked, spoke,
and acted differently than Anglo-Americans, increasing concerns that immigrants could upset
established hierarchies. This fear provided fertile ground for the Know Nothings to build their
grassroots campaign.
While Know Nothings could deliver a nativist message, their secrecy and party
procedures garnered sharp criticism. This “subterranean organization” operated clandestinely
and avoided “the free and public discussion of all political questions” that characterized
American politics, a Clarksburg newspaper charged.135 Secret oaths, night meetings, guarded
members, and refusing to debate appeared to validate Democrats’ accusations that Know
Nothings constituted a tangible threat to political stability. Further, this secrecy that shrouded
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the party caused some residents to question the manhood of its members. “[A]bolitionists and
disunionists,” though preachers of “treasonable” doctrines, were “sufficiently honest and manly
to boldly avow their principles.” Know Nothings’ secrecy made members “excessively modest”
and inculcated a “conscious weakness and unworthyness” among its followers.136 Indeed, some
Democrats applauded Abolitionists’ “manliness” to maintain their stance and combat Democrats;
Know Nothings, though, skirted such conflict.137 “In Virginia men are manly,” the Morgantown
Telegraph declared; “they are not sneaks.”138
Most Know Nothings expressed little concern about their party’s procedures, but the
issue of slavery proved nagging and difficult to navigate. Their candidate for governor in 1855,
Thomas S. Flournoy, a former Whig congressman, encountered this sharp criticism. The
Richmond Enquirer uncovered a speech given by Flournoy that caused some Virginians to
question his position on slavery. “No country can be prosperous with a slave population,”
Flournoy stated, an argument that closely paralleled abolitionist rhetoric.139 In an effort to
burnish their candidates’ proslavery credentials, Know Nothings across the state maintained that
their nominees would protect the interests of slaveholders, notably by supporting the Fugitive
Slave Act, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, and popular sovereignty in the territories. Know
Nothings held “sound views of State policy,” notably on slavery, members declared.140 In
Morgantown, the American Union, one of the few Know Nothing newspapers in the region,
defended the disenfranchisement of foreigners and Catholics because of the threat they posed to
slavery. Such men believed that “ecclesiastical” authority was “superior to…civil power,”
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regarding their allegiance to the pope as superior to their allegiance to Virginia and its
institutions. Foreigners’ “mistaken notions of Liberty, and more erroneous ideas of their
Constitutional prerogatives as citizens” invariably led them to demand slavery’s abolition,
joining with other “mad-cap factionists…in a war upon the peculiar institutions of the South.”141
By restricting foreigners’ political representation and power, Know Nothings sought to halt the
spread of abolitionism while demonstrating their fealty to slavery.
These public stances on slavery coincided with Know Nothings’ attempts to disarm
Democrats’ accusations about their unsafe position on the institution. Many western Know
Nothings mocked attempts by Democrats to label Americans as “traitors” to Virginia
institutions, including slavery. Know Nothings sought neither the abolition of slavery nor the
overthrow of established hierarchies; rather, they sought to purify the electoral system from
Democratic corruption and manipulation.142 A Parkersburg newspaper maintained that Know
Nothings’ candidate for lieutenant governor candidate, James M.H. Beale of Mason County,
“avows and entertains the same views on Slavery” as those found in “the whole district, without
distinction of party.” Indeed, “all Western Virginia” shared Beale’s proslavery convictions. 143
In Ohio County, Know Nothings denounced Democrats’ fear mongering techniques. Democrats
resorted to “detraction and misrepresentation, and falsehood upon falsehood” in order “to injure
[Know Nothings] in the eyes of the people.”144 “Sundry rumors” designed to cast doubt in the
minds of voters about Know Nothings’ fealty toward slavery should be vehemently rejected.145
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Northwestern Know Nothings’ rhetoric and pledges on the issue of slavery, though, often
conflicted with their national platform. During their national convention, northern delegates,
frustrated with the proslavery leanings of the party, rejected the southern plank of their
organization’s platform. Northern Know Nothings had passed anti-slavery resolutions in their
home states and hoped to include these resolutions in the party’s national platform. But southern
Know Nothings’ insistence on protecting slavery divided members. This fissure fueled
Democratic claims that southern Know Nothings could not be trusted on the question of slavery,
as they would capitulate to their northern colleagues and seek slavery’s abolition.146
Northwest Democrats hounded Know Nothings on their supposed threatening stance on
the issue of slavery, what one leading Democrat considered the “most important” issue of the
election.147 For Democrats, the connection between Know Nothings and abolitionists was clear
and compelling. “[P]rominent abolitionists” in Ohio candidly admitted that “Know Nothingism
is intended to abolitionize the South” and spread their “infamous doctrines” throughout
Virginia.148 Democrats charged that James Beale, Know Nothings’ candidate for lieutenant
governor, declared in a speech in Parkersburg that the “existence…of the institution of Slavery”
produced the evils that afflicted the state. This denunciation of slavery sounded less “like the
speech of a Virginian” and more “like the impious pratings of some suddenly transplanted
Northern Abolitionist.”149 Know Nothings, in collusion with northern abolitionists, sought to
repeal the Fugitive Slave Act and the Kansas-Nebraska Act while halting the interstate slave
trade and abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. “Were Virginians ready for this?”
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Democrat E.W. McComas of Kanawha County averred that such actions “boded no good to
Southern rights.”150 “Know Nothingism,” the “foe of the South and the ally of Northern
fanaticism,” deserved a sound rebuke in the upcoming gubernatorial election to demonstrate that
northwesterners detested their abhorrent doctrines.151
Wise defeated Flournoy in the 1855 gubernatorial election by approximately ten thousand
votes, a similar majority Johnson enjoyed four years earlier. Traditional Democratic
northwestern counties toed the party line, as Monongalia, Harrison, Marion, and Preston
provided majorities to Wise. Typical Whiggish counties such as Wood and Ohio racked up large
margins for Flournoy.152 Democrats rejoiced at Virginians’ rejection of northern dogma. In
electing Wise, voters illustrated that “they are Virginians; they are not Yankees.” Virginians
refused to embrace politics “from such a sink of painful infidelity, shallow learning, lechery,
corruption, and hypocrisy” that had infected the abolitionist states of Massachusetts and New
York.153 A Wheeling newspaper celebrated the results, congratulating voters for defeating that
“new fangled humbug which had its origin in the brain of some Yankee.”154 As during the
previous gubernatorial election, the “politics of slavery” figured prominently, as partisans
courted voters by stressing their party’s fealty toward the peculiar institution. But voters,
acclimated to this strategy, generally maintained party affiliation because they believed that their
party offered the strongest defense of African American bondage. Perhaps most importantly, the
gubernatorial election and the rise of the Know Nothing Party reflected the dynamic nature of
Virginia’s electoral system. Two viable political parties with distinct ideologies and platforms
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continued to court voters in the Commonwealth, and neither party appeared in danger of fading.
While national politics appeared to be ossifying in the 1850s, Virginia politics remained
flexible.155
Know Nothings remained an electoral force throughout 1855 and into 1856. Know
Nothing politician John S. Carlile of Harrison County won election in the Eleventh
Congressional District, while the party maintained an organ in Morgantown and looked to
remain a viable political alternative to Democrats.156 The party held regular meetings and Fourth
of July parades in the region, maintaining its public presence among residents while remaining a
thorn in the side of “Dimmykrats.”157 Know Nothings burnished their proslavery credentials,
too, mocking “Black Republicans” while warning fellow Virginians about abolitionism and free
soilism, two ingredients found in the “boiling cauldron of Northern fanaticism.”158 Know
Nothings stated unequivocally that they “are…good and loyal Virginians” who championed
slaveholders’ rights and defended slavery against all threats.159 Despite their recent
gubernatorial defeat, Know Nothingism continued to find fertile ground in northwestern
Virginia.
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William Pope Cooper, a passionate Democrat and
editor of the Cooper’s Clarksburg Register, continued to hound
Know Nothings on the issue of slavery. Know Nothings, like
Whigs, exhibited a weakness on slavery that threatened the
institution and white men’s political independence. Southern
Know Nothings appeared “willing to relinquish their
constitutional rights” to appease “their abolitionist brethren of
the North,” proving once again that the party’s members were
not “sound upon the slavery question.”160 African American
bondage generated and protected white men’s “natural and
Constitutional rights,” Cooper asserted, and required vigilance
upon the part of all Virginians to ensure slavery’s health and
vitality. Opponents of this fundamental southern axiom had to
be defeated.161
On April 4, 1856, Cooper published an engraving that
he believed revealed Know Nothings’ true motives and actions.
Under the caption “SAM KNOW-NOTHING,” a young, male
African American slave rides on the back of a well-dressed white man. The man dons a top hat,
a jacket with long coattails, a high dress collar, a cane, and holds a money purse. A raccoon
takes the place of the individual’s head. In bold capital letters under the engraving, Cooper
wrote, “GOING HOME TO THE NORTH.” In a brief editorial below the picture, Cooper
remarked that “Sam Know-Nothing” now found himself “making tracks for Yankee land”
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following his “fruitless efforts to proselyte” Virginians with his “abominable political heresies.”
The connection between Know Nothings and northern abolitionists could not be more manifest.
“Sam,” a “Yankee” exponent, espoused alarming messages that threatened the state’s established
racial and political hierarchies. “Sam” had “stolen a nigger and…resolved to devote himself
more exclusively to that business hereafter.” The issue of slave kidnapping represented a raw
nerve in the body politic for many Virginians, notably those in the Northwest, who accused
abolitionists of absconding with slaves. Know Nothings, Cooper averred, were complicit in such
activities and disregarded proslavery legislation. Cooper, like other Democrats, believed that
Know Nothings represented apostates to Virginia’s slaveholding interests and had to be branded
as hostile outsiders.
The political cartoon’s iconography confirms Cooper’s suspicion that Know Nothings
represented Whigs incognito. This disguise, though, could not hide the same fundamental truth:
Whigs and Know Nothings posed an acute threat to slavery. The raccoon serving as the figure’s
head reminded readers that while Know Nothings proclaimed to be a new party, the party
represented the reincarnation of the Whig Party. During the 1844 presidential campaigns, Whigs
used the raccoon and coonskin hat as a means of capitalizing on the rural identity that propelled
them to victory during the previous presidential election. Democrats used the raccoon and
coonskin hat to accuse Whigs of being political manipulators and traitors to the “common man,”
hiding under a hat rather than revealing their true identity.162 While Know Nothings paraded as a
new political party, Cooper assured his audience that they were “the same old coon.”163
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The figure’s fashion also provided important political and social commentary. The top
hat, suit, cane, high collar, and coin purse represented the trappings of a northern aristocrat, a
man of wealth that contrasted sharply with a northwestern yeoman farmer. Yeomen embodied
the “homespun ideology” made fashionable during the American Revolution while Know
Nothings, by contrast, were greedy northern capitalists who had strayed from the ideals of the
Revolution.164 These references represented more than simple partisan conflict. Cooper
illustrated that northwest Virginians would remain vigilant against threats to Virginia’s
republican institutions, notably slavery. Northwesterners would continue to identify and
condemn politicians and parties that threatened the values and interests of “the people,”
promising to uphold and preserve southern democracy.
Cooper’s political cartoon illustrates that northwestern Virginians by the 1850s had
deepened their commitment to slavery and to the state. Some residents, though, objected to this
deepening commitment. As the Wellsburg Weekly Herald declared, “there are other interests in
Virginia…besides those pertaining to slavery.”165 “[S]lave influences” had “moulded, cramped
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and controlled” the “entire legislation of the state” to the detriment of nonslaveholders. Lest
residents labeled the newspaper an abolitionist organ, the Herald would remain aware of “all the
existing interests and grievances of slaveholders” and repudiated the notion that “slavery [was]
wrong in itself.” Still, the Herald supported some form of gradual emancipation as it would
serve and protect the “best interests of the white population of the State.”166 Dissatisfaction over
the state legislature’s continued reluctance to appropriate funds for internal improvements and
unfair taxation policies roiled some northwesterners who bemoaned eastern legislators’
continued intransigence and the favoritism doled on their section of the state.167
These dissonant voices, though, remained on the political periphery. Grievances
expressed by residents often included continued pledges of fidelity to the state and fealty toward
slavery. Northwestern Virginians, “living on…[the] Western border,” still felt “as much pride in
and veneration” for the state and its institutions all other Virginians.168 As Granville Davission
Hall later admitted, northwesterners “were Virginian in their traditions and did not give up their
pride in the historic fame of the Commonwealth.”169 Residents often confessed that they lived in
one of the most democratic states in the country, and sought not to overturn established
hierarchies but merely secure and protect the rights of western white men.
Many historians contend that during the 1850s, northwesterners drifted further away from
the state and slavery, growing frustrated with the monomania that characterized Virginia’s
political culture in regard to African American bondage. But from the Constitutional Convention
of 1850-1851 through the middle of the 1850s, northwesterners deepened and intensified their
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attachment to Virginia and the peculiar institution. Rather than pursuing division, residents
sought closer union. Instead of denouncing slavery, residents defended the institution. These
sentiments would continue to pervade northwesterners’ actions and thoughts through the
secession crisis in 1860-1861.
As Lacy Ford has illustrated, as the process of democratizing state constitutions unfolded
in the 1830s, politics emerged as the sole purview of white men as democratic reform flattened
other distinctions. And as whiteness became the single characteristic demarcating freedom from
bondage, white men fought to protect the institution that validated that racial divide and ensured
their political representation. The racial and political implications were profound. The
“imperatives and prerogatives of whiteness” became “clear and compelling” for white
southerners, as this racial divide “gave a harder, uglier, and more permanent edge to the idea of
racial differences.”170 Those who sought to challenge or overturn this fundamental axiom
elicited the censure of white southerners.
This same phenomenon unfolded in Virginia after 1851. The 1851 Constitution provided
political representation to all white men regardless of property, status, or socioeconomic status.
With politics now open to all white men and race as the only division between liberty and
slavery, white northwesterners passionately defended this axiom with arguably greater vigor than
in previous years. Part of this increased intensity reflected the growth of groups hostile to
slavery. Abolitionists, free soilers, and anti-slavery proponents all appeared determined to upset
this ruling southern axiom and deny the benefits of whiteness that northwesterners had long
sought. The differences between those extremists mattered little, as their ultimate objective
appeared identical. The “politics of slavery,” manifested through the state’s two first popularly-
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elected gubernatorial contests, took on a greater urgency than in previous elections because the
stakes were higher and more important. Each sign of political weakness could provide an
opening for northern extremists to exploit. Though Democrats considered themselves the
standard-bearer for protecting slavery, Whigs and Know Nothings engaged in similar tactics,
professing their hatred for northern “isms” and “ists” while pledging their support for
slaveholders and slavery. Political organizations attempting to break ground in the Northwest
faced an immense challenge.
Northwesterners’ increased intensity defending slavery and their fidelity to the state
further reflected what Leigh, Dew, and Upshur had envisaged years earlier. By placing slavery
at the core of Virginia’s republican institutions, delegates at the constitutional convention
tethered the health and longevity of slavery to that of the state government. Virginia’s political
and constitutional structures, interlaced with safeguards for slavery, shielded the peculiar
institution from enemies within and without. The few critics who claimed that the state
constitution furthered and protected the interests of slaveholders were correct; but the state
constitution furthered and protected the interests of all white men, slaveholders and
nonslaveholders alike, by promoting and protecting independence and liberty for all white men.
This powerful dynamic subsumed class and political divisions, promoted sectional harmony, and
created a united front among Virginians. Northwestern Virginians remained wedded to slavery
and the state, the wellsprings of their political representation.
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Chapter 5: Defeating the “mongrel platform”: Partisan Politics, Slavery, and the Limited Appeal
of the Republican Party, 1856-1861
In late January 1861, Hancock County residents convened to discuss the crisis unfolding
across the nation. In December 1860, South Carolina had seceded from the Union, and other
states across the Deep South soon joined the Palmetto State to form the Confederate States of
America. Virginia, the largest slaveholding state, remained in the Union, but events within and
without the Old Dominion challenged its fealty to the nation. Virginia Governor John Letcher
convened a special session of the legislature in early January 1861, and delegates approved a
special election for representatives for a state convention to meet on February 13. Virginians
believed that this convention would help determine the Commonwealth’s fate, specifically
whether it would join other slaveholding states in the new Confederacy or remain in the United
States.
For Hancock County residents, the reasons for remaining in the Union were clear and
compelling. Virginians, slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike, “can always obtain…their just
rights…by remaining with the Union.” And the “rights” Virginians “now enjoy[ed]” were
numerous: “the credit and protection of our present government,” along with “a share of the
common territories, to the arms, the arsenals, the dockyards, and the navy.” The federal
government’s military prowess protected Virginians, most recently in October 1859 when federal
soldiers captured John Brown and his armed rebels at Harpers Ferry. Further, the nation’s
international credit facilitated commercial transactions, an attractive characteristic that could
assist the Northwest’s expanding industrial footprint.1
But Hancock County residents understood that the state’s overwhelming investment in
slavery led many Virginians, especially those east of the Blue Ridge, to aver that a union under a

1

Wellsburg Weekly Herald, February 1, 1861, 2.

196

Republican administration would prove fatal to African American bondage. But these Northwest
residents found such fears unfounded. Northwesterners “sincerely sympathize with our Eastern
Virginia friends in their present alarm, but…assure[d] them that…their fears are groundless and
arise from a misapprehension of the intentions of our Northern friends.” Remaining “faithful to
the Union” represented the safest path for eastern Virginians concerned about their chattel.
Northerners “will assist them in the maintenance of their just rights and labor with them for their
enforcement,” northwesterners maintained. “[S]ome conciliatory plan for the preservation of our
institutions” should be pursued “without doing violence to the conscientious opinions of either
Northern or Southern men.” If Virginians wanted to protect and ensure slavery’s immediate
future, Virginians needed to remain in the Union.2
The argument that slaveholders’ rights and slavery were safer in the Union received
widespread acceptance in the Northwest. At a Union meeting in Parkersburg in early January
1861, residents asserted that secession would prove ruinous to slavery. Northwesterners
admitted that their neighbors across the Ohio River “have been guilty of flagrant acts of
injustice” and had violated the “constitutional rights of slaveholders.” But secession would
destroy slavery. Joining the Confederacy would produce a “connexion fatal to [Virginia’s]
credit, her prosperity, and to the happiness of her people” by abrogating the constitutional
privileges slaveholders possessed in the Union. “[W]e are fully persuaded that all our grievances
may be redressed under the Constitution,” residents concluded. Slaveholders’ grievances could
be addressed if the state remained in the United States; the uncertainty surrounding secession’s
effect on slavery should give pause to slaveholders as they contemplated Virginia’s future. 3
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Northwesterners’ declarations asserting their fealty to the Union, even as a Republican
president assumed office, were common throughout the region. But historians have unfairly
overlooked these pronouncements, selecting instead resolutions and declarations demanding an
adjustment of the state’s ad valorem tax and readjusting apportionment in the state legislature.
These grievances appear to illustrate a growing antislavery sentiment in the Northwest and
foreshadow residents’ demand for a new state free from slavery. Granville Davission Hall
argued that nearly all northwesterners were “fighting to get away from” slavery as the secession
crisis unfolded.4 Northwestern Virginians’ “natural association to Ohio and Pennsylvania”
encouraged residents’ to adopt northern “sentiments” and political “institutions,” according to
another historian. In a national crisis concerning slavery, these historians claim, northwesterners
would align themselves with other northerners and choose the Union and the extermination of
slavery.5
Current historians have reinforced these earlier interpretations, maintaining that the late
antebellum era witnessed an increase of Unionist and antislavery or antislaveholder sentiment
among northwestern residents. The rise of the Republican Party in the Northwest further
transformed the state’s political calculus, as northwesterners allegedly exhibited their true fealty
by supporting a party devoted to ending slavery. Each national and state political contest
widened the breach between eastern and western Virginians, as the former protected slavery
while the latter advanced “free labor.” By February 1861, that breach was a chasm. And as the
secession crisis unfolded around them in early 1861, northwestern Virginians preached
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adherence to the Union over protecting slavery, an institution that had long shackled their
political and economic capabilities.
In advancing this interpretation, historians echo the Republican memory of Virginia’s
intrastate conflict. Northwesterners’ political isolation and alienation from Virginia’s
slaveholding culture reflected residents’ increasing antipathy toward slavery and an acute
recognition of slavery’s deleterious political, social, and economic effects. Further, residents
expressed a marked determination to destroy the “Slave Power” that wielded inordinate power
and lorded over white nonslaveholders. Charles Ambler argued that Republicans “fed upon the
discontent” manifested in the lack of internal improvements, unequal taxation, and an inadequate
public education system. By 1860, Republicans within Virginia constituted a “formidable
party…resolved to stand by the Union.”6 Henry T. Shanks notes that the geographic
“dissimilarity” between regions west and east of the Alleghenies exacerbated political tensions
throughout the antebellum era. By 1861, few internal improvements existed that could conquer
these geographic divisions and promote solidarity among Virginians. With railroads extending
into northern and western markets, northwesterners drew closer to free states as they exited
Richmond’s political gravity.7
The perspective of irreconcilable differences emanating from western and eastern
Virginia has continued to receive scholarly approval. Richard Orr Curry, while he challenged
the Northwest’s alleged monolithic nature, still posits that eastern and western Virginia
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constituted two separate civilizations on the eve of secession. Different constitutional and
political principles combined with the Northwest’s hostile climate for slavery encouraged the
region to develop along a different trajectory than the rest of the state. William W. Freehling
argues that in “vast southern white belt areas,” such as the Northwest, “nonslaveholders felt less
brotherhood with slaveholders.” Indeed, the “fault lines” between the two groups continued to
widen throughout the late antebellum era, turning numerous nonslaveholders into “antiConfederates” by 1861.8 William Link contends that “northwestern exceptionalism,” an ethos
incongruous with proslavery values, reflected years of “eastern domination” in politics and
slaveholders’ monomania concerning their chattel’s protection. Northwesterners embraced the
Republican Party, interpreting in the organization their opportunity to defeat the “Slave Power”
that had long wielded power over western whites.9
Other studies exploring sectional tensions in Virginia have approached the late
antebellum era through different lenses but have arrived at similar conclusions. Kenneth Noe,
echoing Henry Shanks’ argument about the lack of economic development in western Virginia,
contends that the economic and social impact of railroads represented the “leading factor” in
determining loyalty during the secession crisis. Northwestern railroads, connected to northern
and western markets, transported northern goods, values, and institutions into the region while
alienating residents from the state’s slaveholding culture. Railroads in southwest Virginia,
connected to Richmond, increased that region’s commitment to slavery and the state.10
Northwestern Unionists exhibited most of the characteristics that Daniel W. Crofts identifies
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among Border South residents, including a firm belief that the Union provided a bulwark for
slavery against antislavery forces.11 Crofts argues that geographical proximity to northern free
states, a lack of state-sponsored internal improvements west of the Alleghenies, and a small slave
and slaveholder population produced a “keen sense of regional isolation and resentment” among
northwesterners.12 Northwestern residents, expressing their dissatisfaction through “an
antislavery tone and a threat to divide the state,” would finally achieve liberation during the Civil
War.13
This historiographical consensus posits a clean and comfortable interpretation concerning
late antebellum sectional tensions in the Old Dominion. Eastern Virginians’ denial of internal
improvements and political equality, when combined with the Northwest’s geographical
isolation and residents’ commercial ties to northern and western states, attenuated residents’
fealty toward slavery and the state over the preceding decades. By the late 1850s,
northwesterners sought refuge in the Republican Party, a political vehicle that could politicize
their disenchantment and challenge the “Slave Power.” The Republican Party’s growth in the
Northwest appeared inevitable, as the region’s political, demographic, economic, and social
characteristics all appeared to provide fertile ground for the “free soil” and “free labor” party.
Republicans also provided important leadership during the statehood movement, guiding
northwesterners from political bondage to freedom in 1863. Republicans controlled the state and
its memory.
Notable flaws, however, weaken this interpretation. Historians rely on extant Republican
sources to explain northwesterners’ interpretation of political developments in the late
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antebellum era. The two prominent Republican newspapers, the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer
and Wellsburg Weekly Herald, enjoyed limited appeal in the region, providing historians a useful
but highly subjective and narrow perspective. Republicans increased in strength during the late
1850s but their membership remained generally confined to the northern panhandle. Historians’
selective use of the two newspapers, however, mischaracterizes and exaggerates Republicans’
strength and appeal in the region. Northwesterners’ deep engagement in the “politics of
slavery,” the numerous proclamations of fealty toward slavery and the state expressed by
residents, and their recognition that black bondage protected white liberty demonstrates
residents’ firm attachment to Virginia and to African American slavery. A few northwesterners
attempted to challenge this dominant paradigm but made little progress, encountering hostility
from residents who interpreted their ideology as subversive and dangerous to established and
traditional hierarchies. Political affiliations remained relatively constant in the region as
northwesterners maintained that their party protected slavery, patriarchy, and whiteness.
Historians have often treated Virginia as a microcosm of the national struggle concerning
slavery. Decades of conflict in the Old Dominion over slavery and slaveholders’ prerogatives
and privileges mirrored national crises, as western nonslaveholders and yeoman farmers chafed
at eastern slaveholding oligarchs who protected their chattel while corrupting republican
government. This anachronistic historiographical argument overlooks decades of northwestern
support for slavery and slaveholders’ privileges, as only a fraction of the population opposed this
political dynamic. An armed conflict over slavery in the Old Dominion was not inevitable, even
by 1861. Further, historians misinterpret northwesterners’ fealty toward the Union. Nearly all
residents expressed unwavering fealty toward the Union but also pledged to protect Virginia and
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slavery, two institutions that blossomed under the Stars and Stripes and guarded and guaranteed
their political representation and liberty.
The late antebellum era in northwest Virginia witnessed residents’ continued struggle to
protect racial hierarchy, patriarchy, and slavery from dangerous “isms” and “ists.” Most
northwesterners viewed Republicans not as saviors but sinners, acolytes of a northern, sectional
party that advocated principles incongruous with traditional and established hierarchies.
Northwesterners’ hostility toward Republicans manifested their visceral disgust for a party that
allegedly promoted racial equality and the overthrow of slavery. This hostility also manifested
residents’ continued devotion to other Virginians, including their slaveholding neighbors east of
the Blue Ridge. The intrastate sectional struggle that had long characterized Virginia politics
faded as residents continued to thrive under the 1851 Constitution. Disputes concerning
legislative reapportion or ad valorem taxation reflected disagreements over the most effective
means to protect slavery; they were not proposals to place the peculiar institution on the path
toward extinction. Even as secession loomed, northwesterners remained devoted to slavery and
to protecting eastern slaveholders’ rights. The political struggles of the late antebellum era
neither attenuated northwesterners’ fealty toward slavery and the state nor increased residents’
political isolation; rather the late 1850s witnessed northwesterners’ strengthening their
commitment to slavery and Virginia. Northwesterners were vanguards in Virginia’s proslavery
defense.
By 1856, the threats to slavery and slaveholders in Virginia appeared increasingly
tangible and serious. Democrats considered themselves the standard-bearers of Virginia’s
slaveholding interest, identifying and vilifying opponents who showed the slightest weakness on
the issue of slavery. Much of Democrats’ derision fell on Know Nothings, a party that continued
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to recover from its gubernatorial defeat the previous spring. Know Nothings remained a potent
political force, sharpening their proslavery message while assailing Democrats who appeared to
equivocate on slavery. Northwestern Democrats and Know Nothings continued to operate
within the “politics of slavery” throughout the 1850s, a reflection of residents’ concern for
African American bondage. This political calculus, though, changed as a new threat to slavery
appeared in the Northwest.
In early August 1856, the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer published the proceedings of a
Republican Party meeting held in the city. The newspaper commented on the meeting’s
attendance, the national Republican platform, and Republicans’ desire to organize an electoral
ticket for the forthcoming presidential election. Though “small in numbers,” Republicans,
warned the editors, represented a “movement calculated only for bad results.” A “little
reflection” among Republicans would manifest the “unfortunate consequences likely to result
from their action” the editors felt, and would ultimately dissuade them from maintaining the
party’s presence in the Northwest.14
The establishment of the Republican Party in the Northwest has received much scholarly
attention, as historians maintain that the party’s founding hastened secession and the Civil War.
Granville Davisson Hall celebrated the Republican Party, lauding its increasing membership
despite increasing threats of violence and abusive epithets from opponents.15 Northwesterners
embrace of the Republican Party, William Link argues, reflected residents increasing political
isolation and their determination to arrest the power of the slaveholding regime.16 Republicans
proved successful in achieving that goal, Richard G. Lowe contends. Eastern Virginians, fearful
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of a growing Republican electorate, advocated secession to stymie the party’s expansion.
Republicans helped guide the Northwest through secession and statehood, liberating white
northwesterners from the political bondage enacted by eastern slaveholders.17 The founding of
the Virginia Republican Party, according to historians, placed the Old Dominion on the
inevitable path toward dismemberment.
For contemporaries and historians, a Virginia Republican Party centered in the Northwest
appeared possible, if not plausible. Several factors appeared encouraging. The growth of
southern cities, including Baltimore, St. Louis, and New Orleans, inaugurated a form of urban
politics often incongruous with traditional “planter-influenced politics.” Slaveholders worried
that this increasingly heterogeneous urban population possessed values opposed to slaveholding
interests, notably an affinity for “free labor” politics and an apathy or hostility toward slavery.
Republicans, meanwhile, envisioned these urban dwellers establishing “bridgeheads for a
Republican Party invasion of the South.” Through patronage and political favors, Republicans
could nurture these southern pockets of Republicanism and challenge slaveholder hegemony.18
The growth of southern cities in the 1840s and 1850s reflected an important demographic
trend. Immigrants, notably Germans fleeing the failed 1848 Revolution, represented one of the
largest constituencies in these southern cities and Wheeling was no different. Though Germans
had immigrated to Wheeling during the preceding decades, their numbers increased following
1848 as thousands flooded the city in search of employment. By 1860, immigrants or their sons
constituted approximately one-half of the city’s voting-age male population, with most of these
families residing in Wheeling’s southern wards and specializing in trades and less-skilled
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occupations. Many Republicans believed that these plebeian laborers would embrace the party’s
“free labor” ideology, a tenet that emphasized social and economic mobility and the dignity of
labor.19 This assumption carried some legitimacy. While the majority of pre-1848 German
immigrants supported the Democratic Party, those arriving after the Revolution gravitated
toward the Republican Party. The continued arrival of these Revolutionary Germans meant an
increasing Republican electorate, too.20
The influx of German immigrants to Wheeling reflected the city’s dynamic economic
growth. Ironworks flourished in the 1850s, with rolling mills and foundries dotting the city’s
landscape. Glassworks, tanneries, and tobacco and cotton manufacturers continued to thrive,
too.21 This growth appeared to distance Wheeling’s residents from Virginia’s planter-centered
political economy. Manufacturers in Richmond and Petersburg often relied on agricultural
goods produced by slave-labor, including tobacco, cotton, and hemp, generating ties between
slaveholders and business leaders.22 But manufacturing in Wheeling, centered on the glass and
iron industries, relied on few, if any, agricultural goods produced with slave labor.23 As one
contemporary later reflected, Wheeling’s “interests were industrial rather than agricultural,”
leading few to cultivate relationships with slaveholders and fewer still to own slaves.24
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These demographic and economic trends suggested that northwesterners might embrace
the Republican Party. Virginia’s intrastate sectional tensions also offered Republicans an
opportunity to test the party’s “Slave Power” thesis. Republicans argued that a conspiratorial
“Slave Power” manipulated the U.S. Constitution and corrupted democratic politics to protect
slavery and slaveholders’ interests.25 The work of the “Slave Power” colored Virginia’s history,
Republicans maintained. For decades, eastern slaveholders denied western nonslaveholders
political representation and equality, and used the structures and functions of the state
government to shield the institution and further slaveholders’ privileges. Opposing the “Slave
Power” could result in “blood or banishment,” one Republican warned.26
Republicans hoped to politicize Virginia’s sectional discord and channel it into party
politics. Virginia Republicans could effectively check slaveholders’ power and address the few
political and constitutional inequalities that remained on the books. A Virginia Republican Party
could also, Republican editor John G. Jacob believe, provide “organization and concert” for men
not “habitually disposed to dabble in politics.” Jacob and other Republicans worried that many
farmers, laborers, and yeomen avoided politics because Democrats and Know Nothings
championed the slave interest over all others. Without Republicans’ assistance, these
northwesterners “are practically disenfranchised,” making their party invaluable.27 Republican
success in Virginia could translate into similar movements in other southern slaveholding states,
including Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, where Republicans would continue to battle the
“Slave Power.”
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Despite these favorable characteristics, Republicans discovered that northwestern
residents were not as receptive as initially conceived. Few residents recanted their previous
proclamations concerning slavery and slaveholders’ rights, especially since many had deepened
their engagement in the “politics of slavery” following the ratification of the 1851 Constitution.
The “high minded loyal citizens of the Commonwealth” rejected Republicans who sought to
“bring us to a level with negroes and Yankee pedlers.” Speaking against slavery was tantamount
to attacking the political prerogatives of all white men, an action that could elicit a violent
reaction. “Wheeling cannot consent to become the asylum for politicians of the black creed,”
one northwestern newspaper editor averred. “Trifle not with public sentiment. Defy not the will
of the people,” he warned Republicans.28 After learning that another Republican meeting would
be held in Wheeling, the “Union and Constitution-loving men of the South…advise[d] the
members of that party to change both time and place.” The editors of the Wheeling Daily
Intelligencer warned Republicans that those opposed to this meeting would “protect” the city’s
reputation.29
Such veiled threats of violence against Republicans carried legitimacy. A melee ensued
in Wheeling following a Republican meeting as the speaker, Dr. G.P. Smith, was “met with
rough handling” following his speech. Smith defended himself with a knife against assailants,
leaving two men with lacerations and the doctor in jail. The editors of the Wheeling Daily
Intelligencer were “not surprised that our citizens are incensed at this Republican effort.”
Outbreaks of violence directed toward Republicans could be excused because “this little band”
possessed “aims [that] are at war with the institutions of Virginia.” Republicans’ opposition to
slavery’s expansion appeared tantamount to abolitionism, a dangerous doctrine that threatened
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established political and social hierarchies. Northerners attempting to settle in Virginia needed
to understand what it meant “to be true to Virginia.” Being faithful to the Old Dominion meant
supporting and defending slavery.30
The attacks levied against Republicans signaled northwesterners continued struggle to
protect whiteness. “Abolitionists, Atheists, Socialists…Disunionists, negro worshipers in
theory…Beechers and Stowes” all supported the same “mongrel platform” that Republicans and
Know Nothings championed. In short, Republicans “advocate every change from the established
order of things, no matter how ruinous to society.”31 All white men stood to lose if Republicans
abolished slavery. Abolition would “at once place the poor white man and free negro upon the
same level,” dragging the “white laborer down to the same wretched pittance and…degraded
condition and level” that African Americans occupied, a Democratic newspaper insisted.32
Northwesterners would “spurn…all new-fangled, false philanthropic, degenerating,
disorganizing attempts of brainless innovators upon her ancient and well tried institutions.”33
Republicans threatened the Union, southern society, and the household, all domains structured
on patriarchy. Further, the political rights white northwesterners acquired only a few years
earlier would be devalued or eliminated with Republican political dominance. Republicans’
attacks on slavery targeted more than the institution; they targeted all parts of southern society.
As the 1856 presidential election approached, residents increased their engagement in the
“politics of slavery.” Know Nothings, embittered by their recent gubernatorial defeat, attempted
to distance themselves from Republicans and abolitionism. Accusations concerning Know
Nothings’ abolitionist sentiment “won’t lie, though every one who makes it does,” the
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Morgantown American Union declared.34 Any association “between Black Republicanism and
Americanism” represented an egregious “mistake,” as Know Nothings held nothing in common
with the “‘wooly heads’” of the Republican Party.35 Those “Ultraists of the North…originated a
crusade upon slavery” and had to be defeated, Know Nothings declared.36 Though Republicans
professed not to meddle with slavery where it existed, the “rankest and most ultra ABOLITION
sentiments and appeals” had infected the party and soon Republicans would demand slavery’s
abolition.37 The sectional nature of the Republican Party signaled more trouble on the issue of
slavery. “Black Republicanism cannot reconcile our difficulties, because it is…sectional” and
“both its candidates [are] from the North.”38 How could a sectional, northern party be trusted to
protect slavery? Further, the proslavery, anti-foreign Know Nothing Party would disenfranchise
the “foreign vote” in the North, a “pestiferous source of Abolition power.”39
Democrats could not escape Know Nothings’ criticism either. Know Nothings
questioned two Democratic state legislators who allegedly voted against a bill that would have
increased slave patrols on maritime commerce to prevent runaway slaves from absconding.
“They ain’t Black Republicans, too, are they?” Charges by Democrats that Know Nothings
sought to repeal proslavery legislation amounted to “deliberate falsehood[s]” designed to
discredit Know Nothings’ proslavery position. True protection for slavery, Virginia, and the
nation rested in the Know Nothing ticket. By electing Millard Fillmore, Virginians would ensure
the perpetuity of the Union, repudiate “Black Republicanism,” and secure allies who would
ensure slavery’s protection.
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Democrats assailed both Know Nothings and Republicans on their supposed infidelity
toward slavery, maintaining that African American bondage “was the issue of the canvass and on
it alone the contest would be decided.”40 Know Nothings constituted a favorite target for
Democrats who believed that the party’s clandestine nature and northern membership
demonstrated the American Party’s weakness on slavery. The American Party represented the
northern “stepping stone” that allowed the “black clan” to elect Republican representatives,
senators, and governors.41 Under pressure from its northern wing, Know Nothings, Marion
County lawyer Alpheus F. Haymond alleged, had “became sectional and abolitionized.”42
Rumors of Know Nothings celebrating Republican John Fremont’s victory in Pennsylvania
validated Democrats’ accusations of their opponents’ “sympathies for the black flag of
niggerism.”43
While engaged in the “politics of slavery,” partisans often engaged in questionable tactics
to demonstrate their opponents’ weakness on slavery. A Know Nothing elector from the
Shenandoah Valley canvassing the Northwest supposedly confessed that Millard Fillmore “was
prejudiced against slavery,” a charge Democrats had long suspected. Further, Virginians were
“foolish” to fight for slavery in the territories; as a political minority in Congress, southerners
should “compromise with Northern fanaticism or be driven to the wall.” Democrats found his
conclusion repulsive. Virginians should “give up all their natural and Constitutional rights, and
cry ‘amen’ to the fanaticism of the nigger stealers.”44 While the newspaper’s transcription of the
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speech can be questioned, Democrats wanted the message to be clear: a Know Nothing victory
imperiled slavery.
Republicans posed an equally dangerous threat to slavery, Democrats asserted. While
northern Know Nothings dictated the party’s platform, Republicans purely sectional and northern
electorate forecasted danger for southern institutions. “Fremont has a ticket in every Northern
States,” one newspaper editor warned, “but no Southern State” had been canvassed by
Republicans.45 John C. Frémont, the “Republican-Abolition candidate,” according to a
Democratic organ, sought to abolish slavery and champion “Free Love and Polygamy.”
Republicans’ desire to destroy slavery and inaugurate these two lifestyles threatened white men’s
patriarchal power in both the public and private spheres.46 Democrats were incredulous that
even a small number of Virginians supported Frémont knowing that his party threatened
patriarchy. “[I]s it possible, that men in Virginia…prefer Fremont to Buchanan,” a Democratic
partisan questioned. The Old Dominion and its institutions deserved Virginians’ “undying
protection” from the “damnable doctrines” of northern abolitionists who sought to upset
established hierarchies.47 Only the election of James Buchanan, a Pennsylvania Democrat who
would equally abhorred these “doctrines,” could prevent such calamities from unfolding across
Virginia and the South.
The partisan attacks coupled with the innuendo and misinformation surrounding
Republicans stunted the party’s growth. Few northwesterners supported the party, leaving the
handful of Virginia Republicans to lean on Ohio or Pennsylvania Republicans for political and
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emotional support and speakers for meetings.48 Violence plagued Republicans, too. In
Wellsburg, the staff of the Wellsburg Weekly Herald hoisted an American flag above their
printing house in support of Republican John Frémont. Their neighbors interpreted the flag as
the banner of “black Republicanism” and “swore that down it must come.” A “poor, crazy
lunatic” performed this “damning deed,” and served as a warning for other northwestern
Republicans who supported Frémont.49
Despite the criticism and physical threats levied against Republicans, members continued
to convene in the region and recruit other northwesterners into their party. During Republican
meetings, members expressed maintained the steady drumbeat of “free soil” and anti-“Slave
Power.” In Wheeling, Republicans condemned both Democrats and Know Nothings for
christening “the extension of slavery the paramount object of government” while marginalizing
all other interests. Republicans reaffirmed their position that Congress could not “interfere with
any of the States in regard to the ‘peculiar institution,’” but supported Congress’ power to
“prohibit the extension of slavery” into the territories.50 This “free soil” platform would protect
white laborers’ social and economic mobility in western territories. Equally important, “free
soil” would halt the expanding “Slave Power.”
Virginia Republicans believed that the “Slave Power” operating in the Old Dominion had
retarded economic growth and undermined political equality. Hancock County Republicans
reaffirmed their support for “free soil” for western territories because of slavery’s deleterious
effects in the Northwest. Slavery acted as an “incubus upon the energies of the white population,
keeping a large part…in ignorance and poverty.”51 Further, the Virginia “Slave Power” had long
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protected its chattel by “violating the constitution,” notably “by passing laws abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press.” The “Slave Power” decreed that “equality cannot be
recognized but by an investment…in the purchase of Slaves” but acquiring slaves “would but
strengthen the fetters which now trammel us in our state affairs.” Every slave that entered
Virginia strengthened the institution and the “Slave Power” while other interests suffered. Faced
with this conundrum, northwestern Republicans longed for 1865 when, according to the 1851
Constitution, Virginians could reapportion the state legislature. Apportioning both houses on the
“white basis” would “proclaim to the world that Virginia is redeemed” and liberate the “free
white race in Virginia” from political bondage.52
The returns of the 1856 presidential election revealed to Republicans that the “Slave
Power” continued to maintain its hold on politics. Most residents interpreted the election as a
affirmation of the “politics of slavery” and the continued dynamism of the Northwest’s two-party
system.53 Residents recognized that the “slave question was the sole issue in the election,” and
declared by their votes that Democrat James Buchanan would protect slavery.54 Buchanan easily
carried the Northwest and Virginia, with Know Nothing candidate Millard Fillmore finishing
second and Republican John Frémont a distant third. As with previous presidential and
gubernatorial elections, northwesterners’ traditional political affiliation held sway. Buchanan
performed well in the northern panhandle counties of Brooke, Hancock, and Ohio, along with
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Monongalia, Harrison, Marion, and Preston. Fillmore fared better than previous Whig/Know
Nothing candidates in the state, carrying, among others, Kanawha and Marshall counties.
Frémont, receiving 291 votes or 0.2% of all ballots cast statewide, failed to carry a single
county. He received his strongest support in the northern panhandle counties of Hancock, Ohio,
and Brooke, along with a few scattered votes in Monongalia and Upshur.55 Republicans’
lackluster turnout depressed members, as one solemnly remarked that the election passed
“quietly and soberly” with “large democratic majorities” in numerous precincts.56 This
Republican’s dour observation reflected most Republicans’ uncertainty of whether their party
could thrive on southern soil. The lack of voter turnout further reflected residents’ skepticism of
Republicans’ political ideology and the continued entrenchment of the two-party system.
Republicans, unable to tailor their message to the “politics of slavery,” remained peripheral and
alien to most northwesterners in 1856.
Republicans’ poor showing revealed the Northwest’s political dynamics. The continued
use of viva voce balloting probably frightened a handful of Republicans who wanted to vote for
Frémont but reconsidered when faced with threats, intimidation, and ostracism from neighbors.
Still, that number would not have been significant enough to swing any county. Rather,
residents’ continued engagement in the “politics of slavery” and their defense of “whiteness”
contributed to Republicans’ low turnout. For decades, residents had extolled their nominee’s
proslavery credentials while characterizing their opponent as weak on this seminal issue. This
practice held firm in the election. The majority of northwesterners believed that Republicans’
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political ideology threatened slavery and whiteness,
two cornerstones of Virginia’s political culture.
Republicans’ alleged support of abolitionism,
amalgamation, polygamy, socialism, and atheism, ran
counter to white northwesterners’ beliefs and
threatened to upset established political, racial,
economic, and social hierarchies. Northwesterners
were pleased by the Republicans’ trouncing; they had
defeated another dangerous northern “ism.”
Northwestern Democrats rejoiced at
Buchanan’s victory, interpreting it a reaffirmation of
their party’s “safe” stance on African American
bondage. To celebrate their “GLORIOUS VICTORY,”
Democrats planned a “TORCH-LIGHT PROCESSION”
through the streets of Morgantown in Monongalia County. The advertisement for the procession
included a wood engraving of the three presidential candidates astride three different animals.
James Buchanan, or “Buck,” represents the figure on the right riding a male, antlered deer, and
winning “THE GREAT RACE OF 1856.” The two other figures represent Buchanan’s defeated
opponents. The middle figure, John Frémont, rides a black horse, a reference to the denigrating
“black” epithet opponents associated with Republicans. Frémont also brandishes a whip, an
instrument wielded by slaveholders to punish and compel slaves to work, and a tool that
Republicans would use on white southerners if elected. Millard Fillmore, the Know Nothing
nominee, represents the figure on the left. Fillmore sits atop a wolf in sheep’s clothing,
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reflecting Democrats’ accusations that Know Nothings proclamations extolling their position on
slavery rang hollow. The dark lantern held by Fillmore signals his party’s clandestine suspicious
nature. As Democrats maintained, the “allied armies of Black Republicanism and KnowNothingism” could not be trusted on the issue of slavery; Virginians needed to rely on
“indomitable and invincible” Democrats to protect African American bondage.57
Though northwestern Democrats claimed victory in 1856, nearly all northwesterners felt
that the election reaffirmed their fealty toward slavery. “No portion of Virginia is more loyal to
the institutions of the State,” exclaimed a Charleston newspaper, “or more devoted to the rights
of the South, than the Trans-Alleghany.” Practically all residents were “proslavery” in
sentiment.58 The same newspaper supported legislation that would exempt slaveholders from
paying taxes on one slave, allowing all Virginians the opportunity to purchase a slave and
“rapidly diffuse slaves in every portion of the State.” This would further generate a “strong proslavery sentiment” throughout the region.59 At a Democratic meeting in Harrison County,
residents denounced the “erroneous belief abroad that Virginia is not a unit on the question of
slavery.” The “West is now, and ever has been devoted” to slavery, and challenged anyone to
contradict this assertion.60 Further, residents’ paternalistic arguments reflected their deep
investment in slavery, maintaining that slaveholders provided “all his slaves with good food and
raiment whether they earn it or not.” Moreover, “slave labor” was much more “lenient” than
Republicans’ “free labor.”61 Travelers in the region noted the prevalence of southern attitudes,
notably the hostility directed toward those who hailed from northern states. Upon visiting
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Fairmont, one northerner “learned that northern men were not wanted in any part” of the
Northwest.62
These pronouncements defending slavery and Virginia left many northwestern
Republicans dumbfounded. For decades, Republicans exclaimed, eastern slaveholders had
cowed and duped white northwesterners while retarding the state’s economic growth and
undermining political equality. Virginia’s “nigger interest have ever been hostile to the interests
of the wool growers,” a Northwest Republican organ explained, “[and] has ever been dead
against the iron interest of the country.” Northwesterners’ representatives had done little to
resolve this situation. Instead of securing economic freedom and political equality, these
politicians “have frequently gone into elaborate expositions to show that we…were all right on
the peculiar question.” By supporting Virginia’s slaveholding regime, northwesterners defended
planters and elites who disregarded western interests.63 These “poor emasculated drivels of a
Turkish harem” have been “bagged neck and heels for the use of the Sublime Porte at
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Richmond,” the Wheeling Daily Intelligencer lamented.64 Cowed into submission by the “Slave
Power,” northwestern representatives secured little for their constituents as “all legislation, great
and small” supported eastern Virginia.65
No piece of legislation embodied northwesterners’ submission to eastern slaveholders
than the state’s ad valorem tax, Republicans argued. While Virginia taxed all forms of private
property ad valorem, slaves younger than twelve were exempt while the state capped the tax on
those twelve and older at $300. The increasing value of slaves in Virginia now made this policy
especially onerous and objectionable to nonslaveholders, Republicans alleged.66 Eastern
Virginians implemented these tax exemptions “to encourage and foster slavery,” shielding
slaveholders from burdensome taxes while the “non-slaveholder and laboring white man” paid
the full allotment of taxes.67 “Equality in taxation is what we want, be the taxes high or low,”
demanded Republicans, “and anything else is both degrading and oppressive.”68 But why had so
few residents publicly condemned this policy or the “Slave Power” in Richmond? “Were it not
that the fear of being called ‘abolitionists’ deters you, you would have repudiated this reign on
iniquity long ago,” Republicans claimed. But the “spell of enchantment” placed on
northwesterners by eastern slaveholders convinced them that all white Virginians possessed
similar interests. Republicans wanted to break that spell.69
Chief among Republicans’ attempts to defeat the “Slave Power” was emphasizing the
benefits of “free labor.” Slavery bred “vice and slothfulness” wherever it expanded, endangering
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the Northwest’s “free laboring classes.”70 But further economic decay, emigration, and poor
work habits could be prevented if Virginia would “commit the industrial interests of the State to
intelligent Anglo-Saxon labor.”71 Western Virginia’s abundant natural resources and burgeoning
industries required “free labor” for the region to achieve its full economic potential. The
salubrious effects of “free labor” were clear at the Belmont Nail Works, the second largest nail
factory in Wheeling and location of one of two blast furnaces in the city.72 The “enlightened and
intelligent appearance of the operatives, from the highest to the lowest in station” provided clear
evidence that “free labor” benefited all white workers regardless of status. Further, the generous
wages these employees earned provided clear evidence that “free labor” could thrive in
northwestern Virginia.73
Embracing “free labor” would strengthen northwestern laborers and transform many of
them to stalwart Republicans. But in order to defeat the “Slave Power,” northwesterners needed
to appreciate the power and operations of this conspiratorial cabal. For decades, eastern
Virginians had deemed “the price of niggers the rule by which to determine any question of State
policy.”74 What were the results of this policy? “Free speech is suppressed and freedom of the
press abridged by the populace, where” such words “infringe[d] upon the sacredness of slavery.”
“Mob law” reigned, as northwesterners intimidated and lashed out in violence against those
opposed to slavery.75 “[C]otton, tobacco, and niggers” represented the state’s prevailing
interests.76 But Republicans identified a silver lining. The Northwest’s declining slave
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population forecasted the impending collapse of the “Slave Power.” Boosterism literature for
Parkersburg extolled the city’s commercial advantages while noting that “slavery in North
Western Virginia is an institution existing only in name.” Indeed, “free white labor is the
productive power of the region” and immigrants would not compete with African American
slaves.77 The Northwest’s declining slave population, an “inexorable” trend, would continue
unabated regardless of “impotent protests and pseudo indignation resolutions” that claimed
northwesterners’ fealty toward slavery. A waning slave population would weaken residents’
support for slavery and ultimately decrease the dominion of the “Slave Power.” Freed from
political bondage, northwestern residents “true interests” with the “border free states” would
become realized.78
Republicans’ optimistic outlook, though, clashed with reality. Dissatisfaction with the
tax exemptions enjoyed by slaveholders existed and many residents demanded a resolution. But
other political or constitutional issues had been resolved through the 1851 Constitution.
“Western Virginia acquired great political power” with “the adoption of the new Constitution,”
the Kanawha Valley Star declared, removing the “feeling of political inequality” that had
characterized intrastate sectional relations. Former opponents of slavery “now argue that African
slavery…is a social, moral and political blessing,” the newspaper averred, and those who had
“desired a division of the State” had recanted their apostasy. The editor charged that a
“hallucination” impaired Virginia Republicans from acknowledging these new developments.
Whether “Whigs, Know-Nothings, or Democrats,” northwesterners are “thoroughly imbued with
States Rights’ principles and are warmly attached to…the welfare of Virginia and the interests of
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the South,” he concluded. The Northwest’s political fissures that Republicans had hoped to
exploit had been closed and the bonds between residents strengthened by Virginia’s proslavery
and democratic constitution.79
More political realities became manifest to Republicans during the 1859 gubernatorial
election. Democrats and Oppositionists (a mixture of alienated Democrats, Know Nothings, and
Whigs) fielded candidates for the state’s third popularly-elected gubernatorial contest; no
Republican ran for office. Oppositionists, meeting in Richmond in February 1859, nominated
Bedford County attorney and planter William L. Goggin for governor and Monongalia County
lawyer and slaveholder Waitman T. Willey for lieutenant governor.80 One northwestern
Oppositionist exclaimed that Willey’s nomination represented an “honor conferred…upon our
section of the State and…County.”81 While Oppositionists statewide applauded their party’s
ticket, Democrats faced internal discord.
Following the death of Richmond Enquirer editor and state Democratic leader Thomas
Ritchie in 1854, a power vacuum emerged in the Virginia Democratic Party. Governor Henry A.
Wise and Senator R.M.T. Hunter both vied for the mantle of Democratic standard-bearer,
generating an internecine conflict within their party. Hunterites supported Rockbridge County
slaveholder and newspaper editor John Letcher while Wise and his backers opposed Letcher
because of his endorsement of the Ruffner Pamphlet in 1847.82 Because Letcher believed that
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“Western Virginia would be better off without than with negroes,” a northwestern newspaper
observed, “he is not fit for a Governor.”83 Fairmont lawyer Francis H. Pierpont believed that
“the ‘negroocracy’ of Virginia” advanced these arguments “as cogent reasons why Letcher
should be defeated.”84 Though Letcher secured the party’s nomination in December 1858, his
previous stance on slavery threatened to derail his candidacy.85
Most northwestern Democrats supported Letcher, dismissing his endorsement of the
Ruffner Pamphlet and highlighting his work in the previous constitutional convention. At a
Democratic meeting in Harrison County, Democrats rejected eastern Virginians’ accusations that
Letcher was “unsafe” on slavery. Such accusations, which northwestern Democrats considered
“unjust” and “calculated to excite a sectional feeling,” generated the “erroneous belief abroad
that Virginia is not a unit on the question of slavery.” Letcher’s “public life” and slaveholding
status exhibited his “fealty to the Democratic party and the South,” evidence that should placate
eastern Virginians. Further, his “manly course” during the previous constitutional convention
helped secure a democratic and proslavery constitution. Letcher was “now, and ever has been
devoted” to the “‘peculiar institution.”86
In an effort to boost his candidacy and quiet critics, Letcher penned an open letter where
he once again abnegated his support of the Ruffner Pamphlet (something he had already done in
1850) and extolled his soundness on the issue of slavery. An “owner of slave property, by
purchase and not inheritance,” Letcher denied ever considering slavery a moral blight. He
recanted his “erroneous” conclusions concerning slavery’s detrimental political and economic
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influences, condemned the “exceptional” arguments contained in the final version of the Ruffner
Pamphlet, and candidly “acknowledged my error” in supporting its publication. Letcher’s public
apology revealed the deepening importance of slavery in the post-convention years. Since 1851,
the slavery question “has been much better understood, not only in Virginia, but throughout the
South” as slavery “has been discussed with an ability never before expended upon it.”87 The
ratification of the new constitution deepened residents’ participation in the “politics of slavery”
because the constitution placed slavery and whiteness at the center of all political discussions, a
“revolution of public sentiment” according to Letcher. Any weakness or equivocation exhibited
by politicians of any stripes concerning slavery or whiteness elicited censure and condemnation
from residents across the state for their political independence and liberty hung in the balance.
Oppositionists doubted Letcher’s sincerity. At their nominating convention in Richmond
in early February 1859, Oppositionists denounced Letcher’s “willingness to divide this ancient
Commonwealth, for the purpose of exterminating slavery” in western Virginia.88 Oppositionists
convening in Norfolk in January 1859 argued that Letcher’s nomination “threatens the ultimate,
if not speedy overthrow of African slavery.” His support of the Ruffner Pamphlet, a document
containing “sentiments more foully abolition than ever fell from the lips” of northern
abolitionists, revealed Letcher’s true character.89 Letcher’s endorsement of the Ruffner Pamphlet
coincided with the establishment of a “powerful party” that launches the “most bitter and
determined assaults upon our institutions.” This former endorsee of the Ruffner Pamphlet “now
demands the suffrages of Virginia slaveholders for the office of their Chief Magistrate, the
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conservator of their sectional rights, and guardian of their peculiar institution!”90 Protecting
slavery required Virginians to move beyond party loyalty and prioritize the cornerstone of their
state’s political foundation. Though “party has ties and obligations,” Oppositionists reminded
Virginians that “state and sections had ties and obligations of a far higher, stronger, and a more
sacred character.” Norfolk Oppositionists encouraged all Virginians who supported slavery to
endorse Goggin and defeat Letcher.91
This proslavery rhetoric found a receptive audience in the Northwest. Northwestern
Oppositionists rhetorically questioned how residents could “conscientiously and patriotically
vote for a man…who was…a foul-mouthed Abolitionist a few years ago.”92 Letcher’s
endorsement of the Ruffner Pamphlet manifested his “unsoundness on the slavery question, and
his consequent unfitness for” governor.93 Indeed, Letcher’s alleged “abolitionism” was “killing
him in every slave district” in eastern Virginia, an Oppositionist newspaper charged, forcing him
to focus his campaign west of the Blue Ridge. But because slavery concerned all Virginians,
Oppositionists maintained Letcher’s prospects in the Shenandoah Valley, Southwest, and
Northwest were equally as fleeting.94 Letcher’s abolitionism was so apparent that Oppositionists
predicted that he would receive the “anti-slavery vote in Northern and Northwestern Virginia
bordering on Pennsylvania and Ohio.”95
While Oppositionists painted Letcher as “unsound” on slavery, their candidates burnished
their proslavery credentials. In a speech in Wheeling, Willey stated his continued belief in the
“principles that which had been enunciated at Richmond” in 1851, specifically that democratic
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reform and increased protection for slavery secured the “best interests of the State and the
nation.” Willey considered this the “correct” position for all Virginians across the state.96
Oppositionists considered Willey’s position on slavery as in “perfect propriety” with the “most
rabid pro-slavery man in Eastern Virginia.”97 Indeed, Willey was “as true a Virginian, and as
loyal a friend of slavery, and as staunch a Southern man, in all his impulses, principles, and
purposes” as any Virginian east of the Blue Ridge.98 Goggin’s record on slavery was “fair and
untarnished” and his “soundness on [slavery] had never been called in controversy.”99 Banker
and businessman Chester D. Hubbard characterized Goggin’s speech in Wheeling as “very
effective” and “gained [him] many friends,” although Republicans denounced him because of his
“slavery proclivities.” Hubbard dismissed Republicans’ opinion of Goggin, characterizing the
party as “only a corporal guard at best and more impracticable than the Democrats.” Though the
Republican Party persisted in the Northwest, its incremental growth and failure to field
candidates or win numerous legislative seats convinced Hubbard and other northwesterners’ that
Goggin’s proslavery speech, not Republicans’ platform, defined Virginia politics.100
Slavery’s increasing importance to Virginia’s electoral politics once again became
manifest. Oppositionists agreed with Letcher’s assessment of the post-1851 years, arguing that
the 1851 Constitution solidified slavery’s centrality to politics and white men’s political
independence. “Slavery or anti-slavery,” an issue that held “so little interest in our midst a few
years since, has grown in consequence, in magnitude, [and] in momentousness,” Oppositionists
declared. Now, the “very soul and centre of our social compact and being” centered on African
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American bondage.101 Oppositionists and Democrats declared that their candidate and ideology
protected slavery, secured slaveholders’ rights, and defended whiteness for all white Virginians.
These assertions were more than political rhetoric; they constituted the ruling political paradigm.
Republicans witnessing the election unfold mocked this spectacle of political
cannibalization. The contest, which “hinge[d] on the everlasting nigger question,” provided
residents the choice of electing “tweedle-dum” or “tweedle-dee” to carry on the mission of the
“ultra niggerites.”102 Democrats’ and Oppositionists’ monomania concerning slavery reflected
Virginians’ overwhelming interest in the peculiar institution, a dynamic Republicans lamented.
“Its politics—its democracy—its constitutionalism,” the Republican Wheeling Daily
Intelligencer groaned, “and its [sic] all hangs and swings upon the idea of a universal nigger
dominion.”103 Those opposed to this political dynamic felt trapped. Northwestern political
organs were “either too hopelessly bigoted or too fearful of being called Black Republican” to
challenge this ruling political paradigm, the Wellsburg Weekly Herald charged.104 Anyone
opposed to the prevailing “nigger interest” would be labeled an “abolitionist,” “traitor,” or
“conspirator” by Democrats and Oppositionists.105 Though Republicans suggested that the
“politics of slavery” had “played out” in the Northwest, they were mistaken; slavery dominated
the gubernatorial contest.106
Letcher won the contest by approximately five thousand votes. This margin represented
four thousand fewer votes than what Wise received in 1855, a result some Democratic partisans
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attributed to Letcher’s former “free soil proclivities.”107 The slim margin also evoked concern
from Democrats about their waning hegemony over state affairs. William Link argues that the
gubernatorial contest, compounded with Democratic congressional losses in June 1859,
“provided…evidence of the erosion of Democratic domination.” Northwestern residents
expressed “an anti-Democratic tradition” that opposed Democrats’ proslavery platform and
proslavery politics in general, he maintains. This waning Democratic support, Link contends,
increased larger intrastate tensions concerning African American bondage and provided an
opening for Republicans to exploit.108
Anti-Democratic politics in the Northwest, though, did not represent antislavery politics.
The 1859 gubernatorial contest featured two proslavery candidates and passionate debates
among partisans on both sides who extolled their party’s sound position on slavery. Much to
Republicans’ chagrin, the election failed to show residents’ waning fealty toward slavery; rather,
the election reaffirmed slavery’s centrality to politics and residents’ worldview. Further, the
continued viability of a second party in the Northwest reflected a continuation of politics that had
commenced during the 1820s and 1830s. The establishment of these two parties also
inaugurated the “politics of slavery,” and this brand of southern politics continued to dominate
the political landscape. Finally, the gubernatorial election confirmed residents’ political
affiliation. Traditional Democratic counties, such as Monongalia, Preston, Harrison, and Marion
returned majorities for Letcher; Marshall, Ohio, Kanawha, and Wood, all Whiggish counties,
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supported Goggin.109 The electoral patterns exhibited in the 1859 gubernatorial election
confirmed Oppositionists’ observation: slavery dominated politics.
Slavery dominated northwesterners’ political worldview and took on greater importance
in the wake of John Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry on October 16, 1859. Brown’s audacious
plan stoked fears among slaveholding Virginians about their nonslaveholding neighbors’ fealty,
notably those along the state’s northern and western borders. But northwesterners’ condemned
the raid, labeling Brown a northern abolitionist radical and a possible harbinger of future conflict
over slavery. A Parkersburg resident characterized the raid as “evidence of the intense
fanaticism which exists among some persons on the subject of slavery.” “[J]ustice” would be
brought to bear on the “ringleaders” of this raid, a Parkersburg newspaper predicted, as they
would “scarcely escape hanging.”110 Preston County locomotive engineer Patrick Plummer
considered the “insurrection” the work of “Black Republicans,” but noted that Brown met his
fate at the gallows.111 Lewis County attorney Joseph Spalding supported Governor Wise’s
aggressive response to Brown’s raid, applauding his stance despite the “threats or imprecations”
from the “friends and sympathizers of these blood stained emissaries of Black
Republicanism.”112 The Republican Wheeling Daily Intelligencer also condemned this
“suicidal” attack from a “fanatical renegade.”113 But the raid could turn public opinion in favor
of colonization, Virginia Republicans hoped. A “large and degraded class of humanity” resided
within Virginia and appeared poised to revolt against white Virginians, Republicans erroneously
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speculated. Much like San Domingo and Southampton, Harpers Ferry should remind Virginians
that an “irruption” threatened to decimate society.114
This “irruption” could be prevented, Virginia Republicans maintained, by electing
Abraham Lincoln for president in November 1860. For decades, the national government had
operated like a “machine for the propagation of the institution of slavery” by increasing the
number of slaves and augmenting slaveholders’ power while the 1851 Constitution induced
Virginians into “ten years sleep” by providing democratic reforms but enslaving white men. 115
But Lincoln would prohibit the extension of slavery into the territories, protect the interests of
white laborers, and defeat the national “Slave Power.” And as the national “Slave Power”
withered, the Virginia “Slave Power” would weaken, too. Virginia Republicans believed that his
election would accelerate the party’s growth. As one national Republican predicted, Lincoln’s
“triumph…would give the cause of Free Soil a powerful propulsion” in the Old Dominion and
“in all the border slave states.” In a few years, Virginia Republicans could secure a “free soil
balance of power” over state politics that would soon liberate Virginia from the “incubus” of
slavery. White Virginians would finally be freed from the “Slave Power.”116
Republicans envisioned a whole sequence of political and social changes that would flow
from Lincoln’s victory. The “unequal and unfair operation of pro-slavery legislation upon
Western Virginia” would be stymied, specifically the constitutional provision exempting full
taxation on slaves and the continued use of the “mixed basis” to determine state Senate
apportionment.117 The “gradual emancipation sentiment” that had long existed among residents

114

Wheeling Daily Intelligencer, October 21, 1859, 2.
Wellsburg Weekly Herald, September 28, 1860, 2 and Daily Intelligencer, February 13, 1860, 2
116
J. Medill to Archibald Campbell and John McDermot, 30 October 1859, Archibald W. Campbell Papers, A&M
14, Box 1, Folder 2: April-November 1859, WVRHC.
117
Daily Intelligencer, April 7, 1860, 2.
115

230

would soon “triumph.” Slavery’s demise in the Northwest manifested the “order of nature” and
“fate itself,” finally freeing residents to pursue closer relations with their northern neighbors.118
The Northwest’s “free laboring white men” would experience liberation from the state’s
slaveholding “Olegarchy.” For decades, this slaveholding cabal “aim[ed] for the destruction of
all the industrial interests of Western Virginia,” sanctioned the construction of “railroad and
other public improvements” east of the Blue Ridge, and considered white northwesterners “more
subservient to their interest and dictation than the degraded African.” The “sacred guarantees of
Constitutional liberties” extended to white northwesterners in exchange for their political
submission only strengthened this “Olegarchy.”119 The “mighty movement” of Republicanism
would soon instigate a “radical change in our organic laws” that would liberate white
northwesterners and destroy the “Slave Power.”120
Though the confidence expressed by Republicans ran counter to political developments
in the Northwest over the previous decades, Republicans believed they could politicize the
intrastate animosity that existed in the state. But Republicans’ sanguine outlook contained
numerous flaws. Republicans often exaggerated their numerical strength, admitting that the
majority of their strength, “with few exceptions, reside in the Panhandle” and the “great bulk of
them in [Wheeling].”121 Taylor County farmer Fabricius A. Cather attended a “Republican poleraising” in late September 1860 but noticed the lackluster attendance, noting “[n]ot a very large
turnout” for this Republican gathering.122 John G. Jacob, editor of the Republican Wellsburg
Weekly Herald, understood the party’s challenge to building a grassroots movement. Jacob
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“[e]ncourage[d]…outsiders…to break through the shackles” while Virginia Republicans “put in
an occasional modest lick.”123 Jacob blamed the epithet “Black Republicanism” for suppressing
Republican membership, finding it “difficult to induce men to subscribe their names” to
Republican organs.124
Republicans also faced difficulties in overcoming northwestern residents’ established
political affiliations. For over three decades, Democrats, Whigs, Americans, or Oppositionists
courted voters with well-defined and accepted ideological platforms based on protecting slavery
and whiteness. Attracting an electorate would be difficult for Republicans, notably because of
the party’s association with some avowed antislavery politicians and abolitionists. As one
Democratic newspaper declared, Virginia Republicans worked with “that greasy, manumitted
African, Fred Douglas,” a relationship that would compel its members to support racial
equality.125 Though Republicans claimed to protect the interests of white men through “free
labor” and “free soil,” northwestern residents believed that protecting slavery offered the best
defense of whiteness. Republican doctrines, conversely, appeared to threaten whiteness.
The 1860 presidential election demonstrated northwesterners’ concern for protecting
slavery and whiteness. Four candidates vied for the White House, including two Democrats.
Southern Democrats had walked out of the national convention after northern delegates refused
to support a plank that would have protected slave property in all territories. The remaining
Democrats nominated Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas. Douglas, an exponent of “popular
sovereignty” in the territories, represented the only nomine who could prevent the “Black
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Republicans” from destroying the Union, a Fairmont supporter declared.126 Though “[s]outhern
papers” questioned “Douglas’ peculiar dogma,” the Little Giant’s doctrine of “popular
sovereignty” provided stability and security for slaveholders and nonslaveholders alike.
Douglas’ “popular sovereignty” also separated him from the notorious “free-soil party” that
sought slavery’s extinction.127
Douglas’ national appeal made him a more viable candidate than his Democratic
counterpart, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. Douglas Democrats maintained that
Breckinridge represented the “Seceders” and supported a “sectional party” that would repel
northern voters.128 Wheeling banker Chester D. Hubbard considered Douglas the “stronger”
Democratic candidate “in this part of the state,” predicting that the Illinois Senator would “poll
two votes to his [Breckinridge] one.”129 Hubbard was sanguine about Douglas’ electability
because his platform protected white men’s interests. Following a Douglas rally, white laborers
paraded the streets of Wheeling while they displayed their trade tools. The “bricklayer with his
trowel and a wheelbarrow full of bricks, the blacksmith with his hammer and tongs, [and] the
carpenter with his saw and adze” endorsed Douglas because unlike his opponents, the Little
Giant championed the interests of white men.130
Vice President John C. Breckinridge was the other Democratic nominee. Breckinridge
supporters characterized Republicans and their other opponents as unsound on slavery, the
seminal issue of the election. Republicans “favor[ed]…negro equality,” Breckinridge partisans
declared, and “wanted to free all the negroes who would come in competition with the white
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laborer, and by working for low wages make hard times among the white folks.” The
“Republican Party is not the white man’s party” while Breckinridge “was the true friend of the
laboring white man.” Breckinridge supporters considered Douglas’ doctrine of popular
sovereignty “as not much better than the Lincoln doctrine in regard to the territories.”
Northerners’ alleged superior mobility meant that they “could gather their little dunnage in a
bandana handkerchief and with a few clocks…hurry into a new territory and make a patent free
state in three months.” Popular sovereignty forecasted doom for white southerners, Breckinridge
Democrats argued. Douglas’ plan amounted to southern submission to northerners; white
southerners who cherished their constitutional rights to take their property into the territories
needed to endorse Breckinridge.131
Though Breckinridge enjoyed widespread support throughout the Deep South, his
prospects in western Virginia were equally encouraging. One Barbour County resident argued
that the “Northwest is for Breckinridge & Lane.” So confident was this resident in
Breckinridge’s prospects that he chastised eastern Virginians for their lukewarm support for him.
“Are they all teeming Free Soilers” east of the Blue Ridge? “[I]f so, let them go, as the
Northwest has more than once saved the Democratic party.”132 Western Virginians needed to
endorse Breckinridge because his platform championed African American bondage, the
wellspring of white men’s political independence. “Negro slavery protects the white laborers’
interests,” maintained one western Virginia Breckinridge organ, as slavery placed the “white
laborer in the south…upon a perfect equality with his employer.” A Republican victory would
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upset that hierarchy. Only a Breckinridge victory could prevent that calamity from unfolding, a
dire situation for all white Virginians.133
Former Whigs continued to be a potent political force in 1860, reorganizing as the
Constitutional Union Party and nominating Tennessean John Bell for president and
Massachusetts politician Edward Everett for vice president. Bell and his supporters proclaimed
that the Constitution contained the remedy for the ills that afflicted the republic. The rights of
slaveholders, Constitutional Unionists declared, were safer in the Union and under the
Constitution where their grievances could be redressed and the power of the Constitution
compelled northerners to respect southerners’ constitutional rights. This message found wide
acceptance in the Northwest. Taylor County newspaper editor Daniel S. Morris “expect[ed] to
fight hard for Bell and Everett,” while Constitutional Unionists in Upshur County reported that
“Bell and Everett poles are going up all over the [c]ounty.”134 Wheeling insurance agent
Nathaniel C. Arthur noted that the “Bell & Everett stock” was “on the increase here and is
increasing everywhere.”135
Bell’s popularity reflected white northwesterners’ belief that Bell, unlike his opponents,
provided white northwesterners the greatest economic and political security. Kanawha County
slaveholder George W. Summers warned northwesterners that a Breckinridge administration
would reopen the African slave trade, a practice that “would ruin the slave interests of
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Virginia.”136 Wheeling lawyer and slaveholder A.B. Caldwell “convict[ed] the Republican Party
of Abolitionism and Sectionalism,” noting the presence of few southern Republicans. Without a
southern wing, he inferred, northern Republicans could declare war on slavery.137 Randolph
County lawyer and slaveholder David Goff, a Bell supporter, believed the contest to be between
“Bell & Lincoln.” The “whole south should unite…in order to defeat black republicans.”138 In
Wheeling, Waitman Willey emphasized the danger of a Republican president. Willey predicted
“hordes of free negroes running loose here amongst us freemen, and competing in labor with our
honest artizans.”139 During a meeting, Constitutional Unionists declared their nominee’s
“allegiance to support [southern] institutions…and [that] the North and the Republican party”
should not meddle in southern affairs. White southerners could rest assured that Bell would
secure their interests.140 Such fealty toward the Constitution and to slavery provided “every
assurance” to Chester Hubbard that Bell would carry Virginia.141
Virginia Republicans attempted to engage in the “politics of slavery” but with mixed
results. Republicans championed “loyalty to party, loyalty to State, [and] loyalty to Southern
institutions,” uttering “not a single word in derogation of such a sentiment.” Yet many
Republicans also considered this unquestioned loyalty “political suicide” and characteristic of
the “empty ideas of Southern society.”142 In a Republican meeting in Hancock County,
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Republicans stressed that “we are loyal to the constitution and laws of our own state…and
ready…to defend our institutions and soil from invasion of fanatics.” Further, northwestern
Republicans’ “fealty and kindness to the State of Virginia and to our Eastern brethren” was
unmatched. But these Republicans also condemned the “Constitutional wrongs and Legislative
enactments of this Commonwealth,” labeling them a “stain” on the state’s dignified history.
Republicans’ pronouncements concerning slavery obfuscated their message of “free labor” and
“free soil,” casting further doubt about their party’s political motives.143
While Republicans struggled to navigate “politics of slavery,” they emphasized their
overwhelming concern for whiteness, an important interest for white northwestern laborers.
Republicans manifested their advocacy of whiteness by holding rallies and meetings at
northwestern industries, notably iron mills. This appropriation of the Northwest’s industrial
context held deep political meaning. Since the 1820s and 1830s, courthouses represented the
locus and projection of state power and white men’s political independence and liberty.144 Both
Democrats and Whigs appropriated the courthouse during election season to manifest their
party’s defense of whiteness and white men’s political privileges. Republicans envisaged the
Northwest’s industries commanding the same political and cultural significance as the
courthouse. Labor generated self-worth, dignity, and independence in white men, important
virtues that carried over into politics. The state no longer represented the source of political
independence for white men, generating greater distance between the laborer and the values and
institutions that shaped the state. The “four hundred people” in attendance at a Republican
meeting at La Belle Rolling Mill in Wheeling celebrated more than the Republican ticket or the
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employment provided by the mill; they manifested their political independence. These attendees
“will be found voting the glorious Republican ticket,” the Daily Intelligencer reported, as these
men considered labor the wellspring of their political independence.145
Virginia Republicans understood the challenges they faced heading into the presidential
election. To mobilize northwestern voters, Republicans encouraged the formation of Wide
Awake organizations and held numerous pole raisings throughout the region. Republicans hoped
that these civic functions would “stir up a spirit of enthusiasm and secure a full turn out of the
Republican strengthen of the city at the election.”146 Wheeling Germans often enrolled as Wide
Awakes, a paramilitary organization that courted young voters and encouraged political
participation.147 Members held the proceedings and adopted a Constitution in German, often
inviting the “German public…to attend” these gatherings.148 Republicans also held pole raisings
throughout the region and extended invitations to “any of the friends of Lincoln.” The
attendance of Republican neophytes during these gatherings offered a clear signal to
northwestern Republicans of their party’s ascendency and popularity.149
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On the election’s eve, Republicans expressed optimism about their electoral chances in
the Northwest. Many Republicans appeared “in good spirits” as they looked ahead toward a
“bright, political sky before them.”150 Hancock County farmer Abraham Pittenger remarked that
the “Rail Splitter has lots of friends here.”151 Republicans received further encouragement with
news that Francis Pierpont was “stirring up the sovereigns in the mountain counties,” showing
residents slaveholders’ tax receipts and the exemptions the state provided them.152 As
Republicans argued during their state convention in Wheeling, the “non-Slaveholding farmers,
mechanics and workingmen of Western Virginia” had been “oppressed and weighed down with
taxation for the benefit of Eastern Virginia Slave capitalists.” But Lincoln’s election would
represent a watershed moment in the state’s history.153 “The great cause of free labor, free
speech, and free homesteads” would encourage northwesterners to elect Abraham Lincoln, the
“champion of all their best hopes.”154
Even if Lincoln failed to carry Virginia, the votes northwesterners cast for him would
represent a stinging rebuke to eastern slaveholders. Northwesterners “should vote for Lincoln
and Hamlin…because they have been told in some quarters that they would not be allowed to
vote that ticket.” Such a denial fed Republicans’ arguments that the “Slave Power” despised and
manipulated democracy and would prevent white men from choosing the candidate of their
choice. “The right to vote as a man pleases is the very corner stone of free institutions,”
Republicans declared, and a vote for Lincoln would illustrate northwesterners’ “independence”
and “their abhorrence of the treasonable sentiments of the secession democracy.” Ballot by
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ballot, Republicans would defeat the “Slave Power” and achieve political liberation for white
northwesterners.155
The election returns demonstrated that Republicans still operated on the Northwest’s
political margins. Constitutional Union candidate John Bell narrowly carried the state over
Democrat John C. Breckinridge by a few hundred votes. Lincoln failed to win the state or a
single county, even in the supposed fertile soil of the Northwest or northern panhandle. While
Republicans captured the White House, his vote total in Virginia illustrated his party’s limited
appeal. Lincoln received 1,929 votes or approximately 1.2% of all ballots cast statewide; both
the aggregate and the percentage represented increases from Frémont’s candidacy four years
earlier.156 Yet Republicans failed to win a single county, even though Democrats offered a split
ticket. Lincoln performed well in Hancock and Brooke counties; both counties, though,
supported Breckinridge. In Ohio County, Lincoln finished just ahead of Douglas but still two
hundred votes short of Breckinridge and five hundred votes behind Bell.157 What accounts for
these voting patterns and Republicans’ continued poor showing?
Republicans pinpointed the continued operation of the viva voce method of balloting but
those prevented from voting for Lincoln would not have been enough to swing a count in his
favor. Entrenched political affiliations continued to frustrate Republicans who failed to dislodge
residents from their party loyalties. Traditionally Democratic counties once again provided
important majorities for Breckinridge or Douglas, with Brooke, Hancock, Harrison, Lewis,
Marion, and Preston counties all supporting the former. Monongalia County was one of the few
across the state that Douglas carried. Over fifty-percent of northwestern voters supported
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Democratic candidates.158 Whiggish northwestern counties, including Kanawha, Marshall, and
Ohio, supported Bell.159 These partisan affiliations had remained relatively stable since the
1820s, an important roadblock Republicans failed to remove prior to the election.
The campaign revealed residents’ continued deep engagement in the “politics of slavery.”
Whiteness and the protection of slavery represented the central issues of the election and all four
parties cast their candidate as the “safest” choice for voters. Democrats and Constitutional
Unionists experienced little difficulty in this political practice; Republicans, though, found it
difficult to navigate the latter. While Republicans cast their party as the “white man’s party,”
their membership included some antislavery politicians and even a few abolitionists. How could
a party associated with such “radicals” truly protect white Virginians’ interests? Republicans,
unable to provide a sufficient answer for such a question, failed to significantly increase its
northwestern membership. No party or politician in Virginia could succeed without finding the
right answer to this question.
Northwesterners’ expressed disappointment with Lincoln’s election but recognized that
his administration could do little to interfere with African American bondage. Fairmont Clerk of
the Circuit Court Thomas G. Watson “acknowledge[d] the election of Lincoln…but it goes hard”
among his Marion County neighbors.160 Chester Hubbard maintained that “Mr. Lincoln can not
move a step…and will be checkmated at every turn” if he attempted to interfere with slavery in
Virginia or across the South. If Lincoln “stands by the Constitution with all its compromises and
enforces the laws,” Virginia’s institutions would be secured.161 Monongalia farmer William
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Price, who, though he opposed Lincoln’s election “with all my might and advocated that of Bell
as strenuous,” found no constitutional grievance with Lincoln “until he commits some
unconstitutional act.”162 At a meeting in Triadelphia, residents “regret[ted] his success” and
“emphatically denounce the cardinal principles of the party which elevated him to power,” but
considered Lincoln’s election as “prescribed by law.” Northwesterners would accept his
administration until he “clearly violates their constitutional rights.”163 Though many
northwesterners deplored Lincoln’s election, most believed that the Constitution and the federal
government’s system of checks and balances would restrain his administration from meddling
with Virginia’s peculiar institution. Slavery in Virginia would continue to thrive under the Stars
and Stripes.
Virginia Republicans celebrated Lincoln’s election, interpreting it as a transformative
moment in Virginia politics. “The aristocracy of niggerdom will no longer be dominant,” the
Wheeling Daily Intelligencer exclaimed. Northwestern voters would no longer be shackled to
the Richmond “Slave Power,” subordinating their interests to those of “Eastern Virginia’s nigger
interest.” Residents would be unafraid to elect officials “for their soundness on our own
interests” rather than “being selected for their soundness on the nigger.”164 And with
“Republicanism…the growing element…in Western Virginia,” the political calculus in the state
would never be the same. Soon, Republicans would inaugurate a true ad valorem tax, commence
construction on internal improvements west of the Blue Ridge, achieve equal representation in
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both state houses, and unleash the economic power of western Virginia. These changes in state
and constitutional policies would hasten the collapse of the Virginia “Slave Power.”165
While northwesterners formulated two different interpretations concerning Lincoln’s
election, other white southerners interpreted his election as the death knell of the Union. South
Carolina seceded in the wake of Lincoln’s election, with Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, and Texas following the Palmetto State’s action in January and February 1861. The
dissolution of the Union and the subsequent formation of the Confederate States of America
initiated meetings and debates across the Northwest concerning Virginia’s future. Most
meetings evinced residents’ determination to resist secession and remain in the Union. Hancock
County residents maintained that they “can remain loyal to both” the United States and Virginia,
arguing that their institutions depended on the Old Dominion remaining in the Union. These
gatherers also assured “our Eastern brethren” that “their fears are groundless and arise from a
misapprehension of the intentions of our Northern brethren.” As “long as they remain faithful to
our State and Union,” Hancock County residents would use “our best efforts” to secure “their
just rights, and labor with them for their enforcement.” Bound by a shared goal, Virginians in all
regions of the state would protect slavery and slaveholders’ prerogatives.166
Similar meetings in Wheeling, Wellsburg, and Preston County manifested
northwesterners’ belief that remaining in the Union provided the greatest security for slavery and
slaveholders. Most residents supported the Crittenden Compromise as a “final compromise of
the vexed question of slavery,” arguing that this constitutional “remedy” would resolve “any and
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all aggressions.”167 Democratic Congressman Sherrard Clemens maintained that the U.S.
Constitution provided Virginia “greater protection than she will ever obtain” in the
Confederacy.168 Waitman Willey recounted how the “Northern press and pulpit” had
“persistently assailed” African American bondage, and believed that such abuses by northerners
“ought to excite indignation and do demand resistance” from white northwesterners. But the
federal government had always acted faithfully toward slaveholders, providing protection and
ensuring the recapture of fugitive slaves and would mitigate this conflict. “What infraction of
Southern rights has the General Government ever committed? Can any Southern man find any
defection here?” Willey found it equally “remarkable…that Northern Presidents have always
been faithful to Southern rights” and believed that Lincoln could do little to interfere with
slavery. Secession, a “degrading” action and a “virtual acknowledgement of southern inferiority
and inability to maintain her rights and vindicate her character,” would threaten African
American bondage. Slavery would continue to thrive under the federal government and
Constitution.169
Not all white northwesterners, though, agreed that the Union would continue to protect
slavery. In a meeting in Ritchie County, residents denounced the “spirit and legislation of Black
Republicanism in the North, the unconstitutional enactments of the Northern States, and the
denial of equal rights in the territories.” How would remaining in the Union resolve these
grievances? While residents “deprecate[d] disunion,” Virginia should secede if northern states
continued to deny white southerners “equal right[s].”170 Some Parkersburg residents expressed
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similar grievances. The “nullifying action of Northern States” and the “encroachments of the
North upon our rights” provided enough evidence for these Wood County residents that only
secession could secure their constitutional rights.171 During a public meeting in Gilmer County,
residents denounced the actions “fanatical, sectional Black Republican[s]” who have “arrogated
to themselves the dangerous privilege of interfering…with our domestic institutions.” How
could northwesterners trust northern Republicans who labored for slavery’s “ultimate
extinction”?172 The Fairmont True Virginian reminded residents that “Virginia claims your
allegiance,” an important reminder considering that Lincoln possessed the “power…to force you
to be a butcher of your own brethren.” Aggression against any slaveholding state should compel
Virginians to defend their fellow southerners.173
Residents’ disagreements concerning Virginia’s future in the Union reflected disputes
about the Northwest’s future if the Old Dominion joined the Confederacy. Republicans
maintained that Virginia’s secession would justify residents’ pursuit of dismemberment and the
creation of a new state. Secession, the pet project of eastern slaveholders, would drag white
westerners into a union with other slaveholders who likewise prized their chattel over white
equality. White westerners would resist such action and break their political bondage by creating
a new and free state. If Virginia “shows herself unfaithful, it will be at the expense of a division
of the State,” John G. Jacob declared. Northwesterners would “repudiate the hasty and fanatical
Southern sentiment so prevalent East of the Blue Ridge.”174 If dismemberment occurred, “it was
not the West, but the East, not the free labor, but the slave labor half” that deserved blame and
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condemnation, he concluded.175 Republican Archibald W. Campbell concurred, declaring that
“no affinity” had ever existed between eastern and western Virginians. Differences in “climate,”
“geography,” and “slave populations” divided the Commonwealth.176 At a Union meeting in
Wheeling’s Fifth Ward, gatherers averred that should Eastern Virginians be “untrue to the Union
and secede therefrom,” these slaveholders “must go by themselves” as northwesterners
“procure[d] the establishment of a separate, sovereign State.”177 Hancock County residents
maintained that their “particular geographical position” made it “incumbent” upon them to
adhere to the Union, even if it meant Virginia’s division.178
Northwestern residents unaffiliated with the Republican Party downplayed the threat of
dismemberment, considering it a last resort or ultimatum. Chester Hubbard believed that he and
fellow northwesterners could “keep Virginia” under the Stars and Stripes, while exuding
confidence that the “‘handle’ will stick to the ‘pan.’”179 A few weeks later, Hubbard judged that
only the “smallest number” of residents “advocate a division of the state at present except under
strong provocation from Eastern Va.” Still, if Virginia only fought in “defence of her rights
under the Constitution,” he predicted that the state “will be a unit.”180 Ritchie County residents
considered the “division of the State by any line…as worse than a dissolution of the National
Union.”181 Reflecting on the secession crisis, Waitman Willey considered a “division of the
state” as the “‘only alternative’” available to residents if war commenced.182 Northwesterners,
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continuing a line of thinking present over the previous three decades, lamented a division of the
state and would postpone such action until they exhausted all other options.
The formation of the Confederacy compelled the Virginia state legislature, under the
instruction of Governor John Letcher, to convene an assembly of elected representatives to
discuss this national crisis. Representatives elected by northwestern voters evinced slavery’s
continued importance in the region and in any decision residents would reach concerning
secession. Preston County attorney William G. Brown, one of the largest slaveholders in the
region, held seven slaves.183 Monongalia County attorney Waitman Willey and Ohio County
Democratic congressman Sherrard Clemens both owned two slaves.184 Clemens’ also possessed
familial connections to the Deep South as his wife, Betty, hailed from Louisiana.185 Braxton
County lawyer Benjamin Byrne and John Carlile of Harrison County were both slaveholders,
too, owning three and one slaves respectively.186 While not a slaveholder, Benjamin Wilson, a
lawyer representing Harrison County, used his legal training to protect slaveholders. Wilson
acted as prosecuting attorney when Harrison County indicted three individuals, including Horace
Greeley, for circulating the “incendiary” New York Tribune in the Northwest.187
Further south, in Kanawha County, George W. Summers held fourteen African American
slaves while Spicer Patrick, a planter, owned twenty-two slaves.188 The election of these western
representatives demonstrated that residents still sought to protect and champion slaveholders’
privileges even though the majority of residents were nonslaveholders. These privileges were
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more secure in the Union than the Confederacy, residents argued, and demanded that their
representatives pledged themselves as unconditional unionists. Chester Hubbard characterized
the election for representatives as a “strong rebuke to Disunion in all shapes,” believing residents
had correctly manifested its fealty toward the Union.189 Residents concluded that this adherence
to the Union could only be severed by popular referendum.190
While most northwesterners opposed secession, many believed that the convention
offered an opportunity to redress some lingering constitutional grievances. Parkersburg
newspaper editor Charles Rhoads hoped that the convention would apportion the state senate on
the white basis, “equalize taxation” on all forms of property, and “abolish the County Court
system.” Rhoads, though, dismissed accusations that such demands represented an ultimatum
where a failure to satisfy northwesterners would trigger dismemberment.191 One Preston County
resident considered western Virginia the leading actor in the upcoming convention, as western
delegates would “amend the Constitution” while eastern representatives “will have to take a
‘back seat.’” Any sectional drama would be driven by westerners, the author concluded.192
Clarksburg lawyer John Stringer Hoffman predicted that eastern delegates “will…yield uniform
ad valorem taxation on all property,” a grievance aired by many residents.193 The convention
provided northwesterners an opportunity to reform the state constitution, not to precipitate a
division of the state.

189

Chester D. Hubbard to Waitman T. Willey, 4 February 1861, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 10,
Folder 6, item 292, WVRHC.
190
William W. Freehling and Craig M. Simpson, Showdown in Virginia: The 1861 Convention and the Fate of the
Union, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010), XI and Wellsburg Weekly Herald, February 15, 1861, 2.
Freehling and Simpson argue that the majority in favor of a popular referendum west of the Blue Ridge was
approximately 5-1.
191
Parkersburg News, December 20, 1860, 2 and 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Parkersburg, Wood, Virginia; Roll:
M653_1384; Page: 550; Image: 558; Family History Library Film: 805384 [Ancestry.com][accessed 28 May 2015].
192
Kingwood Chronicle, February 2, 1861, 3.
193
John Stringer Hoffman to Caleb Boggess, 25 January 1861, Gideon D. Camden Collection, A&M 1199, Box 6A,
Folder November 1860 to February 1861, WVRHC.

248

As northwestern representatives travelled to Richmond in early February 1861, the future
appeared uncertain for northwestern residents and all Virginians. Would Virginia secede and
join the Confederacy? If the state left the Union, how would northwestern residents respond?
Was slavery’s future more secure in the Confederacy? If the state remained in the Union, could
slavery be maintained, even in the Northwest? Northwesterners’ election of unconditional
unionists reaffirms Daniel Crofts’ argument concerning these “reluctant Confederates.”
Residents’ economic interests and Whiggish political tendencies aligned them with similar
northerners and westerners. Crofts, though, portrays Virginia’s intrastate sectional conflict as
inevitably concluding in dismemberment, an interpretation that marginalizes contingency and
foreshadows West Virginia’s creation.194 Few residents, except primarily Republicans,
expressed a desire to pursue a division of the state. Most residents preferred remaining in the
Old Dominion.
Residents’ desire to remain in the Union and their marginalization of Republican
ideology exhibited the political dynamics that had unfolded across the region over the previous
years. Republicans had attempted to politicize what they interpreted as northwestern residents’
ardent desire to defeat Virginia’s “Slave Power” and free their region from political bondage.
Demographic, economic, and geographical trends appeared favorable for a Republican Party to
acquire a foothold in the Northwest. A burgeoning immigrant population, a declining slave and
slaveholder population, commercial ties to northern and western markets, and an increasing wage
labor population appeared to provide an opportunity to establish a Virginia Republican Party that
could wield “free soil” and “free labor” politics in state affairs. Republicans’ increasing national
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popularity suggested that Virginia Republicans would receive patronage and assistance from a
national party unafraid of “doughface” northerners. White northwesterners’ political redemption
was at hand.
Republicans, though, misjudged the popularity of their message and residents’ antipathy
toward slavery. The inauguration of universal suffrage in 1851 deepened residents’ engagement
in the “politics of slavery” and made them more acutely aware of threats to whiteness. Eastern
Virginians’ fears that universal suffrage would threaten slavery were unfounded; universal
suffrage strengthened residents’ commitment to slavery and slaveholders’ interests. This
commitment carried over into residents continued political affiliation, as Democrats and
Oppositionists continued to dominate the political landscape. Though these parties differed in
their approach to protecting slavery, patriarchy, and white supremacy, their positions gathered
more support than Republicans. Northwestern residents were “reluctant Confederates” not only
because of the economic and political tendencies Crofts identifies; their reluctance reflected their
belief that their established and traditional hierarchies depended on slavery’s survival.195 And
nearly all residents maintained that slavery was safer in the Union and under the Constitution.
Northwesterners’ belief that the Union protected slavery and slaveholders represented a
fundamental disagreement with many eastern slaveholders. Tidewater and Piedmont residents
elected the majority of representatives who favored immediate secession, arguing that a
Republican administration would place slavery on a path toward extinction. Only a union with
the Confederacy could protect African American bondage.196 Northwesterners’ loathed
Republicans, too, but maintained that Lincoln and his ilk would be constitutionally restrained
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from interfering with slavery. Republicans could be defeated, northwesterners argued, by
remaining in the Union, electing proslavery politicians, and fashioning new alliances with
northern and western constituencies. Leaving the Union meant forgoing the checks and balances
that constrained Lincoln and his Republican operatives, allowing them to inaugurate conflict on
slavery. By early 1861, most northwestern residents expressed a firm attachment to the Union
not as a manifestation of their antislavery position but rather as an argument that their political
independence depended on the maintenance of slavery under the Stars and Stripes.
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Chapter 6: Preserving the Union and Slavery: Secession and the Statehood Movement, 18611862
In early January 1862, the Clarksburg National Telegraph continued to warn
northwesterners about the Confederacy. The “destruction” of the Confederate States of America
“is foredoomed,” the newspaper predicted, and pinpointed the “actions of the secession leaders”
who “are afflicted with madness” as the cause for the southern confederacy’s impending doom.
This “madness” was manifest in Confederates’ decision to secede and wage war against the
United States. These men “profess to be fighting for their rights in slavery when they are doing
the very thing that will injure the institution….[or] destroy it.” African American bondage
thrived under the Stars and Stripes because the federal government “has always…protect[ed] it,”
notably from hostile European nations who would now seek slavery’s abolition. Slavery’s future
in the Confederacy appeared fleeting.1
For northwesterners, slavery’s perpetuation ensured that racial hierarchy and patriarchy
would continue to operate for the benefit of all white men, regardless of their slaveholding status.
Northwesterners’ political rights would remain sacrosanct, too. But the Confederacy’s political
principles threatened those hierarchies and those rights. The Confederate States sought to
“immediately establish a strong Aristocracy or a Monarchy,” the National Telegraph declared.
This patrician ruling class would pronounce slavery as the Confederacy’s “grand desideratum,”
restricting suffrage to slaveholders and using slavery as “the stepping-stone to both official and
social position.” Unlike northwesterners who claimed political independence without owning a
slave, the status of a “free man” in the southern confederacy would only be achieved with the
purchase of human chattel.2
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The National Telegraph revealed northwesterners’ central objective as the Civil War
entered its second year. The majority of residents demanded to remain in the Union, refusing to
join the Confederacy at any cost. The newspaper’s anti-Confederate stance reinforces prevailing
historical scholarship that recognizes the Unionist grounds the Northwest occupied during the
war. Unionists contended that the federal government provided slaveholders the greatest
protection for their property, arguing that constitutional checks and balances, national political
structures, and the armed forces all assisted slaveholders in maintaining power over slaves.
Secessionists fundamentally disagreed and cited the growing Republican threat as evidence that
slavery would soon be abolished. Though a minority, secessionists existed and operated
throughout the region, often with impunity. Still, the majority of northwesterners’ political
compasses pointed to the Union.
The newspaper’s commentary on slavery revealed the fruits of the 1851 Constitution.
Politically and constitutionally empowered by that document, white, nonslaveholding
northwesterners enjoyed tremendous political power. These men elected government officials
from the governor to local judges, exercised suffrage without owning any property, and claimed
the status of a “free man” without purchasing a slave. The Confederacy threatened those rights,
as noted planters and patricians in that nation hoped to limit democracy and disenfranchise large
numbers of Confederates. This project, begun before the war and with disciples in Virginia, too,
revealed to white northwesterners the immense power they exercised and the fragility of that
power. Slavery and democracy coexisted and strengthened each other, northwesterners declared,
providing the proper political and constitutional foundation for their independence.
The National Telegraph published this commentary on slavery at an important time in the
Northwest. Approximately two months prior, northwesterners had voted overwhelmingly to
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ratify a division ordinance that accelerated western Virginia’s separation from the rest of the
commonwealth. A constitutional convention in session at Wheeling now attempted to craft a
state constitution that voters would ratify and Congress would approve. Two previous
conventions also held in Wheeling, however, revealed diverse opinions concerning slavery’s
future in a new state. Few delegates or residents appeared willing to let slavery, reflecting the
broad acceptance the institution enjoyed.
That northwesterners would still remained attached to the peculiar institution as late as
1862 challenges historians’ arguments concerning northwesterners’ interpretation of the
secession crisis and the initial stages of the statehood movement. Contemporaries, including
Union veteran Theodore Lang and Wheeling Daily Intelligencer report Granville Davisson Hall
identified slavery as producing the “inequalities and injustice” that divided Virginians. This
division became manifest in 1863, as the creation of West Virginia “brought the proud old State
down from its ancient grandeur to its later humiliation.” Westerners, unattached to slavery like
their neighbors in Ohio and Pennsylvania, escaped this “humiliation.”3 Charles Ambler provided
a fitting coda to contemporaries’ hagiographic interpretation of northwesterners’ attitudes toward
slavery during the secession crisis. “[L]ess than one year” after the 1860 presidential election,
Ambler argues, “more than one-half” of voters in what would become West Virginia had become
Republicans. A Republican electorate would assuredly not tolerate slavery or secession on
behalf of slavery.4
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Modern historians have generally agreed that as the secession crisis intensified and war
commenced, northwesterners desired slavery’s abolition. Northwesterners operated in similar
fashion to northerners, William Freehling argues, with most apathetic (if not supportive) of
slavery but resistant to attempts by the “Slave Power” to enslave white men alongside black
slaves. Northwesterners’ concerns with equalizing taxes on slaves rather than attacking a
Republican administration, though, further divided and alienated northwesterners from eastern
Virginians.5 Daniel Crofts argues that the “shrill manifestations of western indignation about
eastern dominance and mistreatment contained both an antislavery tone and a threat to divide the
state.”6 William Link agrees with Crofts’ explicit connection between northwesterners’
antislavery attitudes and the creation of a new state. “By 1860-61,” Link argues, “many
northwesterners” had developed a “new political consciousness” that “offered an aggressive
critique of the politics of slavery.” Dissatisfied with slaveholders’ abuse of power over the past
half-century, northwesterners drifted away from slavery and closer to their free state neighbors.7
The intrastate drama between eastern and western Virginians, Crofts and Link maintain, mirrored
the national crisis and would reach a similar conclusion concerning slavery’s future, as well.8
A fatal struggle between democratic reforms and slavery represents the central argument
for these historians. Decades of national and state conflict centered on nonslaveholders resisting
slaveholders’ increasing dominion over political operations and structures, a characteristic that
complemented Republicans’ “Slave Power” thesis. The creation of a “modern proslavery and
antidemocratic state” in 1860-61 represented the culmination of those political trends, Stephanie
McCurry argues. This project defied western political traditions by restricting political
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representation and by creating a republic solely for white men. The “hubris” exhibited by white
men who believed that slaveholding would trump democracy and restrict “the people” was
“stunning,” according to McCurry. The “reckoning” that unraveled the Confederate project
represented a testament of the internal weakness and the “impoverished political vision” of
Confederate leaders.9
McCurry’s argument complements the body of historiography that posits increasing
tension between democratic-minded northwesterners and eastern slaveholding oligarchs. Indeed,
the statehood movement, a process decades in the making according to most historians, reflected
a seemingly natural, if not inexorable, conclusion to Virginia’s intrastate drama. For decades,
eastern Virginians, under the pretext of protecting their chattel from western nonslaveholders,
used constitutional, legal, and political powers to deny their transmontane brethren any measure
of political equality. Eastern Virginians’ decision to secede to protect their chattel over
northwesterners’ protestations destroyed any remaining ties residents held for slavery and
Virginia. Northwest Virginians would no longer support slavery nor would they support
Virginia. This interpretation has served as the dominant memory of the subsequent statehood
movement, portraying the dismemberment of the state as a revolution against eastern Virginia
slaveholders and slavery.
As revealed by the National Telegraph, this body of scholarship misinterprets how white
northwesterners interpreted the dynamic between slavery and democracy during the secession
crisis and early stages of the Civil War. Empowered by the 1851 Constitution, northwesterners
wielded tremendous political and constitutional power and enjoyed rights practically on par with
eastern slaveholding oligarchs. A few constitutional grievances remained, notably the tax
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restrictions on African American slaves, but these were resolvable. Indeed, removing the tax
restrictions placed on chattel would remove a festering inequality and grievance against slavery.
Northwesterners declared that with Virginia in the Union and slavery secured, all white men
regardless of their slaveholding status could rightfully claim the mantle of a “free man.” Put
simply, slavery had perfected the political power white men enjoyed. But Virginia’s secession
challenged that dynamic. White northwesterners believed that they had effectively checked
Virginia planters’ political hegemony over the past decade, but secession brought those planters
together in a formal political alliance with likeminded Deep South planters and patricians. Much
like these cotton aristocrats, Old Dominion planters had sought to stem and reverse the
democratic tide that had washed away their aristocratic political structures and functions. The
state’s membership in the southern confederacy deepened that desire. Faced with the prospect of
losing their hard fought political and constitutional rights, northwesterners began the process of
creating a new state.
But historians err in interpreting this move toward creating a new state centered in the
Northwest as an antislavery reaction. Over the preceding decades, northwesterners had deepened
their fealty toward slavery and recognized the political independence they derived from the
institution’s presence. Abolishing the institution threatened to destabilize or destroy those rights
and upset the established and traditional hierarchies that also buttressed African American
bondage. Rather, Unionist northwesterners initiated a counterrevolution to protect slavery and
democracy, maintaining that the perpetuation of each institution would ensure the survival and
continuation of their political representation.10 This counterrevolution centered on resisting
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secession through the ballot box and enlistment in the armed forces. These forms of resistance
acted as a prelude to northwesterners’ central objective of this counterrevolution, to create a new
state where democracy and slavery would continue to exist in equilibrium. The statehood
movement’s initial stages reveal that though northwesterners understood the political obstacles
incumbent in creating another slave state given the context, few relented. Slavery and
democracy would continue to thrive in the hollows and hills of the Northwest.
On February 13, 1861, representatives from across the state gathered in Richmond to
debate the state’s future. Approximately one-sixth of these delegates championed immediate
secession, with most representing counties with dense slave populations east of the Blue Ridge.
Another one-sixth of delegates considered their fealty to the Union supreme to all other issues;
most of these hailed from western Virginia and the Northwest in particular. The remaining twothirds were conditional unionists, representatives that sought to preserve Virginia’s place in the
Union but wary of Republican coercion. Most delegates waited to see how Lincoln and his
administration would react to the secession crisis unfolding across the nation before deciding
Virginia’s future. Despite these differences, these delegates professed the same goal of
protecting slavery. How to protect slavery, though, represented the fundamental difference that
divided delegates.11
The beginning weeks of the convention contradict many historians’ arguments
concerning the Northwest’s monolithic support for the Union. As Marion delegate and lawyer
Ephraim B. Hall predicted, northwesterners “are going to have trouble here & some of our
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western men will not pull true” to the Union.12 His prediction was accurate. If a conflict
concerning residents’ “allegiance” arose, Barbour County attorney Samuel Woods declared that
his constituents would “yield obedience to the State of Virginia.”13 Woods argued that
“[m]idnight robbers and assassins” had violated northwesterners’ “RIGHTS” and exhibited a
“sentiment hostile to [Virginia’s] institutions.” “[I]nfuriated negroes, with pikes in their hands”
aided these northern agents while northerners “canonized” radical abolitionists like John Brown
as “saints and martyrs.” John Brown’s raid manifested the venom with which abolitionists had
poisoned the northern body politic, turning northerners against southern institutions and society.
Secession, Woods averred, would protect his constituents from northern voters who allegedly
demanded racial equality at all costs.14
A meeting in Woods’ district bolstered his secessionist stance. Barbour County residents
“denounce[d] the doctrine of Federal coercion” and pledged their “obedience and allegiance to
[Virginia] alone.” The Old Dominion, along with other southern states, have “borne so patiently
the encroachment of Northern fanaticism” until residents could no longer bear such injustices.
The election of Abraham Lincoln now christened his party as the “dominant party” and would
empower northern radicals to “perpetuate those grievances.” Raids such as that perpetrated by
John Brown would increase in frequency with an antislavery party in control of the White House.
Faced with continued northern assaults on southern rights, these Barbour County residents
prayed that Virginia would “immediately withdraw” from the Union.15
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Wetzel County lawyer Leonard S. Hall agreed with his Barbour County colleague. Hall
believed that abolitionists’ machinations would become more widespread with a Republican
president. “The press, the pulpit, the school-house and the Sabbath school,” Hall declared, “all
exert their influence in hostility to the institutions of the South.” These institutions could
broadcast their hatred of slavery and southern society with Lincoln granting impunity to such
messages.16 Further, Wetzel’s proximity on the Ohio River made it an attractive “terminus” for
the “underground railroad,” forcing residents to abandon slavery lest “emissaries” abscond with
their human chattel across the river. But the presence of only a few slaves and slaveholders
should not cloud other Virginians’ interpretation of Wetzel’s citizens. “[N]o sounder State-rights
people” existed in the state than Hall’s constituents, and these residents believed that
northerners’ increasing hostility toward slavery forecasted future conflicts concerning the
institution. Only an alliance with the Confederacy could secure slavery and stymie the work of
“emissaries” lurking along Wetzel’s borders.17
Though most northwestern delegates opposed Woods’ and Hall’s secessionism, all
agreed that slavery and slaveholders’ rights demanded protection. They believed that disrupting
the master-slave relation threatened all northwesterners, whether or not they owned slaves.18
Harrison County lawyer Benjamin Wilson worried that abolition would unleash a “half-caste
race” that lacked the “capacity for self-government.” Soon, the “time of our courts would be
occupied in trying them for crime” while the state would be “heavily taxed to defray their
criminal expenses.” Perpetuating slavery ensured that African Americans remained in their
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proper place.19 Sherrard Clemens, representing Ohio County and an owner of two slaves,
rejected claims that he “stood upon a platform which was advocated by the editor of the
Wheeling ‘Intelligencer.’” That Republican organ, Clemens argued, evinced its hostility to
slaveholders and the institution through its free labor and free soil diatribes.20 Harrison County
attorney John S. Carlile, a slaveholder, emerged during the convention as one of slavery’s most
vocal advocates. Carlile considered the institution a “social, political, and religious blessing,”
and declared himself a “slaveholder, not by inheritance, but by purchase.” His declaration of
purchasing rather than inheriting slaves functioned as a powerful shibboleth in late antebellum
Virginia. Carlile manifested his approbation of the institution and proslavery credentials through
deliberate choice, not empty rhetoric. This financial stake in African American bondage proved
useful in bolstering his support for tax reform and remaining in the Union. Such steps, he
avowed, would protect his investment along with thousands of other Virginians. His election to
this convention testified to his constituents’ approval of his status as a slaveholder and his
proslavery ideas, as well.21
Many northwestern delegates stressed their constituents’ fealty toward slavery, reminding
colleagues of northwesterners’ unwavering support for the institution. Carlile averred that
though few northwesterners held a “pecuniary interest” in African American bondage, all
residents championed the axiom that “‘African slavery…is essential to American liberty.’”22
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Doddridge County lawyer Chapman J. Stuart proclaimed that his constituents have been “loyal
and true to the institutions of their State…especially to the institution of slavery.”
Northwesterners had “stood up for the institution and the rights of slavery” and Virginia
slaveholders would continue to “find us at our posts ready to do battle for it.”23 The “people are
as sound and as emphatically Southern as the people of Richmond,” Marion County lawyer
Alpheus Haymond explained. “[N]o want of loyalty to any of the institutions of Virginia”
existed among his neighbors.24
As during the Reform Convention a decade earlier, Monongalia County lawyer and
slaveholder Waitman T. Willey emerged as the Northwest’s principal spokesman. He dismissed
eastern Virginians accusations concerning the Northwest’s unsoundness on the issue of slavery,
reminding delegates that more passionate supporters of the institution could not be found outside
of the Northwest. A “very serious misapprehension” and “intimations and insinuations
prejudicial to the character” of his district had “been busily circulated” but such claims were
unfounded, Willey declared. Monongalia County residents were ready to “defend [Virginia’s]
rights to the death,” a “universal” sentiment in the trans-Allegheny. Unconvinced delegates
needed only to reflect upon his constituents’ history in defending and supporting Virginia
slaveholders.
In what portion of our history can a single incident be pointed to that would subject us to
the ban of your distrust? In what have we been derelict? In what have we been faithless?
When did we not come up to the full demands of justice to the East on all questions?
Never.25
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Eastern delegates’ baseless accusations represented the true danger to slavery, Willey asserted,
not his northwestern neighbors. Their continued attacks on northwesterners’ proslavery
credentials threatened to turn residents against the institution. Such a turn of events would prove
disastrous for slaveholders. For if a national conflict arose concerning the institution, where
would eastern Virginians “get the strong arms to defend your slaves?” “From our glorious
mountains of the West,” he answered. Eastern Virginians needed northwesterners’ support.26
Northwesterners’ continued support for eastern Virginians’ chattel could be secured
through two important measures. The first was to remain in the Union. Though secessionists
claimed that remaining in the Union would prove the death knell of slavery, northwestern
unionists maintained that the federal government strengthened and protected the institution.
Delegates needed to look no further than to John Brown’s failed raid in 1859. Carlile reminded
delegates that when the abolitionist attempted to incite a slave rebellion, “fourteen…marines
belonging to the Federal Government” captured Brown and delivered him to Virginia authorities.
He doubted that a Confederate army stationed in Richmond could mobilize with greater speed in
future crises.27
The federal government’s response to Harpers Ferry demonstrated to Carlile the Union’s
continued defense of slaveholders’ rights. Under “our common Constitution,” the “army,”
“navy,” and the “gallant voters of the non-slaveholding states” will “battle in defence of our
rights.”28 Willey agreed, reminding delegates that the “Supreme Judicial tribunal” had
“guarantee[d]” the “right of every slaveholder…to carry his property into all the territories.”29
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This federal assistance would continue unabated even with a Republican in the White House.
The “Black Republican” Party only controlled the “powerless” executive branch and “can do no
harm” to slavery unless Virginians secede, Carlile stressed.30 But if eastern Virginians dragged
the state out of the Union, he predicted that slavery would “not exist in Virginia five years after
the separation.” The “whole civilized world” demanded slavery’s “ultimate extinction,” he
claimed. Only the U.S. government, not the impotent Confederacy, could guarantee slavery’s
existence.31
Willey echoed Carlile’s fatalistic prediction concerning slavery in the Confederacy.
Virginia’s secession would “bring Canada to our doors,” increasing slaves’ “motive to escape.”
Northwestern slaveholders, fearful of losing their property, would “themselves remove farther
South, or…sell their slaves to be sent farther South.” Slavery’s erosion along the South’s
periphery would produce tremendous harm. The region’s political clout would decrease,
empowering Republicans to reach deeper and more aggressively into the South. Southerners
would be “hemmed in by a cordon of hostile elements,” he concluded.32 The boundaries
between Virginia and its northern neighbors would become a conflict zone, threatening to “make
North-Western Virginia the Flanders of America.” Confederate soldiers would be unable to
rescue northwesterners, as Virginia legislators had failed to provide sufficient “legislative aid to
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transpierce these mountains” that divided the state. This apocalypse could only be prevented by
remaining in the Union.33
Remaining in the Union provided security and safety for northwestern slaveholders and
their chattel. The Union also protected northwesterners from the antidemocratic mindset that
Deep South planters and patricians had exhibited over the years. This mindset, residents
observed, had deepened with the creation of the southern confederacy. In a meeting held prior to
the convention, Morgantown residents declared their opposition to being placed under the “rule
of King Cotton.”34 The epithet of “King Cotton” meant more than the overwhelming economic
importance placed on cotton production while other agricultural and commercial interests
suffered; rather, “King Cotton” symbolized the political tyranny exhibited by Deep South
slaveholders. These cotton planters considered the Confederacy’s establishment as a “moment
of possibility” to purge “corrupting democratic tendencies” that had infected southern states.
Chief among these “tendencies” were universal male suffrage, frequent elections, and unmooring
property from politics. Deep South elites believed these democratic reforms compromised
slavery and threatened to inaugurate “Yankee” politics on southern soil.35
This phenomenon unfolded in Virginia after the ratification of the 1851 Constitution.
That democratic document empowered nonslaveholders across the state through universal
suffrage, direct election of government officials, and greater representation in the state
legislature. The result was a more transparent and open political system that checked planters’
political hegemony. But foes of Virginia’s democratic transformation existed. One Virginian
decried the reign of “King Numbers,” fearing the “deep and radical changes” that this ruler
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would inaugurate. “[C]herished and venerated institutions” would be destroyed and “long
established opinions and principles” would be overturned.36 John Coles Rutherfoord, a lawyer,
slaveholder, and member of the House of Delegates, expressed similar fears. “[P]ublic
opinion…is king,” he lamented, “making and unmaking the laws or setting them at naught…and
sweeping away whatever it opposes.”37 Southerners needed to “modify” their political
institutions, proslavery theorist George Fitzhugh asserted, to dethrone “King Numbers.”
Modifications included “remov[ing] the people farther from the direct exercise of power,”
“lengthen[ing] the tenure of office,” and shielding representatives from public opinion. He
applauded South Carolina for already implementing such measures. “Aristocracy is the only
safeguard of liberty,” he concluded, and stressed that unless planters restricted political
representation, the South, much like the North, would soon devolve into “pure democracy” and
“anarchy.”38
Northwesterners’ feared that Virginia’s membership in the Confederacy could assist these
antidemocratic foes in manifesting their desires. The “political views of the South Carolina
school of politicians,” Wellsburg residents declared, rejected majoritarian rule and restricted
political participation to only slaveholders. How could northwesterners’ democratic rights be
protected in a union with such politicians?39 The Wheeling Daily Intelligencer reported that a
recent issue of the Richmond-based Southern Literary Messenger contained articles that
denounced “universal suffrage of the white man” as a “disgraceful failure.” “African slavery”
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would provide the foundation for the southern confederacy, thereby consolidating political power
in the “fewest possible numbers” and forcing the “poor white man to emigrate.”40 The “ballotbox,” that “mighty engine for the redress of grievances,” would be inaccessible to white men
unless they owned African American slaves. “[A]ristocrats say they will do…[the]
thinking…legislating and governing” for all white men.41
The abrogation of northwesterners’ democratic rights in the Confederacy constituted a
central argument during the convention. “South Carolina initiated this movement,” John Carlile
reminded delegates, and that state “will control this movement.” The Palmetto State’s propertyholding requirements for political office would be replicated in the Confederate national
government, too, forcing nonslaveholders into a state of political bondage.42 Confederates had
already constructed a government lacking “popular sanction,” Willey observed, as Jefferson
Davis had been appointed, not popularly elected. He predicted that the southern confederacy
would soon be ruled by an “oligarchy, or constitutional monarchy, or military despotism.”43 And
with cotton planters controlling the government and reluctant to relinquish that power, the future
appeared bleak for white nonslaveholders in the Confederate States. “It seems to me this
Southern Confederacy,” Willey warned, “is disposed to repudiate the principle that the political
power resides in the people.”44 In Morgantown, merchant Henry Dering supported his delegate’s
conclusions. Monongalia County residents “will not be put along with the Cotton States,” he
declared, and “pray[ed]” that Willey and other northwestern delegates would “keep Va. in her
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present position.”45 Northwesterners opposed any measure that would “precipitate the old
Dominion out of this glorious Union, [and] into the treasonable bosom of King Cotton.”46
Membership in the Confederate States endangered slavery and democracy, the two wellsprings
of northwesterners’ political rights. Remaining in the Union, though, would ensure their
perpetuity.
Remaining in the Union represented northwestern delegates’ primary objective in the
convention and would deepen northwesterners’ desire to protect eastern Virginians’ chattel.
Reforming the tax code, specifically by equalizing taxation across all property, constituted the
second measure northwestern delegates believed would further solidify their constituents’ fealty
toward easterners’ property.47 These exemptions, enacted by the 1851 Constitution, generated
sectional and class friction while providing fodder for Republicans who believed that the
exemptions reflected the machinations of the “Slave Power.” Resolving this taxation issue,
northwesterners assured the convention, would not destroy the institution. Rather, eliminating
these restrictions would ease sectional and class tension and strengthen residents’ support for
slavery. As Alpheus Haymond explained, equalizing taxation would “harmonize this
Commonwealth from one end to the other” and make Virginians “one and indivisible in
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sentiment and feeling.” An ad valorem tax on slaves would not endanger the institution; it
would strengthen it.48
The debate concerning taxation commenced on March 7 when Preston County attorney
William Guy Brown moved that the convention establish a committee to explore ad valorem
taxation on all forms of private property. Brown’s initial argument in offering this motion
centered on the need to equip, arm, and feed an army should military conflict break out. Brown
observed that “Eastern citizens are prepared now…to subject their property to equal
taxation…[to] help us now raise the sinews of war.”49 The convention tabled Brown’s motion
69-41, but Willey introduced a similar measure nine days later, garnering the approval of
northwestern secessionists and unionists.50 Secessionist Samuel Woods of Barbour County
observed that the “common masses of the people…are at a loss to understand” why the state
fully taxed land yet exempted African Americans under the age of twelve.51 Ephraim B. Hall
bemoaned the “odious distinction” and “inequality” created by these restrictions, and believed
that this “inequality” should be resolved before delegates settled Virginia’s future.52 Benjamin
Wilson predicted that a “dire and awful conflict” between the “laboring man and the slave
owner” would unfold in the Old Dominion unless delegates resolved this issue. Wilson
reminded delegates that “[m]ore true and more loyal friends of the negro interest are no where to
be found than in the Western party of the state.” Providing justice to northwesterners would
ultimately strengthen the bonds between them and slaveholders, an important task given the
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national political climate. Refusing to yield on this issue, however, threatened to attenuate those
bonds.53
William Brown expounded on his earlier support for the ad valorem tax on slaves. As an
owner of seven slaves, he was “interested directly in the institution of slavery” and its
preservation. Brown expressed similar paternalistic attitudes as other Virginians, professing that
the institution was “ordained of God himself for the purpose of redeeming the African race from
barbarism.” The Northwest’s scarce slave population, though, should not persuade fellow
Virginians that his neighbors believed differently. Though northwesterners “may not have as
much of that peculiar kind of property as” eastern Virginians, slavery “will never be injured or
disturbed” by the “people of North-western Virginia.” By removing the tax restrictions on
slaves, delegates would ensure that all citizens “bear [the] equal proportion of the burdens of
Government.” This equality would deepen his constituents’ paternalistic and proslavery
sentiments.54
Willey, a slaveholder like Brown, provided a full defense for removing the tax
restrictions on black slaves. The “laggard” construction of western internal improvements was a
visual representation of this policy’s operation. Lacking sufficient roads, canals, or railroads to
eastern markets, northwesterners used natural channels to transport goods to northern and
western markets. This flow of commerce to external markets consolidated capital in northern
states while “Northern population,” “power,” and “the ratio of representation against us”
increased. Republicans, now the dominant party in the North, benefited from this arrangement.55
The operation of this tax policy among nonslaveholders was equally appalling. Willey confessed
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that he felt a “sense of mortification” knowing that the state taxed “every cent” that belonged to
his “non-slaveholding neighbor” while his property was “exempt from taxation.”56 Though
northwesterners had spearheaded this movement to equalize taxation, he denied any sectional
prejudice. Taxation “is not a sectional question,” he declared, but a “question between the nonslaveholding and the slaveholding portions of the people of Virginia.” White laborers in
Richmond, Petersburg, and Lynchburg along with white farmers in the countryside paid a full
share of taxes while a slaveholders’ chattel labored and masters paid only a fraction of taxes.
This scenario represented the true threat to slavery, Willey inferred, not that slaveholders paid
more taxes.57
Despite their efforts to show the injustices created by the tax restrictions, northwestern
delegates failed to persuade Piedmont and Tidewater delegates. These eastern delegates
maintained that the convention should settle federal matters before addressing issues such as
taxes or representation in the state legislature. Petersburg merchant and slaveholder Thomas
Branch declared that he would consider a “re-organization of the organic law” on taxation after
the “Convention shall have determined that the State shall leave the Union.”58 “That is the way
the whip is cracked over the head of Western men,” complained the Wheeling Daily
Intelligencer.59 Ephraim Hall stated that secessionists’ suggestion to “buy us” while offering “all
we asked on the question of negro tax” received quiet endorsement from some colleagues.60
Lewis County attorney Caleb Boggess confirmed such divisions, admitting that “a great number
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of the Valley members and some of the Western Members…are opposed” to removing tax
restrictions on slaves. Plagued by divisions, northwesterners attempts to reform the tax code had
stalled by early April.61 By mid-April, though, northwesterners’ prospects improved as the
convention approved Willey’s motion to form a committee to explore removing the tax
restrictions on slaves.62
Even with this important victory, the convention’s laggard pace coupled with
secessionists’ obduracy frustrated northwestern residents and delegates. This frustration
persuaded some northwesterners that dismemberment should remain on the table. Barbour
County delegate Samuel Woods lamented a “rupture of the good old Commonwealth of
Virginia” but maintained that representatives in Richmond needed to provide “equal justice to
every section” of the state to prevent such a calamity from unfolding.63 In Morgantown, Henry
Dering demanded “our just rights” and “equality in our own state, or in lieu of it, a division of
the state.”64 The Virginia Plain Dealer in Tyler County maintained that if eastern delegates
“give us our rights—make us freeman and equals by the law with themselves,” northwesterners
“will be the last to ask for a division of the state.” “[G]ive us what rightfully belongs to us,” the
newspaper concluded, “and we will never say division, Never, Never, Never.” Refusing to
provide northwesterners justice, though, would intensify the demands for dismemberment.65
By early April, events within and without the convention provided mixed signals
concerning Virginia’s future. On April 4, delegates voted 90-45 against immediate secession.66
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In Washington, D.C., Augusta County delegate John B. Baldwin met secretly with President
Lincoln to ascertain his intentions concerning Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor and the
unfolding national crisis.67 While the vote rejecting secession encouraged northwestern
delegates, Baldwin’s visit proved disappointing, as Lincoln had allegedly supported resupplying
troops in Fort Sumter with food and other essentials without first consulting Virginia unionists.68
Other delegates, unaware of this visit, agreed to send three representatives on a similar factfinding mission Baldwin undertook a few days earlier. During their meeting on April 13,
Lincoln informed the three delegates that the “unprovoked assault” on Fort Sumter the previous
day would compel the president to “repossess” any and all federal forts lost to the Confederacy. 69
The firing on Fort Sumter, though, failed to turn unionists into secessionists or convince
delegates that war was inevitable. Delegates offered a variety of explanations for the assault on
the federal installation. Some accused South Carolina for instigating the conflict while others
were confident that the conflict would be localized to Charleston harbor. Some unionist
delegates believed that their compromise measures would be considered more seriously by all
parties now that fiery rhetoric had turned into open hostilities. Immediate secessionists like
former governor Henry A. Wise were apoplectic that Virginians dithered while war was afoot.70
But on April 15, President Lincoln’s request for 75,000 troops, including 2,340 officers and men
from the Old Dominion, changed the convention’s atmosphere and numerous delegates’ stance
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on secession.71 Delegates convened in secret session, with Wise and George Wythe Randolph of
Richmond declaring that the welfare of the republic required an immediate military response to
Lincoln’s “coercive” declaration before public ratification of a secession ordinance.72
Wise’s assertion that military mobilization against the Union must occur prior to popular
approval or rejection of secession infuriated northwestern unionists. Sherrard Clemens of Ohio
County declared that delegates “must await the decision of the people upon” the secession
ordinance before Virginians seized military installations or aligned with the Confederacy. 73
Wood County lawyer John J. Jackson was “astounded” that secessionists planned to capture
“public property within the limits of Virginia” before Virginians offered their blessing to such
actions. Indeed, Jackson considered Wise’s suggestion a “sham” and a “solemn farce” that
would place Virginians in a “peculiar embarrassment.” Virginians would be in political limbo as
the state collaborated with the Confederacy but remained in the Union until the public approved
of secession.74 Secessionists’ desire to withdraw the state without the consent of the body politic
would prove the death knell of slavery, Willey predicted. “We are certainly not yet out of the
Union,” he declared, warning that this “hasty measure” will “destroy the loyalty of the best
friends that ever your slaveholders had.” Secessionists’ headlong rush to sever Virginia’s ties to
the nation “will dissolve the state,” placing easterners’ property in a precarious situation.75
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Such pleas, however, failed to stop the convention’s march toward secession. Delegates
approved the ordinance, 88-55, with a popular vote on the ordinance to occur on May 23. A
handful of northwestern delegates voted in favor of the ordinance, while one abstained and the
majority voted against its ratification.76 Though the public would vote on the ordinance in
approximately one month, the scenes around Richmond convinced one northwestern delegate
that Virginia’s fate was with the Confederacy. Benjamin Wilson marveled at the “excitement
and action of the people” outside the convention. “Companies are leaving every day,” he
observed, while residents exhibited a “furnished determination to seize all public property within
the state” and “almost every man & boy…has a gun and sword in hand.”77 Many Richmonders
saw no point in waiting for public ratification of the ordinance; Virginia was no longer in the
Union.78
Unionist northwesterners felt despondent about the convention’s action but determined to
continue their fight for slavery, democracy, and the Union. John S. Burdett of Taylor County left
Richmond on April 17 to inform his constituents of the convention’s decision; a few days later,
John Carlile and most other northwestern delegates had left the convention and arrived in the
Northwest by April 21. Carlile convened a meeting in Clarksburg on April 22 and over onethousand residents answered the call to attend this unionist rally. These northwestern unionists
decried secessionists’ actions in seizing federal installations and custom houses in the state
capital without sanction from voters. The “people of Virginia…by their votes, and through the

76

Northwestern delegates who voted in favor of the ordinance included Cyrus Hall of Pleasants and Ritchie;
Leonard S. Hall of Wetzel; John N. Hughes of Randolph and Tucker; and Samuel Woods of Barbour. Benjamin
Wilson of Harrison abstained from voting on the ordinance. Alpheus Haymond and George Berlin, who initially
voted against the ordinance, changed their votes in favor on April 23. A State of Convenience: The Creation of
West Virginia, “Voting Results on the Virginia Ordinance of Secession,” West Virginia Archives & History
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/rcdelegates.html] [accessed 24 June 2015].
77
Benjamin Wilson to unidentified, 19 April 1861, Benjamin Wilson Letter Regarding Conditions in Richmond
after Passage of Ordinance of Secession, A&M 3626, WVRHC.
78
Link, Roots of Secession, 240-243.

275

ballot-box” would solely determine whether the Old Dominion would remain in the Union or
join the Confederacy. The extralegal actions undertaken by secessionists lacked legitimacy
because they occurred without popular sanction. Now northwesterners existed in a political
purgatory as this “fearful emergency” unfolded across the nation and the state. To help
northwesterners’ navigate this fluid and hostile political climate, Carlile endorsed the passage of
a resolution that enjoined residents to “appoint…their wisest, best, and discreetest men” for a
meeting set to convene in Wheeling in May. Northwesterners would find a democratic path out
of this national crisis.79
Not all northwesterners supported Carlile’s “Clarksburg Convention” or expressed
dismay about the convention’s decision, however. Upon returning to Wheeling, Chester
Hubbard remarked that the “secession element is very active” in the city and that a tenuous
“peace” existed between unionists and secessionists.80 Adding to the tense atmosphere in
Wheeling, the Daily Union maintained that “every citizen, native and naturalized” must
“acknowledge allegiance to Virginia alone.” “Self preservation and the best interests of the
State” required this unquestioned fealty toward Virginia.8182 A Parkersburg resident remarked
that though a “large majority” supported the Union, a “very considerable minority of as rabbid
secessionists as could be found in South Carolina” resided in Wood County. These secessionists
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were “openly and secretly plotting the overthrow” of the federal government, he warned.83
Upshur County farmer Lewis Lunsford observed that those “who love Virginia[,] her laws[,]
institutions[,] and dictations in this particular vicinity, are surrounded…by…people whose
Northern feeling and Abolition sentiments are proclaimed among us with impunity.” These
unionists enraged Lunsford. Such northwesterners mocked their birthright and empowered
“Lincoln and his Abolition allies,” men who had “usurped the powers of…[the] Constitution.”
Lunsford feared that his Union neighbors would “put their threats into execution” and, in so
doing, upset the state’s “laws” and “institutions.”84
The convention’s adoption of the Ordinance of Secession further illustrated that the
Northwest remained divided, not monolithic. Taylor County farmer Fabricius Cather witnessed
this division firsthand. Unionists “hissed down” secessionist Samuel Woods during his speech
and showered “secession troops” mobilizing in Grafton with “hisses & groans.”85 In Wellsburg,
John G. Jacob noted that a “formidable and active body of secessionists” operated in “every
community” across the region, including Hancock County.86 On April 26, four days after
Carlile’s “Clarksburg Convention,” secessionists gathered in the city for a “STATES-RIGHTS
MEETING”

to decry northerners’ “long continued hostility” against the slaveholding South. These

residents applauded the work of their elected representatives in Richmond in removing Virginia
from a nation ruled by a “despot” who wielded the “power of a military Emperor” against the
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South’s “free government and enlightened institutions.” Northwestern unionists deserved equal
condemnation. Such men disparaged the memory of the American Revolution and their
birthright as Virginians. Further, their desire to detach the Northwest from Virginia and become
a “fragmentary bastard corner of Pennsylvania or Ohio” or an independent “helpless, renegade
community” would generate “civil strife” and expose “families and…property to murder, rapine,
fire, and general devastation.” Carlile’s attempt to establish a “Provisional Government” in
Wheeling lacked “law or authority” from the people and would surely fail. Accordingly, these
northwestern secessionists “utterly condemn[ed] the proposition to divide the State, and…loath
and abhor the diabolical manner in which it is proposed.”87
This secessionist meeting in Clarksburg contributed to what Waitman Willey considered
unionists’ “embarrassed position in the N. West.” His return to Morgantown convinced him that
secession had “greatly divided” residents, creating doubt about whether the Northwest would
remain in the Union or join the Confederacy. “[W]e do not now know, how strong the Union
sentiment is in the N. Western counties,” he lamented. Willey’s uncertainty reflected the
region’s fluid political climate, as he remained unsure whether his constituents would ratify or
reject the secession ordinance. He believed that the upcoming vote on the Ordinance of
Secession would provide a “reliable index” in measuring residents’ unionism but worried that
overwhelming support for ratification would prove disastrous for unionists. “If we are in a
minority in the N. West, what shall we do?” A lopsided defeat of the ordinance, though, could
assist in securing a division of the state. Though the “idea of a division of the state is new to the
people,” Willey expressed confidence that Virginia’s allegiance with the Confederacy would
deepen that desire. Still, he cautioned against pursuing any “further and ultra movements” if
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residents’ demanded division, including against slavery. Willey was not prepared to propose
slavery’s abolition in a new state.88
Further dividing northwesterners was news from Richmond that on April 26 the
convention had removed the tax restrictions on African American slaves. Many secessionists,
after securing the passage of the secession ordinance, supported full taxation on slave property to
foster unity among Virginians and heal the sectional divisions the convention had exposed.
Jeremiah Morton of Greene County and George W. Randolph of Richmond, both slaveholders,
spearheaded this movement to equalize taxation. Morton maintained that western delegates
would return home “triumphantly” having secured a constitutional guarantee of equal taxation on
black slaves, a measure that would further promote a “united” Virginia during this national
crisis.89 Randolph concurred, arguing that western delegates, notably those who ratified the
secession ordinance, deserved a “satisfactory adjustment” on taxation.90
Some northwesterners agreed with secessionists’ arguments. Benjamin Wilson of
Harrison County, who remained in Richmond after the vote on secession, believed that this
amendment would promote “unity” in a region that had expressed “dissatisfaction” with
secession. Indeed, removing the tax restrictions on African American slaves would “defeat”
those who used such exemptions to foment “discord and division” in the Northwest.91 The
Fairmont True Virginian agreed. With easterners paying “three times as much tax” as
westerners, Virginia would be “one and indivisible.”92 The Republican Wellsburg Herald,
however, considered the amendment one of the convention’s “artful dodges” designed to make
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the secession ordinance more palpable to northwestern voters. Still, the Republican organ
worried that “many good Union men” would fall into the “trap” set by secessionists, specifically
that unionists would be tricked into voting in favor of equalize taxation and the secession
ordinance.93
The Wellsburg Herald and unionists across the Northwest looked toward the First
Wheeling Convention for guidance during this fluid political climate. Convened on May 13, the
convention included over 400 attendees, with a handful of northwestern counties providing over
half the delegation.94 Divisions immediately surfaced among delegates over what mode of
redress northwesterners should pursue and when to place such plans into motion. Parkersburg
lawyer John J. Jackson “opposed…any definite or decisive action” on the part of the convention,
arguing that moving for a division of the state was “premature,” “revolutionary,” and “altogether
unwise” until northwesterners had “exhausted” all other options. Jackson urged the publication
of resolutions expressing the “wrongs” suffered by the Northwest while exhorting delegates to
campaign against the secession ordinance’s ratification.95 Carlile rejected Jackson’s cautious
nature and his “paper resolves.” “[L]et us show our loyalty to Virginia and the Union,” he
declared, “and let us maintain ourselves in the Union at every hazard.” Such prompt action and
determination among unionists would furnish clear evidence of residents’ fealty toward the
federal government, a loyalty that would compel the government to provide northwesterners
military assistance.96 While Brooke County delegate and merchant Campbell Tarr agreed with
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Carlile’s position, Willey stood with Jackson, arguing that residents looked to the convention for
a thoughtful, not a hasty, response.97
This division among delegates about the proper course for northwesterners characterized
the First Wheeling Convention. As Carlile remarked, delegates evinced a “unanimous
determination” to defeat the Ordinance of Secession and remain in the Union but bickered over
the proper “means of resistance” against the Confederacy.98 Though Carlile maintained that
dismemberment represented the “only legal, constitutional remedy” available to residents during
this crisis, others disagreed.99 Clarksburg lawyer John J. Davis avowed that “hasty action would
not do,” and prayed that Virginians would defeat the ordinance and keep the state “one and
indivisible.”100 Constitutional requirements for creating a state from an existing state presented a
formidable obstacle for dismemberment, as nearly all delegates recognized that the Virginia
General Assembly would not assent to such a request.101 At the end of the convention, delegates
passed a series of resolutions enjoining residents to defeat the secession ordinance, denouncing
the Richmond convention’s actions in severing the state’s ties to the Union without first securing
the “consent of the governed,” and pledging their loyalty to the U.S. Constitution and federal
government.102 Prior to adjournment, Carlile made one more impassioned plea for a new state.
He urged the “erection of a New State,” by “blood” if necessary, to help preserve Virginia’s
institutions.103 Willey, acting as Carlile’s political and constitutional counterweight, encouraged
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northwesterners to first “kill” the secession ordinance at the ballot box; a constitutional path
would emerge from this action and guide northwesterners to safety. Though Virginia’s
membership in the southern confederacy appeared as a fait accompli, dismemberment still
appeared possible but not inevitable.104
The First Wheeling Convention’s missive following the proceedings reflected this
division concerning statehood and the overall precarious situation northwestern unionists
occupied. Delegates avoided any mention of the Richmond Convention’s recent removal of tax
restrictions on African American slaves, afraid that even a passing reference to that action would
legitimize the convention’s other initiatives. Delegates carefully chose their words concerning
slavery, too, avoiding avoided any discussion of African American slavery. Rather, the
convention used the word “slavery” to elucidate the Richmond convention’s recent activities.
“Eastern despots” had “tyrannized over” residents and had attempted to “enslave”
northwesterners by removing Virginia from the nation without the people’s consent. This
“crime” had robbed white northwesterners of their political and constitutional rights. Between
the First Wheeling Convention’s conclusion and the commencement of another convention set to
convene in early June, delegates urged continued resistance to the “disunion majority” assembled
in Richmond. Such resistance would demonstrate to Virginia authorities that white
northwesterners would not be dragged into the Confederacy like black slaves.105
The results of voting on the secession ordinance and taxation amendment on May 23
provided mixed results for northwestern unionists. Eleven northwestern counties ratified the
Ordinance of Secession while extreme northwestern counties along the Ohio and Pennsylvania
borders returned solid majorities against secession. Even in these counties, though,
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northwesterners cast ballots in support of the ordinance.106 Over one-hundred residents voted for
secession in Brooke County, while twenty-three ratified the ordinance in Hancock County. In
his History of Brooke County, John G. Jacob recognized that a “very strong southern element”
existed in the county. The “doctrine of States rights,” he observed, “had as staunch advocates”
in Wellsburg as in Richmond.107 The Wellsburg Herald lamented that “so large a proportion” of
“misguided” residents had become “traitors” to the United States. Such citizens deserved to be
recognized, the newspaper determined; the editors printed the names of those who voted in favor
of the ordinance.108
In Ohio County, the Daily Intelligencer undertook a similar action against secessionists.
Over one-hundred and fifty Virginians, including eighty-one in Wheeling, voted to ratify the
ordinance. The Republican Daily Intelligencer printed the broadside “Traitors in Wheeling,”
identifying those who had voted for secession. These secessionists often had close political or
economic ties to state authorities in Richmond, and the prospect of a divided Virginia threatened
those ties.109 Scattered newspaper reports suggest that though unionists defeated the secession
ordinance in most northwestern counties, a strong secessionist element existed in each county.110
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But with statewide approval of the ordinance, this northwestern secession element would likely
receive aid and support from Richmond. The Northwest would continue to be a divided region.
Three days after the vote on the secession ordinance and tax amendment, the federal
government responded to unionists’ pleas. Major-General George B. McClellan led Union
troops into Wheeling to protect ostracized unionists and secure the region’s railroads and
waterways for transporting troops and matériel.111 McClellan ordered his soldiers to respect
“persons and property,” to be merciful to “misguided” secessionists, and allow the “loyal men of
Western Virginia…to organize and arm.”112 McClellan fashioned himself as northwesterners’
savior from the “machinations of a few factious rebels in your midst.” These rebels had
prevented men from “expressing your loyalty at the polls” and would attempt to make Unionists
“yield to their schemes and submit to the yoke of the traitorous conspiracy” of the Confederate
States. McClellan emphasized that northwesterners’ constitutional and personal rights would be
“religiously respected” by the federal government. Chief among such property rights was
slaveholding. Though secessionists maintained that the federal government would wage war on
slavery, McClellan denied such rumors. The federal government would “abstain from all such
interference” on slavery, but would use its “iron hand” to “crush any attempt at insurrection” on
the part of slaves or secessionists.113
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McClellan’s presence and rhetoric calmed unionists’ fears.114 The federal government
extended shelter and protection to besieged unionists while respecting the property rights of all
citizens. Willey later hailed McClellan’s respect for slaveholders’ rights, noting the “supreme
satisfaction” northwesterners’ felt as the general vowed to protect their chattel.115 McClellan’s
aid was critical as unionists reconvened in Wheeling in early June to discuss the reorganization
of the state government and the propriety of dismemberment. Though a month removed from
the First Wheeling Convention, no consensus existed concerning a division of the state.116 This
disharmony became manifest as the Second Wheeling Convention progressed.117 On June 13,
two days after its commencement, the convention passed a declaration denouncing the recent
actions of Virginia Governor John Letcher and the Richmond Convention in denying Virginians
an opportunity to ratify or reject the secession ordinance prior to the state levying war against the
Union.118 Northwesterners considered the actions separating the state from the Union as enacted
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“without authority” and therefore “void.”119 The convention reestablished the offices of
governor and lieutenant governor and elected delegates to meet in a legislative body in the city.
Delegates selected Francis H. Pierpont of Marion County and Daniel Polsley of Mason County
for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively.120
Pierpont’s two addresses to the convention reflected northwestern unionists’ concern with
protecting slavery and democracy. Confederates declared that “the people are not the source of
all power,” an axiom that represented the antithesis of what northwesterners had argued over the
preceding decades. These traitors maintained that only the “educated class” should possess
political representation, not “laboring classes.”121 Importantly, Pierpont denied that the
“protection of negro slavery was the great object” of the war. The blame for the war rested on
southern patricians. These aristocrats had grown “dissatisfied with the Union” and used slavery
as a “pretext” to overthrow the current government and institute “one more suited to their tastes
and habits of life.” By branding southern patricians, not slavery, for instigating the war, Pierpont
disarmed those who may have considered action against the institution a necessary prerequisite
in destroying the Confederacy. Northwesterners should concern themselves with quelling the
rebellion and reorganizing the state government, Pierpont declared, not in interfering with
African American slavery.122
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The motion to reorganize the state government and not to pursue dismemberment divided
the convention. John Carlile, a passionate and ardent supporter of a separate state a month
earlier, expressed more caution during this latter meeting. He confessed that he “first started the
little stone down the mountain” but now believed it prudent to “apply the rubbers to other
gentlemen” who advocated immediate division.123 Chester Hubbard of Ohio County agreed,
arguing that delegates were “not here to create a State, but to save one.”124 Other delegates
insisted that the convention must consider constitutional obligations, especially because the
federal government had provided the necessary security for protecting this convention.125
Delegates advocating immediate dismemberment were few and held little sway in the
convention. Monongalia delegate George B. Dorsey characterized dismemberment as a “dire
necessity” that would permanently separate two “entirely antagonistic” peoples. Virginia’s
“history” provided sufficient evidence to Dorsey that western Virginians’ shared few, if any,
“interests” with their eastern brethren.126 Dorsey and fellow pro-statehood members failed to
convince their colleagues about the immediate need for separation, however. John J. Davis
believed that “Black Republicans” were the “strongest supporters and advocates” for immediate
separation, a scheme that appeared more of a “revolution” than a “legal, constitutional action.”127
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Though the Second Wheeling Convention agreed to consider separate statehood at a future
meeting in August, divisions and accusations prevented delegates from cohering on this issue.128
The divisions expressed by delegates concerning separation should not be surprising or
that advocates for division remained in the minority. Over the preceding decades,
northwesterners wielded dismemberment as a threat against eastern legislators who had abused
political power and refused to extend political equality to all white men. Even when
northwesterners discussed dismemberment, opposing voices noted serious political, economic,
and constitutional issues could derail the movement. Common bonds of heritage, history, and
religion further dampened such talk. The 1851 Constitution extinguished any discussion of
disunion in the state, as northwesterners finally achieved the equality that had been denied to
them. The onset of war, though, challenged residents’ fealty toward the state. Secessionists’
extralegal maneuvers infuriated northwesterners who interpreted such actions as that of a master
compelling his black slave. Questions loomed in northwesterners’ minds. Could
northwesterners trust these secessionists if they occupied the same body politic following the
war? Would a decisive Union victory displace these secessionists from positions of power and
place northwesterners in control of the state government? How would secessionists’ actions
impact slavery? Could northwesterners’ satisfy constitutional requirements if they desired
division? These questions confounded northwesterners. Lacking sufficient answers to these
questions, most northwesterners preferred resistance to secessionists, not revolution, in 1861.
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When the Second Wheeling Convention reconvened in early August,129 Confederate
fortunes had improved immensely. Confederate victories, notably at Manassas in late July,
persuaded many northwesterners that the war would not end quickly and possibly without a
decisive Union victory.130 A Confederate victory or truce between the two belligerents would
create an uncertain future for northwestern unionists and for slavery and democracy in the
region.131 Faced with improving Confederate military prospects, delegates at the Second
Wheeling Convention further distanced the Northwest from the reach of the Richmond
government, declaring all constitutional, legislative, and policy actions enacted by that body
“illegal, inoperative, null, void, and without force or effect.”132 On the convention’s seventh day,
the Committee on a Division of the State offered its ordinance for dividing the state, maintaining
that a division would improve the “social, commercial and political condition” of western
Virginians. Though more delegates supported dismemberment than a month prior, dissenting
voices still existed.133
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Committee chairman James G. West, a farmer from Wetzel County and former opponent
of the statehood movement, dismissed concerns that fluid and hostile boundaries between union
and secession counties should be resolved before creating a state.134 Marion County merchant
John S. Barnes, though, emphasized the “impropriety” of creating a new state, arguing that its
creation should be done in “accordance with the Constitution.” Would Congress admit Western
Virginia on a “mere technicality?” Barnes also stressed that residents in numerous counties
included in the initial boundaries of the state had embraced secession only months earlier.
Barnes urged his colleagues to first exhaust “all peaceful and legal means of obtaining a
separation,” even if that meant consulting the “whole state.” The war, he concluded, had been
waged over the “maintenance of the Constitution,” thereby requiring unionists to strictly adhere
to constitutional principles lest their actions undermine the federal government.135 But Wetzel
County farmer Reuben Martin asserted that a new state would manifest the “line between us”
that the “God of nature” had drawn between eastern and western Virginians. Northwesterners, in
fashioning a new state, would simply be following Providence’s will.136
The issue of slavery entered the discussion as delegates continued to debate
dismemberment. Andrew F. Ritchie, a farmer from Marion County, believed that the
convention’s effort to create a new state would produce irreparable harm for the federal
government. Dividing Virginia, he asserted, would be a “violation of the spirit, if not the letter
of the [Federal] Constitution.” The Constitution provided specific instructions for creating a new
state; western Virginia failed to satisfy those requirements. An attempt to apply to Congress for
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statehood would “embarrass the action” of the federal government in its attempt to “put down the
rebellion.” Attempting to create a state without fully addressing the “slavery question,” he
emphasized, would “only create controversy in Congress.” Controversy would also extend into
the Northwest, where a “divided sentiment” existed among residents concerning the institution.
Republicans, still an alien organization to most residents, would not rest until slavery ceased to
exist in the region, Ritchie insisted, thereby creating a division that would destroy the
reorganized government. The Lincoln Administration had not interfered with slavery or the
rights of slaveholders in its war against the Confederacy; how could western Virginians
inaugurate or tolerate such action in their own state?137
Other delegates agreed with Ritchie’s rationale concerning slavery. Fontain Smith, a
lawyer from Marion County, maintained that geography and climate could resolve the question
of slavery in western Virginia, freeing delegates from any action on the issue. Still, African
American bondage was “constitutionally right,” he declared.138 Charles S. Lewis, a slaveholder
and lawyer in Harrison County, resisted secession because he believed the Confederacy “would
strike a death blow at the institution,” not save it. Lewis dismissed the “ravings of the
abolitionists” in demanding emancipation and cautioned delegates about the “danger” of turning
western Virginia into a free state. Instead of permitting the “emancipationist…[to] raise his head
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in our midst,” Lewis urged delegates to allow the “silent laws of political economy” to determine
slavery’s fate.139
The slavery question continued to vex delegates. Wood County delegate Arthur I.
Boreman asserted that a constitution submitted to Congress that contained no provision for
ending slavery would be rejected. Such an action by the Republican legislature would “foment
such an excitement in Western Virginia as was never witnessed before.” Could this
“excitement” evolve into secessionism?140 Ohio County banker Daniel Lamb agreed with
Boreman’s conclusion. Though Lamb admitted that the territory proposed for the new state
contained a small slave population in comparison with eastern Virginia, he became concerned
that this statehood movement would evolve into an “abolition movement.” If the convention
petitioned Congress for statehood with slavery, Republicans would deny admittance. Why “push
such a question upon the councils of the nation” while the federal government waged war, Lamb
wondered.141 Lieutenant Governor Daniel Polsley maintained that “he was as good a pro-slavery
man as any one in the State,” but confessed that he would abandon slavery if it meant the

139

Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 224-225; 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Millford, Harrison, Virginia; Roll:
M653_1351; Page: 767; Image: 257; Family History Library Film: 805351 [Ancestry.com][accessed 5 July 2015];
and, 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Slave Schedules – Harrison County, VA [Ancestry.com][accessed 5 July 2015].
Waitman Willey and Taylor County merchant and fellow slaveholder John S. Burdett agreed with Lewis. In a
speech in the U.S. Senate, Willey argued that Virginians and all Americans should “leave slavery where the
Constitution and laws have placed it.” Burdett reaffirmed his position as a “pro-slavery man,” noting that he had
“bought and sold a few Negroes” over the past years. He also maintained that the “way to perpetuate the institution
is to preserve the Union of the states,” especially against that “damnable heresy of secession.” Willey, Object of
War, 11; John S. Burdett to Waitman T. Willey, 27 August 1861, Charles H. Ambler Collection, A&M 122, Box 10,
Folder 7, item 347, WVRHC; 1860 U.S. Federal Census: Taylor, Virginia; Roll: M653_1381; Page: 508; Image: 12;
Family History Library Film: 805381 [Ancestry.com][accessed 6 July 2015]; and, 1860 U.S. Federal Census – Slave
Schedules: Taylor, Virginia [Ancestry.com][accessed 6 July 2015].
140
Lewis, How West Virginia Was Made, 273-274.
141
A State of Convenience: The Creation of West Virginia, “Proceedings of the Second Session of the Second
Wheeling Convention, August 20, 1861, Mr. Lamb’s Speech on the Division of the State,” West Virginia Archives
& History: West Virginia Division of Culture and History
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/statehood08.html][accessed 6 July 2015] and 1860 U.S. Federal
Census: Wheeling Ward 5, Ohio, Virginia; Roll: M653_1368; Page: 340; Image: 348; Family History Library Film:
805368 [Ancestry.com][accessed 6 July 2015].

292

salvation of Virginia and the federal government.142 As Republican John G. Jacob later
admitted, though the Northwest was “on the margin of the slaveholding community” by 1861,
residents expressed “a good deal of interest” in the institution and its maintenance. In “various
ways” and “by association” slavery impacted each and every resident, he observed.143 Jacob was
correct. Though few slaves and even fewer slaveholders resided in the Northwest, the institution
enjoyed broad acceptance and countless advocates. Cognizant of residents’ support for slavery,
delegates remained uncertain about the prospects of a new state or the institution.
When the convention adjourned on August 21, delegates passed “An Ordinance to
Provide for the Formation of a New State out of a Portion of the Territory of this State” by a 5028 margin, a reflection of persistent divisions.144 Delegates tackled the issue of slavery by not
addressing it at all; the ordinance made no reference to slaves or slavery. Residents would vote
on the ordinance, along with a slate of delegates to attend a constitutional convention set to
convene in November if the ordinance carried, on October 24. Dismemberment and the creation
of the new state of Kanawha were on the horizon but without a resolution on slavery, Kanawha’s
admittance into the Union appeared uncertain.145
Residents remained conflicted as the October vote loomed. In a mass meeting held in
Wheeling, Governor Pierpont emphasized that Confederates’ “leading object…was not only to
keep their negroes enslaved, but to enslave the whole working classes of the country.” Securing
a division of the state would save white laborers from political bondage.146 An anonymous
writer in the Daily Intelligencer argued that the vote represented an “opportunity of freeing”
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northwesterners “from the yoke of the oppressor.” Virginia’s “history” and “geography,”
notably the “mountain barriers” that no internal improvement had “hewn down or pierced,”
should provide sufficient evidence to all voters that eastern and western Virginia possessed
divergent “interests.”147 The editors of the Daily Intelligencer believed that the “day that is to
sever us from our political connection with Eastern Virginia” would soon become manifest.148
The newspaper dismissed the slavery issue, reminding readers that Kanawha’s future resembled
that of its free state neighbors Ohio and Pennsylvania. Regardless of future action on slavery,
“natural laws” and the “irresistible march of events” would eventually make Kanawha a free
state, too.149
The Wellsburg Herald expressed more concern and doubt than its fellow Republican
organ. “The signs in the political heavens are unpropitious.” Though optimistic about the
ordinance receiving residents’ approval, the newspaper believed that congressional approval for
a new slave state was unlikely. A “civil war” would commence, dividing residents into those
who demanded the “abolition of slavery” and those “whose rallying cry will be death to the
Abolitionists.” Civil war would engulf the region.150 John J. Davis, a delegate to the Second
Wheeling Convention who had voted in favor of the division ordinance, “hope[d]…[that] the
measure will carry with the people and relieve West Va.” Still, he found the timing “inopportune
during the continuance of hostilities.”151 A convincing Confederate victory in the Northwest
could force Davis and other unionists “to say farewell to the land of my birth” and imperil the
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statehood movement.152 Lewis County attorney Caleb Boggess noted that a “large majority” of
northwesterners favored division but worried that achieving “Congressional consent” would
derail the movement. This “doubt” concerning congressional approval expanded the “diversity
of opinion” already existing on the subject. Could a resolution on this issue be achieved that
satisfied voters?153
The results on the division ordinance revealed residents’ desire for dismemberment but
presented a cautionary tale about aggressive action concerning slavery. Over eighteen-thousand
residents voted in favor of the ordinance, while less than five-hundred rejected it.154 John J.
Davis celebrated the “overwhelming” margin in favor of division. He “hope[d] Jeff Davis will
let us depart in peace now,” as the election results provided “unmistakable evidence of our
unwillingness to become subjects of his.”155 Though one hurdle had been cleared, several more
remained with slavery being the most imposing. An anonymous writer remarked that “the
people are not yet prepared for a rejection of slavery” and argued that it constituted “too great a
change” for many to consider. Could a free state be realized?156 The Wellsburg Herald was
“satisfied” with the results but cautioned that the issue of slavery still loomed. The Herald
predicted that a “provision for gradual emancipation, would probably not abolish slavery under
25 or 30 years” in the Northwest, and instead recommended that residents let slavery perish from
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“natural decay.” Any aggressive action concerning African American bondage, including a
gradual emancipation clause, threatened to derail the statehood movement.157 In Wheeling, the
Daily Intelligencer appeared less concerned about the issue of slavery. The newspaper
castigated those who “bring forward Mr. Nigger on all occasions, and use him as a getter up of
prejudice,” notably those who characterized the statehood movement as an offspring of
“abolitionism, or some other obnoxious ism.” The issue of slavery, the newspaper confidently
predicted, would be easily resolved in the coming months.158
The Daily Intelligencer expressed a confidence concerning slavery and the upcoming
constitutional convention that appeared justified. Northwestern Republicans believed that the
war manifested the bitter fruits of the peculiar institution and its subversive effects on democratic
government. Republican John G. Jacob recognized that the “incompatibility of African slavery
with republican institutions and the development of the American idea of self-government”
produced the troubles that afflicted both the nation and the state.159 The actions of the Richmond
Convention and Henry Wise and his ilk in levying war against the Union prior to public
ratification of the secession ordinance smacked of tyranny as it constituted an affront to
republican government. Such actions, Republicans averred, reflected slavery’s corrupting
political influence. As the war continued and the deaths mounted, Republicans reasoned that any
remaining proslavery sentiment in the Northwest would dissipate. The vote on the division
ordinance further clarified and strengthened Republicans’ interpretation concerning slavery and
the statehood movement. Residents demanded a new state, one free from slavery’s baneful
reach.
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The Daily Intelligencer poorly misread northwesterners’ interpretation of African
American bondage, a misinterpretation that has shaped the historiographical debate concerning
West Virginia statehood and the issue of slavery. Northwesterners’ adhered to the Union and
rejected the Confederacy not because they desired slavery’s extinction; rather, residents
remained committed to the Union because slavery would continue to flourish under the Stars and
Stripes. The hierarchies constructed on the peculiar institution, notably racial supremacy and
patriarchy, would remain inviolable in the Union. Further, northwesterners’ democratic rights—
rights obtained after decades of struggle and debate—would remain protected from overzealous
planters who wished to stem the tide of democratic reform across the South.
The “Slave Power” that Republicans castigated existed under the guise of “King Cotton”
in the Deep South and parts of eastern Virginia. But unlike in South Carolina, Alabama, or
Mississippi, northwesterners believed that their constitution properly situated power in the hands
of nonslaveholders while checking the power of such patrician-minded slaveholders.
Empowered by universal suffrage and more legislative representation, northwestern
nonslaveholders believed that they wielded tremendous political power and, in general, they
were correct. Though a few grievances remained on the books that expanded slaveholders’
power, nonslaveholders believed they could resolve those issues by appealing to democratic
sensibilities. Few, if any, non-Republican northwesterners, though, sought to use that political
power to disturb the master-slave relationship.
The preservation of the master-slave relationship and protecting democratic rights
constituted northwesterners’ primary objectives during the Richmond Convention, important
objectives that historians have overlooked. Unionists and secessionists disagreed over the proper
means of securing both but agreed that their preservation was vital. For unionists like William
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G. Brown and Waitman Wiley, the means for securing both rested on staying in the union and
taxing African American slaves at their full market value. Such a move, they declared, would
remove an odious feature that irritated nonslaveholders and would ultimately make the institution
more secure, not endanger it. Rather than an abolitionist scheme as interpreted by some
secessionists, northwesterners sought only to strengthen the institution. Northwestern
secessionists generally agreed that removing tax restrictions on slaves would promote unity and
raise much-needed revenue. But such actions should occur in concert with Virginia’s
membership in the southern confederacy. Secessionists’ desire to protect their chattel persuaded
many to sanction Henry Wise’s extralegal actions and that of the convention as a whole, notably
as the convention began to sever Virginia’s bonds to the Union before the people voted on the
Ordinance of Secession. Unionists bemoaned the convention’s decision, interpreting the triumph
of “King Cotton” over republican government and principles. Faced with a hostile populace,
many northwestern delegates returned home and contemplated what move unionists could take in
this national crisis.
For some northwesterners the next move was to adhere to the Union but remain loyal
Virginians. The national crisis would soon be resolved through diplomacy or military conflict,
and soon residents could return to their antebellum political status. Others, though, believed that
secessionists’ actions forced northwesterners to explore a division of the state. For decades,
northwestern residents and politicians had wielded dismemberment as a signal of their
dissatisfaction with their lack of political equality and as a threat to extract concessions from
obdurate easterners. Now, with a war expanding in scope and cost and faced with an uncertain
future, northwesterners took the next step in exploring dismemberment and statehood. But their
desire for a new state did not necessarily reflect their desire for a free state, a premature
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conclusion too many historians have supported. While some residents endorsed gradual and
compensated emancipation for loyal slaveholders, other northwesterners maintained that slavery
must constitute the foundation for any new state. Anything short of that feature could imperil the
whole movement. The unionist coalition that had steered the Northwest through the initial
phases of the Civil War would be tested in the coming months on the paramount issue of the day:
slavery.
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Chapter 7: (Some) Mountaineers are Always Free: Statehood and Preserving Racial Hierarchy,
1862-1863
On June 20, 1863, West Virginia entered the Union as a slave state. In his inaugural
address as the state’s first governor, Republican Arthur Ingraham Boreman characterized the
Mountain State’s creation as a manifestation of the intrastate sectional tension that had
threatened to dismember Virginia multiple times over the preceding years. Eastern Virginians
had “always” considered the trans-Allegheny an “outside appendage” or “territory,” Boreman
insisted, as constitutional, political, and economic structures favored eastern Virginians at the
expense of their transmontane neighbors. Empowered by the “original Constitution of the
State,” eastern Virginians had “collected heavy taxes from us” to construct “railroads and canals
in the East” while they “withheld appropriations from the West.” West Virginia’s “natural
channels” meant that “[o]ur markets, our trade and our travel” occurred with northern and
western states, generating “little intercourse” among eastern and western Virginians. Differences
in “nature, our commerce, travel, habits, associations, and interests” coupled with eastern
Virginians’ support for the “fatal doctrine of secession” strengthened Boreman’s interpretation
that “two peoples” occupied the same state, making the Old Dominion’s dismemberment
inevitable.1
Boreman’s memory of Virginia’s sectional history reflected the difficulty leading a state
still struggling with the issue of slavery. West Virginia’s path to statehood was fraught with
numerous obstacles and divisive issues, most notably slavery. In 1861, Northwest residents
pledged loyalty to the United States for, among other reasons, the government’s unwavering
commitment to slavery and slaveholding interests. Northwest politicians carried this message to

Arthur I. Boreman, “Inaugural Address of Governor Arthur I. Boreman,” West Virginia Archives & History: West
Virginia Division of Culture and History [www.wvculture.org/history/boremania.html][accessed 21 June 2013].
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Richmond in 1861, attempting to convince their fellow Virginians that their constituents
supported slavery and would protect slaveholders’ chattel from meddling abolitionists and a
Republican president. Northwesterners’ support for easterners’ property, though, was contingent
upon remaining in the Union, for an alliance with Deep South planters imperiled the political
rights guaranteed by the 1851 Constitution. Any disruption of equilibrium between slavery and
democracy threatened to destroy both institutions. Despite northwesterners’ protestations,
Virginia seceded and joined the Confederate States of America.
The commencement of civil war divided Northwest residents. Secessionists’ applauded
the Richmond convention’s decision and promised to defend the state and new nation from
northern enemies. Many northwesterners considered secession an unforgivable act and grounds
for dismemberment, however, while others stressed caution and deliberation, wary that hasty
action would precipitate further calamities or a speedy conclusion to the war would embarrass
the movement. Confederate military victories, though, impressed upon the majority of
Northwest unionists that dividing Virginia would protect African American bondage and
democratic rights. A series of meetings and conventions established a reorganized government
for loyal Virginians and laid the groundwork for the statehood movement. But the statehood
movement, rather than promoting cohesion and unity, fostered more division and acrimony.
The statehood movement’s divisiveness centered on the issue of slavery. Politicians and
residents had expressed caution tackling the subject because of the institution’s centrality to
northwesterners’ political thinking. Northwest Republicans emerged as vocal supporters of
abolishing slavery to save the Union and to hasten West Virginia’s creation. Republicans, aided
by the presence of federal troops and their identification with the statehood movement, stressed
that slavery’s abolition in western Virginia would liberate white residents from the political
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tyranny imposed by eastern Virginia oligarchs. Slavery, the central cause of secession and the
Civil War according to Republicans, had severed the remaining bonds of union between eastern
and western Virginians; removing this cancer from the body politic represented a lasting rebuke
to the Richmond “Slave Power” and those who performed that cabal’s bidding in the Northwest.
Slavery’s destruction in western Virginia would also undermine Confederate efforts, hasten the
war’s conclusion, and preserve the Union. “Shall we object that slavery is destroyed…if the
Union is thereby saved,” Boreman questioned.2 Republicans’ leadership in the new statehood
movement increased their popularity, allowing them to control the direction of the state and the
memory of its formation.
Republicans’ eagerness to abolish slavery encountered intense opposition. Many nonRepublicans who supported the statehood movement suggested measures that prohibited
importing African Americans into the state while others insisted that market forces would slowly
drain that population southward. Other westerners were more vocal in their opposition.
Conservative northwesterners—some who expressed varying degrees of support for statehood
while others outright opposed it—worried about the broadening scope of war, notably
Republicans’ flagrant dismissal and denigration of fundamental constitutional rights. Foremost
among these rights were those of slaveholders. “[W]aging…a war for the abolishment of slavery
in the southern States is in open violation of the Constitution,” the Clarksburg Patriot insisted.3
A war to save the Union had evolved into a war to destroy slavery, a development that
unconditional unionists before the war had not supported and now strongly opposed. John
Carlile maintained this position, arguing that directions from congressional Republicans to create

2
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a new state amounted to congressional dictation. The creation of West Virginia reflected
political submission, conservatives averred, not liberation.
The Union’s victory over the Confederacy in 1865 overshadowed conservatives’
arguments, a phenomenon that has shaped the memory and historiography of West Virginia’s
founding. The seemingly inevitable conflict of slaveholding states and nonslaveholding states
has colored historians’ arguments concerning the inevitable conflict between eastern
slaveholders and western nonslaveholders in Virginia. Western nonslaveholders, aware that their
political liberation was near, helped overthrow the Richmond “Slave Power,” destroy African
American bondage, and separate from eastern Virginians. As Charles Ambler argued, these
developments in Virginia represented a “microcosm” of the national struggle.4 Decades of
conflict concerning slaveholders’ prerogatives, slavery’s political characteristics, geographical
isolation, and political inequality led to the creation of West Virginia, William Freehling argues,
leaving Virginia “shattered” by 1863.5
This argument concerning the inevitable and inexorable conflict between western and
eastern Virginians has received broad scholarly support from contemporary and current
historians. Theodore Lang averred that during the “thirty years before the Rebellion,” a
“condition of absolute hostility” existed between eastern and western Virginians. Matters of
political inequality, specifically limited suffrage, unequal representation, and unfair taxation,
contributed to this “hostility.” Further, “in order to secure the suffrage of people of his district,”
Lang claimed that prospective candidates for political office had to “pledge…to the principle of a
division of the state.” Politics in the Northwest, therefore, centered on dismemberment.6
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Charles Ambler argued that the creation of West Virginia arose from the Old Dominion’s
sectional conflict, a development that was “impossible” to prevent. The “radicals of the
northwest” succeeded in 1863 in “dismembering the ‘Mother of Commonwealths,’” he
concluded, a fitting coda to a process decades in the making.7 Henry Shanks maintained that the
“separate state movement was part of a long, sectional rivalry” that had been building for
decades over the political issues raised by Lang and Ambler. Northwesterners’ nearly
unanimous opposition to secession while eastern Virginians embraced the Confederacy
represented the final act in this intrastate sectional struggle. And this struggle not only led to
West Virginia’s founding but the long-awaited death knell of slavery, too.8
Modern historians have generally agreed that Virginia’s decades-long sectional struggle
culminated in the statehood movement, a movement driven by the same tensions and forces that
tore the nation apart in 1861. Daniel Crofts emphasizes that years of “intense” sectional
animosity in Virginia generated the “most explosive regional antisecession movement” of the
war. Northwesterners, “exploited” and “neglected” by eastern Virginians, argued that the state
failed to “provide tangible benefits” for their region while slaveholders enjoyed special
privileges. Secession increased sectional tension to a breaking point.9 The “formation of West
Virginia…represented a culmination of trends evident” in preceding years, specifically in
Virginians’ disagreement over slavery’s role and power in electoral politics, William Link
argues. By the 1850s, William Link argues that “West Virginia exceptionalism emerged and
blossomed as a social and political phenomenon.” Residents, imbued with this ethos, challenged
Charles H. Ambler, “The Cleavage between Eastern and Western Virginia,” American Historical Review, 15, no. 4
(July 1910): 780.
8
Shanks, Secession Movement in Virginia, 211-212. Other earlier historians have echoed this interpretation.
Granville Davisson Hall, Virgil A. Lewis, and George E. Moore contend that sectional grievances dating back to the
American Revolution set in motion the creation of West Virginia, an inevitable result considering eastern
Virginians’ refusal to embrace democratic reforms and abandon slavery.
9
Crofts, Reluctant Confederates, 159-160.
7
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eastern slaveholders’ hegemony while articulating militant antislavery appeals. The widespread
acceptance of antislaveryism provided the contours for West Virginia’s establishment as a free
state in 1863. Thus, the “same narrative of sectional conflict” that unfolded across the nation
during the Civil War era was manifest in Virginia, too.10
The statehood movement’s culminating phases appears to bear out that interpretation,
specifically in regard to abolishing slavery. Northwest Virginia represented what William
Freehling considers one of the South’s “white belts,” areas where geographic features prevented
widespread plantation agriculture and large slave populations. With little personal, financial, or
political investment in the institution, northwesterners faced little difficulty in resolving the issue
of slavery on the path toward statehood.11 James Oakes maintains that only western Virginians’
“deference to the property rights of slaveholders,” not their deep investment in racial hierarchy
or defense of slavery, convinced them to initially “block the adoption of a gradual emancipation
clause in the new state constitution.”12 Northwestern Republican organs during the war offered
similar arguments concerning slavery’s fate in the new state. As a writer in the Wellsburg
Herald explained, slavery had placed eastern and western Virginia in its “conflicting position,”
making it “unjustifiable” and “reprehensible” that northwesterners should further condone that
institution.13 Residents’ eventual and overwhelming support for gradual emancipation in 1863
provided “an unmistakable indication” that northwesterners demanded a free state.14
A closer analysis of the statehood movement suggests a more divided constituency and
uncertainty surrounding slavery’s future in the Northwest and West Virginia. Far from a
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comfortable or clean divorce from the institution, northwesterners experienced a protracted and
difficult debate concerning African American bondage. Residents acknowledged slavery’s vital
importance to political rights and wondered how to reconstruct white liberty without black
bondage. Northwesterners’ reluctance to embrace emancipation also reflected their hatred for
abolitionists who allegedly desired to foist immediate emancipation and racial equality upon
West Virginians. But emancipation on northwesterners’ own terms made emancipation more
tolerable, a sentiment that increased in popularity as guerrilla conflict continued in the mountains
and the Civil War’s conclusion appeared uncertain.
The changing war context, though, provided only part of the reason for northwesterners’
ratification of gradual emancipation. Following months of intense popular debate, statehood
promoters convinced residents that racial hierarchy would survive without slavery, as African
Americans would remain subordinate while white residents retained their superior political,
social, and economic statuses. An exodus of slaves and freed blacks following statehood would
produce a demographic “whitening” of West Virginia, supporters declared, preserving the new
state for white residents only. The few remaining freed blacks would labor in menial, service
positions, a visual manifestation of the racial hierarchy West Virginians sought to perpetuate.
Restrictive laws, including corporal punishment, extended antebellum “justice” on African
Americans into the statehood years, too. Though slavery eventually ceased to operate within the
Mountain State, the institution’s effects lingered. Residents’ belief in liberty for whites and
slavery for blacks, a stance derived from and animated by residents’ deep engagement in the
“politics of slavery” over the preceding decades, provided the foundation for West Virginia’s
establishment.
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The Constitutional Convention convened in Wheeling on November 26, 1861. Critical
issues lay ahead for delegates, notably defining the state boundaries, settling on a name for the
new state, and, above all, settling the issue of slavery. As John Stealey III has noted, delegates
approached resolving these issues through two methods. Some delegates suggested that the 1851
Constitution required only slight modifications while others maintained that eastern Virginians’
rebellion required westerners to overhaul that constitution and write a new one.15 James H.
Brown of Kanawha County and Peter G. Van Winkle from Parkersburg articulated these two
positions. Brown, a lawyer and slaveholder, argued that anything “Virginian commends itself to
my approval first and foremost.” Brown admonished those delegates who considered it “a mark
of degradation…[and] opprobrium” to borrow constitutional or political principles “that is
Virginian.”16 Van Winkle, though, disagreed. “We are here with a blank sheet of paper on
which we are to write a constitution,” he declared. He opposed Brown’s motion “to take the old
constitution and patch it here and there.”17 Whether or not these framers would write a new
constitution that mirrored Virginia’s constitutional history represented a central theme of the
convention.
Delegates first tackled the state’s boundaries. The secession ordinance ratified by voters
in October identified those counties included in the new state, but statehood opponents suggested
adding more counties in an effort to foil the movement. On December 3, the Committee on
Boundary reported that in addition to the original thirty-nine counties contained in the October
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ordinance, committee members proposed an additional thirty-two counties.18 Most of these
counties, located in the Shenandoah Valley and southwest, had supported secession and
remained under Confederate control.19 Committee members defended these new boundaries.
Chapman J. Stuart of Doddridge County argued that including these counties shielded unionists
there from the “oppression and tyranny of eastern Virginia.” Such men endured the same
political inequality as northwesterners and deserved protection from a new government. 20
Brown concurred with Stuart. Echoing a previous argument made by Marion County delegate
Ephraim B. Hall, Brown argued that the presence of “one solitary Union man in those counties”
should compel the convention to expand the state’s boundaries. These unionists deserved our
“protection and aid, and we ought to include them and save [them].”21
Other delegates doubted the sincerity of such pronouncements. Ohio County merchant
James W. Paxton predicted that this expanded boundary would “embarrass, retard, and…defeat
this whole new state project.”22 Fellow Ohio County delegate and Methodist minister Gordon
Batelle agreed, characterizing the expanded boundary as “dodge” designed to destroy the
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movement.23 Adding a large number of secessionists worried William G. Brown, who quipped
that these Confederates could elect a secessionist governor in the new state.24 Creating a new
state provided western Virginians’ an opportunity to break away from the “old slave oligarchy”
that ruled the state and declared war against the Union, Cabell County lawyer Granville Parker
declared. The Massachusetts-born lawyer suggested that the convention distance themselves
from the committee’s proposal; if not, “nothing – nothing! – will carry us through” Congress.25
Parker’s argument concerning the proposed state’s affiliation with eastern Virginians
reflected some delegates’ concern about increasing Kanawha’s slave population. Delegates
already doubtful of Congress admitting another slave state predicted that increasing the proposed
state’s slave population would foil statehood. John M. Powell, a minister from Harrison County,
remarked that adding more slaves “would destroy us in Congress.”26 Others dismissed such
concerns. Waitman Willey considered slavery “doomed,” and asserted that “the friends of the
institution have brought the doom upon it by their own conduct.” He predicted that every slave
in the proposed counties would be freed soon through self-emancipation or by the Union army.
Adding a few slaves, he concluded, should not prohibit delegates from considering additional
counties.27
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Following ten days of what one observed called a “long and profitless debate” concerning
the boundary, delegates opposed to the expanded boundaries defeated the committee’s proposal,
28-17.28 Delegates added nine southern counties while permitting seven Shenandoah Valley
counties to vote on admission.29 Solidifying the new state’s boundaries reopened discussion of
the new state’s name. “Kanawha” supporters maintained that creating a new state required a
name unaffiliated with its progenitor, especially one that had offered nothing but “oppression” to
their western brethren, Daniel Lamb of Wheeling maintained.30 “[W]e are…casting off the
fetters,” Peter Van Winkle exclaimed, and retaining any affiliation with “Virginia” required
westerners to “bow the knee to Old Virginia.” Any “soubriquet” like “West,” “New,” or “Little”
would continue to “degrade us in comparison with” easterners.31
But opponents of “Kanawha” stressed that the state’s bitter sectional history should
convince delegates to embrace the moniker of “West.” “Western Virginia has been made dear to
all of us” through years of struggle for “western Virginia rights,” Marshall County lawyer Elbert
H. Caldwell insisted.32 “[W]e have fought this fight under the name of West Virginia,” Waitman
Willey stressed, and adopting “West Virginia” reflected residents’ “love of right and of
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liberty.”33 Chapman Stuart believed that the same “fire and patriotism” that previous western
Virginians exhibited in defending the state and nation was manifest in “the people of
northwestern Virginia.” Retaining the name of “Virginia” honored the Revolutionary spirit that
continued to animate northwesterners.34 Proponents of “West Virginia” carried the day, with a
strong majority pulling in favor over “Kanawha” or “Western Virginia.”35
First and Second Wheeling Convention delegate John J. Davis worried that the
convention’s progress outpaced residents’ desires. A “body of radicals and extremists” seized
control of the convention, Davis lamented, and threatened to “change in toto the character of our
State government.” Such men wanted to “give us a Yankee constitution and laws,” a prospect
that “will defeat the whole movement in West Va.”36 These “Yankee” sentiments were manifest
in debates on the viva voce voting system. Republican Granville Davisson Hall later proclaimed
that this “open” voting system perpetuated the “domination of the slave aristocracy.”37 Some
delegates arrived at similar conclusions and mentioned the May vote on secession for evidence.
Hancock County minister Joseph S. Pomeroy remarked that “if it had not been for the viva voce
plan of voting Virginia would never have voted herself out of the Union.”38 The “present mode
of voting…give[s] an undue power to men of wealth, influence and position – especially party
leaders,” Gordon Battelle asserted.39 Secessionist merchants in Taylor County reportedly filed
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suit against approximately twenty unionists who refused to elect a secessionist delegate to the
Richmond Convention. Such were the “evils resulting from viva voce voting,” mechanic
Harmon Sinsel of Taylor County quipped.40
But proponents argued that open voting displayed a man’s political independence.
“[T]he poor man feels his consequence, self-respect and equality with the highest and richest in
the land,” James Brown of Kanawha stressed. The “viva voce system tends to encourage a
manly independence in the voter, and leads him to prize the privilege of voting more highly.”
Opponents’ attempts to inaugurate a secret ballot threatened to turn these independent men into
“cowards and slaves” who “will not dare to come up to the polls like men and speak aloud their
preferences.” Brown finally appealed to Virginians’ fondness for this oral tradition. Oral voting
“is a Virginia system, long and dearly cherished by our people.”41 Chapman Stuart agreed with
Brown. Stuart failed to “detect any corruption” concerning open voting, but asserted that the
“independent character that seems to be stamped and inherent in the principles of Virginia”
emanated from viva voce.42 Despite claims that viva voce inculcated independence, the
convention voted to implement the secret ballot and, in the words of Morgantown merchant
Henry Dering, maintain the “security” and “purity of the ballot box.”43
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When the constitutional convention adjourned on December 20, delegates had decided
the new state’s name, boundary, and method of election. But the “more difficult question of
slavery is as yet untouched,” Wheeling banker Chester Hubbard observed. Hubbard suggested
that the convention’s reluctance to tackle African American bondage signaled delegates’
realization that the “whole movement for division was premature and can not be accomplished at
present.” Without a resolution on slavery, the new state movement could not proceed. Some
“prefer saying nothing about slavery in the constitution while others are for putting the
declaration in the” document. Proponents of the former, like Willey, argued members should
“say nothing, [and] do nothing” concerning slavery. Members of the latter, including Gordon
Battelle, were “disposed to give the subject an airing.” Hubbard suggested that the convention
should “indicate our future policy on this question” but offer no firm declarations concerning
slavery’s future.44
Some delegates forced the convention to open this discussion on slavery prior to the
December adjournment. On November 30, Boone County minister Robert Hagar introduced two
resolutions concerning the institution. The first resolution identified “Negro slavery…[as] the
origin and foundation of our national troubles, and the cause of the terrible rebellion in our
midst.” Hagar considered the institution “detrimental to the interests of free people.” These
conclusions led him to propose “gradual emancipation” in the second resolution. James Brown
of Kanawha characterized any discussion of slavery as “unwise and impolitic,” and suggested
that the state legislature handle this matter. A majority of delegates shared Brown’s opinion and
tabled Hagar’s resolutions.45 Two weeks later, Gordon Battelle introduced a similar gradual
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emancipation clause but included a prohibition on importing slaves into West Virginia.
Delegates tabled Battelle’s motions, too.46 These gradual emancipation resolutions worried
northwestern delegates. “I am sorry [Battelle] has introduced the subject,” Henry Dering
lamented.47 But after conversing with Peter G. Van Winkle, Dering cheerfully reported that only
“a handfull” supported Battelle’s plan and that delegates “will not have any trouble in keeping
the vexed question out of the Constitution.”48
The march of democratic reform in the convention’s first month encouraged free state
supporters that slavery would soon be expunged, too. Hagar, Battelle, and the Daily
Intelligencer believed that West Virginia’s future mirrored that of its free state neighbors. “[W]e
can never be a Southern State,” the Daily Intelligencer declared. “We may say that we are a
Southern State, and that we ought to have a negro policy, just as many foolish people in Western
Virginia have said for years past,” but such thoughts only “mock, deride, and curse us.”49 But
such thoughts still remained in the minority, despite Campbell’s assertions. Northwestern
delegates had long maintained that democratic reform and slavery were compatible, if not
symbiotic. Moving toward a secret ballot would not inaugurate slavery’s demise or undermine
slaveholders’ power; other southern states operated with the secret ballot and slavery thrived.50
Nor would later actions undertaken by the convention threaten the institution, including
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replacing the county court system with townships or instituting ad valorem taxation or creating a
system of free public schools.51 Northwesterners had long supported these initiatives and
dismissed concerns that democratic reforms would disturb the master-slave relationship. Rather,
these reforms would strengthen white equality and marginalize criticism of slavery and
slaveholders.
That gradual emancipation supporters faced a hostile audience, then, should not be
surprising. Cabell County delegate Granville Parker later remarked that the institution held a
“mysterious and over-powering influence” that became manifest when Battelle introduced his
resolutions.52 The “influence” Parker observed represented slavery’s continued centrality to
political matters, and that delegates’ constituents remained reluctant to abandon African
American bondage even as the Civil War continued. This “influence” also reflected residents’
hatred of abolitionism. As the Clarksburg National Telegraph averred, “fanatical abolitionists”
like Battelle who advocated emancipation “cling to the ebony, woolly-headed god of their
idolatry.” Battelle should labor for the “preservation of the liberties of the twenty millions of
white people who are fighting to retain their free institutions than to be wasting time in
endeavoring to liberate the few thousand slaves of West Virginia.” Further, if Battelle and his ilk
succeeded in foisting emancipation upon West Virginians, what other legislation would they
enact? Would they seek racial equality at the ballot box?53 Unless free state advocates could
ensure the perpetuation of racial hierarchy without slavery, West Virginia’s prospects as a free
state appeared fleeting.
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The constitutional convention reconvened in early January 1862 following a brief recess.
Gordon Battelle introduced similar resolutions on slavery, including a colonization plan and
pushing back gradual emancipation until July 4, 1865. Delegates tabled those resolutions.54
Henry Dering chastised Battelle for “press[ing] this subject upon us,” and feared that further
agitation on slavery “will prove the opening of Pandoras Box.”55 Dering further admonished
Battelle for such resolutions, insisting that these actions would “prove…fatal before the people.”
Battelle and his ilk “will not be able to carry his proposition,” Dering predicted but feared that
this constant agitation would “produce disturbance[s]” in West Virginia and other Union slave
states.56 The Wellsburg Herald agreed with Dering’s conclusion. “The people will not vote for
gradual emancipation or any other interference with the rights of slave owners.” Many delegates
will “snap and snarl” if Battelle continued to persist in his antislavery mission, jeopardizing the
entire movement.57
Battelle persisted despite these fatalistic predictions. On February 12, he introduced a set
of similar resolutions. Battelle supported a prohibition on African Americans entering the state
after the constitution’s ratification and paired this with a more lenient gradual emancipation
clause. West Virginia voters, not constitutional delegates, would either ratify or reject these
resolutions.58 Battelle demanded an open and candid discussion on slavery, quipping that he
“hope[d] that no such gag rule will be instituted here in this Convention.”59 Chapman Stuart
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chided Battelle, declaring that the issue of slavery was “not debatable.” Delegates tabled these
resolutions, too, 24-23.60 The following day, Hancock County minister Joseph Pomeroy
suggested a compromise. West Virginians “do not want free negroes here,” Pomeroy declared,
leading him to recommend the adoption of Battelle’s prohibition on African Americans entering
the state following the constitution’s ratification. By a 48-1 margin, delegates adopted Battelle’s
motion. Following the vote, Marion County delegate Hiram Raymond instructed Battelle to
“never mention slavery here again.”61
The convention adjourned a few days later after formally adopting a new state
constitution. Despite dire warnings from proslavery advocates that “a body of radicals and
antislavery sympathisers” would inaugurate a “Yankee constitution,” the final draft of the
constitution demonstrated that West Virginians “were also Virginians.”62 This Virginia mindset
was manifest in how delegates resolved the issue of slavery. Battelle’s resolution prohibiting the
importation of any African Americans, free or enslaved, amounted to a disappointing defeat for
“free soil” advocates. An anonymous Tyler County resident derisively referred to it as “our proslavery Constitution” and doubted that Congress would approve this constitution.63 The
Wellsburg Herald, though, acknowledged the difficulty in introducing Battelle’s prohibition
measure. A “direct emancipation clause…would have shocked long-existing prejudices of a
majority of the people,” the newspaper reasoned. Aggressive advocates of emancipation “make
a great noise, [but] in numbers they don’t amount to much outside of the Panhandle.” The
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“people,” it concluded, “are not yet ripe for that question.”64 Though some Republicans and free
state supporters hoped that West Virginia’s climate and lack of southern staples would compel
African Americans to move to warmer climates, natural reproduction would likely ensure
slavery’s presence in the new state.65 Many West Virginians “seem to rely with implicit
confidence upon the silent innovations of future years for [slavery’s] elimination from our
midst,” an unnamed resident remarked. “The voice of history is a disappointment to their
cherished hopes.”66 For free state promoters, Battelle’s resolution failed to resolve the slavery
question.
But for some West Virginia politicians and residents, Battelle’s resolution amounted to a
compromise that saved the statehood movement. Henry Dering predicted that had the
convention adopted all three of Battelle’s resolutions, “the whole…Sou[th] Western Delegation
would have left…and have got their whole people to oppose it.” The new constitution “would
have been voted down by the Counties from Harrison [County] to the Kentucky line.”67 Dering
later reported that the convention’s ratification of all three of Battelle’s resolutions would have
“kill[ed] the new state” in the Kanawha River Valley.68 Taylor County farmer William W.
Warder maintained that delegates constructed “a firstrate constitution” and had “settled the niger
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question without any excitement.” He predicted that the compromise “will be received by all
parties with sadisfaction.”69 A Preston County resident believed that the new constitution would
receive the “suffrage of every friend of a New State, whatever may be his proclivities in regard to
the colored race.”70 Chester Hubbard applauded the “compromise” enacted by the convention,
as African Americans would either “flourish or perish as the case may be.”71 The Wellsburg
Herald agreed with Hubbard’s conclusion. The new constitution would “not interfere with the
master’s rights” but simply allowed slavery to either “stand” or “fall.”72
West Virginia Republicans and other free state supporters applauded the “onward spirit
and progressive tendencies” of the new constitution’s democratic reforms but loathed the
convention’s refusal to make the new state a free state.73 A Hancock County writer characterized
the “compromise” on slavery as a “subterfuge” to deceive the public. Virginians had exported,
not imported, slaves for decades and slavery continued to expand; how would this measure
hasten the institution’s extinction in West Virginia?74 In a mass meeting in Upshur County,
residents maintained that the “interests of the white laboring population” opposed the “peculiar
course of legislation” that the “protection of slavery” demands. Those West Virginians who
“love slavery…that they cannot consent to have it ever removed are no friends of a new State,”
gatherers concluded.75
Supporters of a free West Virginia denounced their neighbors’ attempts to brand
Battelle’s resolution as an “abolitionist scheme.” One Monongalia County writer admonished
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constitutional convention delegates who had been “gulled and bamboozled by…advocates and
representatives of the small ‘nigger interest’ in Western Virginia.” These delegates had
“shrunk…at the old cry of ‘abolitionism’ sounded by those who own a part of the little stock of
niggers now in the west.”76 The constitutional convention’s refusal to allow public ratification
on Battelle’s resolutions reminded Brooke County residents of the “Lecompton stratagem” that
proslavery politicians in Kansas inaugurated in the 1850s. West Virginia politicians beholden to
the institution rejected voters’ opinion on slavery because they feared residents’ antislavery
sentiments.77 Republicans lamented that the “old standard slang about ‘abolition’ has been
poured out day by day to serve a personal and partisan purpose.”78 Despite Republicans’
protestations, the “abolitionist” shibboleth still commanded tremendous power and influence
across West Virginia.
On April 3, West Virginia voters approved the new constitution by a wide margin, 18,862
in favor to 514 opposed. In some precincts, residents could also vote on a nonbinding gradual
emancipation clause. As with the new constitution, West Virginians overwhelmingly supported
gradual emancipation, 6,052 to 616.79 The gradual emancipation proposal mirrored that offered
by Battelle, as slaves born after 1870 would be freed upon reaching twenty-eight years for males
and eighteen years of age for females. Slaves would continue to reside in the region well into the
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twentieth-century. Free state supporters believed that this informal election provided “an
unmistakable indication that our people want to make their State a free State.”80 The Wellsburg
Herald declared the informal poll on gradual emancipation “a blow at slavery, and…[it] cripples
the rebellion more than the defeat of an army.”81 Others were less sanguine, however. Peter G.
Van Winkle considered the “grand experiment of taking a vote on emancipation at the late
election…a fizzle” that had frustrated free state supporters.82 John G. Jacob inferred that strong
support for gradual emancipation reflected residents’ desire to control possible emancipation
without congressional interference, not a reflection of West Virginians’ antislaveryism. 83
Historians have generally interpreted the informal poll on the gradual emancipation
clause as revealing West Virginians’ desire to liberate their region from slavery’s deleterious
effects. Granville Davisson Hall proclaimed that the vote demonstrated that West Virginians
“were ready to accept emancipation—eager to do so—as giving their new State its fitting status
at home.”84 Richard Curry declared the vote a “turning point in the history of statehood
politics,” igniting residents’ latent and long-held antislavery sentiment.85 For some West
Virginians, the vote on the gradual emancipation represented their opportunity to destroy the
institution that had instigated the war and torn asunder the Union. These residents also blamed
slaveholders who prized their chattel over white political equality for the constitutional ills that
had plagued the Northwest over the preceding decades. “The wicked rebellion, as well as all the
past and present injustices suffered by Western Virginia,” Upshur County resident William M.
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Shinn declared, “are due to Slavery and the evil principles engendered by it.”86 Residents’ vote
on April 3 confirmed their resolve to hasten slavery’s demise, the source of the political and
economic inequality that had plagued their region for decades. As Preston County merchant
Harrison Hagans maintained, the “masses were sincere” in their vote, believing that a “New State
meant not only loyalty, but prospective deliverance from slavery.”87
For other West Virginians, the informal poll represented their opportunity to take control
of the statehood movement from misguided delegates. Disappointed that delegates during the
constitutional convention had capitulated to slaveholding interests, these residents would use the
ballot box to admonish their representatives and manifest their desires concerning slavery.
Lewis County physician Newton B. Barns reported that the “great masses fully expected the
convention to propose the new state freed of slavery.” Residents reacted with “surprise…and
regret” that the convention included only Battelle’s prohibition measure.88 Residents understood
that their petition to Congress for admission would be stronger if the state sought entry as a free
state, not a slave state, a move that reflected political pragmatism rather than deeply-held
emancipationist sentiments. As a Ritchie County resident argued, the “road by which slave
States have traveled into the Union, has become so slippery with the blood of the brave men of
our nation that it cannot be traveled any more.” The war had made slavery unpalatable and West
Virginia’s admission as a slave state unfeasible. Placing slavery on a path toward gradual
extinction would ensure the state’s admission to the Union.89
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Other West Virginians wanted to control the statehood movement because they feared
congressional interference and abolitionist meddling. As Arthur I. Boreman reported, “many
good men in Wheeling, who generally took no part in politics, were opposed to congress
prescribing the provisions of our constitution on any subject embraced in it.” This fear of
“congressional dictation” received widespread support from John Carlile.90 Carlile and other
conservatives feared that the war and demands for unquestioned patriotism provided a “pretext
for transcending Constitutional limits,” notably private property rights. 91 As the Republican
Wellsburg Herald explained in its defense of the Union army confiscating slaves, the “present
emergency” necessitated such actions to prevent Confederates from exploiting slaves’
“intelligence” and “military aid.”92 Such arguments smacked of congressional tyranny,
according to some conservatives. “Congress has no right to go further and inquire into the
domestic institutions of the state,” the National Telegraph maintained. “The people of the State
themselves must be left free to regulate their own domestic affairs,” the newspaper stressed. The
prospect of “Congressional dictation” took on added urgency as the “negro loving fanatics in
Congress” appeared bent on making West Virginia a free state without “the people determin[ing]
the question for themselves in in their own way.”93
West Virginians’ fear of “Congressional dictation” reflected their hatred for abolitionists.
Abolitionists’ advocacy of racial and political equality threatened the hierarchies that residents
had championed and defended over the preceding decades. Recent actions by the federal
government concerning slavery augmented those fears. In March 1862, Waitman Willey
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denounced the bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia in March 1862, castigating the
legislation as neither “essential, nor even beneficial, in prosecuting the war and restoring the
peace.” Willey further doubted that emancipating slaves would change African American’s
status in the body politic. “You may emancipate the slave, and call him free,” he affirmed, “but
he is still a slave. He can never be anything else in this country.” Abolitionists’ attempts to turn
African American slaves into “freemen…is utterly fallacious,” he insisted.94 Morgantown
merchant Henry Dering agreed with Willey. The “whole series of Nigger bills which are being
introduced into Congress are all wrong, untimely and calculated to do mischief,” he declared,
“and the abolition of slavery in the district…is exceedingly unfortunate.”95 Congress should
“leave [slavery] to Providence and our people to work out,” he concluded.96
Residents’ informal ratification of gradual emancipation also signaled their attempt to
limit the power wielded by West Virginia Republicans, a group that often appeared allied with
northern abolitionists. Chester Hubbard reported that “Republicanism has full sway in the
Panhandle,” and that Republicans “are making every thing bend to the behest of party.”97 The
Wheeling Daily Intelligencer’s stance on gradual emancipation in connection with statehood
“has been jesuitical,” Van Winkle grumbled. Newspaper editor Archibald Campbell and his ilk
opposed the “New State unless the Abolitionists can rule,” what Van Winkle considered a
“humiliating condition.”98 He later prayed that this Republican “clique will be able to lay the
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devil [of emancipation] they have raised.”99 John J. Davis, disgusted with the “Anti-Slavery
parasites” in the state legislature who attempted to foist emancipation on West Virginians, voted
against an antislavery measure.100 He later predicted that the Daily Intelligencer would provide
“Comments” on this negative vote and that the newspaper along with other Republicans would
encourage his constituents to convene “another indignation meeting” against him. By
determining how West Virginians would control and resolve the issue of slavery, Davis and
others believed that they could remove such “parasites” from the body politic before they
infected it with radical ideas.101
Residents’ aspiration for a new state deepened in mid-1862 as Major-General George B.
McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign appeared poised to capture Richmond and end the war before
an independent West Virginia had been secured. Indeed, Governor Francis Pierpont, confident
that the “rebellion” would “shortly [be] put down,” contacted President Lincoln inquiring about
treatment of former Confederates and their political status in the Reorganized Government of
Virginia.102 Other West Virginians shared this same expectation throughout early 1862. “We
are watching and waiting with anxious hearts for the fall of Richmond,” Morgantown attorney J.
Marshall Hagans reported.103 Residents’ anxiousness, though, coexisted with trepidation of
reuniting with Confederates. “Wo be to the West,” Rev. James L. Clark warned, “if we have to
go back under the dominion of Richmond.”104 If Richmond fell and Virginia remained
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undivided, Harrison Hagans of Preston County explained, the “rebel constituency in the East
will…send men to represent them, who will tax the West to pay this rebel war debt, and rule it
with an iron rod.” The “pitiless storm of wrath” that westerners had endured over the preceding
decades would be “made hotter by disappointed ambition in this wicked rebellion.”105 Unable to
create a national “cotton oligarchy,” one Clarksburg newspaper predicted that these embittered
Confederates would establish a similar “aristocratic structure” in Virginia where the “wealthy”
controlled the government and diminished “the influence of the poor man.”106 West Virginians,
faced with possible reunion with secessionist Virginians, prayed that a new state would deliver
them from their former brethren.
On May 6, 1862, Francis Pierpont convened the General Assembly of the Reorganized
Government of Virginia in Wheeling to satisfy constitutional requirements concerning the
establishment of a new state. In his address to the legislature, Pierpont stressed that Virginia’s
“history, geography, and social relation[s]” required dismemberment. Burdensome taxation,
unequal representation, and easterners’ preference of slave labor over westerners’ “free labor”
had generated conflict over the preceding decades. The rebellion’s possible conclusion
threatened to reunite West Virginians with easterners, a prospect many residents loathed. West
Virginians needed a new state.107 One week later, the legislature granted permission.108 On May
29, Senator Waitman Willey presented West Virginia’s petition for admission to the Senate,
recapitulating the events of the previous two years and the difficult position West Virginia
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unionists occupied during the war. The “loyal spirit of the people of northwest Virginia,” he
declared, “revolted” against secession and adhered to the Union. “Public mass meetings” held
across the Northwest announced “our allegiance to the United States” and sought how to “protect
ourselves from the remorseless despotism of the usurpers.”109 Willey, like Pierpont, insisted that
Virginia’s diverse geographic, commercial, and social institutions produced two civilizations
possessing “interests fundamentally different” from the other.110 West Virginia’s marginal and
declining slave population manifested residents’ “free labor” interests while the proposed state’s
climate and geographic proximity demonstrated that “slave labor cannot be profitable there.”
Armed with evidence of slavery’s inevitable extinction in West Virginia, Willey assured
northern Republicans that the Mountain State would be a slave state in name only.111
The Senate Committee on Territories received Willey’s petition and committee chairman
Benjamin Wade of Ohio instructed Virginia Senator John Carlile to compose West Virginia’s
statehood bill. The bill the committee returned on June 23 shocked and disappointed West
Virginians. Carlile, in his effort to adhere to strict constitutionalist grounds and defeat the
statehood measure, altered Willey’s petition. He increased West Virginia by adding fifteen
counties and included a gradual emancipation clause that a new constitutional convention would
have to ratify. The emancipation clause mandated that all slaves born on or after July 4, 1863,
would be free.112 Carlile’s political chicanery appeared to doom the statehood movement. “The
bill carries death to our new state,” Henry Dering lamented. The slave population included in the
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additional fifteen counties would rankle northern Republicans while the entire bill “ignores the
action of our loyall people in West Va.” Many West Virginians now expected Congress to deny
admission. “Our people are in despair and many have now given up all hopes of a new state.”113
Methodist Episcopal minister Moses Tichenell of Marion County implored Willey to remove the
additional counties from the statehood bill. Shenandoah Valley residents possessed “sympathies,
habits, and…interests” identical to those of the “strong niggerdum of the east” and antagonistic
to West Virginians. Though his neighbors “are not Abolitionists in the present acceptation of the
offensive term,” they despised the “rule of southern slave[ry]” and sought freedom from the
“tyranical lash of the proud nabobs of eastern Virginia” at any cost.114 Morgantown resident J.
Marshall Hagans agreed. Though the “vox populi” of West Virginia had not placed their official
“stamp” on a gradual emancipation clause, he believed residents would approve that plan if
Congress granted admission.115
Carlile’s political subterfuge elicited censure from many West Virginians who viewed his
actions as a denial of majoritarian power. In a meeting in Wetzel County, residents labeled
Carlile a “political desperado,” a “disgrace,” and a “w[i]llful deceiver of his constituents.” He
acted as one of Jefferson Davis’ “minions,” truckling to West Virginia Confederates who wished
to join the Confederacy and wage war against the Union.116 Residents in Taylor County agreed,
denouncing their senator for “willfully misrepresent[ing] the loyal people of West Virginia.”
Carlile must resign lest he continue ignoring and misrepresenting voters.117 Though Carlile’s
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mouthpiece, the Clarksburg National Telegraph, declared him a “true and loyal statesman” who
had “been assiduous in his works of loyalty and for the good of West Virginia,” few residents
agreed.118
Senate debate on West Virginia’s admission focused on the issue of slavery. Republican
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, a prominent abolitionist, opposed the gradual emancipation
clause as it “recognize[d] the existence of slavery during the present generation.” One extra day
was “too long for slavery,” he announced. He proposed adding a clause that would free all
slaves on July 4, 1863.119 Willey, though, doubted the efficacy of Sumner’s proposal.
Providence had ordained that West Virginia “must…be free forever,” and his work was already
unfolding in the state. West Virginia’s climate, soil, geographic position, and declining slave
population demonstrated the institution’s fleeting prospects.120 Political complications, however,
would arise with congressional emancipation. Willey acknowledged that a “very considerable
amount of secession sentiment” existed in the proposed state, and that these secessionists would
wield the issue of slavery to “stir up the prejudices of the people” and “defeat” the statehood
movement. Though he preferred senators abstain from interfering with slavery in West Virginia,
Willey recognized that abolitionists and northern Republicans would never consent to another
slave state. Confronted with this dilemma, Willey sought compromise.121
Willey proposed emancipating all slaves born after July 4, 1873, a measure that rankled
antislavery northerners and abolitionists. He then introduced a similar measure written by
Representative William G. Brown of Preston County that would free slaves born after July 4,
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1864 and banned future importation of slaves into the state. With assistance from Kansas
Senator James Henry Lane, Willey amended his proposal to include a more comprehensive
gradual emancipation policy. The “Willey Amendment” would free slaves born after July 4,
1863, while those younger than ten would be liberated upon turning twenty-one; slaves older
than ten but younger than twenty-one would remain enslaved until they reached twenty-five.
The “Willey Amendment” also contained a ban on importing African American slaves into the
state. Senators approved the compromise and West Virginia’s admission by a 23-17 vote.122
When the House of Representatives reconvened in December, former opponents of West
Virginia’s admission emerged as supporters because slavery’s demise in the state appeared
certain. Thaddeus Stevens of Massachusetts endorsed West Virginia’s application, noting that
the added provision “makes [West Virginia] a free State.” Schuyler Colfax of Indiana agreed,
expressing his “peculiar pleasure” that West Virginians “have provided for the ultimate
extinction of slavery.”123 On December 10, representatives passed West Virginia’s statehood
application, 96-55. West Virginia’s statehood bill next required Lincoln’s signature.124
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The bill admitting West Virginia arrived on Lincoln’s desk on December 22. Lincoln felt
conflicted. Issues of slavery, constitutionality, and timing vexed the president, leading him to
solicit arguments from cabinet members concerning the state’s admission.125 On December 31,
1862, President Lincoln concurred with those cabinet members who agreed that West Virginia’s
admission was “expedient” and constitutionally sound. West Virginians’ loyalty to the Union
and their “aid” in fighting the rebellion manifested residents’ unwavering devotion to the federal
government, Lincoln declared. The addition of the “Willey Amendment” ensured that “slave
soil” would become “free,” what Lincoln considered an “irrevocable encroachment upon the
cause of the rebellion.” The president applauded West Virginians’ “secession in favor of the
constitution” and granted their request for statehood.126
West Virginia’s admission into the Union would become official pending ratification of
the “Willey Amendment” by a constitutional convention and by public referendum. But as
Willey acknowledged, secessionists in the proposed state would wield the gradual emancipation
clause against statehood supporters. These secessionists constituted a mixture of Confederate
sympathizers, residents opposed to “congressional dictation,” or opponents to statehood on all
grounds. Secessionists’ planned to defeat the amendment by branding it as an abolitionist
attempt to foist racial equality upon white West Virginians, what John J. Davis characterized as
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“degrading terms” for statehood.127 African Americans, opponents declared, would flood West
Virginia and demand full and equal access to employment opportunities and the ballot box. To
perpetuate and protect racial hierarchy, West Virginians must reject the “Willey Amendment.”
From early 1862 through 1863, pro-statehood West Virginians launched a counteroffensive against their opponents. These proponents campaigned to convince white West
Virginians that ratifying the “Willey Amendment” would strengthen, not threaten, racial
hierarchy. Gradual emancipation would hasten slavery’s decline in the region, accelerating a
demographic “whitening” already unfolding across the region. This erosion of slave labor would
facilitate the expansion of “free labor,” transforming West Virginia into an industrial state like
Ohio and Pennsylvania. Removing slaves from the state would also remove West Virginia
beyond “Jeff. Davis’ kingdom,” an aristocratic nation allegedly bent on disenfranchising poor
white men.128 Access to the ballot box in West Virginia, though, would continue for white men
regardless of wealth while the state’s few African Americans would be disenfranchised. West
Virginians’ abolition of slavery would hasten the war’s conclusion, a stinging rebuke to eastern
Virginians whose zeal to protect their slave property now threatened its existence. West
Virginians, supporters proclaimed, would continue to enjoy the benefits of slavery as
“whiteness” would reign as the principal political ethos.
West Virginians in favor of statehood stressed the benefits of “free soil,” crafting
arguments that touched on contemporary political developments and Virginia’s sectional history.
Upon hearing the news that the House of Representatives approved West Virginia’s admission,
an anonymous writer in the Daily Intelligencer celebrated West Virginia’s policy of “equal
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taxation, [and] equal representation.” These democratic principles “have animated…all true
Western Virginians for many long years.”129 In a meeting in Marshall County, Brooke County
merchant Campbell Tarr, a Wheeling convention delegate, blamed the “slaveholding oligarchy
of Eastern Virginia” for the “whirlpool of destruction” that now engulfed the country. Tarr
expressed little remorse for the “poor Eastern Virginia rebel wretches…suffering all the horrors
of a desolating and destructive war.” This cabal had governed by the maxim “‘rule or ruin’”
over the preceding decades, and without western allies, eastern Virginians faced certain
destruction.130 A Marion County resident reported that his neighbors “are highly gratified with
the cheering prospect of being separated from Eastern Virginia.” For decades, western
Virginians had lived in “Niggerdom,” where all political matters centered on slavery. But West
Virginia’s establishment and slavery’s inevitable demise had overthrown the “king” and
“master” of this tyrannical domain.131 Though secessionists “might prate forever about rights,
and might appeal to all our Virginia-ism, and all our nominal connection with the institutions of
the South,” West Virginia was not a southern state, the Daily Intelligencer asserted. Richmond
legislators’ attempts to make the Northwest “southern” failed because residents shared more in
common with their “free soil” neighbors than eastern Virginians.132
West Virginia’s transformation into a free state mirrored geographical realities,
proponents maintained. As the Daily Intelligencer explained, “natural causes, silently and
uncontrollably at work, were…ridding Western Virginia of slavery,” as the region’s “climate”
and “soil” were hostile to this “foreign institution.” Further, West Virginia’s proximity to Ohio
and Pennsylvania shaped residents’ interpretation of African American bondage. The
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“influence,” “politics,” “industries,” and “sentiments” of West Virginia’s neighbors “were
steadily destroying the hold of slavery” in the region.133 Abolishing slavery promised to expand
industrial development and place the state on a similar economic trajectory as that of Ohio and
Pennsylvania. The “black spots that has given us so much trouble and retarded our growth and
prosperity so greatly” would be removed, Henry Dering predicted.134 Slavery had “paralyzed”
West Virginia’s economic development over the preceding decades, Willey declared, while the
“rapid progress” evinced by Ohio demonstrated the benefits of “free soil” and “free labor.” With
slavery removed, West Virginians would finally unleash the state’s “inexhaustible mineral
resources” that had remained undisturbed for decades.135
The labor force required to transform West Virginia into an industrial state rested on the
state’s “intelligent freemen.” Such “men work for a purpose,” one statehood proponent declared,
as these white laborers sought to secure their “destiny in their own hands.” Unlike slaves whose
masters compelled them to labor, white workers labored because they “have families to rear and
educate, and friends to entertain, and a fortune” to acquire. These “purposes” promoted a
healthy body politic, “free labor” advocates declared, encouraging the development of
independence, comity, and erudition. A slave’s labor, though, solely benefited his master and
sharpened divisive class distinctions.136 The “hardy sons of toil in our mountains” opposed
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placing “free labor…on equality with slave labor,” Willey declared.137 “Vote in the New State,”
he instructed Wheeling laborers, and “[y]ou will have…free labor.”138
The economic prosperity wrought by “free labor” would also protect white men’s
political rights. Confederates sought to establish an aristocratic government and place white
laborers in the same economic stratum that African American slaves occupied, statehood
supporters alleged. In a meeting in Triadelphia, Governor Francis Pierpont declared that
Confederates believe “that the working classes are the mudsills of society” and that “capital
should own labor.” These beliefs revealed Confederates’ true character. “Aristocracy never
could tolerate the idea that the country should belong to those who rightfully cultivate it,” he
proclaimed.139 George Porter, Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates in Wheeling, agreed
with Pierpont. In a gathering in Wheeling, Porter confirmed that Confederates “are not a
democratic people.” They opposed “a government of all the people” and sought to restrict the
“right of suffrage” until only property owners could vote.140 In a mass meeting in Philippi,
residents maintained that Confederates sought to create a government “in which negro slavery
shall be made a fundamental principle of government.” Slaveholding would constitute the “basis
of civil preferment, [and] of elevated social positions and distinctions.” Confederates, to achieve
this goal, would “open and maintain the African slave trade in all its barbarous cruelty and
injustice.” West Virginia’s creation, however, would protect residents from these antidemocratic
Confederates.141
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The “secessionists” that Willey feared often articulated similar arguments offered by
statehood supporters. Carlile’s organ, the National Telegraph, remained staunchly unionist and
opposed to the Confederacy.142 The National Telegraph celebrated West Virginia’s natural
resources,” predicting that the state would become “powerful and…wealthy” in the “not far
distant” future. West Virginia should separate from the “Eastern portion of the State,” the
newspaper continued, as “impassable mountains” and divergent “commercial interest[s]”
demonstrated that the two sections possess “nothing in common.”143 Carlile expressed his
continued hope for a new state, too. He remained steadfast that his actions against the new state
in the Senate “will not delay our separation from Eastern Virginia.”144 The Morgantown
Monitor, edited and published by William P. Willey and George C. Sturgis, expressed their
“general acclamation” and “relief” that residents appeared willing to accept the new state with a
gradual emancipation clause. Though Congress had “intermeddled” with the state’s constitution,
Willey and Sturgis believed that the “people of the counties composing the proposed new State”
would ratify the new constitution.145
Though these “secessionists” expressed varying degrees of opposition, their hatred for
and fear of abolitionists united them. Abolitionists, conservatives maintained, sought to
transform West Virginia into a colony for freed blacks, initiating a demographic “blackening” of
the region” and dismantling the region’s racial hierarchy. Defying congressional emancipation
would hopefully convince northern Republicans and their Northwest allies that residents would
not submit to the “Wheeling Abolition clique.”146 This clique, West Virginia conservatives
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charged, attempted to foist a constitution crafted by northern abolitionists and their allies upon
residents to maintain “themselves in power and carry out their promise to the Abolitionists of
New England to give the New State to them.” The new constitution offered little benefit for
white West Virginians.147 Indeed, a state constitution tinctured by abolitionism threatened all
residents. “No matter where abolition touches,” the National Telegraph maintained, “it palsies,
pollutes and destroys.”148
Conservatives hoped to seize upon residents’ widespread hatred for abolitionism by
blurring distinctions between Republicans, abolitionists, and statehood advocates, a tactic that
centered on the “inevitable nigger question.”149 Gradual emancipation would not “whiten” the
state but “blacken” the mountains, conservatives alleged, as African Americans would flood the
state seeking employment and political and civic equality. Aided by northern abolitionists and
their West Virginia allies, freed blacks would control the state. Skeptical residents needed to
only look at Lincoln’s draconian policies on political opponents and slaveholders for evidence of
abolitionists’ increasing power over the president and the administration’s prosecution of the
war. Abolitionists had transformed a war for the Union into a crusade for racial equality, a
transformation that now targeted West Virginia.
John Carlile emerged as a prominent exponent of such views. Carlile had initially
attempted to defeat the statehood movement in the Senate by enlarging West Virginia’s proposed
boundary, a move that signaled his wariness of the state’s constitutionality. His efforts in 1862
and 1863 centered on his hatred for northern abolitionists, a group he worried would foist racial
equality upon white residents. In a speech in Clarksburg, Carlile “classed all friends of the New
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State Bill in the same category with Wendell Phillips and J.R. Giddings.” The “Secessionists of
this vicinity were greatly pleased with the remarks,” reported Union soldier E.C. Moderwell,
while “many undoubted Union men felt outraged by the same.” Carlile “advised his hearers to
resist Congressional interference or dictation, if needs be with the sword.”150 Carlile carried this
message beyond West Virginia. In Indianapolis, he assailed Republicans for “turning this war
for the Constitution and the Union, into a war for the negro over the prostrate bodies of both the
Constitution and the Union.”151 Republicans insisted that “the existence of the institution of
slavery…is incompatible with the existence of the Union,” a claim Carlile labeled a “slander”
against the nation’s founders and motivated by visions of “power, and place, and treasuries to
plunder.”152 But if Republicans succeeded in abolishing slavery, these freed blacks “would
scatter over the different States, and be brought into competition with the laboring whites.” The
“free labor” that Republicans championed would be a chimera, while all white residents would
feel abolitionism’s denigrating effects. “Your alms-houses, prisons, and poor-houses would soon
inform you, if you had not known it before,” Carlile asserted, “that the Abolitionists’ dream had
been realized.” White men in West Virginia and across the nation had to resist abolitionism.153
Achieving abolitionists’ “dream” of racial equality began with attacking slavery. Carlile
considered the institution a “right established by the Constitution,” and that he “would not
abolish the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.” Loyal southerners should
determine slavery’s fate, he stressed, not northern abolitionists.154 The Wheeling Daily Press
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worried that statehood proponents, including Waitman Willey, exaggerated the institution’s
adverse characteristics in compliance with abolitionists’ wishes. “Willey enlarged considerably
on the evils of slavery,” the newspaper charged, as such accusations threatened “the very
framework of our existing civilization.” Abolishing slavery would only appease northern
abolitionists like “Sumner,” “Lovejoy,” and “Wendell Phillips,” along with Daily Intelligencer
“Editor [Archibald] Campbell and the Custom House clique.”155 At an anti-statehood meeting in
Parkersburg, gatherers worried that abolitionists “claim a great moral victory” with slavery’s
destruction in western Virginia. Any resident who voted for the “Willey Amendment” and
statehood in general sanctioned the “purpose and principles of the Abolition party, whether they
are so in heart or not.” A vote for statehood only strengthened abolitionists, opponents
declared.156
President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation deepened conservatives’ convictions that
abolitionists demanded slavery’s destruction. Lincoln “obey[ed] the behests of the insane
fanatics he has encouraged around him,” the National Telegraph alleged, notably those “most
ultra men of the northern faction.” Unionists in Kentucky, Missouri, and Western Virginia,
confronted by the president’s “contemptuous disregard” for their loyalty, now “must surrender to
the fanatics of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and the Western Reserve.”157 The enlistment of
African Americans incensed conservatives. West Virginia politicians who supported such a
measure “must think [their] constituents [to be] among the most narrow, hidebound and
contracted of men, if they would support an act, so objectionable” that the bill’s “grossness” was
manifest to everyone.158 Arthur Boreman reported that numerous Union soldiers “are opposed to
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the arming and making soldiers of negroes,” and predicted that the policy would “produce
disquietude, desertions, and…serious demoralization.”159 Still, Republicans persisted in arming
African Americans, a policy that would lead to the “extermination of both races in the
slaveholding States.” These same men, claimed the National Telegraph, also endorsed the
“Willey Amendment.”160
The 1862 mid-term elections offered hope to conservatives that “Abolition rule is
drawing to a close” and that the statehood movement would be foiled.161 West Virginia
conservatives interpreted Republicans’ loss of thirty-two seats in the House of Representatives as
a repudiation of Lincoln’s unconstitutional policies, including the suspension of habeas corpus
and authorizing military trials for “all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors…and all
persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal
practice.”162 This blanket condemnation smacked of executive tyranny and abolitionist
meddling, according to conservatives. Lincoln’s “band of demons may be able to construe
anything they like into disloyalty,” the Charleston Guerilla charged.163 These “arbitrary
arrests…were not made for the benefit of the country, but in behalf of the Abolition party,” the
Wheeling Daily Press exclaimed, as the arrests “reduce[d] the opponents of that party to such an
extremity of fear and trepidation that they would offer no political resistance to its universal
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domination.” Governor Pierpont allegedly “hankered” after similar power, “copying upon the
Washington tyrants” to remove “obstacle[s] to his political projects,” including the creation of
West Virginia.164
Pierpont’s quest for unconstitutional executive powers akin to Lincoln’s demonstrated to
conservatives that the statehood movement represented an abolitionist scheme to impose racial
equality. Republicans, allied with abolitionists, promised much with West Virginia’s creation
but their promises rang hollow. “Coming in as the Free Speech, Free Vote, Free Soil and Free
man’s party,” Republicans offered “flimsy fictions about what great things are come to the New
State” the Wheeling Daily Press claimed.165 Republicans’ “sole aim,” “every act,” and “highest
ambition…irrespective of their own race or their government,” the Morgantown Monitor
protested, “is for the negro.” Republicans’ “speeches are for the negro; their votes are for the
negro; [and] their taxes are for the negro.” Despite the “wild and reckless theories” expounded
by “Abolitionists, fanatics, and many leaders of the Republican party,” African Americans
constituted an “inferior race, deficient in judgment, and incapable of self-government.” This
“inferior race” would clamor for political and social equality with West Virginia’s founding;
would residents sanction such actions?166 Triadelphia residents would resist such efforts. “We
look upon the effort to place the African upon an equality with the white man in Western
Virginia as vain and foolish,” residents declared during a mass meeting. Previous attempts of
imposing racial equality had failed, “bring[ing] demoralization and ruin to both” races and had
threatened to “destroy the best interests of our country.” Welcoming “free negroes into Western
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Virginia,” Triadelphia residents further averred, was “unwise and ruinous to the order and good
morals of our society.” These West Virginians promised resistance to abolitionists’ efforts.167
West Virginians’ opposition to the “black toadies” that advocated statehood reflected
their concern that a new state would overturn the region’s established racial hierarchy.168 A
“majority” of residents opposed the “negro-equalizing amendment” known as the “Willey
Amendment,” one conservative newspaper declared, but military and political authorities at the
behest of abolitionists prevented a full and open discussion of the issue.169 West Virginians are
to be “enslaved, and…Africanized” if voters ratified the “Willey Amendment,” the Clarksburg
Patriot warned.170 Wheeling abolitionists “would not pass the New State bill without imposing
the condition that it should be an Abolition State, and a roosting and lurking place for the
negroes.”171 Statehood supporters hoped to transform West Virginia into “a colony for runaway
negroes,” welcoming African Americans with the promise of liberation by the “Willey
Amendment.”172 The National Telegraph suggested renaming the amendment “An act to
Africanize North Western Virginia, and to enslave the white inhabitants thereof,” a more
accurate representation of the amendment’s purpose.173 “Give us a new State, unAbolitionized,” the Wheeling Daily Press demanded, “a new State without the secret machinery
which is to guide its control and direction into Abolition.”174 Protecting West Virginians’ racial
hierarchy demanded that residents oppose this abolitionist attempt to foist gradual emancipation
upon unwilling residents, even if this opposition undermined the statehood movement. As the
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Clarksburg Patriot proclaimed, “every man who is opposed to making Western Virginia a free
negro colony” must reject the new state.175
Statehood proponents, though, maintained that West Virginia’s creation guaranteed and
protected “whiteness,” even without slavery. West Virginia’s admission into the Union ensured
that, regardless of the war’s outcome, Deep South planters would not politically enslave white
residents or consider them “like slaves on the block.”176 The “Willey Amendment” would
compel slaveholders to sell or emancipate their chattel, while the prohibition on importing slaves
would further “whiten” the Mountain State. And with a climate inhospitable for freed blacks or
plantation agriculture, African Americans had little incentive to remain in the state. The
demographic “whitening” that would unfold across West Virginia promised a thorough
“whitening” of the political process, too.
West Virginia’s demographic “whitening” had been unfolding for years, statehood
proponents declared, as census data revealed a decline in the slave population. “The end of
slavery is a foregone conclusion,” the Wellsburg Herald insisted, with the institution’s
“health…beyond the skill of the leech.”177 In the northern panhandle, both slavery and “free
negroes” have been “dead letters,” and John G. Jacob believed that the “entire free black
population can be counted on the fingers.”178 Waitman Willey, a slaveholder, agreed with Jacob.
Willey considered the number of African American slaves in West Virginia “too small to stand
in the way of the public good.” Further, the state’s “geographical situation” meant “that slavery
could never exist here to any great extent, even if it were desirable to have it.” West Virginians’
agricultural and manufacturing interests required free labor, Willey asserted, not slave labor.
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“Why then should we want slavery here?” Faced with a declining slave population, Willey and
other pro-statehood members implored West Virginians to hasten that demographic shift and, in
the process, fully inaugurate free labor.179
Emancipating African American slaves raised the question of freed blacks’ status in the
new state. West Virginians held a “deep and universal prejudice against this class of persons,”
confessed one statehood proponent.180 Statehood opponents wielded this question “with
considerable success,” William P. Willey boasted, as he and his ilk predicted that West
Virginians “will soon be overrun with them.”181 Waitman Willey acknowledged that adversaries
“clamor[ed] about the danger of free-negro-ism,” but he and other advocates believed that
African Americans would not constitute a problem in West Virginia.182 A “very large proportion
of the slaves will be converted into money and started Southward,” the Wellsburg Herald
declared.183 “[O]ur Northern negrophobists” further reasoned that “free negroes will remain
where they were born and continue to work for their masters,” especially those on southern
plantations. The Herald predicted that the Emancipation Proclamation would accelerate the
“current of negro travel…southward,” draining the African American population and whitening
the Upper South.184
But would the few African Americans who remained increase competition in the job
market and depress wages? Statehood opponents maintained that West Virginia’s founding
would trigger a flood of freed blacks, where “every nigger” would push “a white man out of
employment” and Wheeling “Germans…would all be turned out of employment and free
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negroes substitute[d] in their stead.”185 Statehood promoters dismissed this baseless rumor.
African Americans “will seek menial employment as they always and everywhere do,” one
supported declared.186 “The hotel, the barber shop, [and] the steamboat, are the paradise of the
free negroes,” answered another proponent, as blacks would labor as “waiters, porters, barbers or
hostlers” while avoiding any “mechanical employment.” These service occupations reinforced
racial hierarchy, as African Americans would labor in subordinate industries while white
residents occupied more prestigious positions. This unnamed author assured West Virginians
that African Americans “naturally adapt themselves” to those “peculiar services,” calming fears
that freed blacks would challenge that labor hierarchy.187
African Americans’ subordinate position reflected the will of Providence, a universal
truth that statehood supporters endorsed. “How can the negro, whom God has made so inferior
to the white, morally, intellectually and physically, ever be made his equal[?]”188 West
Virginians received confirmation of such beliefs from minstrel shows. These shows, performed
in Wheeling since the early 1850s, offered a popular cultural performance that allowed audience
members to express their racial anxieties and collective fears of African Americans.189 For
example, in March 1863, Sam Sharpley announced that his noted “Ethiopian Iron Clads” would
perform in Wheeling.190 The Wheeling Daily Intelligencer reported that the minstrels’ comedic
performance “makes hosts of friends and admirers,” and that Sharpley “has few if any
superiors.”191 Minstrels’ mockery of African Americans reinforced statehood advocates’
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assertions that the “ignorant African slave” and its “offspring” were unsuited to the labor
required in West Virginia’s economy. White laborers in West Virginia, not African Americans,
would provide the labor needed to unleash the new state’s mineral resources.192
The menial employment African Americans occupied reflected their political status in the
new state, too. “The hackneyed song of negro equality, negro jurors, and the like, is the old
argument of secessionists,” complained a resident in the Daily Intelligencer.193 This “old
argument” was impossible in West Virginia, supporters explained, because the new state “will
have the strongest anti-free negro laws of any loyal State in the Union.” West Virginia would
enforce the “old laws of Virginia,” laws characterized as “severe and restrictive enough to meet
the fears of the most timorous.”194 Article 11, Section 8 of West Virginia’s proposed
constitution stated that the “common law and the laws of the State of Virginia” concerning free
African Americans would remain untouched. These laws included forced removal of freed
blacks older than twenty-one; imprisoning individuals who transported blacks into the state; and
imposing fines on African Americans who refused to leave the state. Corporal punishment
against this last group would also be enforced. Slavery’s shadow would still linger over the
mountains even though the institution would soon no longer officially exist.195
Slavery’s demise not only benefited West Virginia but the entire state, as the institution’s
death in the Mountain State would hasten the war’s conclusion. “This is a Pro-Slavery
Rebellion,” the Fairmont National declared, “fomented by slaveholders, and for Slavery’s sake.”
West Virginia’s admission would assist in slavery’s “overthrow and extinction.”196 Many

192

Daily Intelligencer, January 28, 1863, 1.
Daily Intelligencer, July 31, 1862, 1.
194
Daily Intelligencer, February 10, 1863, 2. Such restrictions may have included barring African Americans from
carrying a gun, testifying against whites in court, and serving on juries or voting.
195
Constitutional Convention of West Virginia, 12 February 1863
[http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/cc021263.html][accessed 31 July 2015].
196
Fairmont National, April 4, 1863, 2.
193

346

statehood advocates endorsed Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation as a similar means of
destroying the Confederacy and ending the war. The Wellsburg Herald believed that the
proclamation would “speedily bring the war to an issue.”197 In a new state mass meeting in Ohio
County, residents “hail[ed] the President’s emancipation proclamation as an efficient means of
destroying the prime cause and backbone of the present malignant and unholy rebellion.”198
Ending the war would also hopefully end the guerilla conflict that had terrorized residents.
Arthur Boreman reported that counties below the northern panhandle were “not safe for a loyal
man” and recommended that loyalists remain within “sight of the Ohio River.”199 Virginia
Representative Jacob B. Blair of Parkersburg instructed Willey to hold “the election [on the new
constitution] as early as possible before warm weather when the guerrillas can infest the
mountains and prevent the people from voting.” With the state’s future assured, such attacks
would hopefully cease.200
The constitutional convention that reconvened in February 1863 enacted few substantive
changes to the constitution ratified by voters the previous year. Compensating loyal slaveholders
emerged as the most divisive issue, with James Brown of Kanawha demanding federal
compensation for loyal slaveholders who immediately emancipated their slaves and James S.
Wheat of Morgan County suggesting that funds derived from sale of Confederate property,
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including slaves, be directed to loyal slaveholders.201 Delegates narrowly defeated Wheat’s
proposal, 28 to 26, while Brown’s proposal suggesting immediate emancipation failed to garner
much support.202 Rather, in a unanimous vote, delegates approved the “Willey Amendment,”
54-0, while agreeing to petition the federal government for two million dollars for loyal
slaveholders.203 West Virginia voters would ratify or reject the new constitution on March 26,
the final obstacle to statehood.
On March 26, West Virginia residents and soldiers voted overwhelmingly to ratify the
new state constitution with the “Willey Amendment,” 28,318 in favor to 572 opposed.204 Upon
receiving the returns, on April 20 President Lincoln issued a proclamation that West Virginians
had satisfied all constitutional obligations and West Virginia would be admitted into the Union
on June 20, 1863.205 The Daily Intelligencer celebrated the “wonderful” results, regarding the
wide margin as a “grand and overwhelming…triumph.”206 West Virginians’ demonstrated that
they “didn’t need a new nigger State” but a “free State,” even though “such men as
Carlile…were for the niggers” and attempted to persuade voters to that perspective, too. 207 The
Daily Intelligencer applauded West Virginians for abolishing slavery through the ballot box, a
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process that other southerners should undertake, too. Residents “did what very few people in
this generation have done,” the Intelligencer declared, for “they abolished slavery by their
votes.” While other southerners “have talked” about abolishing slavery, West Virginians “talked
it and voted it.”208
Historians have echoed the laudatory tone expressed by the Daily Intelligencer.
Granville Davisson Hall believed that the vote demonstrated that West Virginians were “ready to
accept emancipation” and place the state on that “irresistible march” toward slavery’s
abolition.209

Charles Ambler and Festus P. Summers considered West Virginia’s

“admission…a triumph for Abolitionists,” as residents finally inaugurated a gradual
emancipation process to remove slaves from the state.210 Slavery’s demise via the ballot box
appears to validate interpretations offered by Sean Wilentz, William Freehling, William Link,
and Stephanie McCurry. These historians emphasize the fatal struggle between African
American bondage and democracy, characterizing southerners’ attempts to promote equilibrium
between the two institutions as ill-fated and myopic. Previous scholars of West Virginia’s
history echo that interpretation. Mountaineers, cognizant of slavery’s incongruity with “modern”
democratic principles, demanded liberation from eastern oligarchs and their peculiar institution.
The Civil War offered West Virginians the opportunity to emancipate themselves from such
tyranny, a microcosm of the national struggle.211
This interpretation, however, reflects the Republican memory of West Virginia’s
sectional history and the Civil War and overlooks the protracted and often bitter debates
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concerning slavery, emancipation, and statehood. West Virginians’ initial policy on slavery only
prohibited the importation of African American slaves, a resolution that signaled residents’
reluctance to dismantle the institution. Congressional pressure compelled West Virginians to
pursue compromise, but the accord reached by politicians and ratified by voters reflected
residents’ continued endorsement of proslavery beliefs and democratic principles. From a
practical standpoint, slavery would continue to operate in the new state for decades. The “Willey
Amendment” delayed emancipation for thousands of young slaves while older slaves would
remain in bondage until death. African Americans could acquire freedom through selfemancipation or through a generous master but some slaveholders, wary of losing their
investment, could look for prospective buyers in nearby Kentucky or Missouri. African
American bondage in West Virginia would likely continue into the twentieth-century, when a
majority of statehood leaders would have entrusted their descendants to tackle the final stages of
emancipation. Could shifting political and racial norms reignite this emancipation debate? How
would an independent and permanent Confederate nation shape this debate? With no
prospective conclusion to the Civil War by 1863, slavery’s future remained uncertain but few
predicted the institution’s demise in the Union within only a few years. Still, regardless of the
Civil War’s outcome, the “politics of slavery” would figure prominently over the coming
decades, cementing slavery’s centrality to politics.
Slavery’s influence was manifest in the new constitution. While emancipation unfolded
over the proceeding decades, laws imposed on African Americans promoted and perpetuated
racial hierarchy. Corporal punishment remained on the books, authorizing white authorities to
mete out punishment on unrepentant blacks. Freed blacks would perform menial labor,
occupying low-level service positions while white laborers occupied more prestigious and
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lucrative positions. African Americans would not “blacken” West Virginia’s growing industrial
sector. This economic segregation carried over into politics. Statehood leaders’ refusal to
endorse African American political and civil rights or countenance any status for blacks other
than slavery reflected their desire to “whiten” the Mountain State. Disenfranchised and
marginalized freed blacks provided similar visual evidence as enslaved African Americans
before the war: politics remained the purview of white men. West Virginians’ embrace of
democratic reform with a new state exhibited neither a clean break from slavery nor their
Virginia heritage that historians suggest. Rather, the political “whitening” residents sought with
statehood reflected a continuation of antebellum norms concerning race and politics, norms
constructed and refined through residents’ defense of African American bondage and political
equality for white men.
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Conclusion: The Long Shadow: The Politics of Slavery in West Virginia, 1863-1865
In April 1864, a slave auction occurred in Morgantown, an event the Morgantown Weekly
Post reported had “not been witnessed in our town before for many a long day.”1129 The estate
of Alpheus C. Dorsey placed two slaves for sale to “liquidate a debt” of the late master.
Morgantown attorney William A. Hanway purchased African American Stephen Trimble, known
as “‘black Steve’” to locals, for $326. Alpheus’ widow, Eliza, purchased the other slave,
Elizabeth, for $71. The relationship, if any, between the two slaves remains unclear.1130 The
Morgantown Weekly Post noted a “great deal of interest was manifested on the occasion,”
characterizing “sales of this kind” as a “rare occurrence in West Virginia.” One year removed
since statehood, West Virginians continued to exploit slavery’s manifold benefits for white
residents, notably commodifying slaves to settle debts.1131
Statehood failed to remove slavery or the “politics of slavery” from West Virginia. In
many instances, the Mountain State’s creation intensified this southern brand of politics. On
June 20, 1863, the Morgantown Monitor assailed what it characterized as “Abolition Unionism,”
a political stance shared by Republicans and abolitionists and imposed upon white Americans.
Republicans and their abolition allies “would rather the Union should be eternally destroyed than
that it should be restored, with slavery as an institution recognized and protected by” the
Constitution, and believed in “elevating the black race to a level with the white man.” This
“nonsensical fanaticism” opposed what the Monitor believed most West Virginians professed,
specifically that “this Government was made for the WHITE MAN and not for blacks or a mongrel
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race.” On West Virginia’s founding, the Monitor reminded its audience that the nation and the
state remained the purview of white men, not African Americans.1132
Conservatives continued to warn residents about the dangers of freed blacks in the
Mountain State. During his congressional campaign in 1863, Willis De Hass, a self-proclaimed
Democrat and conservative, reminded voters that he was “the White Man’s Candidate.” His
opponent, Jacob B. Blair, “is the Candidate for the NEGRO.” While De Hass supports the
“UNION” and “DEMOCRACY,” Blair advocated “DIS-UNION” and “ABOLITIONISM.”1133 The “friends
of Mr. Lincoln and the African” had protracted the war so “that the institution of slavery…be
wiped out” and “the white people themselves…be swept from the face of the earth,” claimed the
Wheeling Daily Register. The Register supported a change in leadership before abolitionists’
dreams became manifest.1134
Leading up to the 1864 presidential election, conservatives continued to remind West
Virginians that abolitionists and some Republicans sought to undermine racial purity and
hierarchy. The Weekly National Telegraph in Clarksburg assailed “misguided philanthropists”
who “place[d] [African Americans] upon an equality with the white man.” This equality
extended into the political and social spheres. Abolitionists “would not only have [African
Americans] vote in elections, but permit him to testify in courts of justice against a white man,
and occupy the same jury box with him,” empowering freed blacks with “all the privileges and
immunities of the white man.” Though West Virginians and residents of other union slave states
“have their prejudices against anything that savors of negro equality,” abolitionists persisted with
their “infernal radicalism.” The freedom that abolitionists provided African Americans
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constituted the “freedom to commit crime,” including “[d]runkeness, debauchery, riot and
bloodshed.” Emancipation was a “damnable” policy, the Telegraph insisted.1135 Such
accusations assisted Democratic nominee George McClellan’s presidential candidacy. Though
McClellan lost the state, his performance in West Virginia worried Republicans that the “politics
of slavery” would continue to shape elections.1136
As before public ratification of the “Willey Amendment,” Republican and pro-statehood
organs and members attempted to convince West Virginians that their new state and federal
government would continue to protect white interests. The Wellsburg Herald predicted
“little…trouble” with African Americans “because happily, we have few free negroes among us
and nothing to invite their immigration.” Other regions across the nation, notably the South,
would not be as fortunate as West Virginia. Southern states, inundated with a population
“helpless almost as children and ignorant as savages,” could expect “more than the average
amount of crime,” notably “riots and insurrections.” The Herald hoped the federal government
would provide some form of schooling and assistance to educate and elevate African
Americans.1137
These benefits provided to freed blacks, though, paled in comparison to the advantages
offered to white residents now emancipated from slaveholders’ political tyranny, the Fairmont
National insisted. “[W]e imperatively declare that all the good that the black minority will win
from the abolition of slavery is eclipsed by the surpassing good to the white majority.” This war
to abolish slavery would ultimately benefit white residents, while merely providing the “justice”
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that African Americans deserved.1138 The Fairmont National encouraged residents to avoid
“missegenation” with African Americans, a lifestyle it characterized as “social degradation.”
Though such racial mixing occurred between masters and slaves, West Virginians “are opposed
to the mixing of the white with the black races.” Interracial West Virginians undermined the
clear racial divide that residents and the state’s founders envisioned and promised in 1863.1139
One of those founders faced an intense reelection campaign in 1865. Waitman Willey’s
expiring senatorial term encouraged some West Virginians to oppose his reelection because of
his previous stances on slavery. “Mr. Willey has always been the inveterate partizan of slavery,”
the Fairmont National declared. Though Willey blamed slavery for the current rebellion, “he
votes steadfastly and consistently against knocking that prop from under it.”1140 Opponents also
charged him for “being an enemy to the separation of West from East Virginia” and denounced
his apparent “reluctance to save the New State.”1141 Indeed, Morgantown resident and West
Virginia Speaker of the House Leroy Kramer informed Willey that some delegates “are very
radical on the Slavery question” and “expressed fears that…you would be too pro Slavery.”1142
Some West Virginians supported Daily Intelligencer editor Archibald Campbell. His supporters
characterized Campbell as “the inveterate enemy of slavery and all forms of aristocracy,” though
he possessed “good common sense” to reject the sentiments of a “small class of the New
England anti-slavery men.”1143 Morgantown attorney Edward C. Bunker reported that Campbell
was “using every means” to defeat Willey, including claiming “he is entitled to all the credit for
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the admission of W Va.”1144 Willey won reelection despite Campbell’s efforts but the debate
surrounding his candidacy revealed that the “politics of slavery” would not dissipate for some
time.
West Virginia’s founding did little to destabilize the brand of politics that had defined the
rituals and rhythms of political life in the Northwest over the preceding decades. Since the
second two-party’s inception in the 1820s and 1830s, the “politics of slavery” shaped parties’
platforms, candidates’ speeches, and voters’ preferences in the Northwest. Economic,
ethnocultural, and myriad political issues competed with slavery during campaign season, but
each party and candidate had to convince voters that their stance on such issues would not
interfere with the master-slave relationship. Though few slaves and fewer slaveholders resided
in the Northwest, the institution still exerted a tremendous and powerful influence in the region.
Not all Virginians, though, believed that the Northwest followed similar political rules as
other areas more heavily invested in slavery. For decades, eastern Virginians had shaped and
controlled the structures and functions of the state government to further their section’s interests,
notably slavery. Northwesterners’ efforts to reform and democratize the state constitution
encountered stiff resistance from eastern elites and slaveholders who feared democracy’s
deleterious effects on their peculiar institution. These eastern elites doubted slavery’s
compatibility with democratic government. Viewed from Virginia’s eastern shore, western
Virginians’ attempts to democratize the state allegedly reflected mountaineers’ antislaveryism.
During the Constitutional Convention of 1829-1830, Tidewater and Piedmont delegates defeated
numerous attempts to reorganize representation on the “white basis” and to enfranchise all white
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men irrespective of property qualifications, initiatives advocated by western reformers. Slight
alterations in voting prerequisites, however, broadened enfranchisement, though not as far as
reformers’ desired. Western Virginians expressed their disappointment by overwhelmingly
voting against the new constitution’s ratification, while some contemplated a division of the
state.
The frustration and apoplexy expressed by residents in 1830 convinced contemporary and
modern historians that Virginia’s “drift toward dissolution” accelerated when residents ratified
the new constitution. A democratic, free labor west allegedly groaned under the dominion of an
aristocratic, slaveholding east, a microcosm of the national struggle beginning to unfold. A closer
analysis of residents’ reactions following the constitution’s ratification provides another
narrative. Some residents endorsed the new constitution, celebrating the more lenient suffrage
requirements as evidence of democracy’s inevitable, if slow, march in the Old Dominion. Other
residents voiced more practical concerns about annexation or dismemberment. Annexation to
Pennsylvania threatened to strangle the Northwest’s burgeoning industrial sector, as the
competition between Pittsburgh and Wheeling would become more intense. Above all, the
majority of northwesterners opposed dividing Virginia because they identified themselves as
Virginians and refused to countenance any discussion of dismemberment. Only a handful of
western Virginians appeared to advocate separation, a small minority whose power and influence
historians have exaggerated over the preceding years.
Northwesterners deepened their fealty toward the state and slavery during the proceeding
two decades. The two-party system fostered statewide alliances irrespective of sectional
affiliation and encouraged broad participation in local events and campaign even though some
residents remained disenfranchised. The proslavery ideology crafted by Benjamin Watkins

357

Leigh, Thomas Dew, and Abel P. Upshur in the wake of the 1829-1830 Constitutional
Convention and Nat Turner’s Rebellion emphasized the myriad benefits provided to
nonslaveholders by African American bondage. Slavery’s benefits extended beyond the
plantation, these authors declared, as all white men regardless of birthright, socioeconomic
status, occupation, or political affiliation found their political freedom in African American’s
enslavement. This recruitment of northwestern allies proved important as the national crisis
concerning slavery expanded in the 1850s while Virginians set about to reform their constitution
yet again.
The 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention brought slavery and democracy into sharp
relief. Northwestern delegates insisted that their neighbors remained committed to the masterslave relationship and sought only to democratize the state government, not interfere with chattel
slavery. Indeed, democratic reform would quiet the few lone voices opposed to Virginia’s
slaveholding interests. Defections from eastern ranks and support from Henry A. Wise further
emboldened northwesterners who achieved an important victory with the adoption and
ratification of the 1851 Constitution. The constitution represented a blending of proslavery and
democratic thought. Universal male suffrage, greater representation in the state legislature, and
the direct election of public officials opened politics to all white men while statutes concerning
African Americans and the ad valorem taxation policy wedded slavery to the state. This
development became manifest as northwestern residents deepened their engagement in the
“politics of slavery” in subsequent gubernatorial and presidential elections. Indeed, eastern
slaveholders’ fears prior to the convention proved unfound, as northwesterners emerged as vocal
and active allies of slaveholders across the Commonwealth and South.
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This influence was manifest in residents’ reaction to the rise of abolitionism and the
Republican Party. Whigs and Democrats blurred the distinctions between those two groups,
portraying Republicans as abolitionists in disguise or as abolitionists’ political allies. Both
Republicans and abolitionists sought racial equality at the ballot box and in the household,
opponents charged, threatening racial hierarchy and patriarchy. By portraying Republicans and
abolitionists as dangers to these two traditional and established hierarchies, Whigs and
Democrats appealed to practically every white man in the region, regardless of his slaveholding
status. Though Republicans’ professed to protect white residents’ political interests through
“free soil” and “free labor,” few northwesterners believed such remarks. The Republican Party
remained foreign to voters, as most residents retained their traditional political affiliations, even
when the Whig Party collapsed. Politics and slavery remained inseparable during the 1850s.
The secession crisis in 1860-1861 did little to disturb the prevailing political dynamic of
the Northwest. Residents and their representatives demanded slavery’s protection but divided
over the best means to achieve that end. Most northwesterners believed that political
compromises, court decisions, and constitutional principles shielded slaveholders from meddling
Republicans and abolitionists, even with a Republican in the White House. Remaining in the
Union also protected white nonslaveholders from Deep South cotton planters, a class of elites
wary of democratic government. A vocal minority protested unionists’ position. The
Confederate States, not the United States, offered slaveholders the maintaining that the
Confederate States, secessionists insisted. Lincoln’s call for troops intensified this debate, as
delegates adopted the Ordinance of Secession but many northwesterners remained committed to
the Union. Secessionists, however, operated in the Northwest and plagued residents’ attempts of
achieving consensus on statehood.
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Northwesterners’ tortuous route to embracing and achieving statehood and adopting
gradual emancipation reflected their desire to perpetuate established and traditional hierarchies.
Foremost among these was racial supremacy. Residents agreed that “proper” racial hierarchy
should continue but divided whether that could be achieved in a new state. Statehood proponents
pointed to the demographic “whitening” already unfolding across the proposed state as evidence
of residents’ declining support for chattel slavery. This demographic reconfiguration reflected
residents’ increasing acceptance of “free soil” and “free labor” principles and that the proposed
state’s climate and proximity to northern states precluded plantation agriculture. Ratifying the
“Willey Amendment” would accelerate this “whitening,” too, removing African Americans from
the Mountain State while creating a hostile environment for those blacks that remained. West
Virginia’s creation would not challenge racial hierarchy but rather reaffirm it.
Statehood opponents agreed that African Americans’ inferiority remain undisturbed but
questioned whether statehood could achieve that goal. These detractors worried that national
Republicans and their abolitionist allies would foist civil and political equality between whites
and blacks, treating the Mountain State into an interracial experiment. The “Willey
Amendment” appeared poised to “blacken” the mountains by transforming West Virginia into a
safe haven for African Americans. The overwhelming vote in favor of statehood, while
celebrated by contemporary supporters and modern historians, obscures the common ground that
statehood advocates and enemies occupied. Both groups demanded the perpetuation of racial
hierarchy, African Americans’ subordination, and democracy for white men; only the means of
achieving that goal separated them.
West Virginia’s creation upon the basis of racial democracy diminishes the celebratory
and self-affirmative narratives offered by numerous modern historians. William Freehling, Sean
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Wilentz, and Stephanie McCurry, for example, emphasize slavery’s impending destruction as
democratic reforms transformed the slaveholding South’s political landscape. Slavery’s
incongruity with “modern” democratic principles allegedly became unbearable for white
southerners, especially for nonslaveholders in western Virginia. This interpretation, however,
overlooks the strong proslavery element in the region and residents’ refusal to abandon racial
supremacy. Indeed, West Virginians’ desire to maintain racial supremacy tempered enthusiasm
for statehood and threatened to derail the entire project, with some leaders doubting West
Virginia’s creation. West Virginia’s founding in the midst of the Civil War reflected residents’
unwavering belief that racial subordination constituted a fundamental element of democratic
government, a belief that would shape Reconstruction in the Mountain State and the nation.
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